A HISTORY OF WORLD SOCIETIES   FIFTH EDITION

McKAY   HILL   BUCKLER   EBREY

FIFTH EDITION

A HISTORY OF WORLD SOCIETIES

Custom Edition for
Franklin Pierce College

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Listening to the Past

Preface

In this age of a global environment and global warming, of a global economy and global banking, of global migration and rapid global travel, of global sports and global popular culture, the study of world history becomes more urgent. Surely, an appreciation of other, and earlier, societies helps us to understand better our own and to cope more effectively in pluralistic cultures worldwide. The large numbers of Turks living in Germany, of Italians, Hungarians and Slavic peoples living in Australia, of Japanese living in Peru and Argentina, and of Arabs, Mexicans, Chinese, and Filipinos living in the United States—to mention just a few obvious examples—represent diversity on a global scale. The movement of large numbers of peoples from one continent to another goes back thousands of years, at least as far back as the time when Asian peoples migrated across the Bering Strait to North America. Swift air travel and the Internet have accelerated these movements, and they testify to the incredible technological changes the world has experienced in the last half of the twentieth century.

For most peoples, the study of history has traditionally meant the study of their own national, regional, and ethnic pasts. Fully appreciating the great differences among various societies and the complexity of the historical problems surrounding these cultures, we have wondered if the study of local or national history is sufficient for people who will spend most of their lives in the twenty-first century on one small interconnected planet. The authors of this book believe the study of world history in a broad and comparative context is an exciting, important, and highly practical pursuit.

It is our conviction, based on considerable experience in introducing large numbers of students to the broad sweep of civilization, that a book reflecting current trends can excite readers and inspire a renewed interest in history and the human experience. Our strategy has been twofold.

First, we have made social history the core element of our work. We not only incorporate recent research by social historians but also seek to re-create the life of ordinary people in appealing human terms. A strong social element seems especially appropriate in a world history text, for identification with ordinary people of the past allows today's reader to reach an empathetic understanding of different cultures and civilizations. At the same time we have been mindful of the need to give great economic, political, intellectual, and cultural developments the attention they deserve. We want to give individual students and instructors a balanced, integrated perspective so that they can pursue on their own or in the classroom those themes and questions that they find particularly exciting and significant.

Second, we have made every effort to strike an effective global balance. We are acutely aware of the great drama of our times—the passing of the era of Western dominance and the simultaneous rise of Asian and African peoples in world affairs. Increasingly, the whole world interacts, and to understand that interaction and what it means for today's citizens, we must study the whole world's history. Thus we have adopted a comprehensive yet manageable global perspective. We study all geographical areas and the world's main civilizations, conscious of their separate identities and unique contributions. We also stress the links among civilizations, for it is these links that have been transforming multicentered world history into the complex interactive process of different continents, peoples, and cultures that we see today.

CHANGES IN THE FIFTH EDITION

In preparing the fifth edition of this book we have worked hard to keep our book up-to-date and to strengthen our distinctive yet balanced approach.

Organizational Changes and New Author

In order to give greater depth to our world focus, major organizational changes proved essential. The fortunate addition of a distinguished Asian expert, Professor Patricia Buckley Ebrey, to our author team has enabled us not only to expand our coverage of Asian developments but also to concentrate that coverage on those historical problems scholars today consider most current. Thus, Chapter 4 considerably expands the treatment of early China; Chapter 7 contains new material on the Silk Road trade, Tang politics and culture, and the spread of Buddhism from India to China, Japan,

and Korea; Chapter 11 has been largely rewritten, with fresh material on the Mongols, a new discussion on Islam in India and Muslim relations with local religions, and much revised coverage of Heian and Kamakura Japan. Chapter 16 likewise has been extensively rewritten, with new information on the culture of the Indian Ocean, on the impact of global trade on the Chinese and on the Spanish empire. Chapter 22 contains broadened treatment of the commerce of the Ming empire, introduces a new section on Korea, and explores the impact of urbanization and commercialization on Japan. Chapter 27 represents another major reorganization and revision, with new material on the Ottoman Empire under pressure, a more detailed appreciation of internal developments in eighteenth-century Africa before European imperialism, and new analysis of French and British imperialism in Asia. Chapter 32 has expanded the discussion of World War II in the Pacific, including the intensity of the fighting and the deep hostility between Americans and Japanese.

New "Individuals in Society" Feature

In each chapter of the fifth edition we have added a short study of a fascinating man or woman or group of people, which is carefully integrated into the main discussion in the text. This new "Individuals in Society" feature grows out of our long-standing focus on people's lives and the varieties of historical experience, and we believe that readers will empathize with these flesh-and-blood human beings as they themselves seek to define their own identities today. The spotlighting of individuals, both famous and obscure, carries forward the greater attention to cultural and intellectual developments that we used to invigorate our social history in the fourth edition, and it reflects changing interests within the historical profession as well as the development of "micro history."

The men and women we have selected represent a wide range of careers and personalities. Several are well-known historical figures, such as Aspasia, the famous Greek courtesan (Chapter 5); Theodora, the Byzantine empress (Chapter 8); Ibn Battuta, the Muslim world-traveler (Chapter 9); Olaudah Equiano, the black slave, entrepreneur, and navigator (Chapter 20); Rosa Luxemburg, the German socialist (Chapter 29); Vaclav Havel, the Czech poet-statesman (Chapter 33); and Mother Teresa of Calcutta, the Albanian-Indian nun and missionary (Chapter 36). Other individuals and groups, perhaps less well-known, illuminate aspects of their times: Lady Hao, a Chinese noblewoman (Chap-

ter 4); Mukhali, a Mongol army officer (Chapter 11); Zheng He, a Muslim Chinese admiral (Chapter 16); Hürrem, wife of Suleiman the Magnificent (Chapter 21); Martha Ballard, an obscure Maine midwife (Chapter 19); and the Protestant villagers who resisted Nazi evil in Le Chambon in southern France (Chapter 29). Creative artists and intellectuals include the ancient Egyptian scholar-bureaucrat Wen-Amon (Chapter 2); the Chinese poet Tao Qian (Chapter 7); the West African artist from Djenné (Chapter 10); the Jewish philosopher Moses Mendelssohn (Chapter 18); the prolific Japanese artist Hokusai (Chapter 22); and the influential romantic writer Germaine de Staël (Chapter 25).

Expanded Ethnic and Geographic Scope

In this fifth edition we have added significantly more discussion of groups and regions that are often short-changed in the general histories of world civilizations. This expanded scope is, we feel, an important improvement. It reflects the renewed awareness within the profession of the enormous diversity of the world's peoples, and of those peoples' efforts (or lack thereof) to understand others' regional, ethnic, and cultural identities. Examples of this enlarged scope include new material on Muslim attitudes toward blacks (Chapter 9) and on the Mongols and other peoples of Central Asia (Chapter 11); a broadened treatment of Europe's frontier regions—Iberia, Ireland, Scotland, eastern Europe, and the Baltic region (Chapter 12); the peoples of the Indian Ocean—of the Malay archipelago and the Philippines (Chapter 16); and a completely fresh discussion of twentieth-century eastern Europe (Chapters 29 and 33). Our broader treatment of Jewish history has been integrated in the text, with stimulating material on anti-Semitism during the Crusades (Chapter 12), during the Spanish Inquisition (Chapter 15), in tsarist Russia (Chapter 27), Jewish Enlightenment thought in Germany (Chapter 18), and the unfolding of the Holocaust during the Second World War (Chapter 32). Just as the fourth edition developed our treatment of the history of women and gender, so in this fifth edition significant issues of gender are explored with respect to Native American peoples (Chapter 14) and Indian Ocean peoples (Chapter 16). The overall length of the book has been slightly reduced, but an expanded treatment of non-European societies and cultures has been achieved by reducing detailed coverage of Europe in Chapters 5, 6, 8, 12, 13, 17, 19, 24, 26, 31, and 32.

Incorporation of Recent Scholarship

As in all of our previous revisions, we have made a conscientious effort to keep our book up-to-date with new and significant scholarship. Because the authors are committed to a balanced approach that reflects the true value of history, we have continued to incorporate important new findings on political, cultural, and intellectual developments in this edition. Revisions of this nature include a new interpretation of the religions of India, showing the changes from Brahamanic religions to Hinduism in Chapter 3; a new treatment of the character of Alexander the Great and on the Greeks in the western Mediterranean in Chapter 5; significant new research on Cairo as an international trading entrepôt in Chapter 9; new material on Chinese economic progress in the early modern period in Chapter 11; a new subsection on the importance of the Olmecs in Chapter 14; an entirely new discussion in Chapter 20 of women, marriage, and work in the West African kingdoms; the impact of the fall of communism on Europe and the world in Chapter 33; and in Chapter 34 the economic difficulties of Japan in the 1990s, national developments in Bangladesh, Rabin's assassination and Israeli-Palestinian problems—with the goal of bringing Middle Eastern and Asian developments up to the present.

Revised Full-Color Art and Map Program

Finally, the illustrative component of our work has been carefully revised. We have added many new illustrations to our extensive art program, which includes over three hundred color reproductions, letting great art and important events come alive. Illustrations have been selected to support and complement the text, and, wherever possible, illustrations are contemporaneous with the textual material discussed. Considerable research went into many of the captions in order to make them as informative as possible. We have reflected on the observation that "there are more valid facts and details in works of art than there are in history books," and we would modify it to say that art is "a history book." Artwork remains an integral part of our book; the past can speak in pictures as well as in words. The use of full color serves to clarify the maps and graphs and to enrich the textual material. The maps and map captions have been updated to correlate directly to the text, and several new maps have been added, as in Chapters 7, 9, 16, and 28.

DISTINCTIVE FEATURES

In addition to the new "Individuals in Society" study, distinctive features from earlier editions guide the reader in the process of historical understanding. Many of these features also show how historians sift through and evaluate evidence. Our goal is to suggest how historians actually work and think. We want the reader to think critically and to realize that history is neither a list of cut-and-dried facts nor a senseless jumble of conflicting opinions. To help students and instructors realize this goal, we have significantly expanded the discussion of "what is history" in Chapter 1 of this edition.

Revised Primary-Source Feature

In the fourth edition we added a two-page excerpt from a primary source at the end of each chapter. This important feature, entitled "Listening to the Past," extends and illuminates a major historical issue considered in the chapter, and it has been well received by instructors and students. In the new edition we have reviewed our selections and made judicious substitutions. For example, in Chapter 3 we use selections from the *Ramayana*, the great Indian Sanskrit epic, to explore Hinduism; In Chapter 5 the Greeks welcome the Egyptian god Serapis to their pantheon of deities; in Chapter 11 the *Pillow Book of Sei Shonagon* provides an introduction to aspects of Asian sensuality; in Chapter 14 the death of Inca Yupanque offers students information on the complicated rituals related to imperial death; in Chapter 20 the Portuguese Barbosa, through his description of the African Swahili city-states, suggests cross-cultural attitudes in the fifteenth century; in Chapter 21 the weighing of Shah Jahan reveals the fabulous wealth of Mughal India and the state's concern for the poor; in Chapter 27 the daily lives of an ordinary German soldier and of a Viennese woman on the home front during World War I are revealed; and in Chapter 33 the Solidarity activist Adam Michnik defends nonviolent resistance to communism from prison.

Each primary source opens with a problem-setting introduction and closes with "Questions for Analysis" that invite students to evaluate the evidence as historians would. Drawn from a range of writings addressing a variety of social, cultural, political, and intellectual issues, these sources promote active involvement and critical interpretation. Selected for their interest and importance and carefully fitted into their historical context, these sources do indeed allow the student to

"listen to the past" and to observe how history has been shaped by individual men and women, some of them great aristocrats, others ordinary folk.

Improved Chapter Features

Other distinctive features from earlier editions have been reviewed and improved in the fifth edition. To help guide the reader toward historical understanding, we pose specific historical questions at the beginning of each chapter. These questions are then answered in the course of each chapter, and each chapter concludes with a concise summary of its findings. All of the questions and summaries have been re-examined and frequently revised in order to maximize the usefulness of this popular feature.

In addition to posing chapter-opening questions and presenting more problems in historical interpretation, we have quoted extensively from a wide variety of primary sources in the narrative, demonstrating in our use of these quotations how historians evaluate evidence. Thus primary sources are examined as an integral part of the narrative as well as presented in extended form in the "Listening to the Past" chapter feature. We believe that such an extensive program of both integrated and separate primary source excerpts will help readers learn to interpret and think critically.

Each chapter concludes with carefully selected suggestions for further reading. These suggestions are briefly described to help readers know where to turn to continue thinking and learning about the world. Also, chapter bibliographies have been thoroughly revised and updated to keep them current with the vast amount of new work being done in many fields.

Revised Timelines

The timelines appearing in earlier editions have been revised in this edition. Once again we provide a unified timeline in an appendix at the end of the book. Comprehensive and easy to locate, this useful timeline allows students to compare simultaneous political, economic, social, cultural, intellectual, and scientific developments over the centuries.

Flexible Format

World history courses differ widely in chronological structure from one campus to another. To accommodate the various divisions of historical time into intervals that fit a two-quarter, three-quarter, or two-semester period, *A History of World Societies* is published in three versions that embrace the complete work:

- One-volume hardcover edition: *A History of World Societies*
- Two-volume paperback edition: *A History of World Societies,* Volume I, *To 1715* (Chapters 1–17), and Volume II, *Since 1500* (Chapters 16–36)
- Three-volume paperback edition: *A History of World Societies,* Volume A, *From Antiquity to 1500* (Chapters 1–14), Volume B, *From 1100 to 1815* (Chapters 13–23), and Volume C, *From 1775 to the Present* (Chapters 23–36)

Overlapping chapters in two-volume and three-volume editions facilitate matching the appropriate volume with the opening and closing dates of a specific course.

ANCILLARIES

Our learning and teaching ancillaries enhance the usefulness of the textbook:

- *GeoQuest World CD-ROM*
- *@history web site*
- *Study Guide*
- *Instructor's Resource Manual*
- *Test Items*
- *Computerized Test Items*
- *Map Transparencies*

A new CD-ROM, *GeoQuest World,* features thirty interactive maps that illuminate world history events from the days of the Persian Empire to the present. Each map is accompanied by exercises with answers and essay questions. The four different types of interactivity allow students to move at their own pace through each section.

Houghton Mifflin's @history web site provides the finest text-based materials available for students and instructors. For students, this site offers primary sources, text specific self-tests, and gateways to relevant history sites. Additional resources are provided for instructors.

The excellent *Study Guide* has been thoroughly revised by Professor James Schmiechen of Central Michigan University. Professor Schmiechen has been a tower of strength ever since he critiqued our initial prospectus, and he has continued to give us many valuable sug-

gestions as well as his warmly appreciated support. His *Study Guide* contains learning objectives, chapter summaries, chapter outlines, review questions, extensive multiple-choice exercises, self-check lists of important concepts and events, and a variety of study aids and suggestions. The fifth edition also retains the study-review exercises on the interpretation of visual sources and major political ideas as well as suggested issues for discussion and essay, chronology reviews, and sections on studying effectively. To enable both students and instructors to use the *Study Guide* with the greatest possible flexibility, the guide is available in two volumes, with considerable overlapping of chapters. Instructors and students who use only Volumes A and B of the textbook have all the pertinent study materials in a single volume, *Study Guide,* Volume I (Chapters 1–23). Those who use only Volumes B and C of the textbook also have all the necessary materials in one volume, *Study Guide,* Volume II (Chapters 13–36).

The *Instructor's Resource Manual,* prepared by John Reisbord of Vassar College, contains instructional objectives, annotated chapter outlines, suggestions for lectures and discussion, paper and class activity topics, primary-source exercises, map activities, and lists of audio-visual resources. The accompanying *Test Items,* by Professor Charles Crouch of Georgia Southern University, offer identification, multiple-choice, map, and essay questions for a total of approximately two thousand test items. These test items are available to adopters in a computerized version, with editing capabilities.

In addition, a set of full-color *Map Transparencies* of all the maps in the textbook is available on adoption.

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assistance provided by Bryan Ganaway and Camille Monahan and thanks them for it. Finally, he also expresses his deep appreciation to Jo Ann McKay for her sharp-eyed editorial support and unfailing encouragement.

Each of us has benefited from the criticism of his or her coauthors, although each of us assumes responsibility for what he or she has written. John Buckler has written Chapters 1–2 and 5–6; Patricia Buckley Ebrey has contributed Chapters 3, 4, 7, and 11; Bennett Hill has continued the narrative in Chapters 8–10, 12–16, 20–22, and 28; and John McKay has written Chapters 17–19, 23–27, and 29–36. Finally, we continue to welcome the many comments and suggestions that have come from our readers, for they have helped us greatly in this ongoing endeavor.

J. P. M.   B. D. H.   J. B.   P. B. E.

27 Africa and Asia in the Era of Western Industrialization, 1800–1914

Western warehouses and offices in Canton Harbor, nineteenth century (detail). *(Courtesy Peabody Essex Museum, Salem, Massachusetts)*

While industrialization and nationalism were transforming urban life and Western society, Western society itself opened a new era in world history. An ever-growing stream of products, people, and ideas flowed out of Europe at this time. The most spectacular manifestation of this many-sided Western expansion came in the late nineteenth century when the leading European nations established or enlarged their far-flung political empires.

Western industrialization and commercial expansion posed a profound challenge to the many, highly diverse peoples of Africa and Asia. Economic relationships changed, as Europe consolidated its industrial lead and urged Africa and Asia to sell more commodities and raw materials. Political independence and established cultural and religious values also were threatened by Western penetration. It is little wonder, therefore, that African and Asian peoples usually tried to reject the foreigners, first with traditional methods and then increasingly with the modern national movements that would dominate after World War I (see Chapter 30).

Although Western expansion and the interrelated spread of modern nationalism generally laid the foundations for a global society in the current era, the diversity of historical experiences in Africa and Asia between 1800 and 1914 was truly enormous. In Africa the decline of the slave trade opened a promising new era, which was derailed by European conquest and empire building. Within the Muslim world the Ottoman Empire lost its vigor, and Algeria and Egypt were conquered by Europeans. In South Asia Indians developed the first modern nationalist movement in an Asian colony, and only Siam (modern-day Thailand) escaped the imperialist embrace. In East Asia Japan became the first non-Western country to industrialize successfully, whereas conditions in neighboring China deteriorated, opening a period of revolution and upheaval. As these divergent paths suggest, the Western challenge was only one of many forces in Africa and Asia.

- How and why did the West's many-sided, epoch-making expansion occur in the nineteenth century?
- How did the different peoples of Africa and Asia interact with the industrializing West?
- What other factors affected the course of development in different regions and countries?

These are the questions this chapter will examine.

INDUSTRIALIZATION AND THE WORLD ECONOMY

The Industrial Revolution created, first in Great Britain and then in continental Europe and North America, a growing and dynamic economic system. In the course of the nineteenth century that system expanded and transformed economic relations across the face of the earth. Some of this global extension was peaceful and beneficial for all concerned, for the West had products and techniques that the rest of the world desired. If peaceful methods failed, however, Europeans used their superior military power to force non-Western nations to open their doors to Western economic interests. Moreover, Westerners fashioned the global economic system so that the largest share of the ever-increasing gains from trade, technology, and migration flowed to the West and its propertied classes. Thus Western industrialization had profound consequences for the world economy and for Africa and Asia.

The Rise of Global Inequality

The Industrial Revolution in Europe marked a momentous turning point in human history. Indeed, only by placing Europe's economic breakthrough in a global perspective can one truly appreciate its revolutionary implications and consequences.

From such a global perspective, the ultimate significance of the Industrial Revolution was that it allowed those regions of the world that industrialized in the nineteenth century to increase their wealth and power enormously in comparison to those that did not. As a result, a gap between the industrializing regions (mainly Europe and North America) and the nonindustrializing ones (mainly Africa, Asia, and Latin America) opened up and grew steadily throughout the nineteenth century. Moreover, this pattern of uneven global development became institutionalized, or built into the structure of the world economy, and the "lopsided world"—a world of rich lands and poor—evolved.

Historians have long been aware of this gap, but only recently have historical economists begun to chart its long-term evolution with some precision. Their findings are extremely revealing, although they contain a margin of error and other limitations as well. Figure 27.1 summarizes the findings of one such study. It compares the long-term evolution of average income per person in today's "developed" (or industrialized)

FIGURE 27.1 The Growth of Average Income per Person in the Third World, Developed Countries, and Great Britain, 1750–1970   (*Source: P. Bairoch and M. Lévy-Leboyer, eds.,* Disparities in Economic Development Since the Industrial Revolution. *Copyright © 1981 by P. Bairoch and M. Lévy-Leboyer. Reprinted with permission of St. Martin's Press, Inc., and Macmillan Ltd.*)

regions with average income per person in the "Third World" (or developing regions) (see page 1119). To get these individual income figures, researchers estimate a country's gross national product (GNP) at different points in time, convert those estimates to some common currency, and divide by the total population.

Figure 27.1 highlights three main points. First, in 1750 the average standard of living was no higher in Europe as a whole than in the rest of the world. In 1750, Europe as a whole was still a poor agricultural society. By 1970, however, the average person in the wealthiest countries had an income fully twenty-five times as great as the income received by the average person in the poorest Third World countries of Africa and Asia.

Second, it was industrialization that opened the gaps in average wealth and well-being among countries and regions. Great Britain had jumped well above the developed countries' average by 1830. But as the developed countries successfully industrialized in the course of the nineteenth century, Great Britain's lead gradually narrowed, although the gap between the industrializing West and the undeveloped nations continued to grow.

Third, income per person stagnated in the Third World before 1913, in striking contrast to the industrializing regions. Only after 1945, in the era of political independence and decolonization, did the Third World countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America finally make

some real economic progress, beginning the critical process of industrialization.

The rise of these enormous income disparities, which are poignant indicators of disparities in food and clothing, health and education, life expectancy and general material well-being, has generated a great deal of debate. One school of interpretation stresses that the West used science, technology, capitalist organization, and even its critical world-view to create its wealth and greater physical well-being. Another school argues that the West used its political and economic power to steal much of its riches, continuing in the nineteenth (and twentieth) century the rapacious colonialism born of the era of expansion.

These issues are complex, and there are few simple answers. As noted in Chapter 24, the wealth-creating potential of technological improvement and more intensive capitalist organization was indeed great. At the same time, the initial breakthroughs in the late eighteenth century rested, in part, on Great Britain's having already used political force to dominate a substantial part of the world economy. In the nineteenth century other industrializing countries joined with Britain to extend Western dominion over the entire world economy. Unprecedented wealth was indeed created, but the lion's share of that new wealth flowed to the West and its propertied classes and to a tiny non-Western elite of cooperative rulers, landowners, and merchants.

The World Market

Commerce between nations has always been a powerful stimulus to economic development. Never was this more pronounced than in the nineteenth century. World trade grew modestly until about 1840 and then took off. After a slowdown in the last years of the century, another surge lasted until World War I. In 1913 the value of world trade was roughly $38 billion, or about *twenty-five* times what it had been in 1800, even though prices of manufactured goods and raw materials were lower in 1913 than in 1800. In a general way, the enormous increase in international commerce summed up the growth of an interlocking world economy centered in and directed by Europe.

Great Britain played a key role in using trade to tie the world together economically. In 1815 Britain already had a colonial empire, for India, Canada, Australia, and other scattered areas remained British possessions after American independence. The technological breakthroughs of the Industrial Revolution allowed Britain to manufacture cotton textiles, iron, and

Railroad Building in Ceylon (Sri Lanka)   Workers on the Haputale railway pose alongside the temporary bridge foundations that are being replaced by durable stone construction. New tea plantations in the interior now have easy access to ports and foreign markets. Ceylon, a British colony, became a large exporter of tea in the late nineteenth century. *(Foreign and Commonwealth Office Library Photograph Collection)*

other goods more cheaply and to far outstrip domestic demand for such products. Thus British manufacturers sought export markets first in Europe and then around the world.

Take the case of cotton textiles. By 1820 Britain was exporting 50 percent of its production. Europe bought 50 percent of these cotton textile exports, and India, the world's largest producer of cotton textiles in the early eighteenth century, bought 6 percent. When European nations and the United States erected protective tariff barriers and promoted domestic industry, British cotton textile manufacturers aggressively sought and found new foreign markets. By 1850 India was buying 25 percent and Europe only 16 percent of a much larger total of exported British cotton textiles. Of great importance, India could not raise tariffs to protect its ancient cotton textile industry because it was ruled by the British East India Company. Thousands of Indian weavers lost their livelihoods, setting off a tragic process of "de-industrialization" on the Indian subcontinent.

After the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846 (see page 790), Britain became the world's single largest market, and it remained the world's emporium until 1914. Free access to Britain's market stimulated the development of mines and plantations in Africa and Asia.

The growth of trade was facilitated by the conquest of distance. The earliest railroad construction occurred in Europe (including Russia) and in America north of the Rio Grande; other parts of the globe saw the building of rail lines after 1860. By 1920 about a quarter of the world's railroads were in Latin America, Asia, Africa, and Australia. Wherever railroads were built, they drastically reduced transportation costs, opened new economic opportunities, and called forth new skills and attitudes.

Much of the railroad construction undertaken in Africa, Asia, and Latin America connected seaports with inland cities and regions, as opposed to linking and developing cities and regions within a given country. Thus railroads dovetailed admirably with Western economic

interests, facilitating the inflow and sale of Western manufactured goods and the export and development of local raw materials.

The power of steam also revolutionized transportation by sea. Steam power, long used to drive paddle wheelers on rivers, particularly in Russia and North America, finally began to supplant sails on the oceans of the world in the late 1860s. Lighter, stronger, cheaper steel replaced iron, which had replaced wood. Screw propellers superseded paddle wheels, and mighty compound steam engines cut fuel consumption in half. Passenger and freight rates tumbled, and the shipment of low-priced raw materials from one continent to another became feasible.

An account of an actual voyage by a typical tramp freighter highlights nineteenth-century developments in global trade. The ship left England in 1910 carrying rails and general freight to western Australia. From there it carried lumber to Melbourne in southeastern Australia, where it took on harvester combines for Argentina. In Buenos Aires it loaded wheat for Calcutta, and in Calcutta it took on jute for New York. From New York it carried a variety of industrial products to Australia before returning to England with lead, wool, and wheat after a voyage of approximately seventy-two thousand miles to six continents in seventeen months.

The revolution in land and sea transportation helped European settlers open vast new territories and produce agricultural products and raw materials there for sale in Europe. Moreover, the development of refrigerated railway cars and, from the 1880s, refrigerator ships enabled first Argentina and then the United States, Australia, and New Zealand to ship mountains of chilled or frozen beef and mutton to European (mainly British) consumers. From Asia, Africa, and Latin America came not only the traditional tropical products—spices, tea, sugar, coffee—but also new raw materials for industry, such as jute, rubber, cotton, and coconut oil.

Intercontinental trade was enormously facilitated by the Suez and Panama Canals. Of great importance, too, was large and continual investment in modern port facilities, which made loading and unloading cheaper, faster, and more dependable. Finally, transoceanic telegraph cables inaugurated rapid communications among the financial centers of the world. While a British tramp freighter steamed from Calcutta to New York, a broker in London was arranging by telegram for it to carry an American cargo to Australia. World commodity prices were also instantaneously conveyed by the same network of communications.

The growth of trade and the conquest of distance encouraged the expanding European economy to make massive foreign investments, beginning about 1840. By the outbreak of the First World War in 1914, Europeans had invested more than $40 billion abroad. Great Britain, France, and Germany were the principal investing countries, although by 1913 the United States was emerging as a substantial foreign investor. The sums involved were very large. In the decade before 1914, Great Britain was investing 7 percent of its annual national income abroad, or slightly more than it was investing in its entire domestic economy. The great gap between rich and poor within Europe meant that the wealthy and moderately well-to-do could and did send great sums abroad in search of interest and dividends.

Most of the capital exported did not go to European colonies or protectorates in Asia and Africa. About three-quarters of total European investment went to other European countries, the United States and Canada, Australia and New Zealand, and Latin America. Europe found its most profitable opportunities for investment in construction of the railroads, ports, and utilities that were necessary to settle and develop the almost-vacant lands. Much of this investment was peaceful and mutually beneficial for lenders and borrowers. The victims were native American Indians and Australian Aborigines, who were displaced and decimated by the diseases, liquor, and weapons of an aggressively expanding Western society (see Chapter 28).

The Opening of China and Japan

Europe's relatively peaceful development of robust offshoots in sparsely populated North America, Australia, and much of Latin America absorbed huge quantities of goods, investments, and migrants. From a Western point of view, that was the most important aspect of Europe's global thrust. Yet Western economic and cultural expansion was also profoundly significant for old civilizations that had previously been little affected by European trade and industry. With such civilizations Europeans also increased their trade and profit. Moreover, as had been the case ever since Vasco da Gama and Christopher Columbus, the expanding Western society was prepared to use force, if necessary, to attain its desires. This was what happened in China and Japan, two crucial examples of Western intrusion in the middle of the nineteenth century.

Traditional Chinese civilization was self-sufficient. For centuries China had sent more goods and inventions to Europe than it had received, and this was still the case in the eighteenth century. Europeans and the English in particular had developed a taste for Chinese tea, but they had to pay for it with hard silver since

China was supremely uninterested in European wares. Trade with Europe was carefully regulated by the Chinese imperial government—the Qing (or Manchu) Dynasty—which was more interested in isolating and controlling the strange "sea barbarians" than in pursuing commercial exchange. The imperial government refused to establish diplomatic relations with the "inferior" European states, and it required all foreign merchants to live in the southern city of Gwangzhou (Canton) and to buy from and sell to only the local merchant monopoly. Practices considered harmful to Chinese interests, such as the sale of opium and the unauthorized export of silver from China, were strictly forbidden.

For years the little community of foreign merchants in Gwangzhou had to accept the Chinese system. By the 1820s, however, the dominant group, the British, were flexing their muscles. Moreover, in the smoking of opium—that "destructive and ensnaring vice" denounced by patriotic Chinese decrees—they had found something the Chinese really wanted. Grown legally in British-occupied India, opium was smuggled into China by means of fast ships and bribed officials. The more this rich trade developed, the greedier British merchants became. By 1836 the aggressive goal of the British merchants in Gwangzhou was an independent British colony in China and "safe and unrestricted liberty" in trade. Spurred on by economic motives, they pressured the British government to take decisive action and enlisted the support of British manufacturers with visions of vast Chinese markets to be opened.

At the same time, the Qing government decided that the opium trade had to be stamped out. The tide of drug addiction was ruining the people and stripping the empire of its silver, which was going to British merchants to pay for the opium. The government began to prosecute Chinese drug dealers vigorously and in 1839 sent special envoy Lin Tse-hsü to Gwangzhou. Lin Tse-hsü ordered the foreign merchants to obey China's laws, "for our great unified Manchu Empire regards itself as responsible for the habits and morals of its subjects and cannot rest content to see any of them become victims of a deadly poison." The British merchants refused and were expelled, whereupon war soon broke out.

Using troops from India and being in control of the seas, the British occupied several coastal cities and forced China to surrender. In the Treaty of Nanjing (Nanking) in 1842, the imperial government was forced to cede the island of Hong Kong to Britain forever, pay an indemnity of $100 million, and open four large cities to foreign trade with low tariffs.

Thereafter the opium trade flourished, and Hong Kong developed rapidly as an Anglo-Chinese enclave. China continued, however, to refuse to accept foreign diplomats in Beijing (Peking), the imperial capital. Finally, there was a second round of foreign attack between 1856 and 1860, culminating in the occupation

East Meets West   This painting gives a Japanese view of the first audience of the American Consul and his staff with the shogun, Japan's hereditary military governor, in 1859. The Americans appear strange and ill at ease. *(Laurie Platt Winfrey, Inc.)*

FIGURE 27.2 The Increase of European and World Populations, 1750–1980   *(Sources: W. Woodruff,* Impact of Western Man: A Study of Europe's Role in the World Economy. *St. Martin's Press, New York, 1967, p. 103; United Nations,* Statistical Yearbook, *1982, pp. 2–3.)*

of Beijing by seventeen thousand British and French troops and the intentional burning of the emperor's summer palace. Another round of harsh treaties gave European merchants and missionaries greater privileges and protection and forced the Chinese to accept trade and investment on unfavorable terms for several more cities. Thus Europeans used military aggression to blow a hole in the wall of Chinese seclusion and sovereignty, thereby contributing to growing instability and rebellion in China, as we shall see.

China's neighbor Japan had its own highly distinctive civilization and even less use for Westerners. European traders and missionaries first arrived in Japan in the sixteenth century. By 1640 Japan had reacted quite negatively to their presence. The government decided to seal off the country from European influences in order to preserve traditional Japanese culture and society. When American and British whaling ships began to appear off Japanese coasts almost two hundred years later,

the policy of exclusion was still in effect. An order of 1825 commanded Japanese officials to "drive away foreign vessels without second thought."[2]

Japan's unbending isolation seemed hostile and barbaric to the West, particularly to the United States. Americans shared the self-confidence and dynamism of expanding Western society and felt destined to play a great role in the Pacific. To Americans, therefore, it seemed their duty to force the Japanese to share their ports and behave as a "civilized" nation.

After several unsuccessful American attempts to establish commercial relations with Japan, Commodore Matthew Perry steamed into Edo (now Tokyo) Bay in 1853 and demanded diplomatic negotiations with the emperor. Some Japanese warriors urged resistance, but senior officials realized how defenseless their cities were against naval bombardment. Shocked and humiliated, they reluctantly signed a treaty with the United States that opened two ports and permitted trade. Japan was "opened," and it plunged deeper into a grave crisis that would have far-reaching consequences.

THE GREAT MIGRATION

A poignant human drama was interwoven with economic expansion: millions of people pulled up stakes and left their ancestral lands in the course of history's greatest migration. For millions of ordinary people this great movement was the central experience in the saga of Western expansion.

In the early eighteenth century the world's population entered a period of rapid growth, which continued unabated through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, as Figure 27.2 shows. The population of Europe (including Asiatic Russia) more than doubled, from approximately 188 million in 1800 to roughly 432 million in 1900. These figures actually understate Europe's population explosion, for between 1815 and 1932 more than 60 million people left Europe, primarily for the rapidly growing "areas of European settlement"— North and South America, Australia, New Zealand, and Siberia (see Chapter 28). North America (the United States and Canada) alone grew from 6 million to 81 million between 1800 and 1900 because of continual immigration and high fertility rates.

Between 1750 and 1900 the population of Asia followed the same general trend, as scholars now realize. China, by far the world's most populous nation in the middle of the eighteenth century, saw its numbers rise

FIGURE 27.3 Emigration from Europe by Decades, 1851–1940   *(Source: W. Woodruff, ed.,* Impact of Western Man: A Study of Europe's Role in the World Economy. *Copyright © 1967 by W. Woodruff. Reprinted by permission of St. Martin's Press, Inc.)*

steadily and spectacularly well before significant Western intrusion.[3] The Chinese population almost tripled, from about 143 million in 1741 to a little more than 400 million in the 1840s, then grew more slowly in the turbulent late nineteenth century. Since population increased more slowly in Africa and Asia than in Europe, Europeans and people of European origin jumped from about 22 percent of the world's total in 1850 to about 38 percent in 1930, as Figure 27.2 shows.

The growing number of Europeans was a driving force behind emigration and Western expansion. The rapid increase in numbers led to relative overpopulation in area after area. Thus millions of country folk went abroad as well as to nearby cities in search of work and economic opportunity.

European emigration crested in the first decade of the twentieth century, when more than five times as many men and women departed as in the 1850s. As Figure 27.3 shows, different countries had very different patterns of movement. Thus German migration grew irregularly after about 1830, reaching a first peak

in the early 1850s and another in the early 1880s. Thereafter it declined sharply, for Germany's rapid industrialization was providing adequate jobs at home. This pattern contrasted sharply with that of Italy. More and more Italians left the country right up to 1914, reflecting severe problems in Italian villages and relatively slow industrial growth. Migration patterns mirrored social and economic conditions in the various European countries and provinces.

The United States absorbed the largest number of European migrants, but slightly more than half of all migrants went to Asiatic Russia, Canada, Argentina, Brazil, and Australia. The common American assumption that European migration meant migration to the United States is quite inaccurate.

What kind of people left Europe, and what were their reasons for leaving? The European migrant was most often a small peasant landowner or a village craftsman whose traditional way of life was threatened by too little land, estate agriculture, and cheap factory-made goods. Selling out and moving to buy much cheaper

land in the areas of new settlement became a common response. Thus the European migrant was generally an energetic small farmer or skilled artisan trying hard to stay ahead of poverty, not a desperately impoverished landless peasant or urban proletarian. Determined to maintain or improve their status, migrants were a great asset to the countries that received them. This was doubly so because the vast majority were young and very often unmarried. They came in the prime of life and were ready to work hard in their new lands, at least for a time. Many Europeans were truly migrants as opposed to immigrants—that is, they returned home after some time abroad. One in two migrants to Argentina and probably one in three to the United States eventually returned to their native land.

The likelihood of repatriation varied greatly by nationality. People who migrated from the Balkans, for instance, were far more likely to return to their countries than were people from Ireland and eastern European Jews. Once again, the possibility of buying land in the old country was of central importance. In Ireland (as well as in England and Scotland) land was tightly held by large, often absentee landowners, and little land was available for purchase. In Russia most land was held by non-Jews. Russia's 5 million Jews were confined to the market towns and small cities of the so-called Pale of Settlement, where they worked as artisans and petty traders.

In contrast, most Italian migrants were small landowning peasants whose standard of living was falling because of rural overpopulation and agricultural depression. Migration provided them with an escape valve and possible income to buy more land. Many Italians had no intention of settling abroad permanently. Some called themselves "swallows." After harvesting their own wheat and flax in Italy, they "flew" to Argentina to harvest wheat between December and April. Returning to Italy for the spring planting, they repeated this exhausting process. This was a very hard life, but a frugal worker could save from $250 to $300 in the course of a season.

Ties of family and friendship played a crucial role in the movement of peoples. Many people from a given province or village settled together in rural enclaves or tightly knit urban neighborhoods thousands of miles away. Very often a strong individual—a businessman, a religious leader—would blaze the way and others would follow, forming a "migration chain."

Many young European men and women were spurred to leave by a spirit of revolt and independence. In Sweden and in Norway, in Jewish Russia and in Italy, these young people felt frustrated by the small privileged classes that often controlled both church and government and resisted demands for change and greater opportunity. Many a young Norwegian seconded the passionate cry of Norway's national poet, Bjørnstjerne Bjørnson (1832–1910): "Forth will I! Forth! I will be crushed and consumed if I stay."[4] Thus migration was also a radical way to "get out from under." Migration slowed when the people won basic political and social reforms, such as the right to vote and social security.

A substantial number of Asians—especially Chinese, Japanese, Indians, and Filipinos—also responded to population pressure and rural hardship with temporary or permanent migration. At least 3 million Asians (as opposed to more than 60 million Europeans) moved abroad before 1920. Most went as indentured laborers to work under incredibly difficult conditions on the plantations or in the gold mines of Latin America, southern Asia, Africa, California, Hawaii, and Australia.

White estate owners very often used Asians to replace or supplement blacks after the suppression of the slave trade. In the 1840s, for example, there was a strong demand for field hands in Cuba, and the Spanish government actively recruited Chinese laborers. They came under eight-year contracts, were paid about 25 cents a day, and were fed potatoes and salted beef. Between 1853 and 1873 more than 130,000 Chinese laborers went to Cuba. The majority spent their lives as virtual slaves. Such migration was stopped in 1873. More than 100,000 workers from China also went to labor for the great landlords of Peru in the nineteenth century. There were similar movements of Asians elsewhere.

Such migration from Asia would undoubtedly have grown to much greater proportions if planters and mine owners in search of cheap labor had had their way. But usually they did not. Asians fled the plantations and gold mines as soon as possible, seeking greater opportunities in trade and towns. There they came into conflict with white settlers in areas of European settlement. These settlers demanded a halt to Asian migration. One Australian brutally summed up the typical view: "The Chinaman knows nothing about Caucasian civilization. . . . It would be less objectionable to drive a flock of sheep to the poll than to allow Chinamen to vote."[5] By the 1880s Americans and Australians were building "great white walls"—discriminatory laws designed to keep Asians out.

A critical factor in the migrations before 1914 was, therefore, the general policy of "whites only" in the open lands of permanent settlement. Europeans and people of European ancestry reaped the main benefits

Chinese Laborers Arriving in South Africa   In the early twentieth century many black Africans refused to work in the harsh conditions that prevailed in South Africa's rapidly expanding gold mines. Thus capitalists turned to Chinese migrants on strict three-year contracts for additional labor power. The Chinese were limited to unskilled jobs and could not settle or own property in South Africa. *(Courtesy, Dr. Oscar Norwich)*

of the great migration. By 1913 people in Australia, Canada, and the United States all had higher average incomes than people in Great Britain, still Europe's wealthiest nation. This, too, was part of Western dominance in the increasingly lopsided world.

Within Asia and Africa the situation was different. Migrants from south China frequently settled in Dutch, British, and French colonies of Southeast Asia, where they established themselves as peddlers and small shopkeepers. These "overseas Chinese" gradually emerged as a new class of entrepreneurs and officeworkers, who mediated between the ruling European elite and the mass of indigenous peoples. Traders from India and modern-day Lebanon performed the same function in much of sub-Saharan Africa after the European seizure in the late nineteenth century. Thus in some parts of Asia and Africa the business class was both Asian and foreign, protected and tolerated by Western imperialists who found them useful.

⊕ Western Imperialism, 1880–1914

Western expansion into Asia and Africa reached its apex between about 1880 and 1914. In those years the lead-

ing European nations continued to send streams of money and manufactured goods to both continents, and they also rushed to create or enlarge vast *political* empires abroad. This frantic political empire building contrasted sharply with the economic penetration of non-Western territories between 1816 and 1880, which, albeit by naked military force, had left a China or a Japan "opened" but politically independent. By contrast, the empires of the late nineteenth century recalled the old European colonial empires of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and led contemporaries to speak of the "new imperialism."

The most spectacular manifestation of the new imperialism was the seizure of Africa, which broke sharply with previous patterns and fascinated contemporary Europeans and Americans. As late as 1878 European nations controlled less than 10 percent of the African continent, and their possessions were hardly increasing. In addition to French conquests in Algeria and Dutch and British settlers in southern Africa, European trading posts and forts dating back to the Age of Discovery and the slave trade dotted the coast of West Africa. The Portuguese proudly but ineffectively held their old possessions in Angola and Mozambique. Elsewhere over the great mass of the continent, Europeans did not rule

Between 1880 and 1900 the situation changed drastically, and by 1900 nearly the whole African continent had been carved up and placed under European rule. In the years before 1914 the European powers tightened their control and established colonial governments to rule their gigantic empires (see Map 27.1).

Although the sudden division of Africa was more spectacular, Europeans also extended their political control in Asia. The British expanded from their base in India, and in the 1880s the French took Indochina (modern Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos). India and China also experienced a profound imperialist impact (see Map 27.2).

Causes of the New Imperialism

Many factors contributed to the West's late-nineteenth-century rush for territory and empire, and it is little wonder that controversies have raged over interpretation of the new imperialism. But despite complexity and controversy, basic causes are clearly identifiable.

Economic motives played an important role in the extension of political empires, especially the British Empire. By the late 1870s France, Germany, and the United States were industrializing rapidly behind rising tariff barriers. Great Britain was losing its early lead and facing increasingly tough competition in foreign markets. In this new economic situation Britain came to value more highly its old possessions, especially its vast colony in India, which it had exploited most profitably for more than a century. When European continental powers began to grab any and all unclaimed territory in the 1880s, the British followed suit immediately. They feared that France and Germany would seal off their empires with high tariffs and restrictions and that future economic opportunities would be lost forever.

Actually, the overall economic gains of the new imperialism proved quite limited before 1914. The new colonies were simply too poor to buy much, and they offered few immediately profitable investments. Nonetheless, even the poorest, most barren desert was jealously prized, and no territory was ever abandoned. Colonies became important for political and diplomatic reasons. Each leading European country saw colonies as crucial to national security, military power, and international prestige. For instance, safeguarding the Suez Canal played a key role in the British occupation of Egypt, and protecting Egypt in turn led to the bloody conquest of the Sudan, as we shall see. National security was a major factor in the U.S. decision to establish firm control over the Panama Canal Zone in 1903. Far-flung possessions guaranteed ever-growing navies the safe havens and the dependable coaling stations they needed in time of crisis or war.

Many people convinced themselves that colonies were essential to great nations. "There has never been a great power without great colonies," wrote one French publicist in 1877. "Every virile people has established colonial power," echoed the famous nationalist historian of Germany, Heinrich von Treitschke. "All great nations in the fullness of their strength have desired to set their mark upon barbarian lands and those who fail to participate in this great rivalry will play a pitiable role in time to come."[6]

Treitschke's harsh statement reflects not only the increasing aggressiveness of European nationalism after Bismarck's wars of German unification but also Social Darwinian theories of brutal competition among races. Thus European nations, which were seen as racially distinct parts of the dominant white race, had to seize colonies to show they were strong and virile. Moreover, the conquest of inferior peoples was just. "The path of progress is strewn with the wreck . . . of inferior races," wrote one professor in 1900. "Yet these dead peoples are, in very truth, the stepping stones on which mankind has risen to the higher intellectual and deeper emotional life of today."[7] Social Darwinism and harsh racial doctrines fostered imperialist expansion.

So did the industrial world's unprecedented technological and military superiority. Three aspects were crucial. First, the rapidly firing machine gun was an ultimate weapon in many an unequal battle. Second, newly discovered quinine proved effective in controlling attacks of malaria, which had previously decimated whites in the tropics whenever they left breezy coastal enclaves and dared to venture into mosquito-infested interiors. Third, the combination of the steamship and the international telegraph permitted Western powers to quickly concentrate their firepower in a given area when it was needed. Never before—and never again after 1914—would the technological gap between the West and non-Western regions of the world be so great.

Social tensions and domestic political conflicts also contributed mightily to overseas expansion, according to a prominent interpretation of recent years. In Germany, in Russia, and in other countries to a lesser extent, conservative political leaders were charged with manipulating colonial issues in order to divert popular attention from the class struggle at home and to create a false sense of national unity. Therefore, imperial propagandists relentlessly stressed that colonies benefited workers as well as capitalists, providing jobs and cheap raw materials that

1800–1913	World trade increases twenty-five-fold
1816–1880	European economic penetration of non-Western countries
1835	Great Trek: Boers proclaim independence from Great Britain in the South African hinterland
1840s	European capitalists begin large-scale foreign investment
1842	Treaty of Nanjing: Qing government of China cedes Hong Kong to Great Britain
1846	Repeal of Corn Laws: Great Britain declares its strong support of free trade
1848	British defeat of last independent native state in India
1853	Perry's arrival in Tokyo: Japan opened to European and American influence
1857–1858	Great Rebellion in India
1858–1863	Antiforeign reaction in Japan
1867	Meiji Restoration in Japan: adoption of Western reforms
1869	Completion of Suez Canal
1871	Abolition of feudal domains in Japan
1876	Ismail, khedive of Egypt, appoints British and French commissioners to oversee government finances
1880	Establishment of French protectorate on the northern bank of the Congo
1880–1900	European powers intensify their "scramble for Africa"
1882	British occupation of Egypt
1884–1885	International conference on Africa in Berlin: European powers require "effective occupation"; Germany acquires protectorates in Togo, Cameroons, Southwest Africa, and East Africa; Belgium acquires the Congo free state
1885	Formation of the Indian National Congress
1890	Establishment of an authoritarian constitution in Japan
1893	France completes its acquisition of Indochina
1894–1895	Sino-Japanese War: Japan acquires Formosa
1898	Battle of Omdurman: under Kitchener, British forces reconquer the Sudan Spanish-American War: United States acquires the Philippines "Hundred Days of Reform" in China
1899–1902	Boer War: British defeat Dutch settlers in South Africa
1900	Boxer Rebellion in China
1903	American occupation of the Panama Canal Zone
1904–1905	Russo-Japanese War: Japan wins protectorate over Port Arthur in China
1910	Japanese annexation of Korea
1912	Fall of Qing Dynasty in China

raised workers' standard of living. Government leaders and their allies in the tabloid press successfully encouraged the masses to savor foreign triumphs and glory in the supposed increase in national prestige.

Finally, certain special-interest groups in each country were powerful agents of expansion. Shipping companies wanted lucrative subsidies. White settlers on dangerous, turbulent frontiers constantly demanded more land and greater protection. Missionaries and humanitarians wanted to spread religion and stop the slave trade. Explorers and adventurers sought knowledge and excitement. Military men and colonial officials foresaw rapid advancement and high-paid positions in growing empires. The actions of such groups and the determined individuals who led them thrust the course of empire forward.

Western society did not rest the case for empire solely on naked conquest and a Darwinian racial struggle or on power politics and the need for naval bases on every ocean. Imperialists developed additional arguments to satisfy their consciences and answer their critics. A favorite idea was that Europeans and Americans could and should "civilize" supposedly primitive, non-Western peoples. According to this view, Africans and Asians would receive the benefits of modern economies, cities, advanced medicine, and higher standards of living and eventually might be ready for self-government and Western democracy.

Another argument was that imperial government protected natives from tribal warfare as well as from cruder forms of exploitation by white settlers and business people. Thus the French spoke of their sacred "civilizing mission." Rudyard Kipling (1865–1936), who wrote masterfully of Anglo-Indian life and was perhaps the most influential British writer of the 1890s, exhorted Europeans to unselfish service in distant lands:

Take up the White Man's Burden—
Send forth the best ye breed—
Go bind your sons to exile
To serve your captives' need,
To wait in heavy harness,
On fluttered folk and wild—
Your new-caught, sullen peoples
Half-devil and half-child.[8]

Another rationalization for the new imperialism was that peace and stability under European control would

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A Missionary School   A Swahili schoolboy leads his classmates in a reading lesson in Dar es Salaam in German East Africa before 1914, as portraits of Emperor William II and his wife look down on the classroom. Europeans argued that they were spreading the benefits of a superior civilization with schools like this one, which is unusually solid because of its strategic location in the capital city. (*Ullstein Bilderdienst*)

permit the spread of Christianity. In Africa Catholic and Protestant missionaries competed with Islam south of the Sahara, seeking converts and building schools to spread the Gospel. Many Africans' first real contact with Europeans and Americans was in mission schools. Some peoples, such as the Ibo in Nigeria, became highly Christianized.

Such occasional successes in black Africa contrasted with the general failure of missionary efforts in India, China, and the Islamic world. There Christians often preached in vain to peoples with ancient, complex religious beliefs. Yet the number of Christian believers around the world did increase substantially in the nineteenth century, and missionary groups kept trying. Unfortunately, "many missionaries had drunk at the well of European racism," and this probably prevented them from converting people in larger numbers.

Western Critics of Imperialism

The expansion of empire aroused sharp, even bitter, Western critics. A forceful attack was delivered in 1902, after the unpopular Boer War, by radical English economist J. A. Hobson (1858–1940) in his *Imperialism,* a work that influenced Lenin and others. Hobson contended that the rush to acquire colonies was due to the economic needs of unregulated capitalism, particularly the need of the rich to find outlets for their surplus capital. Yet, Hobson argued, imperial possessions did not pay off economically for the home country as a whole. Only unscrupulous special-interest groups profited from them, at the expense of both the European taxpayer and the natives. Moreover, Hobson argued, the quest for empire diverted popular attention away from domestic reform and the need to reduce the great gap between rich and poor. These and similar arguments were not very persuasive, however. Most people then (and now) were sold on the idea that imperialism was economically profitable for the homeland, and a broad and genuine enthusiasm for empire developed among the masses.

Hobson and many Western critics struck home, however, with their moral condemnation of whites imperiously ruling nonwhites. They rebelled against crude Social Darwinian thought. "O Evolution, what crimes are committed in thy name!" cried one foe. Another sardonically coined a new beatitude: "Blessed are the strong, for they shall prey on the weak."[10] Kipling and his kind were lampooned as racist bullies whose rule rested on brutality, racial contempt, and the Maxim machine gun. Polish-born novelist Joseph Conrad (1857–

1924), in *Heart of Darkness,* castigated the "pure selfishness" of Europeans in "civilizing" Africa. The main character in the novel, once a liberal scholar, turns into a savage brute.

Critics charged Europeans with applying a degrading double standard and failing to live up to their own noble ideals. At home Europeans had won or were winning representative government, individual liberties, and a certain equality of opportunity. In their empires Europeans imposed military dictatorships on Africans and Asians; forced them to work involuntarily, almost like slaves; and discriminated against them shamelessly. Only by renouncing imperialism, critics insisted, and giving captive peoples the freedoms idealized in Western society would Europeans be worthy of their traditions. Europeans who denounced the imperialist tide provided colonial peoples with a Western ideology of liberation.

African and Asian Resistance

To peoples in Africa and Asia, Western expansion represented a disruptive, many-sided assault. Everywhere it threatened traditional ruling classes, economies, and ways of life. Christian missionaries and European secular ideologies challenged established beliefs and values. African and Asian societies experienced a crisis of identity and a general pattern of reassertion, although the details of each people's story varied substantially.

Often the initial response of African and Asian rulers was to try driving the unwelcome foreigners away, as in China and Japan. Violent antiforeign reactions exploded elsewhere again and again, but the superior military technology of the industrialized West almost invariably prevailed. Beaten in battle, many Africans and Asians concentrated on preserving their cultural traditions at all costs. Others found themselves forced to reconsider their initial hostility. Some concluded that the West was indeed superior in some ways and that it was therefore necessary to reform their societies and copy European achievements. Thus it is possible to think of responses to the Western impact as a spectrum, with "traditionalists" at one end, "westernizers" or "modernizers" at the other, and many shades of opinion in between. The struggles among these groups were often intense. With time, however, the modernizers tended to gain the upper hand.

When resistance to European domination was thoroughly shattered by superior force, the great majority of Asians and Africans accepted imperial rule. Political participation in non-Western lands was historically limited

to small elites, and the masses were used to doing what their rulers told them. In these circumstances Europeans, clothed in power and convinced of their righteousness, governed effectively. They received considerable support from both traditionalists (local chiefs, landowners, religious leaders) and modernizers (Western-educated professional classes and civil servants).

Nevertheless, imperial rule was in many ways an imposing edifice built on sand. Support for European rule among the conforming and accepting millions was shallow and weak. Thus the conforming masses followed with greater or lesser enthusiasm a few determined personalities who came to oppose the Europeans. Such leaders always arose, both when Europeans ruled directly and when they manipulated native governments, for at least two basic reasons.

First, the nonconformists—the eventual anti-imperialist leaders—developed a burning desire for human dignity. They came to feel that such dignity was incompatible with foreign rule, with its smirks and smiles, its paternalism and condescension. Second, potential leaders found in the Western world the ideologies and justification for their protest. Thus they discovered liberalism, with its credo of civil liberty and political self-determination. They echoed the demands of anti-imperialists in Europe and America that the West live up to its own ideals.

More important, they found themselves attracted to the Western ideology of nationalism, which asserted that every people—or at least every European people—had the right to control its own destiny. After 1917 anti-imperialist revolt would find another weapon in Lenin's version of Marxian socialism. Thus the anti-imperialist search for dignity and equality eventually drew strength from Western culture.

THE ISLAMIC WORLD UNDER PRESSURE

Stretching from West Africa across West Asia all the way to the East Indies and the southern Philippines, Islamic civilization competed successfully and continuously with western Europe for more than a thousand years. But European industrialization drastically altered the long-standing balance of power, and Western expansion eventually posed a serious challenge to Muslims everywhere. In the words of Albert Hourani, a leading historian, "Muslim states and societies could no longer live in a stable and self-sufficient system of inherited culture; their need was now to generate the strength to survive in a world dominated by others."[11] Ruling elites both in

the Ottoman Empire and in Egypt, a largely independent Ottoman province, led the way in trying to generate such strength. But only in the twentieth century did they escape Western political domination.

The Decline of the Ottoman Empire

Although the Ottoman Empire began to decline slowly after reaching its high point of development under Suleiman the Magnificent in the sixteenth century (see pages 647–659), the relationship between the Ottomans and the Europeans in about 1750 was still one of roughly equal strength. However, in the later eighteenth century this situation began to change quickly and radically. The Ottomans fell behind western Europe in science, industrial skill, and military technology, thereby opening up a gap that would increase throughout the nineteenth century. At the same time, absolutist Russia and its powerful westernized army pushed southward between 1768 and 1774, overrunning and occupying Ottoman provinces on the Danube River and inflicting a decisive defeat on the sultan's once mighty forces. Ottoman weakness was clear, and the danger that the Great Powers of Europe would gradually conquer the Ottoman Empire and divide up its vast territories was real.

Caught up in the Napoleonic wars and losing more territory to Russia, the Ottomans were forced in 1816 to grant Serbia local autonomy. In 1821 the Greeks revolted against Ottoman rule, and in 1830 they won their national independence. Facing uprisings by their Christian subjects in Europe, the Ottomans also failed to defend their Islamic provinces in North Africa. In 1830 French armies began their long and bloody conquest of the Arabic-speaking province of Algeria. By 1860, 200,000 French, Italian, and Spanish colonists had settled among the Muslim majority, which had been reduced to about 2.5 million by the war against the French and related famines and epidemics. The European immigrants wanted Algeria to become entirely French. They even argued that there was "no longer an Arab people," but only men and women "who talk a different language than ours."[12] French efforts to strip Algerians of their culture and identity were brutal and persistent, eventually resulting in one of Africa's most bitter anticolonial struggles after 1945.

Ottoman weakness in Algeria reflected the fact that the empire was no longer a centralized military state with provincial governors firmly controlled from the capital. Instead, local governors were becoming increasingly independent, pursuing their own interests

and even seeking to establish their own governments and hereditary dynasties.

Muhammad Ali, the Ottoman governor in Egypt (see the next section), led the way. In 1831 his French-trained armies occupied the Ottoman province of Syria and appeared ready to depose the sultan. The sultan survived, but only by calling on Europe for help. Britain, Russia, and Austria responded, and Muhammad Ali stopped his campaign. Introducing some army reforms, the overconfident Ottomans were saved again in 1839 after their forces were routed trying to drive Muhammad Ali from Syria. Britain, backed by Russia and Austria, compelled France to abandon its Egyptian ally, and it forced Muhammad Ali to return Syria and Arabia to the Ottomans. The European powers, minus France, preferred a weak and dependent Ottoman state to a strong and revitalized Muslim entity under a dynamic leader such as Muhammad Ali.

Realizing their precarious position, liberal Ottoman statesmen decided in 1839 on radical reforms designed to remake the empire on a western European model. Known as the Tanzimat reforms, the new laws called for equality of Muslims, Christians, and Jews before the law and in business, security of life and property, and a modernized administration and military. New commercial laws allowed free importation of foreign goods, as British advisers demanded, and permitted foreign merchants to operate freely throughout an economically dependent empire.

Intended to bring revolutionary modernization such as that experienced by Russia under Peter the Great and Japan in the Meiji era (see page 869), the Tanzimat reforms failed to revitalize the Ottoman state and society for several reasons. First, their implementation required a new generation of well-trained and trustworthy officials, and that generation did not exist. Second, the liberal reforms failed to halt the growth of nationalism among Christian subjects in the Balkans (see Chapter 29), which resulted in crises and defeats that undermined all reform efforts. Third, the reforms disturbed many conservative Muslims, who saw them as an impious departure from Islamic tradition and holy law. These Islamic conservatives became the most dependable support of Sultan Abdülhamid (r. 1876–1909), who abandoned the European model in his long and repressive reign.

The combination of declining international power and conservative tyranny eventually led to a powerful resurgence of the modernizing impulse among idealistic Turkish exiles in Europe and young army officers in Istanbul. These fervent patriots, the so-called Young Turks, seized power in the revolution of 1908, and they forced the sultan to implement reforms. Failing to stop the rising tide of anti-Ottoman nationalism in the Balkans, the Young Turks nevertheless prepared the way for the remarkable creation of modern Turkey after World War I (see pages 959–961).

Egypt: From Reform to British Occupation

Of great importance in African and Middle Eastern history, the ancient land of the pharaohs had been ruled by a succession of foreigners since 525 B.C., most recently by the Ottoman Turks. In 1798 French armies under young General Napoleon Bonaparte invaded the Egyptian part of the Ottoman Empire and occupied the territory for three years. Into the power vacuum left by the French withdrawal stepped an extraordinary Albanian-born Turkish general, Muhammad Ali (1769–1849).

First appointed governor of Egypt by the Turkish sultan, Muhammad Ali set out to build his own state on the strength of a large, powerful army organized along European lines. The government was also reformed, new lands were cultivated, and the state energetically promoted modern industrialization. (See the feature "Individuals in Society: Muhammad Ali: Egyptian Hero or Ottoman Adventurer?") For a time, Muhammad Ali's ambitious strategy seemed to work, but it eventually floundered when he was defeated by his Ottoman overlords and their British allies. Nevertheless, by the time of his death in 1849, Muhammad Ali had established a strong and virtually independent Egyptian state to be ruled by his family on a hereditary basis within the Turkish empire.

Muhammad Ali's policies of modernization attracted large numbers of Europeans to the banks of the Nile. As one Arab sheik of the Ottoman Empire remarked in the 1830s, "Englishmen are like ants; if one finds a bit of meat, hundreds follow."[13] By 1863, when Muhammad Ali's grandson Ismail began his sixteen-year rule as Egypt's khedive, or prince, the port city of Alexandria had more than fifty thousand Europeans. Europeans served not only as army officers but also as engineers, doctors, high government officials, and police officers. Others found their "meat" in trade, finance, and shipping. Above all, Europeans living in Egypt combined with landlords and officials to continue the development of commercial agriculture geared to the European market, which had begun under Muhammad Ali.

Educated at France's leading military academy, Ismail was a westernizing autocrat. Although his grandfather's efforts to industrialize Egypt had failed, Ismail still

Muhammad Ali: Egyptian Hero or Ottoman Adventurer?

Muhammad Ali, the Albanian-born ruler of Egypt, in 1839. *(Aldus Archive/Mirror Syndication International)*

The dynamic leader Muhammad Ali (1769–1849) stands across the history of modern Egypt like a colossus. Yet the essence of the man remains a mystery, and historians vary greatly in their interpretations of him.

Sent by the Ottomans, with Albanian troops, to oppose the French occupation of Egypt in 1799, Muhammad Ali maneuvered skillfully after the French withdrawal in 1802. In 1805 he was named *pasha,* or Ottoman governor, of Egypt. Only the Mamluks remained as rivals. Originally an elite corps of Turkish slave-soldiers, the Mamluks had become a semifeudal military ruling class living off the Egyptian peasantry. In 1811 Muhammad Ali offered to make peace, and he invited the Mamluk chiefs and their retainers to a banquet in Cairo's Citadel. As the unsuspecting guests processed through a narrow passage, his troops opened fire, slaughtering all the Mamluk leaders.

After eliminating his foes, Muhammad Ali embarked on a program of radical reforms. He reorganized agriculture and commerce, reclaiming most of the cultivated land for the state domain, which he controlled. He also established state agencies to monopolize, for his own profit, the sale of agricultural goods. Commercial agriculture geared to exports to Europe developed rapidly, especially after the successful introduction of high-quality cotton in 1821. Canals and irrigation systems along the Nile were rebuilt and expanded.

Muhammad Ali used his growing revenues to recast his army along European lines. He recruited French officers to train the soldiers. As the military grew, so did the need for hospitals, schools of medicine and languages, and secular education. Young Turks and some Egyptians were sent to Europe for advanced study. The ruler boldly financed factories to produce uniforms and weapons, and he prohibited the importation of European goods so as to protect Egypt's infant industries. In the 1830s state factories were making one-fourth of Egypt's cotton into cloth. Above all, Muhammad Ali drafted Egyptian peasants into the military for the first time, thereby expanding his army to 100,000 men. It was this force that conquered the Ottoman province of Syria, threatened the sultan in Istanbul, and triggered European intervention. Grudgingly recognized by his Ottoman overlord as Egypt's hereditary ruler in 1841, Muhammad Ali nevertheless had to accept European and Ottoman demands to give up Syria and abolish his monopolies and protective tariffs. The old ruler then lost heart; his reforms languished, and his factories disappeared.

In the attempt to understand Muhammad Ali and his significance, many historians have concluded that he was a national hero, the "founder of modern Egypt." His ambitious state-building projects—hospitals, schools, factories, and the army—were the basis for an Egyptian reawakening and eventual independence from the Ottomans' oppressive foreign rule. Similarly, state-sponsored industrialization promised an escape from poverty and Western domination, which was foiled only by European intervention and British insistence on free trade.

A growing minority of historians question these views. They see Muhammad Ali primarily as an Ottoman adventurer. This disobedient Turkish general, they say, did not aim for national independence for Egypt, but rather "intended to carve out a small empire for himself and for his children after him."[1] Paradoxically, his success, which depended on heavy taxes and brutal army service, did lead to Egyptian nationalism among the Arabic-speaking masses, but that new nationalism was directed *against* Muhammad Ali and his Turkish-speaking entourage. Continuing research into this leader's life will help to resolve these conflicting interpretations.

Questions for Analysis

1. Which of Muhammad Ali's actions support the interpretation that he was the founder of modern Egypt? Which actions support the opposing view?

2. After you have studied this chapter, compare Muhammad Ali and the Meiji reformers in Japan. What accounts for the similarities and differences?

1. K. Fahmy, *All the Pasha's Men: Mehmed Ali, His Army, and the Making of Modern Egypt* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 310.

A Western Hotel in Cairo
This photo suggests both the reality and the limits of modernization in Ismail's Egypt. An expensive hotel, complete with terrace café and gas lighting, adorns the Egyptian capital. But the hotel is for foreigners, and the native Egyptians are servants and outsiders. *(Popperfoto/Archive Photos)*

dreamed of using European technology and capital to modernize Egypt and build a vast empire in northeast Africa. He concentrated on agriculture, and the large irrigation networks he promoted caused cotton production and exports to Europe to boom. Ismail also borrowed large sums to install modern communications, and with his support the Suez Canal was completed by a French company in 1869. The Arabic of the masses, rather than the Turkish of the conquerors, became the official language, and young Egyptians educated in Europe helped spread new skills and new ideas in the bureaucracy. Cairo acquired modern boulevards, Western hotels, and an opera house. As Ismail proudly declared, "My country is no longer in Africa, we now form part of Europe."[14]

But Ismail was impatient and reckless. His projects were enormously expensive, and by 1876 Egypt owed foreign bondholders a colossal $450 million and could not pay the interest on its debt. Rather than let Egypt go bankrupt and repudiate its loans, as some Latin American countries and U.S. state governments had done in the early nineteenth century, the governments of France and Great Britain intervened politically to protect the European bankers who held the Egyptian

bonds. They forced Ismail to appoint French and British commissioners to oversee Egyptian finances so that the Egyptian debt would be paid in full. This was a momentous decision. It implied direct European political control: Europeans were going to determine the state budget and in effect rule Egypt.

Foreign financial control evoked a violent nationalistic reaction among Egyptian religious leaders, young intellectuals, and army officers. In 1879, under the leadership of Colonel Ahmed Arabi, they formed the Egyptian Nationalist party. Continuing diplomatic pressure, which forced Ismail to abdicate in favor of his weak son, Tewfiq (r. 1879–1892), resulted in bloody anti-European riots in Alexandria in 1882. A number of Europeans were killed, and Tewfiq and his court had to flee to British ships for safety. When the British fleet bombarded Alexandria, more riots swept the country, and Colonel Arabi declared that "an irreconcilable war existed between the Egyptians and the English." A British expeditionary force decimated Arabi's forces and occupied all of Egypt.

The British said their occupation was temporary, but British armies remained in Egypt until 1956. They maintained the façade of the khedive's government as an

autonomous province of the Ottoman Empire, but the khedive was a mere puppet. The able British consul, General Evelyn Baring, later Lord Cromer, ruled the country after 1883. Once a vocal opponent of involvement in Egypt, Baring was a paternalistic reformer who had come to believe that "without European interference and initiative reform is impossible here." Baring's rule did result in tax reforms and better conditions for peasants, while foreign bondholders tranquilly clipped their coupons and Egyptian nationalists nursed their injured pride.

In Egypt Baring and the British reluctantly but spectacularly provided a new model for European expansion in densely populated lands. Such expansion was based on military force, political domination, and a self-justifying ideology of beneficial reform. This model was to predominate until 1914. Thus did Europe's Industrial Revolution lead to tremendous political as well as economic expansion throughout the world.

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: FROM THE SLAVE TRADE TO FOREIGN RULE

From the beginning of the nineteenth century to the global depression of the 1930s, the different regions of sub-Saharan Africa experienced gradual but monumental change. In the early nineteenth century Islam extended its influence in West Africa, while Africa generally remained free of European political control. After about 1880 Islamic expansion stopped, but the pace of change accelerated as France and Britain led European nations in the "scramble for Africa." Africa was divided and largely conquered by Europeans, and by 1900 the foreigners were building imperial systems to consolidate their authoritarian rule. Only in the 1930s did powerful nationalist movements arise, and following World War II African peoples regained their political independence.

Trade and Islamic Revival, 1800–1880

The most important development in West Africa before the European conquest was the decline of the transatlantic slave trade and the simultaneous rise of the export of palm oil and other commodities. A major break with the past, this shift in trade marked the beginning of modern economic development in West Africa.[15]

In 1807, inspired in part by an abolitionist movement in which British women played a major role,

Britain declared the slave trade illegal. It then used its navy to seize the ships of the slave runners, liberating the captives and settling them in the British port of Freetown in Sierra Leone. Yet the transatlantic slave trade declined only gradually. Britain's African squadron intercepted less than 10 percent of all slave ships, and the demand for slaves remained strong on the expanding sugar and coffee plantations of Cuba and Brazil until the 1850s and 1860s. (The United States prohibited the importation of slaves in 1808, and natural increase accounted mainly for the subsequent growth of the U.S. African-American slave population before the Civil War.) Strong incentives remained for Portuguese slave traders, as well as for those African rulers who relied on profits from the trade for power and influence.

"Legitimate" commerce in tropical products (as opposed to the continued illegal trade in slaves) developed in West Africa for at least three reasons. First, the oil and kernels of naturally growing palm trees already provided food for coastal populations, and Britain encouraged palm oil exports as an alternative to the slave trade. Second, the sale of palm oil admirably served the self-interest of industrializing Europe. From palm oil, manufacturers made the first good, cheap soap that ordinary people used in their newfound pursuit of cleanliness, and they mass-produced candles to light people's homes. Most important, a new group of African merchants—often liberated slaves from Freetown who had received some Western education—combined with small African farmers to make the most of the new opportunity. Energetic farmers and their families were willing to plant trees and expand production because they could then buy useful products, especially ever-cheaper cotton textiles coming from Europe. African traders thrived, and some grew rich.

By the 1850s and 1860s legitimate African traders, flanked by Western-educated African lawyers, teachers, and journalists, formed an emerging middle class in the coastal towns. Standing in sharp contrast to African rulers and aristocracies who still benefited from the slave trade, this tiny middle class provided new leadership that augured well for the region's future. Unfortunately for West Africans, in the 1870s big European companies redoubled their efforts to monopolize West Africa's foreign trade. European firms also pressured their governments for support in their dealings with African rulers, which played a small but significant role in the European seizure of African territory in the 1880s and 1890s. African business leadership then gave way to imperial subordination.

A second fundamental development in Africa was a powerful Islamic revival, which began in the late eighteenth century and continued until it was halted by European military might at the end of the nineteenth century. This Islamic revival brought revolutionary change from within to much of the West African interior, as well as to the eastern Sudan. In essence, Muslim scholars and fervent religious leaders arose to defeat both animist rulers and Islamic states that they deemed corrupt. The new rulers believed that African cults and religious practice could no longer be tolerated, and they often effected mass conversions of animists to Islam.

The most important of these revivalist states in West Africa was the vast Sokoto caliphate, emerging by 1830 from the conquest of what is now northern Nigeria and northern Cameroon, and stretching from the Sahara to the coastal rain forest. Other Islamic religious campaigns (jihads) followed. By 1880 the entire western Sudan, from Lake Chad to the Senegal River, had been united in Islam.

Islam also expanded in East Africa, in large part because of the efforts of Sayyid Said (r. 1804–1856), the energetic imam of Oman. Reviving his family's lordship of the African island of Zanzibar and eventually moving his capital from southern Arabia to Zanzibar in 1840, Said and his Baluchi mercenaries (from present-day Pakistan) gained control of most of the Swahili-speaking East African coast. Said concentrated the shipment of slaves to the Ottoman Empire and Arabia through Zanzibar. In addition, he successfully encouraged Indian merchants to develop slave-based clove plantations in his territories. Thus from the 1820s on, Arab merchants and adventurers also pressed far into the interior in search of slaves and ivory, establishing small Islamic states and converting and intermarrying with some local elites. The Arab immigrants brought literacy, administrative skills, and increased trade and international contact. In 1870, before Christian missionaries and Western armies began to arrive in force, it appeared that most of the East African population would accept Islam within a generation.[16]

In southern Africa the British had taken possession of the Dutch settlements at Cape Town during the wars with Napoleon I. This takeover had led disgruntled Dutch cattle ranchers and farmers in 1835 to make their so-called Great Trek into the interior, where they fought the Zulu and Xhosa peoples for land. After 1853 the Boers, or Afrikaners (as the descendants of the Dutch in the Cape Colony were beginning to call themselves), proclaimed their political independence and defended it against British armies. By 1880 Afrikaner and British settlers, who detested each other, had wrested control of much of South Africa from the Zulu, Xhosa, and other African peoples. Thus by 1880 a substantial

Islamic Influence in Northern Nigeria The striking ornamentation on the cement façade of this house is inspired by abstract Arabic handwriting. It attests to the powerful expansion of Islam in sub-Saharan Africa in the nineteenth century. The man's cap and white robe are those of the Hausa, who are predominantly Muslim. *(M & E Bernheim/Woodfin Camp & Associates)*

portion of southern Africa, like conquered Algeria at the other end of the continent, had fallen under European dominion and was being populated by European immigrants. But the rest of the continent was almost free from European political rule.

The Seizure of Africa, 1880–1900

Between 1880 and 1900 Britain, France, Germany, and Italy scrambled for African possessions as if their national livelihoods were at stake. By 1900 only Ethiopia in northeast Africa and Liberia on the West African coast remained independent. Even the Dutch settler republics of southern Africa were conquered by the British in the bloody Boer War (1899–1902). In the years before 1914 the European powers tightened their control and established colonial governments to rule their gigantic empires (Map 27.1).

In the complexity of the European seizure of Africa, certain events and individuals stand out. Of enormous importance was the British occupation of Egypt, which established the new model of formal political control. There was also the role of Leopold II of Belgium (r. 1865–1909), an energetic, strong-willed monarch with a lust for distant territory. "The sea bathes our coast, the world lies before us," he had exclaimed in 1861. "Steam and electricity have annihilated distance, and all the non-appropriated lands on the surface of the globe can become the field of our operations and of our success."[17] By 1876 Leopold was focusing on central Africa. Subsequently, he formed a financial syndicate under his personal control to send Henry M. Stanley, a sensation-seeking journalist and part-time explorer, to the Congo basin. Stanley was able to establish trading stations, sign "treaties" with African chiefs, and plant Leopold's flag. Leopold's actions alarmed the French, who quickly sent out an expedition under Pierre de Brazza. In 1880 de Brazza signed a treaty of protection with the chief of the large Teke tribe and began to establish a French protectorate on the north bank of the Congo River.

Leopold's buccaneering intrusion into the Congo area raised the question of the political fate of Africa south of the Sahara. By 1882, when the British successfully invaded and occupied Egypt, Europe had caught "African fever." There was a gold-rush mentality, and the race for territory was on.

To lay down some basic rules for this new and dangerous game of imperialist competition, Premier Jules Ferry of France and Chancellor Otto von Bismarck of Germany arranged an international conference on Africa in Berlin in 1884–1885. The conference established the principle that European claims to African territory had to rest on "effective occupation" in order to be recognized by other states. This principle was very important. It meant that Europeans would push relentlessly into interior regions from all sides and that no single European power would be able to claim the entire continent. The conference recognized Leopold's personal rule over a neutral Congo free state and declared all of the Congo basin a free-trade zone. The conference also agreed to work to stop slavery and the slave trade in Africa.

The Berlin conference coincided with Germany's sudden emergence as an imperial power. Prior to about 1880 Bismarck, like many other European leaders at the time, had seen little value in colonies. Colonies reminded him, he said, of a poor but proud nobleman who wore a fur coat when he could not afford a shirt underneath. Then in 1884 and 1885, as political agitation for expansion increased, Bismarck did an abrupt about-face, and Germany established protectorates over a number of small African kingdoms and tribes in Togo, Cameroons, southwest Africa, and, later, East Africa. In acquiring colonies, Bismarck cooperated with France's Ferry, who was as ardent for empire as he was for education, against the British. With Bismarck's tacit approval, the French pressed vigorously southward from Algeria, eastward from their old forts on the Senegal coast, and northward from de Brazza's newly formed protectorate on the Congo River.

Meanwhile, the British began enlarging their West African enclaves and impatiently pushing northward from the Cape Colony and westward from the East African coast. Their thrust southward from Egypt was blocked in the eastern Sudan by fiercely independent Muslims, who had felt the full force of Islamic revival. In 1881 a pious local leader, Muhammad Ahmad (1844–1885), declared himself the Mahdi, the expected savior. The Mahdi called for restoration of uncorrupted Islam, and he led a revolt against foreign control of Egypt. In 1885 the Mahdi's army massacred a British force and took the city of Khartoum. After the Mahdi's death, his followers maintained the Islamic state that had been established, and the British retreated to Cairo. The Sudanese people were deeply committed to Islam. For them the struggle to preserve Islam and the struggle for freedom were one and the same thing.

The invaders bided their time, and in 1896 a British force under General Horatio H. Kitchener moved cautiously and more successfully up the Nile River, build-

ing a railroad to supply arms and reinforcements as it went. Finally, in 1898, these troops met their foe at Omdurman, where Sudanese Muslims armed with spears charged time and time again, only to be cut down by the recently invented machine gun. For one smug participant, the young British officer Winston Churchill, it was "like a pantomime scene" in a play. "These extraordinary foreign figures . . . march up one by one from the darkness of Barbarism to the footlights of civilization . . . and their conquerors, taking their possessions, forget even their names. Nor will history record such trash." For another, more somber English observer, "It was not a battle but an execution. The bodies were not in heaps . . . but they spread evenly over acres and acres."[18] In the end eleven thousand brave but poorly armed Muslim tribesmen lay dead. Only twenty-eight Britons had been killed.

The British conquest of the Sudan exemplifies the general process of empire building in Africa. The fate of the Muslim force at Omdurman was eventually inflicted on all native peoples who resisted European rule: they were blown away by vastly superior military force. But however much the European powers squabbled for territory and privilege around the world, they always had the sense to stop short of actually fighting each other. Imperial ambitions were not worth a great European war.

The Imperial System, 1900–1930

By 1900 most of black Africa had been conquered—or, as Europeans preferred to say, "pacified"—and a system of imperial administration was taking shape.

Gradually but relentlessly, this imperial system transformed Africa. Generally, its effect was to weaken or shatter the traditional social order and challenge accepted values. Yet this generalization must be qualified. For one thing, sub-Saharan Africa consisted of an astonishing diversity of peoples and cultures prior to the European invasion. There were, for example, more than eight hundred distinct languages and literally thousands of previously independent political units, ranging from tiny kinship groups to large and powerful kingdoms, such as the Ashanti of central Ghana and Ethiopia. The effects of imperialism varied accordingly.

Omdurman, 1898   European machine guns cut down the charging Muslim tribesmen again and again. "It was not a battle but an execution," said one witness. Thus the Sudan was conquered and one million square miles were added to the British Empire. *(E.T. Archive)*

MADEIRA IS.
(Portugal)

SPANISH
MOROCCO
Tangier
Casablanca
Algiers
TUNISIA

CANARY IS.
(Spain)
IFNI
MOROCCO
Tripoli
Cyrene

RIO DE ORO
ALGERIA
LIBYA
EGYPT
Cairo

ARABIA

SAHARA

FRENCH WEST AFRICA

Nile

GAMBIA
PORTUGUESE
GUINEA
SIERRA LEONE
LIBERIA
IVORY
COAST
GOLD
COAST
TOGOLAND
NIGERIA

L. Chad

Omdurman
Khartoum
ANGLO-EGYPTIAN
SUDAN
Fashoda

ERITREA
Adowa
FRENCH SOMALILAND
BRITISH
SOMALILAND

ETHIOPIA

ITALIAN SOMALILAND

CAMEROONS

SPANISH GUINEA

FRENCH EQUATORIAL AFRICA

Congo

UGANDA
BRITISH
EAST AFRICA

L. Victoria

Mombasa

CABINDA
BELGIAN CONGO

L. Tanganyika

GERMAN
EAST AFRICA
ZANZIBAR (Gr. Br.)

ATLANTIC OCEAN

INDIAN
OCEAN

ANGOLA
NORTHERN
RHODESIA
NYASALAND

MOZAMBIQUE

MADAGASCAR

GERMAN
SOUTHWEST
AFRICA
SOUTHERN
RHODESIA

BECHUANALAND

TRANSVAAL
SWAZILAND

ORANGE
FREE STATE
BASUTOLAND
NATAL

UNION OF
SOUTH AFRICA

Cape Town

ARAB
STATES
Egypt

SAHARA

SUDANESE EMPIRES

Ashanti
Ibo

BANTU
Kikuyu
SWAHILI
LANGUAGE

PEOPLES

Khoisan
(Bushmen)

Hottentots

COLONIAL PRESENCE
IN AFRICA, 1878

British
French
German
Italian

Portuguese
Belgian
Spanish
Independent African
States

0   400   800 Km.

0   400   800 M.

European powers also took rather different approaches to colonial rule. The British tended to exercise indirect rule through existing chiefs. The French believed in direct rule by appointed officials, both black and white. Moreover, the number of white settlers varied greatly from region to region, and their presence had important consequences. In light of these qualifications, how did imperial systems generally operate in black Africa?

The self-proclaimed political goal of the French and the British—the principal foreign powers in black Africa—was to provide good government for their African subjects, especially after World War I. "Good government" meant, above all, law and order. It meant strong, authoritarian government, which maintained a small army, and building up an African police force to put down rebellion, suppress tribal warfare, and protect life and property. Good government required a modern bureaucracy capable of taxing and governing the population. Many African leaders and their peoples had chosen not to resist the invaders' superior force, and most others had stopped fighting after experiencing crushing military defeat. Thus the goal of law and order was widely achieved.

Colonial governments demonstrated much less interest in providing basic social services. Expenditures on education, public health, hospitals, and other social services increased after the First World War but still remained small. Europeans feared the political implications of mass education and typically relied instead on the modest efforts of state-subsidized mission schools. Moreover, they tried to make even their poorest colonies pay for themselves. Thus salaries for government workers normally absorbed nearly all tax revenues.

Economically, the imperialist goal was to draw the African interior into the world economy on terms favorable to the dominant Europeans. The key was railroads linking coastal trading centers to outposts hundreds of miles into the interior. Cheap, dependable transportation facilitated easy shipment of raw materials out and manufactured goods in. Most African railroads were built after 1900; fifty-two hundred miles were in operation by 1926, when attention turned to road building for trucks. Railroads and roads had two other

important outcomes: they allowed the quick movement of troops to put down any local unrest, and they allowed many African peasants to earn wages for the first time.

Efforts to force Africa into the world economy on European terms went hand in hand with the advent of plantations and mines. The Europeans often imposed head taxes, payable in money or labor, to compel Africans to work for their white overlords. No aspect of imperialism was more disruptive or more despised by Africans than forced labor, widespread until about 1920. In some regions, however, particularly in West Africa, African peasants continued to respond freely to the new economic opportunities by voluntarily shifting to export crops on their own farms. Overall, the result was increased production geared to the world market and a gradual decline in both traditional self-sufficient farming and nomadic herding.

In sum, the imposition of bureaucratic Western rule and the gradual growth of a world-oriented cash economy between 1900 and 1930 had a revolutionary impact on large parts of Africa. The experiences of Ghana and Kenya, two very different African countries, dramatically illustrate variations on the general pattern.

Present-day Ghana (see Map 34.2 on page 1096), which takes its name from one of West Africa's famous early kingdoms, had a fairly complex economy well before British armies smashed the powerful Ashanti kingdom in 1873 and established the crown colony that they called the Gold Coast. Precolonial local trade was vigorous and varied, and palm oil exports were expanding. Into this sophisticated economy British colonists subsequently introduced the production of cocoa beans for the world's chocolate bars. Output rose spectacularly, from a few hundred tons in the 1890s to 305,000 tons in 1936.

British imperialists loved to brag about the railroads to the interior, but recent studies clearly show that independent peasants and energetic African business people (many of the traders were women) were mainly responsible for the spectacular success of cocoa-bean production. Creative African entrepreneurs even went so far as to build their own roads, and they sometimes reaped big profits. During the boom of 1920 "motor cars were purchased right and left, champagne flowed freely, and expensive cigars scented the air."[19]

The Gold Coast also showed the way politically and culturally. The westernized elite—relatively prosperous and well-educated lawyers, professionals, and journalists—and business people took full advantage of opportunities provided by the fairly enlightened colonial

The Governor's Arrival   This painting by an African artist depicts the landing of a high British official at a port on the East African coast. African soldiers stand at attention, ready to do the governor's bidding and maintain imperial order. *(National Museums, Tanzania)*

regime. The black elite was the main presence in the limited local elections permitted by the British, for few permanent white settlers ventured to hot and densely populated West Africa.

Across the continent in the British East African colony of Kenya, events unfolded differently. Before the arrival of Western imperialists, East African peoples were more self-sufficient, less numerous, and less advanced commercially and politically than Africans in the Gold Coast. Once the British had built a strategic railroad from the Indian Ocean across Kenya to Uganda, foreigners from Great Britain and India moved in to exploit the situation. Indian settlers became shopkeepers, clerks, and laborers in the towns. The British settlers dreamed of turning the cool, beautiful, and fertile Kenyan highlands into a "white man's country" like Southern Rhodesia or the Union of South Africa. They dismissed the local population of peasant farmers as "barbarians," fit only to toil as cheap labor on their large estates and plantations. By 1929 two thousand white settlers were producing a variety of crops for export. The white settlers in Kenya manipulated the colo-

nial government for their own interests and imposed rigorous segregation on the black and Indian populations. Kenya's Africans thus experienced much harsher colonial rule than did their fellow Africans in the Gold Coast.

COLONIALISM IN INDIA AND SOUTHEAST ASIA

In no area of Africa or Asia did peoples and cultures experience a more pervasive Western impact than on the Indian subcontinent. Controlling much of India as early as 1757, the British proceeded to unify the subcontinent, spread their language, and harness the economy to British interests. Yet, as we shall see, British influence on India and its well-educated westernized elite led not to integration or assimilation, but rather to the creation of a sophisticated political movement demanding Indian autonomy, if not independence.

In a somewhat similar fashion, the Dutch gradually brought the islands of the Indonesian archipelago un

der a single government in the nineteenth century. But Indonesian elites long cooperated with foreign rule, and modern nationalism was very slow to develop. In Vietnam, however, a new dynasty steadfastly resisted French missionaries and then battled tenaciously but unsuccessfully with French armies. Elsewhere in Southeast Asia, the United States took the Philippines from Spain, and only Siam (Thailand) preserved its independence.

India Under British Rule

India was the jewel of the British Empire. Arriving in India on the heels of the Portuguese in the seventeenth century, the British East India Company had conquered the last independent native state by 1848. The last "traditional" response to European rule—the attempt by the established ruling classes to drive the foreigners out by military force—was broken in India in 1857 and 1858. Those were the years of the Great Rebellion (which the British called a "mutiny"), when an insurrection by Muslim and Hindu mercenaries in the British army spread throughout northern and central India before it was finally crushed, primarily by loyal native troops from southern India. Thereafter Britain ruled India directly. India illustrates, therefore, for better and for worse, what generations of European domination might produce.

After 1858 India was ruled by the British Parliament in London and administered by a tiny, all-white civil service in India. In 1900 this elite consisted of fewer than 3,500 top officials for a population of 300 million. The British elite, backed by British officers and native troops, was competent and generally well-disposed toward the welfare of the Indian peasant masses. Yet it practiced strict job discrimination and social segregation, and most of its members quite frankly considered the jumble of Indian peoples and castes to be racially inferior. As Lord Kitchener, one of the most distinguished top military commanders of India, stated:

It is this consciousness of the inherent superiority of the European which has won for us India. However well educated and clever a native may be, and however brave he may prove himself, I believe that no rank we can bestow on him would cause him to be considered an equal of the British officer.[20]

When, for example, the British Parliament in 1883 was considering a major bill to allow Indian judges to try white Europeans in India, the British community rose in protest and defeated the measure. The idea of being judged by Indians was inconceivable to the Europeans, for it was clear to them that the empire in India rested squarely on racial inequality.

In spite of (or perhaps even because of) their strong feelings of racial and cultural superiority, the British acted energetically and introduced many desirable changes to India. Realizing that they needed well-educated Indians to serve as skilled subordinates in the government and army, the British established a modern system of progressive secondary education in which all instruction was in English. Thus through education and government service, the British offered some Indians excellent opportunities for both economic and social advancement. High-caste Hindus formed a new elite profoundly influenced by Western thought and culture.

This new bureaucratic elite played a crucial role in modern economic development, which was a second result of British rule. Irrigation projects for agriculture, the world's third largest railroad network for good communications, and large tea and jute plantations geared to exports and the world economy were all developed. Unfortunately, the lot of the Indian masses improved little, for the increase in production was eaten up by an increase in population. The drastic decline of India's ancient cotton textile industry also weighed heavily on handicraft workers.

Finally, with a well-educated, English-speaking Indian bureaucracy and modern communications, the British created a unified, powerful state. They placed under the same general system of law and administration the different Hindu and Muslim peoples of the subcontinent that had fought each other for centuries during the Middle Ages and had been repeatedly conquered by Muslim and Mongol invaders. It was as if Europe, with its many states and varieties of Christianity, had been conquered and united in a single great empire.

In spite of these achievements, the decisive reaction to European rule was the rise of nationalism among the Indian elite. No matter how Anglicized and necessary a member of the educated classes became, he or she could never become the white ruler's equal. The top jobs, the best clubs, the modern hotels, and even certain railroad compartments were sealed off to brown-skinned men and women. The peasant masses might accept such inequality as the latest version of age-old oppression, but the well-educated, English-speaking elite eventually could not. For the elite, racial discrimination meant not only injured pride but also bitter

Imperial Complexities in India   Britain permitted many native princes to continue their rule, if they accepted British domination. This photo shows a road-building project designed to facilitate famine relief in a southern native state. Officials of the local Muslim prince and their British "advisers" watch over workers drawn from the Hindu majority. *(Nizam's Good Works Project–Famine Relief: Road Building, Aurangabad 1895–1902, from Judith Mara Gutman, Through Indian Eyes. Courtesy, Private Collection)*

injustice. And it was based on dictatorship, no matter how benign.

By 1885, when educated Indians came together to found the predominately Hindu Indian National Congress, demands were increasing for the equality and self-government that Britain enjoyed and had already granted white-settler colonies such as Canada and Australia. By 1907, emboldened in part by Japan's success (see pages 869–871), the radicals in the Indian National Congress were calling for complete independence. Even the moderates were demanding home rule for India through an elected parliament. Although there were sharp divisions between Hindus and Muslims, the common heritage of British rule and Western ideals, along with the reform and revitalization of the Hindu religion, had created a genuine movement for national independence.

Empire Building in Southeast Asia

Although Dutch forts and trading posts in the East Indies dated back to the seventeenth century, in 1816 the Dutch ruled little more than the island of Java. Thereafter they gradually brought almost all of the 3,000-mile archipelago under their political authority, though—in good imperialist fashion—they had to share some of the spoils with Britain. In extending their rule, the Dutch, similar to the British in India, brought diverse peoples—with different languages, distinct cultural traditions, and a predominately Muslim faith—into a single political entity (Map 27.2). Thus they inadvertently created the foundations of modern-day Indonesia—the world's fourth most populous nation.

Taking over the Dutch East India Company in 1799, the Dutch government modified the company's loose

Ready for the Final?   A panel of Vietnamese scholar bureaucrats sits ready in 1890 to give the "make-or-break" oral examination to degree candidates in liberal arts. As this photo suggests, Viet namese education for govern ment employment and cultural leadership was still heavily in fluenced by traditional Chinese models, although the study of French and Western thought was of growing importance. *(Roger-Viollet)*

control of Java and gradually built a modern bureau-cratic state that remained extremely profitable. The Dutch abolished the combination of tribute from rulers and forced labor from peasants that they had used to obtain spices, and they established instead the so-called Culture System. This system still relied on cooperative local rulers and their vassals, but it collected modern-sounding "taxes" from peasants, in the form of valuable goods for export. The Culture System secured an enor-mous surplus of new commodities, such as coffee, sugar, and timber, and it brought Dutch shipping and intercontinental commerce back to life. In 1870 Dutch liberals succeeded in eliminating some of the system's most coercive elements, but the practical effects were limited because Dutch and Javanese officials still worked together to make sure the flow of goods con-tinued.

At the end of the nineteenth century the Dutch en-couraged Western education in the East Indies for the first time. This decision, inspired in part by a newfound sense of a "civilizing mission" and European racial su-periority, had far-reaching consequences. Above all, the children of local rulers and privileged elites encoun-tered new ideas in Dutch-speaking schools. They began to question the long-standing cooperation of local

elites with Dutch colonialism, and they searched for a new identity. Thus in the early twentieth century anti colonial nationalism began to take shape in the East In dies, and it would blossom after World War I.

Unlike India and Java, Vietnam had escaped Euro pean rule in the eighteenth century. In 1802 the new Nguyen dynasty came to power in Vietnam, putting an end to thirty years of peasant rebellion and civil war. For the first time in the country's history, a single Viet namese monarchy ruled the entire country. Vietnam's future appeared bright. Working through a centralizing scholar bureaucracy fashioned on the Chinese model, the dynasty energetically built irrigation canals, roads and bridges, and high walls and impressive palaces in Hue, the new capital city. In 1821 a European who had lived in India, Java, and Siam wrote that Hue had a "neatness, magnitude, and perfection" that made other Asian achievements look "like the works of children."[21] Yet reconstruction placed a heavy burden on the peas ants drafted to do the work, and it contributed to a resurgence of peasant uprisings.

Roman Catholic missionaries from France posed a second, more dangerous threat to Vietnam's Confucian ruling elite. The emperor and his advisers believed that Christianity would undermine Confucian moral values

RUSSIAN EMPIRE

SIBERIA

Tobolsk

Omsk

L. Balkhash
(1854)

Tashkent
(1864)

Aral Sea
(1873)

Merv
(1884)

Teheran
RUSSIAN SPHERE
(1907)

PERSIA

Caspian Sea

AFGHANISTAN

BRITISH SPHERE
(1907)

BALUCHISTAN
(1883)

KASHMIR
(1846)

PUNJAB

Delhi

SINKIANG

TIBET

Lhasa

HIMALAYAS

NEPAL

BHUTAN

OUTER MONGOLIA
(Autonomous, Russian sphere 1912)

Irkutsk

L. Baikal

Chita

INNER MONGOLIA

CHINA

Beijing

Tientsin

Wuhan

Chungking

Huang He (Yellow)

Yangzi

Nanjing

Jiaozhou
(Ger. 1898)

Shanghai
(Gr. Br. 1842)

Fuzhou

Guangzhou
(Gr. Br. 1842)

Macao
(Port. 1557)

Xiamen
(Gr. Br. 1842)

Zhanjiang
(Fr. 1898)

Hanoi

FRENCH INDOCHINA
(1859, 1907)

SIAM

Bangkok

Saigon

South China Sea

MANCHURIA

Harbin

Shenyang
(Mukden)
(Rus. 1898; Jap. 1905)

Port Arthur
(Rus. 1898; Jap. 1905)

Weihai
(Gr. Br. 1898)

KOREA
(1905, 1910)

East China Sea

Pescadores
(Jap. 1895)

Hong Kong
(Gr. Br. 1842)

Formosa
(Jap. 1895)

AMUR DISTRICT
(1858)

Khabarovsk
(1858)

Vladivostok
(1860)

Sea of Japan

Tokyo

JAPANESE EMPIRE

Ryukyu Is. (Jap.)

Sea of Okhotsk

Sakhalin

KARAFUTO
(Jap. 1905)

PACIFIC OCEAN

BRITISH INDIA

INDIA

Karachi

Diu
(Port.)

Bombay

Goa
(Port.)

Madras

Karikal
(Fr.)

Yanaon
(Fr.)

Pondichéry
(Fr.)

Calcutta

Ceylon

Bay of Bengal

Arabian Sea

INDIAN OCEAN

BURMA
(1852, 1885)

Rangoon

Andaman Is.
(Gr. Br.)

PHILIPPINE IS.
(U.S. from Spain 1898)

Manila

BRITISH NORTH BORNEO
(1888)

SARAWAK
(1888)

Borneo

MALAY STATES
(1874, 1909)

Singapore
(Gr. Br. 1819)

Sumatra

Java
(1619)

Celebes

New Guinea

Timor
(Port. 1859)
(Neth.)

Territories held by:

Great Britain

Netherlands

France

United States

Russia

Japan

Railroads

Scale:
0 — 500 — 1000 Km.
0 — 500 — 1000 Mi.

and the unity of the Vietnamese state. Therefore, following a logic that France's Louis XIV would have understood completely (see page 531), in 1825 Emperor Minh Mang (r. 1820–1841) outlawed the teaching of Christianity. In the 1830s his government began executing Catholic missionaries and Vietnamese converts. But Christianity continued to spread, appealing particularly to peasants and leading to the execution of as many as thirty thousand Vietnamese Christians in the 1850s. In 1859–1860 a French naval force seized Saigon and three surrounding provinces in southern Vietnam, which became a French colony. In 1884–1885 France launched a second war against Vietnam and conquered the rest of the country, although the emperor in Hue remained on the throne as a French puppet. Laos and Cambodia were added to French Indochina.

After the French conquest, Vietnamese patriots continued to resist with a combination of loyalty to Confucian values and an intense hatred of foreign rule. Following Japan's victory over Russia in 1905 (see page 871), a new generation of more modern nationalists saw Japan as a model for Vietnamese revitalization and freedom. They went to Japan to study and planned for anticolonial revolution in Vietnam.

Two other imperialist nations, Russia and the United States, also acquired rich territories in Asia. Russia, whose history since the later Middle Ages had been marked by almost continual expansion, extended its own borders steadily throughout the nineteenth century, although it did not reach Southeast Asia. Russians conquered Muslim areas to the south in the Caucasus and Central Asia, and even threatened northern India in the 1880s. Russians also nibbled greedily on Korea and China's outlying provinces, especially in the 1890s.

The United States' great conquest was the Philippines, taken from Spain in 1898 after the Spanish-American War. When it quickly became clear that the United States had no intention of granting independence, Filipino patriots rose in revolt and were suppressed only after long, bitter fighting.

In all of Southeast Asia, only Siam (Thailand) succeeded in preserving its independence. Siam was sandwiched between the British in Burma (and India) and the French in Indochina, which enabled its very able King Chulalongkorn (r. 1868–1910) to balance the two competitors against each other and to escape the smothering embrace of both. Chulalongkorn also implemented modernizing reforms, building a stronger, centralized government that could assert effective control over outlying provinces coveted by the imperialists. Thus independent Siam gradually developed a modern centralizing state similar to those constructed by Western imperialists in their Asian possessions.

RAPID CHANGE IN EAST ASIA

China and Japan, connected in so many ways by history and culture, went their separate ways after they were "opened" in the mid-nineteenth century. New leadership in Japan implemented the most profound and successful modernization effort of any non-Western country before 1914, and Japan even joined the club of imperialist nations. China, a prime target of both Japanese and Western aggression, proved incapable of revitalizing its dynastic government and traditional culture.

Transforming Japan

When Commodore Matthew Perry arrived in Japan in 1853 with his crude but effective gunboat diplomacy, Japan was a complex feudal society. At the top stood a figurehead emperor, but for more than two hundred years real power had been in the hands of the *shogun*, general-in-chief. With the help of the warrior nobility, or *samurai*, the shogun governed a country of hardworking, productive peasants and city dwellers. Often poor and restless, the intensely proud samurai were humiliated by the sudden American intrusion and the unequal trade treaties that the Western countries imposed.

When foreign diplomats and merchants began to settle in Yokohama, radical samurai reacted with a wave of antiforeign terrorism and antigovernment assassinations between 1858 and 1863. The imperialist response was swift and unambiguous. An allied fleet of American, British, Dutch, and French warships demolished key forts, further weakening the power and prestige of the shogun's government. Then in 1867 a coalition led by patriotic samurai seized control of the government with hardly any bloodshed and restored the political power of the emperor. This was the Meiji Restoration, a great turning point in Japanese development.

The immediate, all-important goal of the new government was to meet the foreign threat. The battle cry

MAP 27.2 Asia in 1914   India remained under British rule, while China precariously preserved its political independence. The Dutch Empire in modern-day Indonesia was old, but French control of Indochina was a product of the new imperialism.

A Japanese View of America   Japanese publishers memorialized the opening of Japan to foreign trade with popular woodblock prints. An 1860 American newspaper illustration showing the visit of the Japanese embassy to the sewing and laundry rooms of the Willard Hotel in Washington, D.C., inspired this print. The Americans hold symbols of their technology—a pocket watch and a sewing machine. The Japanese text celebrates American wealth, power, and technological superiority, which the Japanese admired and soon imitated. *(Private Collection)*

of the Meiji reformers was "Enrich the state and strengthen the armed forces." But how were these tasks to be done? In an about-face that was one of history's most remarkable chapters, the young but well-trained, idealistic but flexible leaders of Meiji Japan dropped their antiforeign attacks. Convinced that Western civilization was indeed superior in its military and industrial aspects, they initiated from above a series of measures to reform Japan along modern, Western lines. They were convinced that "Japan must be reborn with America its mother and France its father."[22]

In 1871 the new leaders abolished the old feudal structure of aristocratic, decentralized government and formed a strong unified state. Following the example of the French Revolution, they dismantled the four-class legal system and declared social equality. They decreed freedom of movement in a country where traveling abroad had been a serious crime. They created a free, competitive, government-stimulated economy. Japan began to build railroads and modern factories. Thus the new generation adopted many principles of a free, liberal society. As in Europe, such freedom resulted in a tremendously creative release of human energy.

The overriding concern of Japan's political leadership, however, was always a powerful state, and to achieve this the new leaders borrowed more than liberalism from the West. A powerful modern navy was created, and the army was completely reorganized along French and German lines, with three-year military service for all males and a professional officer corps. (See the feature "Listening to the Past: A Japanese Plan for a Modern Army" on pages 874–875.) In 1877 this army of draftees crushed a major rebellion by feudal elements protesting the loss of their privileges. Japan also borrowed rapidly and adapted skillfully the West's science and modern technology, particularly in industry, medicine, and education. Many Japanese were encouraged to study abroad, and the government paid large salaries to attract foreign experts. These experts were always carefully controlled, however, and were replaced by trained Japanese as soon as possible.

By 1890, when the new state was firmly established, the wholesale borrowing of the early restoration had given way to a more selective emphasis on those things foreign that were in keeping with Japanese tradition. Following the model of the German Empire, Japan established an authoritarian constitution and rejected democracy. The power of the emperor and his ministers was vast, that of the legislature limited.

Japan successfully copied the imperialism of Western society. Expansion not only proved that Japan was strong; it also cemented the nation together in a great mission. Having "opened" Korea with the gunboat diplomacy of imperialism in 1876, Japan decisively defeated China in a war over Korea in 1894–1895 and took Formosa (modern-day Taiwan). In the next years Japan competed aggressively with the leading European powers for influence and territory in China, particularly Manchuria. There Japanese and Russian imperialism met and collided. In 1904 Japan attacked Russia without warning, and after a bloody war Japan emerged with a valuable foothold in China—Russia's former protectorate over Port Arthur (see Map 27.2). By 1910, with the annexation of Korea, Japan had become a major imperialist power.

Japan became the first non-Western country to use an ancient love of nation to transform itself and thereby meet the many-sided challenge of Western expansion. Moreover, Japan demonstrated convincingly that a modern Asian nation could defeat and humble a great Western power. Japan provided patriots in Asia and Africa with an inspiring example of national recovery and liberation.

Toward Revolution in China

In 1860 the two-hundred-year-old Qing Dynasty in China appeared on the verge of collapse. Efforts to repel foreigners had failed, and rebellion and chaos wracked the country. Yet two factors helped the government achieve a surprising comeback that lasted more than thirty years. First, the traditional ruling groups temporarily produced new and effective leadership. Loyal scholar-statesmen and generals quelled disturbances such as the great Taiping Rebellion, which wracked the country from 1850 to 1865. The empress dowager Tzu Hsi, a truly remarkable woman, governed in the name of her young son and combined shrewd insight with vigorous action to revitalize the bureaucracy. Second, destructive foreign aggression lessened, for the Europeans had obtained their primary goal of commercial and diplomatic relations. Indeed, some Europeans assisted in the dynasty's efforts to adopt some aspects of Western government and technology while maintaining traditional Chinese values and beliefs.

The parallel movement toward domestic reform and limited cooperation with the West collapsed under the blows of Japanese imperialism. The Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 and the subsequent harsh peace treaty revealed China's helplessness in the face of aggression, triggering a rush for foreign concessions and protectorates in

Queen Min of Korea An ambitious and successful politician, Queen Min promoted the dominance of her family clan. She also led the effort to resist Japan and maintain Korean independence. In 1895 Japanese troops, acting under orders, stormed the palace, murdered Queen Min, and burned her body. Japanese pressure on Korea was relentless until the end of World War II. *(Courtesy, Yushin Yoo)*

China. At the high point of this rush in 1898, it appeared that the European powers might actually divide China among themselves, as they had recently divided Africa. Probably only the jealousy each nation felt toward its imperialist competitors saved China from partition, although the U.S. Open Door policy, which opposed formal annexation of Chinese territory, may have helped tip the balance. In any event, the tempo and impact of foreign penetration greatly accelerated after 1894.

So, too, did the intensity and radicalism of the Chinese reaction. Like the leaders of the Meiji Restoration

in Japan, some modernizers saw salvation in Western in-stitutions. In 1898 the government launched a desper-ate "Hundred Days of Reform" in an attempt to meet the foreign challenge. Radical reformers, such as the revolutionary Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925), who came from the peasantry and was educated in Hawaii by Christian missionaries, sought to overthrow the Qing Dynasty altogether and establish a republic.

On the other side some traditionalists turned back to-ward ancient practices, political conservatism, and fanati-cal hatred of the "foreign devils." "Protect the country, destroy the foreigner" was their simple motto. Such con-servative, antiforeign patriots had often clashed with for-eign missionaries, whom they charged with undermining reverence for ancestors and thereby threatening the Chi-nese family and the entire society. In the agony of defeat and unwanted reforms, secret societies such as the Box-ers rebelled. In northeastern China more than two hun-dred foreign missionaries and several thousand Chinese Christians were killed. Once again the imperialist re-sponse was swift and harsh. Foreign armies occupied and plundered Beijing. A heavy indemnity was imposed.

The years after the Boxer Rebellion in 1900 were ever more troubled. Anarchy and foreign influence spread as the power and prestige of the Qing Dynasty declined still further. Antiforeign, antigovernment rev-olutionary groups agitated and plotted. Finally, in 1912, a spontaneous uprising toppled the dynasty. After thousands of years of emperors and empires, a loose coalition of revolutionaries proclaimed a Western-style republic and called for an elected parliament. The trans-formation of China in response to the aggressive chal-lenge of Western society entered a new phase, and the end was not in sight.

Summary

In the nineteenth century the industrializing West sub-ordinated non-Western lands to its economic interests, sent forth millions of emigrants, and built vast empires in Africa and Asia. The reasons were many, but the eco-nomic thrust of robust industrial capitalism, an ever-growing lead in technology, and the competitive pressures of European nationalism were particularly important.

Western expansion had far-reaching consequences. For the first time in human history, the world became in many ways a single unit. Moreover, European expansion diffused the ideas and techniques of a highly developed civilization. Yet the West relied on force to conquer and rule, and it treated non-Western peoples as racial inferiors. Thus non-Western elites, often armed with Western doctrines, eventually launched a national, anti-imperialist struggle for equality, genuine indepen-dence, and modernization. This struggle would emerge as a central drama of world history after the great Euro-pean civil war of 1914 to 1918, which reduced the West's technological advantage and shattered its self-confidence and complacent moral superiority.

Unlike most of Asia and Africa, Japan and China es-caped direct foreign rule. But China entered a deepen-ing crisis, while Japan transformed itself and entered the imperialist ranks. This striking contrast is emblematic of the diversity of historical experiences all across Asia, the Muslim world, and Africa.

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G. Stocking, *Victorian Anthropology* (1987), is a brilliant analysis of the cultural and racial implications of Western expansion. Britain's leading position in European imperialism is examined in a lively way by B. Porter, *The Lion's Share* (1976); J. Morris, *Pax Britannica* (1968); and D. Judd, *The Victorian Empire* (1970), a stunning pictorial history. B. Semmel, *The Rise of Free Trade Imperialism* (1970); H. Brunschwig, *French Colonialism, 1871–1914* (1966); and W. Baumgart, *Imperialism: The Idea and Reality of British and French Colonial Expansion* (1982), are well-balanced studies. A. Moorehead, *The White Nile* (1971), tells the story of European exploration of the mysterious Upper Nile. D. Ralston, *Importing the European Army: Military Techniques and Institutions in the Extra-European World, 1600–1914* (1990), compares the experiences of Egypt, Japan, China, and others, while D. Headrick, *Tools of Empire* (1981), highlights Western technological superiority. C. Erikson, *Emigration from Europe, 1815–1914* (1976), and R. Vecoli and S. Sinke, eds., *A Century of European Migrations, 1830–1930* (1991), are valuable studies.

E. Wolf, *Europe and the People Without History* (1982), considers, with skill and compassion, the impact of imperialism on non-Western peoples. Two unusual and provocative studies on personal relations between European rulers and non-European subjects are D. Mannoni, *Prospero and Caliban: The Psychology of Colonialization* (1964), and F. Fanon, *Wretched of the Earth* (1965), a bitter attack on white racism by a black psychologist active in the Algerian revolution. V. Ware, *Beyond the Pale: White Women, Racism and History* (1992), examines the complex role of European women in imperialism. Novels also bring the psychological and human dimensions of imperialism alive. H. Rider Haggard, *King Solomon's Mines,* portrays the powerful appeal of adventure in exotic lands. Rudyard Kipling, the most popular advocate of European expansion, is at his stirring best in *Kim* and *Soldiers Three.* Joseph Conrad unforgettably probes European motives in *Heart of Darkness.* William Boyd, *An Ice-Cream War,* a good story of British and Germans fighting each other in Africa during the First World War, is a favorite of students.

I. Lapidus, *A History of Islamic Societies* (1988), is an excellent introduction to nineteenth-century developments. Hourani, cited in the Notes, is also recommended. B. Lewis, *The Middle East and the West* (1963), is a penetrating analysis of the impact of Western ideas on Middle Eastern thought. T. Mitchell, *Colonizing Egypt* (1988); E. Toledano, *State and Society in Mid-Nineteenth Century Egypt* (1990); and A. Palmer, *The Decline and Fall of the Ottoman Empire* (1992), are useful and engaging studies. Oliver and Hallett, both cited in the Notes, and R. July, *A History of the African People* (1970), contain excellent introductions to Africa in the age of imperialism. Hopkins, cited in the Notes, is a pioneering work, stressing African successes before imperialism. Notable specialized studies include S. Miers and R. Roberts, *The End of Slavery in Africa* (1988); A. Sheriff, *Spices and Ivory in Zanzibar* (1987); and C. Midgley, *Women Against Slavery: The British Campaign, 1780–1870* (1992).

A classic study of Western expansion from an Indian viewpoint is Panikkar's volume, mentioned in the Notes. S. Bose and A. Jalal, *Modern South Asia: History, Culture, Political Economy* (1998), incorporates recent scholarship with a postcolonial perspective in a wide-ranging study, which may be compared with S. Wolpert, *A New History of India,* 5th ed. (1997). P. Mitter, *Art and Nationalism in Colonial India, 1850–1922* (1994), is insightful and richly illustrated. Steinberg, cited in the Notes, edited an impressive work on Southeast Asia by seven specialists. D. Wyatt, *Thailand: A Short History* (1984), is recommended.

Hall, cited in the Notes, is a good introduction to the history of Japan. E. Reischauer's topical survey, *Japan: The Story of a Nation* (1981), is recommended, as are T. Huber, *The Revolutionary Origins of Modern Japan* (1981), and Y. Fukuzawa, *Autobiography* (1966), the personal account of a leading intellectual who witnessed the emergence of modern Japan. M. Weiner, *Race and Migration in Imperial Japan* (1994), and W. Beasley, *The Meiji Restoration* (1972), are important works. Fairbank, cited in the Notes, is a masterful reconsideration by a famous scholar, which may be compared with I. Hsü, *The Rise of Modern China,* 5th ed. (1995). H. Chang, *Chinese Intellectuals in Crisis: The Search for Order and Meaning, 1890–1911* (1987), probes a critical problem.

LISTENING TO THE
PAST

A Japanese Plan for a Modern Army

Japan responded to the challenge posed by the imperialist West by adapting the methods and technologies of the West, and Aritomo Yamagata (1838–1922) contributed significantly to that approach and its successes. Born into the military nobility known as samurai, Yamagata joined in the movement to restore the power of the emperor. To him fell the task of strengthening the armed forces. He traveled in Europe for about a year and a half, studying Europe's armies and navies. On his return in 1872, he wrote the memorandum reprinted here, "Opinion on Military Affairs and Conscription." The next year, he helped overturn traditional Japanese society by writing a law calling for a Japanese army drafted from the whole male population, on the Western pattern. No longer would fighting be the province of samurai alone.

A military force is required to defend the country and protect its people. Previous laws of this country inculcated in the minds of the samurai these basic functions, and there was no separation between the civilian and military affairs. Nowadays civilian officials and military officials have separate functions, and the practice of having the samurai serve both functions has been abandoned. It is now necessary to select and train those who can serve the military functions, and herein lies the change in our military system. . . .

The status of our armed forces today is as follows: We have the so-called Imperial Guards whose functions are nothing more than to protect the sacred person of His Majesty and to guard the Imperial Palace. We have altogether more than twenty battalions manning the four military garrisons who are deployed to maintain domestic tranquility, and are not equipped to fight against any foreign threat. As to our navy, we have a few battleships yet to be completed. How can they be sufficient to counteract foreign threats? . . .

The first concern of the Ministry of Military Affairs is to set up a system to defend our homeland. For this purpose two categories of soldiers are required: a standing army and those on the reserve list. The number of troops differ from country to country. Of the major countries, Russia maintains the largest number of troops and the United States the smallest. The reason for this discrepancy comes from the fact that the governmental system differs from one country to another. Consequently the regulations governing each of the countries also differ. The Netherlands and Belgium are among the smallest countries, but they are located between large countries, and in order to avoid contempt and scorn from their neighbors, they diligently go about the business of defending their countries. Even though one of these countries has a total area not exceeding one-third of the area of our country, it maintains a standing army numbering not less than forty to fifty thousand. . . .

. . . The creation of a standing army for our country is a task which cannot be delayed. It is recommended that a certain number of strong and courageous young men be selected from each of the prefectures in accordance with the size of the prefectures, and that such young men be trained in the Western-type military science and placed under rigorous drills, so that they may be deployed as occasion demands.

The so-called reservists do not normally remain within the military barracks. During peacetime they remain in their homes, and in an emergency they are called to service. All of the countries in Europe have reservists, and amongst them Prussia has most of them. There is not a single able-bodied man in Prussia who is not trained in military affairs. Recently Prussia and France fought each other and the former won handily. . . .

It is recommended that our country adopt a system under which any able-bodied man twenty years of age be drafted into military service, unless his absence from home will create undue hardship for his family. There shall be no distinction made between the common man and those who are of the samurai class. They shall all be formed into ranks, and after completion of a period of service, they shall be returned to their homes. In this way

every man will become a soldier, and not a single region in the country will be without defense. Thus our defense will become complete.

The second concern of the Ministry is coastal defense. This includes building of warships and constructing coastal batteries. Actually, battleships are movable batteries. Our country has thousands of miles of coastline, and any mobile corner of our country can become the advance post of our enemy. . . .

The third concern of the Military is to create resources for the navy and the army. There are three items under consideration, namely military academies, a bureau of military supplies, and a bureau of munitions depots. It is not difficult to have one million soldiers in a short time, but it is difficult to gain one good officer during the same span of time. Military academies are intended to train officers for these two services. If we pay little attention to this need today, we shall not be able to have the services of capable officers for another day. Therefore, without delay military academies must be created and be allowed to prosper. . . . The bureau of military supplies shall be in charge of procuring military provisions and manufacturing weapons of war for the two services. The bureau of munitions depots shall store such provisions and munitions. If we lack military provisions and weapons and our munitions depots are empty, what good will the million soldiers in the army or thousands of warships do? . . .

Some people may argue that while they are aware of the urgency in the need for the Ministry of Military Affairs, they cannot permit the entire national resources to be committed to the need of one ministry alone. They further aver that from the larger perspective of the imperial government, there are so many other projects covering a wide range of things which require governmental attention. . . . This argument fails to discern the fundamental issues. The recommendations herein presented by the Ministry of Military Affairs in no way asks for the stoppage of all governmental activities or for the monopolization of all government revenues. But in a national emergency, a new set of priorities must be established. Those of us who are given the task of governing must learn from the past, discern the present, and weigh all matters carefully. . . .

Those of us who govern must first of all discern the conditions prevailing in the world, set up priorities and take appropriate measures. In our opinion Russia has been acting very arrogantly. Previously, contrary to the provisions of the Treaty of Sevastopol, she placed her warships in the Black Sea. Southward, she has shown her aggressive intent to-

The new Japanese army, with Western uniforms, ca 1870. (Tsuneo Tamba Collection, Yokohama, Japan/Laurie Platt Winfrey, Inc.)

ward Muslim countries and toward India. Westward, she has crossed the borders of Manchuria and has been navigating the Amur River. Her intents being thus, it is inevitable that she will move eastward sooner or later by sending troops to Hokkaido, and then taking advantage of the seasonal wind move to the warmer areas.

At a time like this it is very clear where the priority of this country must lie. We must now have a well-trained standing army supplemented by a large number of reservists. We must build warships and construct batteries. We must train officers and soldiers. We must manufacture and store weapons and ammunitions. The nation may consider that it cannot bear the expenses. However, even if we wish to ignore it, this important matter cannot disappear from us. Even if we prefer to enter into this type of defense undertaking, we cannot do without our defense for a single day.

Questions for Analysis

1. What aspects of military modernization are highlighted here? What goals was Aritomo trying to achieve with each proposal?

2. How does Aritomo use the examples of European countries to reach conclusions?

3. How does Aritomo anticipate criticism and explain the need for prompt action?

28 Nation Building in the Western Hemisphere and Australia

José Gil de Castro. *The Martyr Olaya*. 1823, oil on canvas. *(Museo Nacional de Historia, Lima)*

In the Western Hemisphere and in Australia, as in Europe, the nineteenth century was a period of nation building, geographical expansion, and industrial and commercial growth. Waves of emigrants moved from Europe and Asia to the Americas and to Australia. The millions who braved the oceans populated and built new nations and linked the Western Hemisphere and Australia with the rest of the globe.

The countries of North and South America became highly diverse ethnically and culturally, and the issue of race created serious tensions throughout the hemisphere. In the United States, it helped to bring on the Civil War. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, European immigration directly affected the ways in which the United States and the Latin American nations coped with racial situations.

Today North America consists of Canada, the United States, Mexico, and the countries of Central America north of the Isthmus of Panama; South America comprises the twelve independent nations south of that isthmus. Thus the United States is not synonymous with North America, nor is Latin America synonymous with South America.

At the end of the eighteenth century, Canada and the countries of South America remained colonies. Their European mother countries looked on the democratic experiment of the infant United States with suspicion and scorn. The island continent of Australia, remote from Europe and economically undeveloped, served as a dumping ground for English criminals. By 1914 the Latin American states, Canada, and Australia were enjoying political independence and playing a crucial role in the world economy. The United States had become a colossus on which the Old World depended in the First World War.

- Why and how did the Spanish and Portuguese colonies of North and South America shake off European domination and develop into national states?
- What role did the concept of manifest destiny play in the evolution of the United States?
- How did slavery affect blacks in the United States?
- How did the Americas and Australia absorb new peoples, and what was the social impact of the immigrants?
- What geographical, economic, and political conditions shaped the development of Canada?

- What factors aided the economic growth of Australia?

These are among the questions that this chapter will address.

LATIN AMERICA (1800–1929)

In 1800 the Spanish Empire in the Western Hemisphere stretched from the headwaters of the Mississippi River in present-day Minnesota to the tip of Cape Horn in the Antarctic (see Map 28.1). According to the Kentucky statesman Henry Clay (1777–1852), "Within this vast region, we behold the most sublime and interesting objects of creation: the loftiest mountains, the most majestic rivers in the world; the richest mines of precious metals, the choicest productions of the earth."[1] Spanish and Portuguese America was vast; British America was tiny. In addition to the large regions of South America (the world's fourth-largest continent), the Spanish Empire included large parts of the southwestern sections of the present-day United States, including California. Geographical barriers alone posed tremendous obstacles to the political unity. Spain believed that the great wealth of the Americas existed for its benefit, and Spanish policies fostered bitterness and the desire for independence in the colonies. Between 1806 and 1825, the Spanish colonies in Latin America were convulsed by upheavals that ultimately resulted in their separation from Spain.

The Latin American wars were *revolutions* because the colonists were revolting against the domination of Spain and fighting for direct self-government. They were *wars of independence* because the colonies were seeking economic liberation and management of their own commercial affairs. They were *civil wars* because social and racial groups were fighting one another. The *Creoles*—people of Spanish descent born in America—resented the economic and political dominance of the *peninsulares*, as natives of Spain or Portugal were called. Peninsulares controlled the rich export-import trade, intercolonial trade, and mining industries. At the same time, *mestizos* of mixed Spanish and Indian background and *mulattos* of mixed Spanish and African heritage sought an end to their systematic subordination.

Between 1850 and the worldwide depression of 1929, the countries of Latin America developed into

national states. The predominant factors in this evolution were the heritage of colonial exploitation, a neocolonial economic structure, massive emigration from Europe and Asia, and the fusion of Amerindian, Caucasian, African, and Asian peoples.

The Origins of the Revolutions

Because of regional, geographical, and racial differences, the Latin American movements for independence took different forms in different places. Everywhere, however, they grew out of recent colonial grievances. By the late seventeenth century, the Spanish colonies had achieved a high degree of economic diversity and independence. The Spanish crown, however, determined to control colonial trade for its financial benefit. Thus the Casa de Contratacion, or Board of Trade, set up in Cádiz in 1717, worked to strengthen Spain through greater commercial exploitation of the empire. The colonies, meanwhile, had become self-sufficient producers of foodstuffs, wine, textiles, and consumer goods. What was not produced domestically was secured through a healthy intercolonial trade that had developed independently of Spain, despite formidable geographical obstacles and colonial policies designed to restrict it.

In Peru, for example, domestic agriculture supported the large mining settlements, and the colony did not have to import food. Craft workshops owned by the state or by private individuals produced consumer goods for the working class; what was not manufactured locally was bought from Mexico and transported by the Peruvian merchant marine. By 1700 Mexico and Peru were sending shrinking percentages of their revenues to Spain and retaining more for public works, defense, and administration. The colonies lived for themselves, not for Spain.

The reforms of the Spanish Bourbons radically reversed this economic independence. Spain's humiliating defeat in the War of the Spanish Succession (1701–1713) prompted demands for sweeping reform of all of Spain's institutions, including colonial policies and practices. To improve administrative efficiency, the enlightened monarch Charles III (r. 1759–1788) carved the region of modern Colombia, Venezuela, and Ecuador out of the vast viceroyalty of Peru; it became the new viceroyalty of New Granada with its capital at Bogotá. The Crown also created the viceroyalty of Rio de la Plata (present-day Argentina) with its capital at Buenos Aires (Map 28.1).

Far more momentous was Charles III's radical overhaul of colonial trade policies, to enable Spain to compete with Great Britain and Holland in the great eighteenth-century struggle for empire. The Spanish crown intended the colonies to serve as sources of raw materials and as markets for Spanish manufactured goods. Charles III's free-trade policies cut duties and restrictions drastically for Spanish merchants. In Latin America, these actions stimulated the production of crops in demand in Europe: coffee in Venezuela; sugar in Cuba and throughout the Caribbean; hides, leather, and salted beef in the Rio de la Plata viceroyalty. In Mexico and Peru, production of silver climbed steadily in the last quarter of the century. The volume of Spain's trade with the colonies soared, possibly as much as 700 percent between 1778 and 1788.[2]

Colonial manufacturing, which had been growing steadily, suffered severely. Better-made and cheaper European goods drove colonial goods out of the marketplace. Colonial textiles, china, and wine, for example, could not compete with cheap Spanish products. For one thing, Latin American free laborers were paid more than European workers in the eighteenth century; this disparity helps explain the great numbers of immigrants to the colonies. Also, intercolonial transportation costs were higher than transatlantic costs. In the Rio de la Plata region, for example, heavy export taxes and light import duties shattered the wine industry. Geographical obstacles—mountains, deserts, jungles, and inadequate natural harbors—also frustrated colonial efforts to promote economic integration.

Having made the colonies dependent on essential Spanish goods, however, Spain found that it could not keep the sea routes open. After 1789 the French Revolution and Napoleonic wars isolated Spain from Latin America. Foreign traders, especially from the United States, swarmed into Spanish-American ports. In 1796 the Madrid government lifted the restrictions against neutrals trading with the colonies, thus acknowledging Spain's inability to supply the colonies with needed goods and markets.[3] All these difficulties spelled disaster for colonial trade and industry.

At the end of the eighteenth century, colonists also complained bitterly that only peninsulares were appointed to the *audiencias*—the colonies' highest judicial bodies, which also served as councils to the viceroys—and to other positions in the colonial governments. According to the nineteenth-century Mexican statesman and historian Lucas Alamán (1792–1853),

This preference shown to Spaniards in political offices and ecclesiastical benefices has been the principal cause of the rivalry between the two classes; add to this the fact that

Europeans possessed great wealth, which although it may have been the just reward of effort and industry, excited the envy of Americans and was considered as so much usurpation from them; consider that for all these reasons the Spaniards had obtained a decided preponderance over those born in the country; and it will not be difficult to explain the increasing jealousy and rivalry between the two groups which culminated in hatred and enmity.[4]

From 1751 to 1775, only 13 percent of appointees to the audiencias were Creoles.[5] To the Creole elite of Spanish America, the world seemed "upside down."[6] Creoles hungered for political office and resented their successful Spanish rivals.

Madrid's tax reforms also aggravated discontent. In the 1770s and 1780s, the Spanish crown needed income to finance imperial defense. Colonial ports had to be fortified and standing armies built. Like Great Britain, Spain believed its colonies should bear some of the costs of their own defense. Accordingly, Madrid raised the prices of tobacco and liquor and increased the *alcabala* (a sales tax of Arabic origin) on many items. Improved government administration made tax collection more efficient. Creole business and agricultural interests resented the Crown's monopoly of the tobacco industry and opposed new taxes.

As in the thirteen North American colonies a decade earlier, protest movements in Latin America claimed that the colonies were being taxed unconstitutionally. Merchants in Boston and Philadelphia had protested taxation without representation; the Spanish colonies, however, had no tradition of legislative approval of taxes. Creole mercantile leaders argued instead that relations between imperial authorities and colonial interests stayed on an even keel through consultation and compromise and that when the Crown imposed taxes without consultation, it violated ancient constitutional practice.

The imperial government recognized the potential danger of the North American example. Although Spain had joined France on the side of the rebel colonies against Great Britain during the American Revolution, the Madrid government refused in 1783 to grant diplomatic recognition to the new United States. North American ships calling at South American ports had introduced the subversive writings of Thomas Paine and Thomas Jefferson. For decades the ideas of Voltaire, Rousseau, and Montesquieu had been trickling into Latin America. In 1794 the Colombian Antonio Nariño translated and published the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen (Spanish authorities

sentenced him to ten years in an African prison, but he lived to become the father of Colombian independence). By 1800 the Creole elite throughout Latin America was familiar with liberal Enlightenment political thought.[7] The Creoles assumed, however, that the "rights of man" were limited, and they did not share such rights with Indians and blacks.

Race in the Colonial Period

The racial complexion of Latin American societies is one of the most complicated in the world. Because few European women immigrated to the colonies, Spanish men had relations with Indian and African women. African men deprived of black women sought Indian women. The result was a population composed of every possible combination of Indian, Spanish, and African blood.

Spanish theories of racial purity rejected people of mixed blood, particularly those of African descent. A person's social status depended on the degree of European blood he or she possessed or appeared to possess. Peninsulares and Creoles reinforced their privileged status by showing contempt for people who were not white. As the great nineteenth-century German scientist Alexander von Humboldt put it, having spent five years traveling throughout South America, "Any white person, although he rides his horse barefoot, imagines himself to be of the nobility of the country."[8] Coupled with the Spaniards' aristocratic disdain for manual labor, a three-hundred-year tradition had instilled in the minds of Latin Americans the notion that dark skin and manual labor went together. Owners of mines, plantations, and factories had a vested interest in keeping blacks and Indians in servile positions. Racism and discrimination pervaded all the Latin American colonies.

Demographers estimate that Indians still accounted for between three-fifths and three-fourths of the total population of Latin America at the end of the colonial period, in spite of the tremendous population losses caused by the introduction of diseases in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The colonies that became Peru and Bolivia had Indian majorities; the regions that became Argentina and Chile had European majorities. Indians and black slaves toiled in the silver and gold mines of Mexico, Colombia, and Peru; in the wheat fields of Chile; in the humid, mosquito-ridden cane brakes of Mexico and the Caribbean; and in the diamond mines and coffee and sugar plantations of Brazil.

Nevertheless, nonwhites in Latin America did experience some social mobility in the colonial period.

Disputed by Great Britain, Spain, and Russia

Effective frontier of Spanish settlement

COAHUILA

VICEROYALTY OF NEW SPAIN

BAJÍO LEÓN•

Mexico City• •Veracruz

Havana•

CUBA

JAMAICA

SAINT DOMINGUE (HAITI)

SANTO DOMINGO

PUERTO RICO

•Guatemala

ATLANTIC OCEAN

Caracas•

•Bogotá

VICEROYALTY OF NEW GRANADA

GUIANA

PACIFIC OCEAN

A N D E S

Lima•

VICEROYALTY OF PERU

VICEROYALTY OF BRAZIL

•Bahia

A N D E S

VICEROYALTY OF RÍO DE LA PLATA

São Paulo• •Rio de Janeiro

Santiago•

Buenos Aires• •Montevideo

AUDIENCIA OF CHILE

Spanish colonies

Viceroyalty of New Spain

Viceroyalty of New Granada

Viceroyalty of Peru

Audiencia of Chile

Viceroyalty of Río de la Plata

Portuguese colony

Viceroyalty of Brazil

Disputed territory

Disputed by Great Britain, Spain, and Russia

ISLAS MALVINAS (FALKLAND ISLANDS)

Cape Horn

certainly more than nonwhites in North America experienced. In Mexico, decreasing reliance on slaves led to a great increase in manumissions. Once freed, however, Negroes (the Spanish term for "black persons" coined in 1555) immediately became subject to the payment of a money tribute, as were Indians. Freedmen also incurred the obligation of military service. A few mulattos rose in the army, some as high as the rank of colonel. The army and the church seem to have offered the greatest opportunities for social mobility. Many black slaves gained their freedom by fleeing to the jungles or mountains, where they established self-governing communities. Around the year 1800, Venezuela counted twenty-four thousand fugitive slaves in a total population of eighty-seven thousand.

Many Indians were still subject to the *mit'a* and the *repartimiento. Mit'a* means a turn or rotation. The practice was that every seventh household in the region between Huancavelica and Potosí in the Andes took a turn working in the silver mines, with the duration of service varying. Some historians have called this forced labor. But the Indians took their wives and other family members, who pilfered on the side, usually were not caught, and often made a tidy income for themselves.[9] The law of repartimiento required Indians to buy goods solely from local *corregidores,* officials who collected taxes. The new taxes of the 1770s and 1780s fell particularly heavily on the Indians. When Indian opposition to these taxes and to oppressive conditions exploded into violence, the Creoles organized the protest movements and assumed leadership of them.

Resistance and Rebellion

The middle years of the eighteenth century witnessed frequent Andean Indian rebellions against the Spaniards' harsh exploitation. Five uprisings occurred in the 1740s, eleven in the 1750s, twenty in the 1760s, and twenty in the 1770s. In 1780, under the leadership of José Gabriel Condorcanqui (1742–1781), who claimed descent from the Inca rulers and took the name Tupac Amaru II, a massive insurrection exploded. The *kurakas,* Indian chieftains from the Cuzco region, gathered a powerful force of Indians and *castas,* people of mixed race, including those of African ancestry. They

Diego Rivera: Sugar Cane Field   A Spanish overseer gives an order, as black and Indian laborers cut, bind, and carry away the tall perennial grass from which sugar is made. *(Enrique Franco-Torrillos)*

wanted the redress of long-standing grievances: the repartimiento of goods ended, abolition of the mit'a, better working conditions in the mines, and an audiencia set up in Cuzco. Rebellion swept across highland Peru, and many Spanish officials were executed. In 1781 an army sent from Lima put down the rebellions and captured and savagely executed Tupac Amaru II. Violent rebellion continued, however, and before peace was restored two years later, a hundred thousand people lay dead and vast amounts of property were destroyed. Although these movements failed militarily, the government abolished the repartimiento system and established an audiencia in Cuzco. By raising elite fears of racial and class warfare, these revolts served to buttress Creole loyalty to the Spanish crown, which delayed the drive for Peru's independence.

News of the rebellion of Tupac Amaru II trickled northward, where it helped stimulate revolution in the

MAP 28.1 Latin America Before Independence
Consider the factors that led to the boundaries of the various Spanish and Portuguese colonies in North and South America.

OREGON
COUNTRY
(Joint U.S.-British
occupation)

BRITISH NORTH AMERICA
(Gr. Br.)

UNITED STATES

*ATLANTIC
OCEAN*

MEXICO
1821

San
Antonio

Gulf of Mexico

BAHAMA IS.
(Gr. Br.)

Havana

Mexico City • Veracruz

CUBA
(Spain)

HAITI 1804

PUERTO RICO (Spain)

BRITISH
HONDURAS (Gr. Br.)

JAMAICA (Gr. Br.)

GUATEMALA
• Guatemala

*Caribbean
Sea*

UNITED PROVINCES OF
CENTRAL AMERICA
1823–1839

Panama

Caracas

TRINIDAD (Gr. Br.)

VENEZUELA

BR. GUIANA (Gr. Br.)
DUTCH GUIANA (Neth.)
FRENCH GUIANA (France)

• Socorro
• Bogotá

GRAN COLOMBIA
1819–1830

*Galapagos
Islands*

• Quito
ECUADOR

EMPIRE OF BRAZIL
1822

PERU
1821

Lima •

*PACIFIC
OCEAN*

BOLIVIA
1825
La Paz •

• Bahia

• Sucre

PARAGUAY
1811

São Paulo •

Rio de Janeiro •

CHILE
1817

UNITED
PROVINCES OF
LA PLATA
1816

Valparaiso •
Santiago •

ARGENTINA
Buenos Aires •
Bahia
Blanca •

URUGUAY
1828

Montevideo •

1811 Year independence gained

Colony

0   500   1000 Mi

PATAGONIA
(Disputed between
Argentina and Chile)

*Islas Malvinas
(Falkland Islands)*

New Granada viceroyalty. Disorders occurred first at Socorro in modern Colombia (Map 28.2). Throughout the eighteenth century, Socorro had prospered. Sugar cane, corn, and cattle flourished because of its exceptionally fertile soil. Large cotton crops stimulated the production of textiles, mostly in a primitive cottage industry worked by women. Socorro's location on the Suarez River made it an agricultural and manufacturing center and an entrepôt for trade with the hinterland. Hard-working Spanish immigrants had prospered and often intermarried with the Indians.

When the viceroy published new taxes on tobacco and liquor and reorganized the alcabala, riots broke out in Socorro in March 1781 and spread to other towns. Representatives of peasants and artisan groups from many towns elected a *comun,* or central committee, to lead the insurrection. Each town elected its local comun and the captain of its militia. Known as the Comunero Revolution, the insurrection in New Granada enjoyed broad-based support and good organization.

An Indian peasant army commanded by Creole captains marched on Bogotá. Government officials, lacking adequate military resources, sent a commission to play for time by negotiating with the comuneros. On June 4, the commission agreed to the rebels' terms: reduction of the alcabala and of the Indians' forced tribute, abolition of the new taxes on tobacco, and preference for Creoles over peninsulares in government positions. The joyful Indian army disbanded and went home. What the Indians did not know was that the commission had already secretly disclaimed the agreement with the rebels on the grounds that it had been achieved by force. Having succeeded in dispersing the Indians, the government at Bogotá won over the Creole leaders with a promise of pardons and then moved in reserve troops, who captured large numbers of rebels. When the last rebel base—that of José Antonio Galan—had been captured, a kangaroo court tried Galan and condemned him

to be taken out of jail, dragged and taken to the place of execution where he will be hung until dead, that his head be removed from his dead body, that the rest of his body be

MAP 28.2 Latin America in 1830 By 1830 almost all of Central America, South America, and the Caribbean islands had won independence. Note that the many nations that Central America now comprises were unified when they first won independence from Mexico. Similarly, modern Venezuela, Colombia, and Ecuador were still joined in Gran Colombia.

Francois Bonneville: Toussaint L'Ouverture The French engraver Bonneville usually worked from paintings; lacking one for L'Ouverture, he used his imagination. Thus this quizzical face lacks the strength and determination for which L'Ouverture was famous. He inspired great enthusiasm among liberal contemporaries, such as the English romantic poet William Wordsworth, who concluded a sonnet dedicated to L'Ouverture: "There's not a breathing of the common wind That will forget thee; thou hast great allies; / Thy friends are exultations, agonies, And love, and man's unconquerable mind." *(Menil Foundation/Hickey and Robertson, Houston)*

quartered, that his torso be committed to flames for which purpose a fire shall be lit in front of the platform. . . . All his descendants shall be declared infamous, all his property shall be confiscated by the royal treasury, his home shall be burnt, and the ground salted, so that in this fashion his infamous name may be forgotten.[10]

Thus ended the revolt of the comuneros in New Granada. They failed to win self-rule, but they forced the authorities to act in accordance with the spirit of the "unwritten constitution," whose guiding principle was consultation and compromise.

Much more than the Peruvian and Colombian revolts, the successful revolution led by Toussaint L'Ouverture (ca 1744–1803) in Haiti aroused elite

fears of black revolt and class warfare. The Arawaks, native Americans of the region, gave the name "Haiti" (land of mountains) to the western third of the island of Hispaniola, because most of it is mountainous. Haiti was a haven for French and English pirates in the seventeenth century, but in the eighteenth century, French settlers established sugar plantations there and imported African slaves to work them. Haiti soon became France's most prosperous colony and the world's chief producer of sugar and coffee. Unable to maintain its claim to the region, Spain ceded Haiti to France.

The French maintained a rigid social stratification of French, Creoles, freed blacks, and black slaves. When the Creoles refused the mulattos representation in the local assemblies and in the French National Assembly of 1789, the mulattos revolted. Blacks formed guerrilla bands under the self-educated freed slave Toussaint L'Ouverture. In 1793, as part of their campaign against Napoleon, the British invaded Haiti and took all of its coastal cities. As the recognized leader of the revolt, L'Ouverture had widespread support and retook the cities. In 1801 he also conquered Santo Domingo (which Spain had also ceded to France), declared himself emperor of the entire island of Hispaniola, abolished slavery, and instituted reforms. Napoleon dispatched a large army to restore French control, but the French could not take the interior. U.S. president Thomas Jefferson, fearing that the French would use the island to invade Louisiana, aided the rebels. Weakened by yellow fever, the French withdrew. L'Ouverture negotiated peace with France, but French officials tricked him and took him to France, where he died in prison. In 1804 Haiti became the second nation (after the United States) in the Western Hemisphere to achieve independence. The revolt was also the first successful uprising of a non-European people against a colonial power. The establishment of a legitimate black nation in Latin America sent waves of fear through the upper classes.

Independence

In 1808, as part of his effort to rule Europe, Napoleon Bonaparte deposed the Spanish king Ferdinand VII and placed his own brother on the Spanish throne (see page 736). In Latin America, the Creoles subsequently seized the opportunity. Since everything in Spanish America was done in the name of the king, the Creoles argued that the removal of the legitimate king shifted sovereignty to the people—that is, to themselves. In 1810 the small, wealthy Creole aristocracy used the re

moval of the Spanish king as justification for their seizure of political power and their preservation of that power.

The Creoles who led the various movements for independence did not intend a radical redistribution of property or reconstruction of society. They merely rejected the authority of the Spanish crown. A distinguished scholar has described the war for independence as

a prolonged, confused, and in many ways contradictory movement. In Mexico it began as a popular social movement and ended many years later as a conservative uprising against a liberal Spanish constitution. In Venezuela it came to be a war unto the death; in other places it was a war between a small Creole minority and the Spanish authorities. It was not an organized movement with a central revolutionary directorate. It had no Continental Congress. . . . If there was no central direction, no centrally recognized leadership, likewise there was no formally accepted political doctrine. . . .

In Latin America each separate area went its own way. Central America broke way from Mexico and then splintered into five separate nations. Uruguay, Paraguay, and Bolivia separated themselves from Argentina, Chile from Peru, and [Simón] Bolívar's attempt to federate the state of Greater Colombia (Venezuela, Colombia, and Ecuador) with Peru and Bolivia under a centralized government broke down.[11]

The great hero of the movement for independence was Simón Bolívar (1783–1830), a very able general who is considered the Latin American George Washington. (See the feature "Listening to the Past: Simón Bolívar's Speculation on Latin America" on pages 918–919.) Bolívar's victories over the royalist armies won him the presidency of Gran (Greater) Colombia in 1819. He dreamed of a continental union and in 1826 summoned a conference of the American republics at Panama. The meeting achieved little. Bolívar organized the government of Bolivia and became the head of the new state of Peru. The territories of Gran Colombia splintered, however, and a sadly disillusioned Bolívar went into exile, saying, "America is ungovernable. Those who served the revolution plowed the seas." The failure of Pan-Americanism isolated individual countries, prevented collective action, and later paved the way for the political and economic intrusion of the United States and other powers.

Brazil's quest for independence from Portugal was unique: Brazil won its independence without violent upheaval. When Napoleon's troops entered Portugal, the royal family fled to Brazil and made Rio de Janeiro

Allegorical Shield of Bolívar
This allegorical painting of 1825 honors Simón Bolívar as Liberator of Peru. Other portraits on the shield include that of Antonio Sucre, Bolívar's favorite general *(top right)*, and William Miller, a British general who volunteered to serve under Bolívar *(bottom right)*. *(Instituto Nacional de Cultura-Cusco: Museo Histórico Regional)*

the capital of the Portuguese Empire. The new government immediately lifted the old mercantilist restrictions and opened Brazilian ports to the ships of all friendly nations. Under popular pressure, King Pedro I (r. 1822–1831) proclaimed Brazil's independence in 1822 and published a constitution. Pedro's administration was wracked by factional disputes between Portuguese courtiers and Brazilian Creoles, a separatist movement in the Rio Grande do Sul region, and provincial revolts. His successor, Pedro II (r. 1831–1889), restored order and laid the foundations of the modern Brazilian state. The reign of Pedro II witnessed the expansion of the coffee industry, the beginnings of the rubber industry, and massive immigration.

The Consequences of Independence

The wars of independence ended around 1825. What effects did they have on Latin American societies, gov-

ernments, and national development? Because the movements for independence differed in character and course in different regions and countries, generalizations are likely to be misleading. Significant changes did occur, however, throughout Latin America.

The newly independent nations did not achieve immediate political stability when the wars of independence ended. The Spanish crown had served as a unifying symbol, and its disappearance left a power vacuum. Civil disorder typically followed. The Creole leaders of the revolutions had no experience in government, and the wars left a legacy of military, not civilian, leadership. Throughout the continent, idealistic but impractical leaders proclaimed republics governed by representative assemblies. In practice, the generals ruled

In Argentina, Juan Manuel de Rosas (r. 1835–1852) assumed power amid widespread public disorder and ruled as dictator. In Mexico, liberals declared a federal republic, but incessant civil strife led to the rise of

A Ball at Government House, Santiago, Chile   The architecture, clothes, manners, and customs depicted in this ballroom scene of about 1840 beautifully illustrate the ways Latin American Creoles adopted Spanish culture as their own. *(Royal Geographical Society, London)*

the dictator Antonio López de Santa Anna in the mid-nineteenth century. Likewise in Venezuela, strongmen, dictators, and petty aristocratic oligarchs governed from 1830 to 1892. Some countries suffered constant coups d'état. In the course of the century, Bolivia had sixty and Venezuela fifty-two. The rule of force prevailed almost everywhere. Enlightened dictatorship was the typical form of government.

Although isolated territories such as Paraguay and much of Central America suffered little damage, the wars of liberation disrupted the economic life of most Latin American countries. The prosperity that many areas had achieved toward the end of the colonial period was destroyed. Mexico and Venezuela in particular lost large percentages of their populations and suffered great destruction of farmland and animals. Even areas that saw relatively little violence, such as Chile and New Granada, experienced a weakening of economic life. Armies were frequently recruited by force, and when the men were demobilized, many did not return home. The consequent population dislocation hurt agriculture and mining. Guerrilla warfare disrupted trade and communications. Forced loans and the seizure of private property for military use ruined many people.

Brazil, which had a large slave population, did not free its slaves until 1888. Spain abolished slavery in its Cuban colony in a series of measures between 1870 and 1886; Cuba itself became independent in 1903, a consequence of the Spanish-American War. Elsewhere, however, independence accelerated the abolition of slavery. The destruction of agriculture in countries such as Mexico and Venezuela caused the collapse of the plantation system, and fugitive slaves could not be recaptured. Also, the royalists and patriot generals such as Bolívar offered slaves their freedom in exchange for military service. Most of the new independent states adopted republican constitutions declaring the legal equality of all men. For Indians and blacks, however, these noble words were meaningless, for the revolution brought about no redistribution of property, nor could long-standing racist attitudes be eliminated by the stroke of a pen.

Although the edifice of racism persisted in the nineteenth century, Latin America experienced much more assimilation and offered Negroes greater economic and social mobility than did the United States. As a direct result of their heroic military service in the wars of independence, a substantial number of Negroes improved

their social status. Some even attained political heights: the Mexican revolutionary Vicente Guerrero served as president of his country in 1829; Antonio Guzmán governed Venezuela as a benevolent dictator (r. 1870–1888); Ramón Castilla, a mestizo, served as president of Peru (r. 1845–1851 and 1855–1862) and made great improvements in state financing.

What accounts for the relative racial permeability of Latin America in contrast with the severe segregation in the United States? The Creole elite in Latin America had a "whitening" ideology—that is, they viewed race mixture as a civilizing process that diminished and absorbed the dark and "barbarous" blood of Africans and Indians. Legally and socially, Latin American societies classified people as white, mestizo, mulatto, Negro, *indigena* (native), and *asiatico* (Asiatic). Supposedly, this system measured bloodlines and racial origins. When linked to social class, lightness of skin helped social mobility, but a nonwhite person could not completely shed the absence of *pureza de sangre,* "purity of blood." Although skin color proved a major part of the Latin American system of classification, we have to guard against using United States–centric methods of racial definition when studying Latin American societies. Moreover, racism in Latin America aggressively attacked the indigenous peoples (the Indians). The United States, according to the Dutch scholar H. Hoetink, evolved a simple two-tiered racial edifice. Anyone who was not "pure" white was classified as Negro or black (see pages 900–902).

Hoetink explains the problem partly in terms of the large population of poor whites in the United States: "Nowhere, but in the North American mainland, did the number of extremely poor whites always exceed the number of slaves. Nowhere, but in the U.S. South, were special police forces predominantly manned by poor whites."[12] Also, Latin American elites' definition of *whiteness* and perception of physical beauty seem to have been broader than the definition and perception of the white majority in the United States.

Nevertheless, the advantages of assimilation did not (and do not) apply to dark-skinned people in Latin America. Substantial numbers of light-skinned colored people rose economically and socially, but the great mass of dark-skinned blacks continued to experience all the consequences of systematic and insistent racism.

Neocolonialism

At first, political instability and the preoccupation of European and North American financiers with industrial expansion in their own countries discouraged for

eign investment in Latin America's newly independent nations. The advent of stable dictatorships, however, eventually paved the way for economic growth. After 1870 capital began to flow south and across the Atlantic. In Mexico, North American capital supported the production of hemp (used in the United States for grain harvesting), sugar, bananas, and rubber, frequently on American-owned plantations. British and American interests backed the development of tin, copper, and gold mining in Mexico. By 1911 Mexico had taken third place among the world's oil producers. British financiers built Argentina's railroads, meatpacking industry, and utilities. British businessmen in Chile developed the copper and nitrate industries (nitrate is used in the production of pharmaceuticals and fertilizers). Likewise in Brazil, foreign capital—primarily British—flowed into coffee, cotton, and sugar production and manufacturing. By 1904 Brazil produced 76 percent of the world's coffee. When massive overproduction of coffee led to a sharp drop in prices in 1906, a commission of British, American, German, and French bankers rescued the Brazilian government from near disaster.

The price that Latin America paid for economic development at the end of the nineteenth century was a new form of economic domination. Foreign investors acquired control of the railroads, mineral resources, and banking, and they made heavy inroads into real estate. British investments led all others. But beginning in 1898, the United States flexed its imperialistic muscles and sent gunboats and troops to defend its dollars in the Caribbean and Central America. By the turn of the century, the Latin American nations were active participants in the international economic order, but foreigners controlled most of their industries. Between 1904 and 1929, for example, the United States intervened in Latin American affairs whenever it felt its economic interests threatened. Americans secured control of the Panama Canal in 1904 on their own terms; in 1912 and 1926 U.S. Marines interfered in Nicaragua to bolster conservative governments; and the Marines that were sent to Haiti in 1915 to protect American property stayed until 1934. The result has been a bitter legacy of anti-American feeling throughout Latin America. Only with the launching of President Franklin Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy did relations between the United States and Latin America begin to improve.

Another distinctive feature of the neocolonial order was that each country's economy revolved around only one or two products: sugar in Cuba, nitrates and copper in Chile, meat in Argentina, coffee in Brazil. A sharp drop in the world market demand for a product could

LATIN AMERICA, CA 1760–1900

1764–1780	Charles III of Spain's administrative and economic reforms
1781	Comunero Revolution in New Granada
1810–1825	Latin American wars of independence against Spain
1822	Proclamation of Brazil's independence by Portugal
1825–ca 1870	Political instability in most Latin American nations
1826	Call by Simón Bolívar for Panama conference on Latin American union
ca 1870–1919	Latin American neocolonialism
1876–1911	Porfirio Díaz's control of Mexico
1880–1914	Massive emigration from Europe and Asia to Latin America
1888	Emancipation of slaves in Brazil Final abolition of slavery in Western Hemisphere
1898	Spanish-American War End of Spanish control over Cuba Transfer of Puerto Rico and the Philippines to the United States

destroy the industry and with it the nation's economic structure. The outbreak of the First World War in 1914 drastically reduced exports of Latin American raw materials and imports of European manufactured goods, provoking a general economic crisis.[13]

Throughout the eighteenth century, the Spanish-owned *haciendas*—large landed estates—and plantations had continued to expand to meet the needs of commercial agriculture: wheat for the cities, corn for the Indians' consumption, sugar for export to Europe and North America. By means of purchase, forced removal of Indians, and outright seizure, the Spanish continued to take Indian land, as they had done in the seventeenth century. Some land was acquired merely to eliminate competition by depriving Indians of their fields, which were then left fallow.

The late nineteenth century witnessed ever-greater concentrations of land in ever fewer hands. In places like the Valley of Mexico in southern Mexico, a few large haciendas controlled all the land. Under the dictatorship of General Porfirio Díaz, the Mexican government in 1883 passed a law allowing real estate companies (controlled by Díaz's political cronies) to survey public and "vacant" lands and to retain one-third of the land they surveyed. An 1894 law provided that land could be declared vacant if legal title to it could not be produced. Since few Indians had deeds to the land that their ancestors had worked for centuries, the door swung open to wholesale expropriation of small landowners and entire villages. Shrewd speculators tricked illiterate Indians into selling their lands for trifling sums. Thousands of litigants clogged the courts. Indians who dared armed resistance were crushed by government troops and carried off to virtual slave labor. Vast stretches of land came into the hands of private individuals—in one case, 12 million acres. Stripped of their lands, the Indians were a ready labor supply. They were mercilessly exploited. Debt peonage became common: landowners paid their laborers not in cash but in vouchers redeemable only at the company store, whose high prices and tricky bookkeeping kept the peons permanently in debt.

Some scholars maintain that the hacienda owners usually let their land lie fallow until it rose in value or attracted American investors. The lack of cultivation, they assert, kept the prices of corn and other crops artificially

high. The owners themselves, supported by rents, passed indolent lives in extravagant luxury in Mexico City and other cities.

Other scholars argue that the haciendas were efficient enterprises whose owners sought to maximize profits on invested capital. The Sanchez Navarro family of northwestern Mexico, for instance, engaged in a wide variety of agricultural and commercial pursuits, exploiting their lands and resources as fully as possible. Ultimately, their *latifundio*—a large landed estate—was about the size of West Virginia. Along with vast cattle ranches and sheep runs containing as many as 250,000 sheep, the Sanchez Navarros cultivated maize, wheat, and cotton. They invested heavily and profitably in silver mining and manufacturing and lent sizable sums at high interest. Although they brutally exploited their peons and practiced debt peonage, the Sanchez Navarros lived very modestly on their own estates rather than luxuriating in Mexico City.[14] A final determination of whether the Sanchez Navarros' work ethic and frugal lifestyle were unique or representative must await further investigation.

The Impact of Immigration

In 1852 the Argentine political philosopher Juan Bautista Alberdi published *Bases and Points of Departure for Argentine Political Organization,* arguing that "to govern is to populate." Alberdi meant that the development of his country—and, by extension, all of Latin America—depended on immigration. Argentina had an adequate labor supply, but it was unevenly distributed throughout the country. Moreover, Alberdi maintained, Indians and blacks lacked basic skills, and it would take too long to train them. Thus he pressed for massive immigration from the "advanced" countries of northern Europe and the United States. Alberdi's ideas won immediate acceptance and were even incorporated into the Argentine constitution, which declared that "the Federal government will encourage European immigration." Other Latin American countries adopted similar policies promoting immigration.[15]

European needs coincided perfectly with those of Latin America. After 1880, Ireland, Great Britain, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the central European nations experienced greater population growth than their labor markets could absorb. Meanwhile, the growing industries of Europe needed South American raw materials and markets for their finished goods, and South American countries wanted European markets for their minerals, coffee, sugar, beef, and manufactured goods.

Italian, Spanish, and Portuguese people poured into Latin America.

Immigrants from South, East, and southwestern Asia also flowed into South America and the Caribbean islands. For example, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, large numbers of Japanese arrived in Brazil, most settling in urban areas, especially in São Paulo. By 1920 Brazil had the largest Japanese community in the world outside of Japan. From the Middle East, Lebanese, Turks, and Syrians also entered Brazil. Peru and Argentina received small numbers of immigrants from Japan and China. Between 1850 and 1880, 144,000 East Indian laborers went to Trinidad, 39,000 to Jamaica, and smaller numbers to the islands of St. Lucia, Grenada, and St. Vincent. They all arrived as indentured servants under five-year contracts. Perhaps one-third returned to India, but the rest stayed, saved money, and bought small businesses or land. These people formed tightly knit communities, intermarried only within their group, and maintained their distinct ethnic identity. So, too, did the 8,000 Chinese, who arrived in Trinidad before 1893, bought out the last years of their indentured service contracts, and established businesses. Cuba, the largest of the Caribbean islands (about the size of Pennsylvania), had received 500,000 African slaves between 1808 and 1865. When slavery was abolished in 1886, some of their work in the sugar-cane fields was done by Chinese indentured servants, who followed the same pattern as those who had gone to Trinidad. Likewise, the abolition of slavery in Mexico led to the arrival of thousands of Chinese bonded servants. Worldwide migration knit together all parts of the globe (see page 846), and the migrants helped build the nations where they settled.

Immigration also led to rapid urbanization, which meant Europeanization and industrialization. By 1900 Buenos Aires and Rio de Janeiro had populations of more than 500,000 people; Mexico City, Montevideo, Santiago, and Havana also experienced spectacular growth. Portuguese, Italian, French, Chinese, and Japanese immigrants gave an international flavor to the cities, and a more vigorous tempo replaced the somnolent Spanish atmosphere.

By 1914 Buenos Aires had emerged as one of the most cosmopolitan cities in the world. In less than a half century, the population of the city and its province had grown from 500,000 to 3.6 million. As Argentina's political capital, the city housed all its government bureaucracies and agencies. The meatpacking, food processing, flour-milling, and wool industries were concentrated in Buenos Aires. Half of all overseas tonnage

Business District in Mexico, 1921   Business signs in several languages—such as those here in Spanish, English, and Chinese—indicate the pluralistic, multicultural character of many Latin American cities in the early twentieth century. *(Courtesy of the photographer, C. B. Williams)*

passed through the city, which was also the heart of the nation's railroad network. The University of Buenos Aires was the intellectual hub of the nation. Elegant shops near the Plaza de Mayo catered to the expensive tastes of the elite upper classes, who constituted about 5 percent of the population. But the thousands of immigrants who toiled twelve hours a day, six days a week, on docks and construction sites and in meatpacking plants crowded into the city's *conventillos,* or tenements:

The one-room dwelling . . . served a family with two to five children or a group of four or five single men. At the door to each room stood a pile of wooden boxes. One generally held a basin for washing; another a charcoal brazier on which to cook the daily watery stew, or puchero; and garbage accumulated in a third. Two or three iron cots, a pine table, a few wooden chairs, an old trunk, perhaps a sewing machine, and more boxes completed the furnishings. Light came from the open door and one window, from an oil or gas lamp, or occasionally from a bare electric light bulb. On the once-whitewashed walls were tacked pictures of popular heroes, generals, or kings torn from magazines, an image of the Madonna and a couple of saints, perhaps a faded photograph of family members in Europe. The women often eked out miserable incomes by taking in laundry and washing and drying it in the patios. Others ironed or sewed on a piecework basis. Some men worked here: in

one corner a shoemaker might ply his trade, in another a man might bend over a small table repairing watches.[16]

Immigrants dreamed of rapid economic success in the New World, and there was in fact plenty of upward social mobility. The first generation almost always did manual labor, but its sons often advanced to upper-blue-collar or to white-collar jobs. The rare Genoese or Neapolitan immigrant whose labor and thrift made his son a millionaire quickly learned the meaning of assimilation: the son typically imitated the dress, style, and values of the Spanish elite. Hispanic attitudes toward class, manual labor, and egalitarianism prevailed.[17]

Europeans and Asians gave an enormous boost to the development of industry and commerce. Italian and Spanish settlers in Argentina stimulated the expansion of the cattle industry and the development of the wheat and shoe industries. In Brazil, Swiss immigrants built the cheese business, Italians gained a leading role in the coffee industry, and Japanese pioneered the development of the cotton industry. In Peru, Italians became influential in banking and in part of the restaurant business, while the French dominated jewelry, dressmaking, and pharmaceuticals. Chinese laborers built the railroads, and in sections of large cities such as Lima, the Chinese came to dominate the ownership of shops and restaurants. The North American Henry Meiggs ("Yan

kee Pizarro") long remained the largest railroad contractor in Peru. When the country went bankrupt after a war with Chile (1879–1884), the Peruvian government had to cede control of the railroads to the British shareholders in exchange for their assumption of the national debt. Indeed, the arrival of millions of immigrants changed the entire commercial structure of South America.

Immigration promoted further ethnic integration. The vast majority of migrants were unmarried males; seven out of ten people who landed in Argentina between 1857 and 1924 were single males between thirteen and forty years old. There, as in other South American countries, many of those who stayed sought out Indian or other low-status women. Male settlers from eastern Europe and women of all nationalities preferred to marry within their own ethnic groups. But men greatly outnumbered women, and a man who chose to marry usually had to marry an Indian.[18] Immigration, then, furthered the racial mixture of Europeans, Asians, and native South Americans.

For Latin America's sizable black population, immigration proved a calamity. The abolition of slavery in Spanish America had scarcely changed the economic and social status of the Negro population. Accustomed to cutting sugar cane and working the rural coffee plantations, blacks sometimes had little preparation for urban living. Many former slaves had skills, even for factory work, but racism explains the greater presence of white immigrants in factories. In 1893, 71.2 percent of the working population of São Paulo was foreign-born. Anxious to adapt to America and to climb the economic ladder, immigrants quickly learned the traditional racial prejudices. Negro women usually found work as domestics, but employers excluded black males from good jobs. Racial prejudice kept the vast bulk of the South American black population in a wretched socioeconomic position until the Second World War.

Recent research has greatly challenged the traditional view that independence did little to change the basic social, economic, and political structure of Latin American countries. The Spanish crown was gone, and *caudillismo* (dictatorial or authoritarian rule), militarism, and standing armies filled the power vacuum. The old colonial caste system with two social classes, Spanish and Indian, dissolved, and social categories shifted. Property changed hands and haciendas expanded, reflecting the concentration of wealth and greater Creole social mobility, often at the expense of the Indians. Some Spanish and Portuguese merchants returned to the Iberian Peninsula, to be replaced by British and U.S. businessmen. As happened in the United States, Latin American nations extended their borders in the later nineteenth century. Just as the United States waged wars against the Indians (see page 894) and pushed its frontier westward, so Brazil, Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia expanded into the Amazonian frontier, at the expense of indigenous peoples. Likewise, Mexico, Chile, and Argentina had their "Indian wars" and frontier expansion. Neocolonialism's modernizing influence on commerce and industry strengthened the position of the elite and allowed it to use capitalistic values and ideals as a shield against demands for fundamental socioeconomic reforms. European styles in art, clothing, housing, and literature became highly popular, particularly among members of the elite as they sought acceptance and approval by their economic masters.

THE UNITED STATES (1789–1929)

The victory of the North American colonies and the founding of the United States seemed to validate the Enlightenment idea that a better life on earth was possible. Americans carried over into the nineteenth and twentieth centuries an unbounded optimism about the future. Although most eastern states retained a property or tax-paying qualification for the vote down to 1860, suffrage was gradually expanded to include most adult white males; New Jersey alone gave (propertied) women the vote for a time. The movement toward popular democracy accelerated as the young nation, confident of its "manifest destiny," pushed relentlessly across the continent. Westward movement, however, threatened to extend black slavery, which generated increasing disagreement between the industrialized North and the agricultural South. The ensuing Civil War cost more American lives than any other war the nation has fought. The victory of the North did not resolve the racial issue that had led to war, but it did preserve the federal system.

The years between 1865 and 1917 witnessed the building of a new industrialized nation. Immigrants settled much of the West, provided the labor to exploit the country's mineral resources, turned small provincial towns into sophisticated centers of ethnic and cultural diversity, and built the railroads that tied the country together. The ideology of manifest destiny lived on after the frontier closed and considerably affected relations between the United States and Latin America. In the First World War, American aid and American troops

Christian Mayr, Kitchen Ball at White Sulphur Springs, 1838 The German artist who painted this picture shortly after his arrival in the United States apparently had no preconceived racial views; he portrayed blacks without the insulting caricatures, marginalized situations, or political formulas typical of many mid-century representations. Rather, African Americans are shown here as graceful, dignified, and in a social scene of their own creation. Light-skinned and dark-skinned, old and young, plain and beautiful celebrate and reveal an individual and a group dignity. White Sulphur Springs was (and is) a fashionable resort. *(North Carolina Museum of Art, Raleigh. Purchased with funds from the state of North Carolina)*

were the deciding factor in the Allied victory. After the war, "normalcy" and the façade of prosperity supported a persistent optimism.

Manifest Destiny

In an 1845 issue of the *United States Magazine and Democratic Review*, editor John L. O'Sullivan boldly declared that foreign powers were trying to prevent American annexation of Texas in order to impede "the fulfillment of our manifest destiny to overspread the continent allotted by Providence for the free development of our yearly multiplying millions." O'Sullivan was articulating a sentiment prevalent in the United States since early in its history: that God had foreordained the nation to cover the entire continent. After a

large-circulation newspaper picked up the phrase "manifest destiny," it was used on the floor of Congress and soon entered the language as a catchword for and justification of expansion. The concept of manifest destiny played an important role in some basic developments in American history: the settlement of peoples of diverse nationalities, the issue of slavery, and the conflict over whether the United States was to remain agrarian or become a commercial and industrial society.

Two other concepts also played a powerful role in the formation of the young republic: social equality, by which was meant equality of opportunity, and optimism about the future. After a visit to the United States in 1831, the French nobleman Alexis de Tocqueville wrote in *Democracy in America*, a classic analysis of American civilization, "No novelty in the United States

struck me more visibly during my stay there than the equality of conditions." By equality Tocqueville meant the relative fluidity of American society, and he attributed this to Americans' mobility. Unlike Europe, where family and inherited wealth meant a great deal and people typically lived all their lives in the regions where they were born, geographical mobility in America provided enormous opportunity. A deeply rooted work ethic taught that everyone could advance through thrift and hard work. Americans also had an unbounded faith in the future. This belief that America offered golden and limitless opportunities is epitomized in the letter an immigrant Englishman wrote home to his wife:

I do not repent coming, for you know that there was nothing but poverty before me, and to see you and the dear children want was more than I could bear. I would rather cross the Atlantic ten times than hear my children cry for victuals. . . . There is plenty of room yet, and will be for a thousand years to come.[19]

When George Washington took office in 1789, fewer than 4 million people inhabited the thirteen states on the eastern seaboard. By the time Abraham Lincoln became the sixteenth president in 1861, the United States stretched across the continent and had 31 million inhabitants.

During the colonial period, pioneers had pushed westward to the Appalachian Mountains. After independence, westward movement accelerated. The eastern states claimed all the land from the Atlantic Ocean to the Mississippi River, but two forces blocked immediate expansion. The Indians, trying to save their lands, allied with the British in Canada to prevent further American encroachment. In 1794, however, Britain agreed to evacuate border forts in the Northwest Territory, roughly the area north of the Ohio River and east of the Mississippi, and thereby end British support for the Indians. A similar treaty with Spain paved the way for southeastern expansion.

Events in Europe and the Caribbean led to a massive increase in American territory. In 1800 Spain ceded the Louisiana Territory—the land between the Mississippi River and the Rocky Mountains—to France. Napoleon planned a war with Great Britain, and on the day he opened hostilities, his foreign minister, Talleyrand, casually asked Robert Livingston, the American minister to Paris, "What would you give us for the whole of Louisiana?" The astonished American proposed $4 million. "Too low!" said Talleyrand. "Reflect and see me tomorrow." Less than three weeks later, the deed of sale was signed. The United States paid only $12 million for

millions of acres of some of the world's richest farmland.

Scarcely was the ink dry on the agreement when pressure rose for war with England. Repeated British attacks on American vessels on the high seas and British interference in American trade provided diplomatic justification for the War of 1812. Western "war hawks" wanted further expansion and believed that a war with Britain would yield Canada, permanently end Indian troubles, and open up vast forestlands for settlement. The Treaty of Ghent (1814) ended the conflict but left the prewar boundaries unchanged.

After the restoration of peace, settlers poured into the Northwest Territory and the Gulf Plains (the Gulf Coast region of Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi). Congress sold land in lots of 160 acres at $2 an acre; only $80 was needed as a down payment. Irish and German immigrants rapidly put the black earth of Indiana and Illinois under cultivation. Pioneers of American stock planted cotton in the lush delta of the Gulf Plains. Scandinavian and German settlers found the softly rolling hills of the Wisconsin country ideal for cattle.

Spain, preoccupied with rebellions in South America, sold the Florida Territory to the U.S. government, and beginning in 1821 American settlers poured into the Mexican territory of Texas, whose soil proved excellent for the production of cotton and sugar. Contemptuous of the government of the Mexican president Santa Anna, the Texans rebelled and proclaimed Texas an independent republic in 1836. Southern politicians, fearing that Texas would become a refuge for fugitive slaves, pressured President John Tyler to admit Texas to the United States. A joint resolution of Congress, hastily signed by Tyler, did so in 1845. The admission of Texas as the twenty-eighth state and Florida as the twenty-seventh state (also in 1845) meant the absorption of large numbers of Hispanic people into the United States. Many of them had lived in those regions since the sixteenth century, long before Anglo immigration.

The acquisition of Texas's 267,339 square miles (France, by comparison, covers 211,200 square miles) whetted American appetites for the rest of the old Spanish Empire in North America. Some expansionists even dreamed of taking Cuba and Central America.

Exploiting Mexico's political instability, President James Polk goaded Mexico into war. Mexico suffered total defeat and in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo (1848) surrendered its remaining claims to Texas, yielded New Mexico and California, and recognized the Rio Grande as the international border. A treaty

Jackson as the "Great Father"   This cartoon satirizes Andrew Jackson, who as president (1829–1837) pushed a policy forcing the relocation of eastern Indian tribes to the west of the Mississippi. The cartoon also insults native Americans by depicting them as diminutive, doll-like, and dependent on the "Great Father," who stands for the power of the federal government. *(William L. Clements Library, The University of Michigan, Ann Arbor)*

with Great Britain in 1846 had already recognized the American settlement in the Oregon Territory. The continent had been acquired. Then, in 1898, a revolt in Cuba against an incompetent Spanish administration had consequences beyond "manifest destiny." Inflamed by press reports of Spanish atrocities, public opinion swept the United States into war. The Spanish-American War—the "splendid little war," as Secretary of State John Hay called it—lasted just ten weeks and brought U.S. control over Cuba, the Philippine Islands, and Puerto Rico. Denying imperialistic ambitions, President William McKinley justified the U.S. acquisition of Cuba and the Philippines with a classic imperialistic argument: the nation wanted only "to take

them all and educate the Filipinos and uplift and civilize and Christianize them." McKinley, like most other Americans, did not know that the Filipinos had an old, sophisticated culture and that they had been Christians for three hundred years. The nation's "manifest destiny," originally achieved at the expense of Native Americans, had evolved into worldwide imperialism.

How did the only people who were native to this vast continent fare under manifest destiny? The Indians faithfully observed their treaties with the United States, but "white pioneers in the Northwest committed the most wanton and cruel murders of them, for which it was almost impossible to obtain a conviction from a pioneer jury."[20] Government officials sometimes manipulated the Indians by gathering a few chiefs, plying them with cheap whiskey, then inducing them to hand over the tribes' hunting grounds. Sometimes officials exploited rivalries among tribes or used bribes. By these methods, William Henry Harrison, superintendent of the Indians of the Northwest Territory and a future president, got some native Americans to cede 48 million acres (Map 28.3). He had the full backing of President Jefferson.

The policy of pushing the Indians westward across the Mississippi, which President James Monroe's administration adopted early in the century, accelerated during Andrew Jackson's presidency (1829–1837). Thousands of Delawares, Shawnees, and Wyandots, tricked into moving from the Northwest Territory to reservations west of Missouri, died of cholera and measles during the journey. The survivors found themselves hopelessly in debt for supplies and farming equipment. The state of Georgia, meanwhile, was nibbling away at Cherokee lands, which were theoretically protected by treaty with the U.S. government. Then gold was discovered on the Cherokee lands, and a gold rush took place. A Vermont missionary, the Reverend Samuel C. Worcester, carried the Indians' case to the Supreme Court. Chief Justice John Marshall ruled that the laws of Georgia had no force within the Cherokee territory and that white settlers and gold rustlers had to leave. President Jackson retorted, "John Marshall has made his decision. Now let him enforce it." The Creek, Cherokee, and other tribes were rounded up, expelled, and sent beyond the western boundaries of Missouri and Arkansas.[21] Later in the century, Indians in the West were forced onto government-designated reservations. The shameful price of westward expansion was the dislocation and extermination of millions of native Americans (see Map 28.3).

Black Slavery in the South

Dutch traders brought the first black people as prisoners to Virginia in 1619 as one solution to the chronic shortage of labor in North America (white indentured servants who worked for a term of years was another solution). The first black arrivals, however, were not slaves. In the seventeenth century, a system of racial servitude and discrimination did not exist. Some blacks themselves acquired property and indentured servants.

In the early eighteenth century, as rice cultivation expanded in the Carolinas and tobacco in the Chesapeake Bay colonies of Virginia and Maryland, planters demanded more laborers. Between 1720 and 1770, black prisoners poured into the Southern colonies. In South Carolina, they came to outnumber whites by almost two to one. In the decades 1730 through 1760, white fears of black revolts pushed colonial legislatures to pass laws that established tight white control and blacks' legal position as slaves, enshrining the slave system in law. Economic demands led to the legal and social institutionalization of black slavery in North America. Racist arguments of blacks' supposed inferiority were used to justify that institutionalization.

Slavery and race relations have posed a serious dilemma for the American majority for more than two centuries. One scholar posed the question in this way:

How did the slave-holding class, which was molded by the same forces that shaped the nation, which fought America's wars and helped inspire its Revolution, a class which boasted of its patriotism, its devotion to freedom, its adherence to the major tenets of liberalism—how did such a class justify its continuing commitment to slavery?[22]

The answer can be given in two words: *profit* and *status.*

Many slave owners realized reasonable, sometimes handsome, profits in the decades before the Civil War. For white planters and farmers, slavery proved lucrative, and ownership of slaves was a status symbol as well as a means of social control. Slavery "was at the center of a well-established way of life to which [slave owners] were accustomed and attached, and the disruption or demise of which they feared above all else."[23] Millions of whites, whether or not they owned many slaves, would have agreed with the South Carolina planter who wrote, "Slavery informs all our modes of life, all our habits of thought, lies at the basis of our social existence, and of our political faith." Since the possession of slaves brought financial profit *and* conferred social status and prestige, struggling small farmers had a mater-

ial and psychological interest in maintaining black bondage. Slavery provided the means by which they might rise and the floor beneath which they could not fall. The issue of slavery is further complicated. In 1840 the U.S. Census Bureau reported six thousand free Negroes holding slaves in the nation. Six thousand black slave owners, most of whom probably held few slaves, constitute a small percentage of all slaveholders, but that number is not insignificant. The slave-owning class cannot be identified entirely with whites.

American society subsequently paid a high price in guilt and psychological conflict. Some slaveholders, like President George Washington, found the subject of slavery too uncomfortable even to talk about: "I shall frankly declare to you that I do not like even to think, much less talk of it."[24] In the half century before the Civil War, most slave owners were deeply religious. On the one hand, they taught their children to get rich by the accumulation of land and slaves; on the other hand, they taught that God would punish the greedy with eternal damnation. Slaveholders justified slavery by dismissing blacks as inferior, but religion preached that in the eyes of God, black and white were equal and would ultimately be judged on that basis.

Perhaps to an even greater extent than men, women of the planter class felt troubled by slavery. The South Carolina aristocrat Mary Boykin Chesnut confided to her diary in 1861:

I wonder if it be a sin to think slavery a curse to any land. . . . God forgive us, but ours is a monstrous system and wrong and iniquity. Perhaps the rest of the world is as bad—this only I see. Like the patriarchs of old our men live all in one house with their wives and their concubines, and the mulattoes one sees in every family exactly resemble the white children—and every lady tells you who is the father of all the mulatto children in everybody's household, but those in her own she seems to think drop from the clouds, or pretends so to think.[25]

Mary Chesnut believed that most white women of the South were abolitionists in their hearts. She enjoyed the attentions and services of her slaves, but when Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation, she welcomed it with "an unholy joy."[26]

What impact did slavery have on the black family? Herbert G. Gutman's authoritative *The Black Family in Slavery and Freedom, 1750–1925,* has demonstrated that, in spite of the destructive effects of slavery, African Americans established strong family units. Most slave couples had long marriages. A study of the entire adult slave

Indian cessions:

By 1784
By 1810
By 1835
By 1868
By 1890

Migrations:

Cherokee
Chickasaw
Choctaw
Creek
Seminole

0   200   400 Km
0   200   400 M

Oh Carry Me Back to Ole Virginny   Advertisers seek to promote their products in a highly positive light, no matter how pernicious those products may be. This 1859 label for tobacco depicts a black slave family in a warm and dignified way, because Southern tobacco manufacturers wanted not only to sell their products but also to present slavery in an affirmative and sentimental way—and thus to preserve it. The label's title refers to a contemporary folksong, not to the Virginia state anthem, ironically written by a black composer, James A. Bland. *(Library of Congress)*

population of North Carolina in 1860 has shown that 25 percent of slave marriages lasted between ten and nineteen years, 20 percent lasted at least twenty years, and almost 10 percent endured thirty years or more. Most slave women spent their entire adult lives in settled unions with the same husband. Planters encouraged slave marriages, because, as one owner put it, "marriage adds to the comfort, happiness, and health of those entering upon it, besides insuring a greater increase."[27] Large slave families advanced owners' economic interests, and planters rewarded slave women who had many children. Forcible separation due to the sale of one partner proved the greatest threat to the permanence of slave marriages. Evidence from all parts of the South reveals that, in spite of illiteracy, separated spouses tried to remain in touch with one another and, once slavery had been abolished, went to enormous lengths to reunite their families.

MAP 28.3 Indian Cession of Lands to the United States Forced removal of the Creek, Cherokee, and Chickasaw Indians led to the deaths of thousands on the Trail of Tears to reservations in Oklahoma, as well as to the destruction of their cultures.

Women often had to resist the attentions of the slave owners. In addition, owners not infrequently supplied slave women with black men who had reputations for sexual prowess. Slave women, however, made choices: they tried to select their own husbands, rejecting—up to the point of risking being sold—mates chosen by their owners.

Typically, slave women had their first child around the age of nineteen. On the Good Hope plantation in South Carolina, 80 percent of slave couples had at least four children. Almost all women had all their children by one husband, and most children grew to their teens in households with both parents present. Although premarital intercourse was common among slaves—though not as common as among young American adults during the 1970s—the weight of the evidence shows that women rarely engaged in extramarital sexual activity. The pattern of stable black marriages lasted into the present century.

Westward Expansion and Civil War

Cotton was king in the mid-nineteenth century, and cotton carried slavery westward. It was westward

expansion, not moral outrage, that brought the controversy over slavery to a head. As Congress created new territories, the question of whether slavery would be extended arose again and again (Map 28.4). For years elaborate compromises were worked out, but the North increasingly feared that the South was intent on controlling the nation. The South was afraid that free territories would harbor fugitive slaves. Issues of sectional political power became more and more heated.

In the 1850s, the question of the further expansion of slavery agitated the nation. Accepting the Republican party nomination for a seat in the U.S. Senate in 1858, Abraham Lincoln predicted the tragic events ahead:

A house divided against itself cannot stand.

I believe this government cannot endure, permanently half slave and half free.

I do not expect the Union to be dissolved—*I do not expect the house to fall—but I do expect it will cease to be divided.*

It will become all one thing, or all the other.

Either the opponents of slavery will arrest the further spread of it, and place it where the public mind shall rest in the belief that it is in the course of ultimate extinction; or its advocates will push it forward, till it shall become alike lawful in all the States, old as well as new—North as well as South.[28]

In this and every other speech that Lincoln made between 1854 and his election to the presidency in 1860, he argued against slavery less on moral or legal grounds and more in terms of free labor's self-interest.

To protest Lincoln's victory in the presidential election of 1860, South Carolina seceded from the Union in December 1860. Ten Southern states soon followed South Carolina's example and formed the Confederacy. Its capital was at Richmond, Virginia.

The Civil War began in 1861. Lincoln fought it to preserve the Union and to maintain the free labor system; the abolition of slavery was a secondary outcome, which he in fact tried to avoid. When a Union general in the field declared the slaves of South Carolina and Georgia free, Lincoln overruled the order. He wanted to bring the seceding states back into the Union with their institutions intact. To many people it seemed absurd to fight the Confederacy, which depended on slavery to wage the war, without abolishing slavery. In the words of one historian, Lincoln wanted "to conduct the war for the preservation of *status quo,* which had produced the war."[29] Only after the war had dragged on and the slaughter had become frightful on both sides,

and only when it had been proved that the Southern war effort benefited considerably from slave labor, did Lincoln, reluctantly, resolve on emancipation.

The Emancipation Proclamation became effective on January 1, 1863. It expressed no moral indignation. It freed slaves only in states and areas that were in rebellion against the United States. It preserved slavery in states that were loyal to the United States or under military jurisdiction. It allowed slavery for convicted felons. The London *Spectator* sneered, "The principle is not that a human being cannot justly own another, but that he cannot own him unless he is loyal to the United States."[30] The Emancipation Proclamation nevertheless spelled the doom of North American slavery. It transformed the Civil War from a political struggle to preserve the Union into a moral crusade for the liberty of more Americans.

European and English liberals greeted the proclamation with joy. A gathering of working people in Manchester, England, wrote President Lincoln: "The erasure of that foul blot upon civilization and Christianity—chattel slavery—during your Presidency will cause the name of Abraham Lincoln to be honoured and revered by posterity."[31] As Lincoln acknowledged, this was a magnanimous statement, for the Civil War hurt working people in Manchester. In fact, it had a worldwide impact socially and economically.

By 1862, deprived of cotton from the American South because of the Union blockade of Confederate ports, the mills of Lancashire in England had closed. Tens of thousands of workers were thrown out of work and nearly starved. Many emigrated to the United States. Between 1862 and 1864, efforts to alleviate the terrible suffering severely taxed the resources of the British government. English manufacturers looked for new suppliers and found them in Egypt, India, and Brazil, where cotton production had been stimulated by the Union blockade. The demands of English industry for Egyptian and Indian cotton played a significant role in the expansion of the English merchant marine fleet. Although England initially opposed construction of the Suez Canal, it later became a major shareholder. The canal was the swiftest route to Indian cotton.

The war also had important political consequences in Europe. In 1861 British and European opinion had divided along class lines. The upper classes sympathized with the American South; the commercial classes and working people sided with the North. The English people interpreted the Northern victory as a triumph of the democratic experiment over aristocratic oligarchy. Thus the United States gave a powerful stimulus to those in

MAP 28.4 Slavery in the United States, 1860   This map illustrates the nation on the eve of the Civil War. Although many issues contributed to the developing tension between North and South, slavery was the fundamental, enduring force that underlay all others. Lincoln's prediction, "I believe this government cannot endure, permanently half *slave* and half free," tragically proved correct.

Britain and elsewhere who supported the cause of political democracy. When parliaments debated the extension of suffrage, the American example was frequently cited.

Military historians describe the American Civil War as the first modern war:

It was the first conflict in which the massive productive capacities of the Industrial Revolution were placed at the disposal of the military machine. It witnessed the first prominent use of mass production of goods to sustain mass armies, mass transportation on railroads, and telegraphic communication between different theaters and on the battlefield. It saw also the first use of such devices of the future as armored warships, breech-loading and repeating rifles, rifled artillery, land and sea mines, submarines, balloons, precursors of the machine gun, and trench warfare. . . . In its material manifestations alone, in its application of the resources of technology to the business of killing, the Civil War presaged the later world wars.[32]

In April 1865, the Confederate general Robert E. Lee surrendered his army at Appomattox Court House in Virginia, ending the war. Lincoln had called for "malice toward none and charity for all" in his second inaugural address in 1864 and planned a generous policy toward the defeated South. The bullet that killed him brought on a different kind of reconstruction, the central figure in which was the Negro.

During the period called Reconstruction (1865–1877), the vanquished South adjusted to a new social and economic order without slavery, and the eleven Confederate states rejoined the Union. For former slaves, Reconstruction meant the reunion of black families separated before emancipation. Reconstruction also represented an opportunity for blacks to exercise their new freedom, though Southerners detested the very notion of social equality and Northerners were ambivalent on the subject.

Blacks wanted land to farm, but, lacking cash, they soon accepted the sharecropping system: farmers paid landowners about half of a year's crops at harvest time in return for a cabin, food, mules, seed, and tools the rest of the year. Believing that education was the key to

economic advancement, blacks flocked to country schools and to colleges supported by Northern religious groups. Although the Fifteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution forbade states to deny anyone the vote "on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude," whites used violence, terror, and, between 1880 and 1920, so-called Jim Crow laws to prevent blacks from voting and to enforce rigid racial segregation. Lacking strong Northern support, blacks did not gain legal equality or suffrage in many parts of the old Confederacy until the 1960s. Racist assumptions and attitudes thwarted their legal, social, and economic advance.

In the construction of a black community, no institution played a larger role than the black Protestant churches. Local black churches provided hope, education, and a forum for the spread of political ideas and platforms. During Reconstruction, black preachers esteemed for their oratorical skill, organizational ability, and practical judgment held important positions in black politics. In a racist and exploitative society, the black church gave support, security, and a sense of solidarity.

Who Is Black? The Racial Debate

In the summer of 1925, Abraham Lincoln's aging son, Robert Todd Lincoln, visited a resort in Manchester, Vermont. Lincoln hated blacks and refused to allow them to wait on him, and if a black man touched his luggage, car, or possessions, he whacked him with his cane. Lincoln selected the fair, blue-eyed, blond-haired Adam Clayton Powell (1908–1972) as his servant. Powell was an undergraduate at Colgate University working as a bellhop for the summer. The other bellhops were very amused because Powell, by the peculiarity of American society, was "black." Powell went on to represent Harlem in the U.S. Congress, 1945–1970.

Millions of other biracial Americans could tell a similar tale. From the seventeenth century to the present, the issue of race has permeated virtually every aspect of American life and culture. Although Americans rarely explore the terms they use when discussing race, a critical analysis of racial concepts is as important to the study of U.S. history as the analysis of the concepts of gender and class.[33] Who is black? How have Americans come to make racial classifications? Why are millions of people whose genetic origins are more European than African defined by custom, by law, and by even themselves as black? Why is there a tremendous disparity be-

tween the scientific definition of who is black and the sociocultural one?

Words can mean anything a community wants them to mean. The use of "black" as a racial category in the United States is actually of recent origin. Until the 1960s, persons with some African ancestry were described in the United States as "Negro" or sometimes "colored"; neither the federal government nor people of some African ancestry described themselves as "black." In the late 1960s, leaders of the Black Power movement (see page 1061), which emphasized racial pride and insisted on self-definition, demanded the substitution of the Old English word *black* for the traditional Spanish or Portuguese term *negro*. The broader American society accepted the word. The recent adoption of the expression *African American* suggests blacks' conscious desire to preserve a link with Africa. Some research shows that in the nineteenth century, however, no one tried to preserve an African culture in the United States and free people of color strongly rejected any hint of an African connection.

Since the arrival of the first Africans, sexual contacts have taken place between whites and blacks. The colonies and later the young American republic, with some hesitations and variation, defined all children born of such unions, regardless of their personal appearances, as Negro. In the American South, this manner of definition became known as the "one drop rule," meaning that a single drop of "African blood" made a person "black." Anthropologists call this the "hypo descent rule": racially mixed persons are arbitrarily assigned the status of the subordinate group. Before 1865 Southern society accepted sexual liaisons between white men and black women with general permissiveness. Recent research demonstrates that Southern communities also tacitly accepted relationships between white women and black men. White concerns for the preservation of slave property sometimes checked owners' violence against their human chattels for such sexual activity. After 1865 and the abolition of slavery, however, property rights ended, whites insisted on a total separation of the races—or at least of white women and black men—and restraints against physical violence disappeared. During Reconstruction, whites resorted to lynching in order to maintain the ideology of superiority.[34]

The U.S. census of 1850 showed that 11.2 percent of the population classed as Negro were of mixed race; the 1910 census put the figure at 20.9 percent. Because these counts were based solely on the census taker's perception of racial visibility, the estimates were proba-

bly gross undercounts of all Negroes with some white ancestry. Today, according to reliable estimates, between 75 and 90 percent of all American blacks have some white ancestry, and millions of white Americans have at least small amounts of black genetic heritage. A central theme in *Light in August* and other novels by Mississippi writer William Faulkner is the anxiety that thousands of white Southerners feel about their racial purity.

Before the Civil War, many parts of the South, but especially Charleston and New Orleans, had sizable populations of mulattos (persons with one Negro parent), quadroons (one Negro grandparent), and octoroons (one Negro great-grandparent). These persons were the results of liaisons (some of long, sometimes lifelong, duration) between persons of European and at least some African ancestry. Louisiana and South Carolina did not apply the "one drop rule" to these mixed-race people, and in 1835 Judge William Harper of South Carolina ruled that a person's acceptance as white, not the proportion of white and black "blood," determined a person's race. In short, the local community determined an individual's race. But as the South came under increasing abolitionist pressure to defend slavery, and as fears of slave revolts increased, attitudes hardened. Custom became law that defined as Negro all persons with any perceptible African ancestry.

Southerners encouraged the "one drop rule" as a way of enlarging the slave population. Likewise, after 1865, when native-born whites feared and resented blacks' economic and political potential, and between 1880 and 1910, when floods of poor immigrants from southern and eastern Europe competed with former slaves for jobs, the physical contrast between blacks and whites (in terms of skin pigmentation) proved useful to whites in justifying and legitimating their economic interests. After 1920, because there were so many mixed-race persons, and because so many Americans with some black ancestry appeared white, the U.S. census stopped counting mixed-race peoples, and the "one

Harlem Hellfighters   Returning to New York in 1919 aboard the U.S.S. *Stockholm*, these black men of the famed U.S. 369th Division had fought in the bloody battle of the Meuse Argonne during the First World War. The French government awarded one hundred and fifty of them the coveted Croix de Guerre. *(Corbis)*

drop rule" became the national legal standard. Scorned and rejected by whites, biracial persons allied with "pure" blacks and in the twentieth century began to lead the struggle for racial equality.[35] The great advocate of nonviolent social action and perhaps the greatest leader of the civil rights movement, Martin Luther King, Jr. (see page 1061), had an Irish grandmother.

Racial categories rest on socially constructed beliefs and on custom backed by law, not on any biological or anthropological classification. While a great amount of myth and folklore surrounds issues of race—myth that cannot stand up to scientific scrutiny—still, an ideology based on myth has had significant effects on people's lives.[36] Race and culture are not the same thing. *Culture* is defined as patterns of behavior, life, and beliefs. Peoples of the same race often have vastly different cultures—as, for example, Chinese culture differs from Japanese culture though both the Chinese and the Japanese are Asian, or as Italian culture differs from Russian culture though both peoples are Caucasian. So with African Americans, among whom different cultures also exist.

The accelerated immigration of huge numbers of Latin Americans and Asians to the United States since 1975 has complicated these issues. In preparation for the federal census of the year 2000, government agencies are considering modifications of customary racial categories and questioning whether it is even proper for the national government to classify people according to the arbitrary and nonscientific criteria of race. The federal Office of Management and Budget, which sets racial and ethnic standards on all governmental forms on the basis of census results, will provide rules that will influence the size and shape of congressional districts, college and business affirmative action programs, university scholarships, and loans and mortgages. As one congressman puts it, "The numbers drive the dollars."

The racial make-up of the United States is changing. More native Americans marry outside their group than within it. In the 1980s black men married white women at a rate of 10 percent (black women married whites at half that rate). Immigration also means cultural change. Large numbers of Asian women are today marrying white, Hispanic, and black men.

Hispanic people pose the greatest racial complexity. According to the Latin American concept of race, skin color is an individual variable, not a group marker; thus within a given family, one child might be considered white, another black. The 1960 census listed all people from Latin America as white—blacks from the Dominican Republic, European whites from Argentina, and Mexicans who resembled native Americans (Indians). In neither the state of Hawaii nor the commonwealth of Puerto Rico does the term *race* carry the connotation it does on the U.S. mainland.

Three broad currents of opinion about racial classification are emerging. One group urges doing away with all racial classifications because they are meaningless and unscientific and have been the historical means of exploiting persons perceived as "inferior." Other thinkers, primarily African-American scholars, agree that the notion of race is a cruel hoax but insist that the racial idea of "black" makes an important political statement. They argue that racial categories are needed to correct injustices and that the U.S. relinquishing of the racial idea of "black" would amount to the abandonment of a poor underclass. These writers have not so far addressed the situations of Hispanics, Asians, and native Americans. The third group consists of increasing numbers of biracial and multiracial persons who resent being assigned to any single category—persons who feel strong ethnic and cultural ties to two or more groups.[37] Should their feelings and pain be ignored? What do racial categories mean, anyway? Should people be discriminated against, or rewarded, on the basis of others' perceptions of who they are? Should the federal government continue its pattern of defining race in order to support the dominant race's economic goals? What if the dominant race is Hispanic? Should "the numbers drive the dollars"?

Industrialization and Immigration

After the Civil War, the United States underwent an industrial boom powered by exploitation of the country's natural resources. The federal government turned over vast amounts of land and mineral resources to industry for development. In particular, the railroads—the foundation of industrial expansion—received 130 million acres. By 1900 the American railroad system was 193,000 miles long, connected every part of the nation, and represented 40 percent of the railroad mileage of the entire world. Immigrant workers built it.

The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries witnessed the immigration of unprecedented numbers of Europeans and Asians to the United States (see page 846). Between 1860 and 1900, 14 million immigrants came, and during the peak years between 1900 and 1914, another 14 million immigrants passed through the U.S. customs inspection station at Ellis Island in

New York City. All sought a better life and a higher standard of living.

The immigrants' ambitions precisely matched the labor needs of the times. Chinese, Scandinavian, and Irish immigrants laid 30,000 miles of railroad tracks between 1867 and 1873 and another 73,000 miles in the 1880s. At the Carnegie Steel Corporation (later USX), Slavs and Italians produced one-third of the world's total steel supply in 1900. Lithuanians, Poles, Croats, Scandinavians, Irish, and Negroes entered the Chicago stockyards and built the meatpacking industry. Irish immigrants continued to operate the spinning frames and knitting machines of New England's textile mills. Industrial America developed on the sweat and brawn— the cheap labor—of its immigrant millions.

As industrial expansion transformed the eastern half of the United States, thousands of land-hungry farmers moved westward, where land was still only $1.25 an acre. In the final third of the nineteenth century, pioneers put 225 million acres under cultivation.

The West also held precious metals. The discovery of gold and silver in California, Colorado, Arizona, and Montana, and on the reservations of the Sioux Indians of South Dakota, precipitated huge rushes. Even before 1900, miners had extracted $1.24 billion in gold and $901 million in silver from western mines. Many miners settled down to farm and help their territories toward statehood. By 1912 the West had been won.

Generally speaking, the settler's life blurred sex roles. Women commonly did the same dawn-to-dusk backbreaking agricultural work as men. In addition, it fell to women to make a home out of crude log cabins that had no windows or doors or out of tarpaper shacks that had mud floors. One "gently reared" bride of seventeen took one look at her mud roof and dirt floor and indignantly announced, "My father had a much better house for his hogs!"[38] Lacking cookstoves, they prepared food over open fireplaces, using all kinds of substitutes for ingredients easily available back east. Before they could wash clothes, women had to make soap out of lye and carefully saved household ashes.

Considered the carriers of "high culture," women organized whatever educational, religious, musical, and recreational activities the settlers' society possessed. Women also had to defend their homes against prairie fires and Indian attacks. These burdens were accompanied by frequent pregnancies and, often, the need to give birth without medical help or even the support of other women. Many women settlers used such contraceptive devices as spermicides, condoms, and, after 1864, vaginal diaphragms. The death rate for infants and young children ran as high as 30 percent in the

THE COMING MAN—JOHN CHINAMAN
Uncle Sam introduces Eastern Barbarism to Western Civilization

Racism Rampant Nineteenth-century immigrants encountered terrible prejudice, as "respectable" magazines and newspapers spewed out racism, such as this cartoon from an 1869 issue of *Harper's Weekly.* The Irishman (identifiable by the shillelagh or blackthorn club, supposedly a sign of his tendency toward violence) and the Chinese man (identifiable by the pigtail, supposedly a sign of his devious obsequiousness) are both satirized as "barbarians." Well into the twentieth century, being "American" meant being of Anglo-Saxon descent. (*Harper's Weekly, August 28, 1869. Private Collection*)

mid-nineteenth century. Even so, these women had large families.

As in South America, immigration led to rapid urbanization. In 1790 only 5.1 percent of Americans were living in centers of twenty-five hundred or more people. By 1860 this figure had risen to 19.9 percent, and by 1900 almost 40 percent were living in cities. The overwhelming majority of the southern and eastern Europeans who came to North America at the turn of the century became urban industrial workers, their entire existence framed by the factory and the tenement. Newly uprooted from rural Europe, Italians, Greeks, Croats, Hungarians, Czechs, Poles, Russians, and Jews contrasted sharply with their urban neighbors and with each other. Older residents saw only "a sea of strange faces, babbling in alien tongues and framed by freakish clothes. Walking through these multitudes now was really like a voyage round the globe."[39]

Between 1880 and 1920, industrial production soared. New inventions such as the steam engine, the dynamo (generator), and the electric light were given industrial and agricultural applications. Large factories replaced small ones. Large factories could buy large machines, operate them at full capacity, and take advantage of railroad discount rates. In the automobile industry, Henry Ford of Detroit set up assembly lines. Each person working on the line performed only one task instead of assembling an entire car. In 1910 Ford sold 10,000 cars; in 1914, a year after he inaugurated the first moving assembly line, he sold 248,000 cars. Such developments changed the face of American society. Sewing machines made cheap, varied, mass-produced clothing available to city people in department stores and to country people through mail-order catalogues. The automobile increased opportunities for travel, general mobility, and change.

As elsewhere, by the 1890s U.S. factory managers were stressing industrial efficiency and the importance of time. Management engineers wanted to produce more at lower costs. They aimed to reduce labor costs by eliminating unnecessary workers. As quantity rather than quality became the measure of acceptability, workers' skills were less valued. Assembly-line workers more and more performed only monotonous and time-determined work; in effect they became interchangeable parts of the machines they operated.

Despite accelerated production, and perhaps because of overproduction, the national economy experienced repeated cycles of boom and bust in the late nineteenth century. Serious depressions in 1873, 1884, and 1893 slashed prices and threw many people out of work. Leading industrialists responded by establishing larger

corporations and consolidated companies into huge conglomerates. As a result of the merger of several small oil companies, John D. Rockefeller's Standard Oil Company controlled 84 percent of the nation's oil and most American pipelines in 1898. J. P. Morgan's United States Steel monopolized the iron and steel industries, and Swift & Co. of Chicago controlled the meat-processing industry.

Industrialization led to the creation of a vast class of wage workers who depended totally on their employers for work. Corporate managers, however, were always preoccupied with cutting labor costs. Thus employers paid workers piecemeal for the number of articles produced, to encourage the use of the new machines; managers hired more women and children and paid them much less than they paid men. Most women worked in the textile industry. Some earned as little as $1.56 for seventy hours of work, while men received from $7 to $9 for the same work. Employers reduced wages, forcing workers to toil longer and harder to maintain a certain level of income. Owners fought in legislatures and courts against the installation of costly safety devices, so working conditions in mines and mills were frightful. In 1913, even after some safety measures had been taken, 25,000 people died in industrial accidents. Between 1900 and 1917, 72,000 railroad worker deaths occurred. Workers responded with strikes, violence, and, gradually, unionization.

Urbanization brought serious problems. In *How the Other Half Lives* (1890), Jacob Riis, a newspaper reporter and recent immigrant from Denmark, drew national attention to what he called "the foul core of New York's slums." Riis estimated that 300,000 people inhabited a single square mile on New York's Lower East Side. Overcrowding, poor sanitation, and lack of health services caused frequent epidemics. The blight of slums increased crime, prostitution, alcoholism, and other drug-related addictions. Riis attacked the vicious economic exploitation of the poor.

New York City was not unique; slums and the social problems resulting from them existed in all large American cities. (See the feature "Individuals in Society: Jane Addams.") Reformers fought for slum clearance, but public apathy and vested economic interests delayed massive urban renewal until after the Second World War. In spite of all these industrial and urban difficulties, immigrants continued to come.

European and Asian immigrants aroused nativist sentiments—that is, intense hostility to foreign and "un-American" looks, behavior, and loyalties—in native-born Americans. Some of this antagonism sprang from the deep-rooted Anglo-Saxon racism of

Jane Addams (1860–1935)

Between 1880 and 1914, tens of thousands of Italian, Jewish, Polish, Hungarian, and Russian people poured into Chicago. Largely from rural backgrounds, these "strangers in a strange land" faced enormous linguistic, bureaucratic, housing, and employment difficulties, as well as nativist hostility, in adapting to this new urban industrial environment. They packed into slum tenements filled with dirt and disease, crime and violence. Overwhelmed municipal authorities could provide only the barest help, even if they had a mind to do so.

In 1889, inspired by English social reformers, Jane Addams "settled" into an old mansion, Hull-House, in an immigrant neighborhood on the near south side of Chicago. Addams had been born into very comfortable circumstances in Cedarville, Illinois, and raised by her father, a Quaker and Republican member of the Illinois legislature. He formed her social conscience by reminding her daily of the condition of the less fortunate. She graduated from Rockford College, a member of the first generation of college-educated women who rejected marriage and motherhood in favor of service to the poor and social reform.

Together with other female and male reformers who joined her, Addams set up a medical dispensary, a nursery for small children, a kindergarten, a playground, and cooperative housing for working women at Hull-House. She started English-language and music classes, and she acted as an advocate for immigrants before civic officials. Addams's basic goals were to relieve poverty and despair, to preserve human values in an urban industrial age, and to help immigrants maintain their particular ethnic and cultural heritages. Private contributions alone financed all her services.

Addams soon discovered that without legal reform and the support of public officials, the needs of slum neighborhoods could not be met. Thus, speaking before city commissions and state legislatures, she advocated the abolition of child labor, the establishment of juvenile courts, a limit to the number of hours women could be required to work (fifty-two hours a week was standard in 1910), and compulsory school attendance. Convinced that war diverted people's attention from social reform and benefited only the munitions

makers, she opposed American entry into World War I. In 1919 Addams helped found and served as first president of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom.

Jane Addams as a mature woman. *(Jane Addams Memorial Collection, Special Collections, University Library, University of Illinois at Chicago)*

Hull-House became perhaps the most famous of the "settlement houses," so called because reformers settled and lived in working-class neighborhoods. It pioneered in social research, publishing reports on "life in the real world" of urban slums. It provided young unmarried women a socially acceptable alternative to living alone. Initially, most women were not trained social workers, and living at Hull-House gave them practical experience. In 1910 Addams published the autobiographical *Twenty Years at Hull-House* to publicize its work.

The settlement movement gradually had an effect on national social reform. In 1912 the Progressive party platform adopted the movement's ideas, and Addams seconded the nomination of Theodore Roosevelt for president. Hull-House's distinguished "graduates" included Alice Hamilton, who became the first woman professor at Harvard Medical School (1919), specializing in industrial medicine; Benny Goodman, the jazz clarinetist who learned to play his instrument at Hull-House; and Frances Perkins, President Franklin Roosevelt's secretary of labor and the first female cabinet member. In 1931, Jane Addams received the Nobel Prize for Peace for her work with the poor and her efforts to promote worldwide peace.

Questions for Analysis

1. Nativist, or anti-immigrant, sentiment was based on economic, religious, and political arguments against newcomers. Can you identify some of those arguments?

2. What is a social conscience? Is it an asset or a liability?

Source: Jane Addams, *Twenty Years at Hull-House* (1910; reprint, New York: Penguin Books, 1998).

many Americans. Some grew out of old Protestant suspicions of Roman Catholicism, the faith of most of the new arrivals. A great deal of the dislike of the foreign-born sprang from fear of economic competition. To most Americans, the Chinese with their exotic looks and willingness to work for very little seemed the most dangerous. Increasingly violent agitation against Asians led to race riots in California and finally culminated in the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, which denied Chinese laborers entrance to the country.

Immigrants from Europe seized on white racism as a way to compensate for their immigrant status by claiming superiority to former slaves and their descendants. The arrival of millions of Italians and Slavs between 1880 and 1914 aggravated an already bad situation. What the German scientist Alexander von Humboldt wrote about the attitude of peninsulares toward Creoles in Latin America in the early nineteenth century—"the lowest, least educated, and uncultivated European believes himself superior to the white born in the New World"[40]—precisely applies to the outlook of Italian or Slavic immigrants to the United States at the turn of this century if one merely substitutes *black* for *white.* The social status of blacks remained the lowest, while that of immigrants rose. As the United States underwent expansion and industrialization during the nineteenth century, blacks remained the worst off *because of immigration.*[41]

In the 1890s, the nation experienced a severe economic depression. Faced with overproduction, the rich and politically powerful owners of mines, mills, and factories fought the organization of labor unions, laid off thousands, slashed wages, and ruthlessly exploited their workers. Workers in turn feared that immigrant labor would drive salaries lower. The frustrations provoked during the depression boiled over into savage attacks on the foreign-born. One of the bloodiest incidents took place in western Pennsylvania in 1897, when about 150 unarmed Polish and Hungarian coal miners persuaded others to join their walkout. The mine owners convinced the local sheriff that the strike was illegal. He panicked and ordered his deputies to shoot at the strikers. Twenty-one immigrants died, and forty were wounded. The sheriff declared that the miners were only "infuriated foreigners . . . like wild beasts." Local people agreed that if the strikers had been American-born, no blood would have been shed.[42]

After the First World War, labor leaders lobbied Congress for restrictions on immigration because they feared losing the wage gains achieved during the war. In the 1920s, Congress responded with laws that set severe quotas—2 percent of resident nationals as of the 1890 census—on immigration from southern and eastern Europe. The Japanese were completely excluded. These racist laws remained on the books until 1965.

CANADA, FROM FRENCH COLONY TO NATION

In 1608 the French explorer Samuel de Champlain (1567–1635) sailed down the St. Lawrence River and established a trading post on the site of present-day Quebec. Thus began the permanent colony of New France. The fur-trading monopolies subsequently granted to Champlain by the French crown attracted settlers, and Jesuit missionaries to the Indians further increased the French population. The British, however, vigorously challenged French control of the lucrative fur trade, and the long mid-eighteenth-century global struggle for empire between the British and the French, known in North America as the French and Indian Wars because of Indian border warfare, tested French control. In 1759, on the Plains of Abraham, a field next to the city of Quebec, the English under General James Wolfe defeated the French under General Louis Montcalm. This battle ended the French empire in North America. By the Treaty of Paris of 1763, France ceded Canada to Great Britain.

British Colony (1763–1839)

For the French Canadians, who in 1763 numbered about ninety thousand, the British conquest was a tragedy and the central event in their history. British governors replaced the French; English-speaking merchants from Britain and the thirteen American colonies to the south took over the colony's economic affairs. The Roman Catholic church remained and until about 1960 played a powerful role in the political and cultural, as well as the religious, life of French Canadians. Most of the French Canadians engaged in agriculture, though a small merchant class sold furs and imported manufactured goods.

Intending to establish a permanent administration for Canada, in 1774 the British Parliament passed the Quebec Act. This law granted religious freedom to French Canadians and recognized French law in civil matters, but it denied Canadians a legislative assembly, a traditional feature of British colonial government. Parliament placed power in the hands of an appointed governor and an appointed council; the latter, however, was composed of French Canadians as well as English

speaking members. English Canadian businessmen protested that they were being denied a basic right of Englishmen—representation.

During the American Revolution, about forty thousand Americans demonstrated their loyalty to Great Britain and its empire by immigrating to Canada. These "loyalists" not only altered the French-English ratio in the population but also pressed for a representative assembly. In 1791 Parliament responded with the Constitution Act, which divided the province of Quebec at the Ottawa River into Lower Canada (present-day Quebec, predominantly French and Catholic) and Upper Canada (present-day Ontario, primarily English and Protestant). The act also provided for an elective assembly in each of the two provinces. Because the assemblies' decisions could be vetoed by an appointed upper house or by the governor and his council, general discontent continued. Finally, in 1837, disputes over control of revenue, the judiciary, and the established churches erupted into open rebellion in both Upper and Lower Canada. The British government, fearful of a repetition of the American events of 1776, decided on a full investigation and appointed Lord Durham, a prominent liberal reformer, to make recommendations. Lord Durham published his *Report on the Affairs of British North America,* later called the "Magna Carta" of British colonial administration, in 1839.

The Age of Confederation (1840–1905)

Acting on Lord Durham's recommendations, Parliament in 1840 passed the Union Act, which united Ontario and Quebec under one government composed of a governor, an appointed legislative council, and an elective assembly in which the two provinces had equal representation. The imperial government in London was to retain control over trade, foreign affairs, public lands, and the colonial constitution. The Union Act marks an important milestone toward confederation. When Lord Durham's son-in-law, Lord Elgin, was appointed governor in 1847, he made it clear that his cabinet (council) would be chosen from the party with the majority in the elected assembly; following the British model, the cabinet had to retain the support of that majority in order to stay in office.

The idea of a union or confederation of the other Canadian provinces persisted in the 1860s. During the American Civil War, English-American relations were severely strained, and according to one historian, "Canada found herself in the centre of the storm. The

resulting fear of American aggression was a powerful factor in bringing confederation to completion."[43] Parliament's passage of the British North America Act in 1867 brought the Canadian constitution to its modern form. By the act, the traditional British parliamentary system was adapted to the needs of the new North American nation. The provinces of New Brunswick and Nova Scotia joined Ontario and Quebec to form the Dominion of Canada (Map 28.5). A governor general, who represented the British crown and fulfilled ceremonial functions, governed through the Dominion Cabinet, which, like the British Cabinet, was composed of members selected from the lower house of the legislature, to which it was responsible.

Legislative power rested in a Parliament of two houses: a Senate, whose members were appointed for life by the governor general, and a House of Commons, whose members were elected by adult males. (Canadian women won the right to vote in national elections in 1917, shortly before women in the United States and Great Britain but after women in Australia.) In theory, the two houses had equal power, though money bills had to originate in the House of Commons. In practice, the Senate came to serve only as a deliberative check on hasty legislation and as a means of rewarding elder statesmen for their party services.

The Dominion Cabinet received complete jurisdiction over internal affairs. Britain retained control over foreign policy. (In 1931 the British Statute of Westminster officially recognized Canadian autonomy in foreign affairs.)

Believing that the American system of the division of powers between the states and the federal government left the states too strong and helped to bring on the Civil War, the framers of the Canadian constitution intended to create a powerful central government. Thus provincial legislatures were assigned powers explicitly stated and applicable only to local conditions. With the implementation of the British North America Act, John A. Macdonald (1815–1891), the strongest advocate of confederation, became the Dominion's first prime minister.

Macdonald vigorously pushed Canada's "manifest destiny" to absorb all the northern part of the continent. In 1869 his government purchased for $1,500,000 the vast Northwest Territories of the Hudson Bay Company. From this territory, the province of Manitoba emerged to become part of the Dominion in 1870. Fearful that the sparsely settled colony of British Columbia would join the United States, Macdonald lured British Columbia into the confederation with a

MAP 28.5 The Dominion of Canada, 1871   Shortly after Canada became a dominion in 1867, new provinces were added (the year that appears near each province's name is the date the province joined the dominion). Still, vast areas of present-day Canada were too sparsely populated to achieve that status. Alberta and Saskatchewan did not become provinces until 1905.

subsidy to pay its debts and the promise of a transcontinental railroad. Likewise, the debt-ridden little maritime province of Prince Edward Island was drawn into confederation with a large subsidy. In five short years, between 1868 and 1873, through Macdonald's imagination and drive, Canadian sovereignty stretched from coast to coast.

Believing that a transcontinental railroad was essential to Canada's survival as a nation, Macdonald declared that "until this great work is completed our Dominion is little more than a 'geographical expression.' We have as much interest in British Columbia as in Australia, and no more. The railroad . . . finished, we [will] become a great united country with a large interprovincial trade and a common interest."[44] On November 7, 1885, Macdonald received a telegram announcing that the first train from Montreal in Quebec was approaching the Pacific; traveling at twenty-four miles per hour, the train had made the coast-to-coast

trip in a little over five days. The completion of the railroad led to the formation of two new prairie provinces, Alberta and Saskatchewan, which in 1905 entered the Dominion. (Only in 1949 did the island of Newfoundland renounce colonial status and join the Dominion.) The Canadian Pacific Railroad was Macdonald's greatest achievement.

Growth, Development, and National Maturity

Macdonald's hopes for large numbers of immigrants to people the thinly populated country did not immediately materialize. Between 1897 and 1912, however, 961,000 people entered Canada from the British Isles, 594,000 from Europe, and 784,000 from the United States. Some immigrants went to work in the urban factories of Hamilton, Toronto, and Montreal. Most immigrants from continental Europe—Poles, Germans, Scandinavians, and Russians—flooded the midwestern

George Heriot: Quebec City   Founded at the confluence of the St. Lawrence and the St. Charles Rivers as a French colony in 1608, making it the second oldest city in North America (after St. Augustine, Florida, founded in 1565), Quebec City has always been the ideological heart of French Canada. Although this scene seems derivative of many Dutch waterfront paintings, it has a certain charm and suggests the excitement of winter sports. *(Royal Ontario Museum, Canadiana Department, Toronto)*

plains and soon transformed the prairies into one of the world's greatest grain-growing regions.

Because of Canada's small population, most of which in the early twentieth century was concentrated in Ontario and Quebec, the assimilation of the immigrants to the older English-Canadian culture occurred more slowly than in the pluralistic United States. French Canadians remained the largest minority in the population. Distinctively different in language, law, and religion, and fiercely proud of their culture, they resisted assimilation. Since the 1950s, Italian and Hungarian immigration has contributed to the evolution of a more cosmopolitan culture.

Supported by population growth, Canada experienced an agricultural and industrial boom between 1891 and 1914. In those years, wheat production rocketed from 2 million bushels per year to 150 million bushels. The discovery of gold, silver, copper, and nickel in northern Ontario led to the full exploitation of those mineral resources. British Columbia, Ontario, and Quebec produced large quantities of wood pulp, much of it sold to the United States. Canada's great rivers were harnessed to supply hydroelectric power for

industrial and domestic use. Meanwhile, the government erected tariffs to protect industry, established a national civil service, and built a sound banking system.

Canada's powerful support of the Allied cause in the First World War demonstrated its full maturity as a nation. In 1914 the British government still controlled the foreign policy of all parts of the empire. When Britain declared war on Germany, Canada unhesitatingly followed. More than 600,000 Canadian soldiers served with distinction in the army, some of them in the bloodiest battles in France. The 60,661 Canadians killed represent a greater loss than that experienced by the more populous United States. Canadian grain and foodstuffs supplied much of the food of the Allied troops, and Canadian metals were in demand for guns and shells. Canadian resentment, therefore, over lack of voice in the formulation of Allied war policies was understandable.

In 1917 the British government established the Imperial War Cabinet, a body composed of the chief British ministers and the prime ministers of the Dominions (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and South Africa) to set policy. In 1918 Canada demanded and

received—over the initial opposition of Britain, France, and the United States—the right to participate in the Versailles Peace Conference and in the League of Nations. Canada had become a respected and independent nation. Since 1939 Canada has been a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations. The constitution of 1982 abolished the power of the London Parliament to amend Canada's constitution and ended all appeals from the provinces to London. Quebec did not sign the 1982 document, and the strong separatist movement within Quebec continues to articulate the desire of French-speaking Canadians for independence from English Canada and sovereignty as a separate nation.

AUSTRALIA, FROM PENAL COLONY TO NATION

In April 1770, James Cook, the English explorer, navigator, and captain of H.M.S. *Endeavor,* dropped anchor in a wide bay about ten miles south of the present city of Sydney on the coast of eastern Australia. Because the young botanist on board the ship, Joseph Banks, subsequently discovered 30,000 specimens of plant life in the bay, 1,600 of them unknown to European science, Captain Cook called the place Botany Bay. Totally unimpressed by the flat landscape and its few naked inhabitants—the Aborigines, or native people—Cook sailed north along the coast. Finally, the ship rounded Cape York Peninsula, the northernmost point of Australia (Map 28.6). On August 21, on a rock later named Possession Island, Cook formally claimed the entire land south of where he stood for King George III, 16,000 miles away. Cook called the land "New South Wales." In accepting possession, the British crown acted on the legal fiction that Australia was *Terra Nullius,* completely unoccupied, thus entirely ignoring the native people.

The world's smallest continent, Australia is located southeast of Asia between the Pacific and Indian Oceans. It is about half the size of Europe and almost as large as the United States (excluding Alaska and Hawaii). Three topographical zones roughly divide the continent. The Western Plateau, a vast desert and semi-desert region, covers almost two-thirds of the continent. The Central Eastern Lowlands extend from the Gulf of Carpentaria in the north to western Victoria in the south. The Eastern Highlands are a complex belt of tablelands. Australia is one of the world's driest continents. It has a temperate climate and little intense cold.

When Cook arrived in Australia, about three hundred thousand Aborigines inhabited the continent. A peaceful and nomadic people who had emigrated from southern Asia millennia before, the Aborigines lived entirely by food gathering, fishing, and hunting. They had no domestic agriculture. Tribal customs governed their lives. Although they used spears and bows and arrows in hunting, they never practiced warfare as it was understood by more technologically advanced peoples such as the Aztecs of Mexico or the Mandinke of West Africa. When white settlers arrived, they occupied the Aborigines' lands unopposed. According to one Australian scholar, from 1788 to the present, "Australian governments have been much more concerned with protecting the Aborigines than with fighting them."[45] Nevertheless, like the Indians of Central and South America, the Aborigines fell victim to the white peoples' diseases and to a spiritual malaise caused by the breakdown of their tribal life. Today only about forty-five thousand pureblood Aborigines survive.

Penal Colony

The victory of the thirteen North American colonies in 1783 inadvertently contributed to the establishment of a colony in Australia five years later. Before 1775 the British government had shipped about one thousand convicts annually to Georgia. Crime in England was increasing in the 1770s and 1780s, and the transportation of felons "beyond the seas" seemed the answer to the problem of overcrowded prisons. Moreover, the establishment of a colony in Australia would provide a home for dispossessed loyalists who had fled America during the American Revolution.

In England, the prisons were so full that old transport ships in southern naval ports were being used to house criminals, and pressure on the government to do something was intense. Finally, in August 1786, the British Cabinet approved the establishment of a penal colony at Botany Bay to serve as "a remedy for the evils likely to result from the late alarming and numerous increase of felons in this country, and more particularly in the metropolis (London)."[46] The name "Botany Bay" became a byword for the forced and permanent exile of criminals. In May 1787, a fleet of eleven ships packed with one thousand felons and their jailers sailed for Australia. After an eight-month voyage, it landed in Sydney Cove on January 28, 1788.

Mere survival in an alien world was the first challenge. Because the land at Botany Bay proved completely unsuited for agriculture and lacked decent

MAP 28.6 Australia   The vast deserts in western Australia meant that cities and industries would develop mainly in the east. Australia's early geographical and cultural isolation bred a sense of inferiority. Air travel, the communications revolution, and the massive importation of Japanese products and American popular culture have changed that.

water, the first governor, Arthur Phillip, moved the colony ten miles north to Port Jackson, later called Sydney. Announcing that those who did not work would not eat, Phillip set the prisoners to planting seeds. Coming from the slums of London, the convicts knew nothing of agriculture, and some were too ill or old to work. The colony lacked draft animals and plows. The troop detachments sent to guard the prisoners considered it below their dignity to work the land. For years the colony of New South Wales tottered on the brink of starvation.

For the first thirty years, men far outnumbered women. Because the British government refused to allow wives to accompany their convict-husbands, prostitution flourished. Many women convicts, if not professional prostitutes when they left England, became such during the long voyage south. Army officers, government officials, and free immigrants chose favorite convicts as mistresses.

Recent research provides useful information about the official attitude toward women. On May 3, 1791, Lieutenant Ralph Clark recorded in his diary that he

had ordered three women convicts flogged. Catherine White fainted after the first 15 lashes, Mary Teut after 22. When Mary Higgins had received 26 lashes, Lieutenant Clark "forgave her the remainder [he had ordered 50] because she was an old woman." From other sources we know that another woman convict was six months' pregnant at the time with Clark's child.[47] This incident shows the brutality of power and the hypocrisy of an administration that simultaneously savagely punished and sexually exploited women. The vast majority of children born in the colony were illegitimate.

Officers and jailers, though descended from the middle and lower middle classes, tried to establish a colonial gentry and to impose the rigid class distinctions that they had known in England. Known as *exclusionists,* this self-appointed colonial gentry tried to exclude from polite society all freed or emancipated persons, called *emancipists.* Deep and bitter class feeling took root.

Economic Development

For eighty long years after 1787, Britain continued to transport convicts to New South Wales. Transportation rested on two premises: that criminals should be punished and that they should not be a financial burden on the state. Convicts became free when their sentences expired or were remitted. Few returned to England.

Governor Phillip and his successors urged the Colonial Office to send free settlers. The Napoleonic wars slowed emigration before 1815, but thereafter a steady stream of people relocated. The end of the European wars also released capital for potential investment. But investment in what? What commodity could be developed and exported to England?

Immigrants explored several economic enterprises. In the last decade of the eighteenth century, for example, sealing seemed a likely possibility. Sealing merchants hired Aborigine women to swim out to the seal rocks, lie down among the seals until their suspicions were dulled, and then at a signal rise up and club the seals to death. In 1815 a single ship carried sixty thousand sealskins to London (a normal cargo contained at least ten thousand skins). Such destruction rapidly depleted the seals.

Credit for the development of the product that was to be Australia's staple commodity for export—wool—goes to John Macarthur (1767–1834). Granted a large tract of Crown lands and assigned thirty convicts to work for him, Macarthur conducted experiments in the production of fine merino wool. In 1800 he sent sample fleeces to England to determine their quality. He also worked to change the government's penal view of

New South Wales to a commercial one and to attract the financial support of British manufacturers.

The report of J. T. Bigge, an able lawyer sent out in 1819 to evaluate the colony, proved decisive. Persuaded by large landowners like Macarthur, Bigge reported that wool was the country's future staple. He recommended that convicts be removed from the temptations of towns and seaports and dispersed to work on the estates of men of capital. He also urged that British duties on colonial wool be suspended. The Colonial Office accepted this advice, and the pastoral economy of Australia, as the continent was beginning to be called, began.

Australia's temperate though capricious climate is ideally suited to sheep farming. Moreover, wool production requires much land and little labor—precisely the situation in Australia. In 1820 the sheep population was 120,000; by 1830 it reached a half million. After 1820 the commercial importance of Australia exceeded its significance as a penal colony, and wool export steadily increased: from 75,400 pounds in 1821, to 2 million pounds in 1830, to 24 million pounds in 1845.

Settlers also experimented with wheat farming. Soil deficiencies and the dry climate slowed early production, but farmers eventually developed a successful white-grained winter variety. By 1900 wheat proved Australia's second most valuable crop.

Population shortage remained a problem. In this area, the development of Australia owes something to the vision of Edward Gibbon Wakefield (1769–1862), a theorist of colonization. Between 1825 and 1850, 3 million people emigrated from Great Britain. In the quest for immigrants, Australia could not really compete with North America. The 12,000-mile journey to Australia cost between £20 and £25 and could take five weary months. By contrast, the trip to Canada or the United States cost only £5 and lasted just ten weeks. Wakefield proposed that Australian land be sold relatively cheaply and that proceeds from the sale be used to pay the passages of free laborers and mechanics. That eliminated the disadvantage of cost. Although over 2,500,000 British immigrants went to North America, 223,000 industrious English and Irish people chose Australia.

Population in the early nineteenth century concentrated on the eastern coast of the continent. The growth of sheep farming stimulated exploration and led to the opening of the interior. In 1813 explorers discovered a route over the Blue Mountains. New settlements were made in Hobart, Tasmania, in 1813; in Queensland on the Brisbane River in 1824; and on the Swan River in western Australia in 1829. Melbourne was established on Port Phillip Bay in 1835 and Ade-

laide on Gulf St. Vincent in 1836. These settlements served as the bases for further exploration and settlement. Population continued to grow with the arrival of more convicts (a total of 161,000 when the system was finally abolished in 1868). The Ripon Land Regulation Act of 1831, which provided land grants, attracted free settlers. By 1850 Australia had 500,000 inhabitants. The discovery of gold in Victoria in 1851 quadrupled that number in a few years.

From Colony to Nation

On February 12, 1851, Edward Hargraves, an Australian-born prospector who had returned to Australia after unsuccessful digging in the California gold rush of 1849, discovered gold in a creek on the western slopes of the Blue Mountains. Hargraves gave the district the biblical name Ophir (Job 22:24), and the newspapers said the region was "one vast gold field." In July a miner found gold at Clunes, one hundred miles west of Melbourne, and in September gold was found in what proved to be the richest field of all, Ballarat, just seventy-five miles west of Melbourne. Gold fever convulsed Australia. Although the government charged prospectors a very high license fee, men and women from all parts of the globe flocked to Australia to share in the fabulous wealth.

Contemporaries agreed with explorer and politician W. C. Wentworth, who said that the gold rush opened in Australia a new era, "which must in a very few years precipitate us from a colony to a nation."[48] Although recent scholars have disputed Wentworth, there is much truth to his viewpoint. The gold rush led to an enormous improvement in transportation within Australia. People customarily traveled by horseback or on foot and used two-wheel ox-drawn carts to bring wool from inland ranches to coastal cities. Then two newly arrived Americans, Freeman Cobb and James Rutherford, built sturdy four-wheel coaches capable of carrying heavy cargo and of negotiating the bush tracks. Carrying passengers and mail up to 80 miles a day, a week's work for ox-drawn vehicles, Cobb and Co.

Convicts Embarking for Botany Bay   The English printmaker and caricaturist Thomas Rowlandson (1756–1827) sketched this scene with ink and watercolor wash. In the background the gibbet with hanging felons shows the legal alternative to transportation to Australia. *(National Library of Australia, Canberra)*

coaches covered 28,000 miles per week by 1870. Railroad construction began in the 1870s, and by 1890, 9,000 miles of track were laid. Railroad construction, financed by British investors, stimulated agricultural growth.

The gold rush also provided the financial means for the promotion of education and culture. The 1850s witnessed the establishment of universities at Sydney and Melbourne and later at Adelaide and Hobart. Public libraries, museums, art galleries, and schools opened in the thirty years after 1851. In keeping with the overwhelmingly British ethnic origin of most immigrants to Australia, these institutions dispensed a distinctly British culture, though a remote and provincial version.

On the negative side, the large numbers of Asians in the goldfields—in Victoria in 1857, one adult male in seven was Chinese—sparked bitter racial prejudice. Scholars date the "white Australia policy" to the hostility, resentment, and fear that whites showed the Chinese.

Although Americans numbered only about five thousand in Victoria and Asians forty thousand, Americans with their California gold-rush experience, aggressive ways, and "democratic" frontier outlook, exercised an influence on Australian society far out of proportion to their numbers. "There was evidence to suggest that some Americans, bringing with them their pre–Civil War racist attitudes, had an appreciable influence on the growth of color prejudice in Australia."[49] On the Fourth of July in 1852, 1854, and 1857 (anniversaries of the American Declaration of Independence), anti-Chinese riots occurred in the goldfields of Victoria. After the gold-rush decade, public pressure for the exclusion of all colored peoples increased. Nevertheless, Asian peoples continued to arrive. Chinese and Japanese built the railroads and ran the market gardens near, and the shops in, the towns. Filipinos and Pacific Islanders did the hard work in the sugar-cane fields. Afghanis and their camels controlled the carrying trade in some areas.

"Colored peoples" (as all nonwhites were called in Australia) adapted more easily than the British to the warm climate and worked for lower wages. Thus they proved essential to the country's economic development in the nineteenth century. But fear that colored labor would lower living standards and undermine Australia's distinctly British culture triumphed. The Commonwealth Immigration Restriction Act of 1901 closed immigration to Asians and established the "white Australia policy." Australia achieved racial and cultural unity only at the price of Asian resentment at discrimination and retarded economic development in the northern

colonies, which desperately needed labor. The laws of 1901 remained on the books until the 1970s.

The gold rush had a considerable political impact. In 1850 the British Parliament had passed the Australian Colonies Government Act, which allowed the four most populous colonies—New South Wales, Tasmania, Victoria, and South Australia—to establish colonial legislatures, determine the franchise, and frame their own constitutions. The gold rush, vastly increasing population, accelerated the movement for self-government. Acknowledging this demand, the colonial secretary in London wrote that the gold discoveries "imparted new and unforeseen features to (Australia's) political and social condition." Western Australia's decision to remain a penal colony delayed responsible government there, but by 1859 all other colonies were self-governing. The provincial parliament of South Australia was probably the most democratic in the world, since it was elected by universal manhood suffrage and by secret ballot. Other colonies soon adopted the secret ballot. In 1909 Australia became the first country in the world to adopt woman suffrage.

The government of Australia combines features of the British and American systems. In the later nineteenth century, pressure for continental federation culminated in meetings of the premiers (governors) of the colonies. They drafted a constitution that the British Parliament approved in 1900. The Commonwealth of Australia came into existence on January 1, 1901. From the British model, Australia adopted the parliamentary form of government in which a cabinet is responsible to the House of Commons. From the American system, Australia took the concept of decentralized government, whereby the states and the federal government share power. The states in Australia, as in the United States, retain considerable power, especially in local or domestic affairs.

Deep loyalty to the mother country led Australia to send 329,000 men and vast economic aid to Britain in the First World War. The issue of conscription, however, bitterly divided the country, partly along religious lines. About one-fourth of Australia's population was (and is) Irish and Roman Catholic. Although the Catholic population, like the dominant Anglican one, split over conscription, the powerful, influential, and long-lived Catholic archbishop of Melbourne, Daniel Mannix (r. 1917–1963), publicly supported Sinn Fein—the Irish nationalist (and later terrorist) movement. Mannix also denounced the English and the European war.

Twice submitted to public referendum, conscription twice failed. When the Australian poet Frank Wilmot

(1881–1942) wrote, "The fumes of ancient hells have invaded your spirit," he meant that English wrongs in Ireland had become part of Australian culture.

Australian troops fought valiantly in the Dardanelles campaign, where more than 10,000 died. During the long nightmare of trench warfare on the western front, Australian soldiers were brilliantly led by Sir John Monash, a Jewish Australian whose planning led to the Allied breakthrough and the ultimate defeat of Germany. Australia's staggering 213,850 casualties, however, exerted a traumatic effect on Australian life and society. With the young men died the illusion that remote Australia could escape the problems and sins of the Old World. But the experience of the Great War forged a sense of national identity among the states of Australia.

At the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, Australian delegates succeeded in excluding recognition of the principle of racial equality in the League of Nations Covenant. Australians did not want Asian immigrants. The treaties that followed the war allowed Australia a mandate over German New Guinea and the equatorial island of Nauru. Nauru had vast quantities of phosphates that Australian wheat fields needed as fertilizer. The former penal colony had become a colonial power.

SUMMARY

Between 1788 and 1931, the United States, Canada, and Australia developed from weak, agricultural colonies of Great Britain into powerful industrial and commercial nations, and the countries of Latin America first secured independence from Spain and then began the process of nation building. Inspired by notions of social equality and manifest destiny, galvanized by the optimism of millions of immigrants who came seeking a better life, Americans subdued the continent, linked it with railroads, and built gigantic steel, oil, textile, food-processing, and automobile industries. The North's victory in the bloody Civil War, fought largely over the issue of black slavery, proved the permanence of the Union, but the unresolved ideal of equality remains the American dilemma. Industrialization and the assimilation of foreign peoples also preoccupied the nations of Latin America, but political instability and economies often dominated by the United States or Great Britain slowed growth.

Canada and Australia followed the path of the United States, though at a slower pace. Adopting the British model of cabinet government under John A. Macdon-

ald, and utilizing rich natural resources, the provinces of Canada formed a strong federation with close economic ties to the United States; each is the other's major trading partner. French separatism, centered in Quebec, remains the Canadian dilemma. Australia utilized political features of both the British and the American systems. Immigrant production of wool, wheat, and now wine has transformed Australia from a remote penal colony into the great democratic nation of the Pacific.

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10. Quoted in Phelan, *The People and the King*, pp. 206–207.

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24. Quoted in Oakes, *The Ruling Race,* p. 120.

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34. See M. Hodes, *White Women, Black Men: Illicit Sex in the 19th-Century South* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1997), pp. 3–9 and passim.

35. F. J. Davis, *Who Is Black? One Nation's Definition* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1991), passim, but esp. Chaps. 2 and 3, pp. 31–80.

36. Hodes, *White Women, Black Men,* p. 9.

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40. Quoted in Lynch, *The Spanish-American Revolutions, 1808–1826,* p. 18.

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On black culture and black women and the family, see J. Jones, *Labor of Love, Labor of Sorrow: Black Women, Work, and the Family from Slavery to the Present* (1985); and C. Neverdon-Morton, *Afro-American Women of the South and the Advancement of the Race, 1895–1925* (1989). See also W. S. McFeely, *Frederick Douglass* (1991), and I. Berlin et al., eds., *Freedom: A Documentary History of Emancipation* (1990). For the powerful influence of the black church, see E. Lincoln and C. H. Mamiya, *The Black Church in the African American Experience* (1990), and J. T. McGreevy, *Parish Boundaries: The Catholic Encounter with Race in the Twentieth Century Urban North* (1996).

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Simón Bolívar's Speculation on Latin America

Descended from a wealthy Venezuelan family, Simón Bolívar (1783–1830) was educated privately by tutors, who instilled in him the liberal and republican ideals of the French Enlightenment. He traveled to Europe and in 1805, while in Rome, dedicated himself to liberating his country from Spanish rule. Returning to Venezuela, Bolívar worked as a diplomat, a statesman, and, above all, the general who defeated the Spaniards and liberated northern regions of the continent. When he entered Caracas, the citizens called him "the Liberator," and the name stuck.

Almost two generations earlier, on July 4, 1776, the Second Continental Congress (an anachronism and misnomer, since the men in Philadelphia hardly represented the entire "continent") had adopted Virginia planter Thomas Jefferson's Declaration of Independence, justifying the thirteen colonies' independence and appealing for European support with a long diatribe against King George III's supposedly tyrannical acts. It was a document of propaganda. In 1815 Simón Bolívar addressed a letter to the governor of Jamaica, responding to the latter's request for Bolívar's views on prospects for Latin American liberation and the establishment of one unified nation. Bolívar's "Letter from Jamaica" expresses Latin American ideals and came to serve purposes comparable to the Declaration of Independence. Excerpts from this letter follow.

Kingston, Jamaica, September 6, 1815.

My dear Sir:

. . . With what a feeling of gratitude I read that passage in your letter in which you say to me: "I hope that the success which then followed Spanish arms may now turn in favor of their adversaries, the badly oppressed people of South America." I take this hope as a prediction. . . . The hatred that the Peninsula[1] has inspired in us is greater than the ocean between us. . . .

Europe could do Spain a service by dissuading her from her rash obstinacy, thereby at least sparing her the costs she is incurring and the blood she is expending. And if she will fix her attention on her own precincts she can build her prosperity and power upon more solid foundations than doubtful conquests, precarious commerce, and forceful exactions from remote and powerful peoples. Europe herself, as a matter of common sense policy, should have prepared and executed the project of American independence, not alone because the world balance of power so necessitated, but also because this is the legitimate and certain means through which Europe can acquire overseas commercial establishments. . . .

It is even more difficult to foresee the future fate of the New World, to set down its political principles, or to prophesy what manner of government it will adopt. Every conjecture relative to America's future is, I feel, pure speculation. . . . We are a young people. We inhabit a world apart, separated by broad seas. We are young in the ways of almost all the arts and sciences, although, in a certain manner, we are old in the ways of civilized society. . . . We are, moreover, neither Indian nor European, but a species midway between the legitimate proprietors of this country and the Spanish usurpers. In short, though Americans by birth we derive our rights from Europe, and we have to assert these rights against the rights of the natives, and at the same time we must defend ourselves against the invaders. This places us in a most extraordinary and involved situation. Notwithstanding that it is a type of divination to predict the result of the political course which America is pursuing, I shall venture some conjectures which, of course, are colored by my enthusiasm and dictated by rational desires rather than by reasoned calculations. . . .

. . . We have been harassed by a conduct which has not only deprived us of our rights but has kept us in a sort of permanent infancy with regard to public affairs. If we could at least have managed our domestic affairs and our internal administration, we could have acquainted ourselves with the processes and mechanics of public affairs. We should also have enjoyed a personal consideration, thereby commanding a certain unconscious respect

from the people, which is so necessary to preserve amidst revolutions. That is why I say we have even been deprived of an active tyranny, since we have not been permitted to exercise its functions.

Americans today, and perhaps to a greater extent than ever before, who live within the Spanish system occupy a position in society no better than that of serfs destined for labor, or at best they have no more status than that of mere consumers. Yet even this status is surrounded with galling restrictions, such as being forbidden to grow European crops, or to store products which are royal monopolies, or to establish factories of a type the Peninsula itself does not possess. To this add the exclusive trading privileges, even in articles of prime necessity, and the barriers between American provinces, designed to prevent all exchange of trade, traffic, and understanding. In short, do you wish to know what our future held?—simply the cultivation of the fields of indigo, grain, coffee, sugar cane, cacao, and cotton; cattle raising on the broad plains; hunting wild game in the jungles; digging in the earth to mine its gold—but even these limitations could never satisfy the greed of Spain. . . .

More than anyone, I desire to see America fashioned into the greatest nation in the world, greatest not so much by virtue of her area and wealth as by her freedom and glory. Although I seek perfection for the government of my country, I cannot persuade myself that the New World can, at the moment, be organized as a great republic. Since it is impossible, I dare not desire it; yet much less do I desire to have all America a monarchy because this plan is not only impracticable but also impossible. Wrongs now existing could not be righted, and our emancipation would be fruitless. The American states need the care of paternal governments to heal the sores and wounds of despotism and war. . . .

From the foregoing, we can draw these conclusions: The American provinces are fighting for their freedom, and they will ultimately succeed. Some provinces as a matter of course will form federal and some central republics; the larger areas will inevitably establish monarchies, some of which will fare so badly that they will disintegrate in either present or future revolutions. To consolidate a great monarchy will be no easy task, but it will be utterly impossible to consolidate a great republic.

It is a grandiose idea to think of consolidating the New World into a single nation, united by pacts into a single bond. It is reasoned that, as these parts have a common origin, language, customs, and religion, they ought to have a single government to permit the newly formed states to unite in

The Liberator: Simón Bolívar. *(ARCHIVO CENI-DIAP-INBA, Mexico City. Collection of Fernando Leal Audirac)*

a confederation. But this is not possible. . . . Would to God that some day we may have the good fortune to convene . . . an august assembly of representatives of republics, kingdoms, and empires to deliberate upon the high interests of peace and war with the nations of the other three-quarters of the globe. This type of organization may come to pass in some happier period of our regeneration. But any other plan . . . would be meaningless.

When success is not assured, when the state is weak, and when results are distantly seen, all men hesitate; opinion is divided, passions rage, and the enemy fans these passions in order to win an easy victory because of them. As soon as we are strong and under the guidance of a liberal nation which will lend us her protection, we will achieve accord in cultivating the virtues and talents that lead to glory. Then will we march majestically toward that great prosperity for which South America is destined. . . .

Questions for Analysis

1. Compare the arguments in the Declaration of Independence (see page 719) and the "Letter from Jamaica."

2. For Bolívar, what are the prospects for Latin American unity as one nation?

1. The Iberian Peninsula—Spain and Portugal

2. Montesquieu (1689–1755) was an Enlightenment philosopher best known for his *Spirit of the Laws* (1755) and his theory that the powers of government ought to be separated to ensure individual freedom

Source: A. J. Andrea and J. H. Overfield, eds., *The Human Record,* vol. 2, rev. ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1994

29

The Great Break:
War and Revolution

In the summer of 1914 the nations of Europe went willingly to war. They believed they had no other choice. Moreover, both peoples and governments confidently expected a short war leading to a decisive victory. Such a war, they believed, would "clear the air," and then European society would be able to go on as before.

These expectations were largely mistaken. The First World War was long, indecisive, and tremendously destructive. To the shell-shocked generation of survivors, it was known simply as the Great War: the war of unprecedented scope and intensity. From today's perspective it is clear that the First World War marked a great break in the course of world historical development. The war accelerated the growth of nationalism in Asia (see Chapter 30), and it consolidated the position of the United States as a global power. Yet the war's greatest impact was on Europe, the focus of this chapter. A noted British political scientist has gone so far as to say that even in victorious and relatively fortunate Great Britain, the First World War was *the* great turning point in government and society, "as in everything else in modern British history. . . . There's a much greater difference between the Britain of 1914 and, say, 1920, than between the Britain of 1920 and today."[1] This strong statement contains a great amount of truth, for all Europe as well as for Britain.

- What caused the Great War?
- How did the war lead to revolution and the fall of empires?
- How and why did war and revolution have such enormous and destructive consequences?
- How did the years of trauma and bloodshed form elements of today's world, many of which people now accept and even cherish?

These are the questions this chapter will try to answer.

THE FIRST WORLD WAR

The First World War was so long and destructive because it involved all the Great Powers and because it quickly degenerated into a senseless military stalemate. Like evenly matched boxers in a championship bout, the two sides tried to wear each other down. But there was no referee to call a draw, only the blind hammering of a life-or-death struggle.

The Bismarckian System of Alliances

The defeat of France in 1871 (see page 827) and the founding of the German Empire opened a new era in international relations. In just ten years, from 1862 to 1871, Bismarck had made Prussia-Germany—traditionally the weakest of the Great Powers—the most powerful nation in Europe. Yet, as Bismarck never tired of repeating after 1871, Germany was a "satisfied" power. Within Europe Germany had no territorial ambitions and wanted only peace.

But how was peace to be preserved? Bismarck's first concern was to keep an embittered France diplomatically isolated and without military allies. His second concern was the threat to peace posed by Austria-Hungary and Russia. Those two enormous multinational empires had many conflicting interests, particularly in the Balkans, where the Ottoman Empire—the "sick man of Europe"—was ebbing fast. There was a real threat that Germany might be dragged into a great war between the two rival empires. Bismarck's solution was a system of alliances (Figure 29.1) to restrain both Russia and Austria-Hungary, to prevent conflict between them, and to isolate a hostile France.

A first step was the creation in 1873 of the Three Emperors' League, which linked the conservative monarchs of Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Russia in an alliance against radical movements. In 1877 and 1878, when Russia's victories over the Ottoman Empire threatened the balance of Austrian and Russian interests in the Balkans and the balance of British and Russian interests in the Middle East, Bismarck played the role of sincere peacemaker at the Congress of Berlin in 1878 (see page 924). But his balancing efforts at the congress infuriated Russian nationalists, and their anger led Bismarck to conclude a defensive military alliance with Austria against Russia in 1879. Motivated by tensions with France, Italy joined Germany and Austria in 1882, thereby forming what became known as the Triple Alliance.

Bismarck continued to work for peace in eastern Europe, seeking to neutralize tensions between Austria-Hungary and Russia. In 1881 he cajoled them both into a secret alliance with Germany. This Alliance of the Three Emperors lasted until 1887.

Bismarck also maintained good relations with Britain and Italy, while encouraging France in Africa but keeping France isolated in Europe. In 1887 Russia declined to renew the Alliance of the Three Emperors because of

FIGURE 29.1 The Alliance System After 1871   Bismarck's subtle diplomacy maintained reasonably good relations among the eastern monarchies—Germany, Russia, and Austria-Hungary—and kept France isolated. The situation changed dramatically in 1891, when the Russian-French Alliance divided the Great Powers into two fairly equal military blocs.

new tensions in the Balkans. Bismarck craftily substituted the Russian-German Reinsurance Treaty, by which both states promised neutrality if the other was attacked.

Bismarck's accomplishments in foreign policy after 1871 were great. For almost a generation he maintained German leadership in international affairs, and he worked successfully for peace by managing conflicts

and by restraining Austria-Hungary and Russia with defensive alliances.

The Rival Blocs

In 1890 the young, impetuous German emperor William II dismissed Bismarck, in part because of the chancellor's friendly policy toward Russia since the 1870s. William then adamantly refused to renew the Russian-German Reinsurance Treaty, in spite of Russian willingness to do so. This fateful departure in foreign affairs prompted long-isolated republican France to court absolutist Russia, offering loans, arms, and friendship. In both countries there were enthusiastic public demonstrations, and in St. Petersburg harbor the autocratic tsar Alexander III stood bareheaded on a French battleship while a band played the "Marseillaise," the hymn of the French Revolution. After a preliminary agreement was reached in 1891, France and Russia became military allies in 1894, pledging to remain so as long as the Triple Alliance of Austria, Germany, and Italy existed (see Figure 29.1). As a result, continental Europe was dangerously divided into two rival blocs.

Great Britain's foreign policy became increasingly crucial. Long content with "splendid isolation" and no permanent alliances, Britain after 1891 was the only uncommitted Great Power. Could Britain afford to remain isolated, or would it feel compelled to take sides? Alliance with France or Russia certainly seemed highly unlikely. With a vast and rapidly expanding empire, Britain was often in serious conflict with these countries around the world.

Britain also squabbled with Germany, but many Germans and some Britons felt that a "natural alliance" united the advanced, racially related Germanic and Anglo-Saxon peoples. However, the generally good relations that had prevailed between Prussia and Great Britain ever since the mid-eighteenth century, and certainly under Bismarck, gave way to a bitter Anglo-German rivalry.

There were several reasons for this tragic development. Commercial rivalry in world markets between Germany and Great Britain increased sharply in the 1890s, and William II's tactless public statements and Germany's pursuit of world power unsettled the British. Above all, Germany's decision in 1900 to expand greatly its battle fleet posed a challenge to Britain's long-standing naval supremacy. This decision coincided with the hard-fought Boer War (1899–1902) between the British and the tiny Dutch republics of South Africa, a conflict that had a major impact on British policy. British political leaders saw that Britain was overextended around the world. The Boer War also brought into the open widespread anti-British feeling as editorial writers in many nations denounced this latest manifestation of British imperialism. There was even talk of Germany, Austria, France, and Russia forming a grand alliance against the bloated but insatiable British Empire. Thus British leaders prudently set about shoring up their exposed position with alliances and agreements.

Britain improved its often-strained relations with the United States and in 1902 concluded a formal alliance with Japan (see Figure 29.1). Britain then responded favorably to the advances of France's skillful foreign minister Théophile Delcassé, who wanted better relations with Britain and was willing to accept British rule in Egypt in return for British support of French plans to dominate Morocco. The resulting Anglo-French Entente of 1904 settled all outstanding colonial disputes between Britain and France.

Frustrated by Britain's turn toward France in 1904, Germany's leaders decided to test the strength of the entente. Rather than accept the typical territorial payoff of imperial competition—a slice of French jungle somewhere in Africa or a port in Morocco—in return for French primacy in Morocco, the Germans foolishly rattled their swords by insisting in 1905 on an international conference on the whole Moroccan question. Germany's crude bullying forced France and Britain closer together, and Germany left the resulting Algeciras Conference of 1906 empty-handed and isolated (except for Austria-Hungary).

The result of the Moroccan crisis and the Algeciras Conference was something of a diplomatic revolution. Britain, France, Russia, and even the United States began to see Germany as a potential threat, a would-be intimidator that might seek to dominate all Europe. At the same time, German leaders began to see sinister plots to "encircle" Germany and block its development as a world power. In 1907 Russia, battered by its disastrous war with Japan and the revolution of 1905, agreed to settle its quarrels with Great Britain in Persia and Central Asia with a special Anglo-Russian Agreement (see Figure 29.1). As a result of that agreement, Germany's blustering paranoia increased, as did Britain's thinly disguised hostility.

Germany's decision to add an enormously expensive fleet of big-gun battleships to its already expanding navy also heightened tensions after 1907. German nationalists saw a large navy as the legitimate mark of a

German Warships Under Full Steam   As these impressive ships engaged in battle exercises in 1907 suggest, Germany did succeed in building a large modern navy. But Britain was determined to maintain its naval superiority, and the spiraling arms race helped poison relations between the two countries. *(Bibliothèque des Arts Décoratifs/Jean-Loup Charmet)*

great world power and as a source of pride and patriotic unity. But British leaders such as David Lloyd George saw it as a detestable military challenge that forced them to spend the "People's Budget" (see page 829) on battleships rather than social welfare. Ongoing economic rivalry, portrayed by journalists as a form of economic warfare, also contributed to distrust and hostility between the two nations, while nationalists in both countries simultaneously admired and feared the power and accomplishments of their nearly equal rival. In 1909 the mass-circulation London *Daily Mail* hysterically informed its readers in a series of reports that "Germany is deliberately preparing to destroy the British Empire."[2] By then Britain was psychologically, if not officially, in the Franco-Russian camp. The leading nations of Europe were divided into two hostile blocs, both ill-prepared to deal with upheaval on Europe's southeastern frontier.

The Outbreak of War

In the early years of the twentieth century, war in the Balkans was as inevitable as anything can be in human history. The reason was simple: nationalism was destroying the Ottoman Empire in Europe and threatening to break up the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The only questions were what kinds of wars would occur and where would they lead.

Greece had long before led the struggle for national liberation, winning its independence in 1832. In 1875 widespread nationalist rebellion in the Ottoman Empire had resulted in Turkish repression, Russian intervention, and Great Power tensions. Bismarck had helped resolve this crisis at the 1878 Congress of Berlin, which worked out the partial division of Turkish possessions in Europe. Austria-Hungary obtained the right to "occupy and administer" Bosnia and Herzegovina.

MAP 29.1 The Balkans After the Congress of
Berlin, 1878   The Ottoman Empire suffered large
territorial losses but remained a power in the Balkans.

MAP 29.2 The Balkans in 1914   Ethnic boundaries
did not follow political boundaries, and Serbian na-
tional aspirations threatened Austria-Hungary.

Serbia and Romania won independence, and a part of
Bulgaria won local autonomy. But the Ottoman Empire
retained important Balkan holdings (Map 29.1).

By 1903 Balkan nationalism was asserting itself once
again. Serbia led the way, becoming openly hostile to-
ward both Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire.
The Serbs, a Slavic people, looked to Slavic Russia for
support of their national aspirations. To block Serbian
expansion and to take advantage of Russia's weakness
after the revolution of 1905, Austria in 1908 formally
annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina, with their large Ser-
bian, Croatian, and Muslim populations. The kingdom
of Serbia erupted in rage but could do nothing without
Russian support.

Then in 1912, in the First Balkan War, Serbia joined
with Greece and Bulgaria to attack the Ottoman Em-

pire and then quarreled with Bulgaria over the spoils of
victory—a dispute that led in 1913 to the Second
Balkan War. Austria intervened in 1913 and forced Ser-
bia to give up Albania. After centuries, nationalism had
finally destroyed the Ottoman Empire in Europe (Map
29.2). This sudden but long-awaited event elated the
Balkan nationalists and dismayed the leaders of multi-
national Austria-Hungary. The former hoped and the
latter feared that Austria might be next to be broken
apart.

Within this tense context Archduke Francis Ferdi-
nand, heir to the Austrian and Hungarian thrones, and
his wife, Sophie, were assassinated by ultranationalist
Serbian revolutionaries on June 28, 1914, during a
state visit to the Bosnian capital of Sarajevo. Although
the leaders of Austria-Hungary did not and could not

British Poster This poster shows the signature page of the 1839 treaty guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium. When German armies invaded Belgium in 1914, Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg cynically dismissed the treaty as a "scrap of paper"—a perfect line for anti-German propaganda. *(By courtesy of the Trustees of the Imperial War Museum)*

know all the details of Serbia's involvement in the assassination plot, they concluded after some hesitation that Serbia was implicated and had to be severely punished once and for all. On July 23 Austria-Hungary finally presented Serbia with an unconditional ultimatum. The Serbian government had just forty-eight hours in which to agree to demands that would amount to Austrian control of the Serbian state. When Serbia replied moderately but evasively, Austria began to mobilize and then declared war on Serbia on July 28. Thus a desperate multinational Austria-Hungary deliberately chose war in a last-ditch attempt to stem the rising tide of hostile nationalism within its borders and save the existing state. The "Third Balkan War" had begun.

Of prime importance in Austria-Hungary's fateful decision was Germany's unconditional support. Emperor William II and his chancellor, Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg, gave Austria-Hungary a "blank check" and urged aggressive measures in early July, even though they realized that war between Austria and Russia was the most probable result. A resurgent Russia could not stand by, as in the Bosnian crisis, and simply watch the Serbs be crushed. Yet Bethmann-Hollweg apparently hoped that while Russia (and therefore France) would go to war, Great Britain would remain neutral, unwilling to fight for "Russian aggression" in the distant Balkans.

In fact, the diplomatic situation was already out of control. Military plans and timetables began to dictate policy. On July 28, as Austrian armies bombarded Belgrade, Tsar Nicholas II ordered a partial mobilization against Austria-Hungary. Almost immediately he found that this was impossible. All the complicated mobilization plans of the Russian general staff had assumed a war with both Austria and Germany: Russia could not mobilize against one without mobilizing against the other. Therefore, on July 29 Russia ordered full mobilization and in effect declared general war.

The same tragic subordination of political considerations to military strategy shaped events in Germany. The German general staff had also thought only in terms of a two-front war. The staff's plan for war called for knocking out France first with a lightning attack through neutral Belgium before turning on Russia. So on August 2, 1914, General Helmuth von Moltke, "acting under a dictate of self-preservation," demanded that Belgium permit German armies to pass through its territory. Belgium, whose neutrality had been solemnly guaranteed in 1839 by all the great states including Prussia, refused. Germany attacked. Thus Germany's terrible, politically disastrous response to a war in the Balkans was an all-out invasion of France by way of the plains of neutral Belgium on August 3. In the face of this act of aggression, Great Britain joined France and declared war on Germany the following day. The First World War had begun.

In reflecting on the origins of the First World War, it seems clear that Austria-Hungary deliberately started the conflict. A war for the right to survive was Austria-Hungary's desperate response to the revolutionary drive of Serbian nationalists to unify their people in a single state. Moreover, in spite of Russian intervention in the quarrel, it is also clear that Germany was most responsible for turning a third war in the Balkans into the Great War by its attack on Belgium and France. Why Germany was so aggressive in 1914 is less certain.

Diplomatic historians stress that German leaders lost control of the international system after Bismarck's resignation in 1890. They felt increasingly that Germany's status as a world power was declining, while the status of Britain, France, Russia, and the United States was growing. Indeed, the powers of what officially became in August 1914 the Triple Entente—Great Britain, France, and Russia—were checking Germany's vague but real aspirations as well as working to strangle Austria-Hungary, Germany's only real ally. Germany's aggression in 1914 reflected the failure of all European leaders, not just those in Germany, to incorporate Bismarck's mighty empire permanently and peacefully into the international system.

A more controversial interpretation argues that domestic conflicts and social tensions lay at the root of German aggression. While Germany industrialized and urbanized rapidly after 1870 and had a popularly elected parliament, political power remained concentrated in the hands of the monarchy, army, and nobility. Determined to hold on to power and frightened by the socialist movement and a wave of strikes in 1914, the German ruling class was willing to take a gamble on a diplomatic victory or even war as the means of rallying the masses to its side and preserving the existing system. Historians have also discerned similar, if less clear-cut, behavior in Great Britain, where leaders faced civil war in northern Ireland, and in Russia, where the revolution of 1905 had brought tsardom to its knees.

This debate over social tensions and domestic political factors correctly suggests that the triumph of nationalism was a crucial underlying precondition of the Great War. Nationalism was at the heart of the Balkan wars, and it drove the spiraling international arms race. Broad popular commitment to "my country right or wrong" weakened groups that thought in terms of international communities and consequences. Thus the big international bankers, who were frightened by the prospect of war in July 1914, and the extreme-left socialists, who believed that the enemy was at home and not abroad, were equally out of step with national feeling. In each country the great majority of the population enthusiastically embraced the outbreak of war in August 1914. The people rallied to defend their nation, and patriotic nationalism brought unity in the short run.

In all of this, Europe's governing classes underestimated the risk of war to themselves in 1914. They had forgotten that great wars and great social revolutions very often go hand in hand. Metternich's alliance of conservative forces in support of international peace and the social status quo had become a distant memory.

Stalemate and Slaughter

When the Germans invaded Belgium in August 1914, they and everyone else believed that the war would be short, for urban society rested on the food and raw materials of the world economy: "The boys will be home by Christmas." The Belgian army heroically defended its homeland, however, and fell back in good order to join a rapidly landed British army corps near the Franco-Belgian border. Instead of quickly capturing Paris in a vast encircling movement, by the end of August dead-tired German soldiers were advancing along an enormous front in the scorching summer heat. On September 6 the French attacked a gap in the German line at the Battle of the Marne. For three days France threw everything into the attack. At one point the French government desperately requisitioned all the taxis of Paris to rush reserves to the troops at the front. Finally, the Germans fell back. Paris and France had been miraculously saved (see Map 29.3).

Soon, with the armies stalled, both sides began to dig trenches to protect themselves from machine-gun fire. By November 1914 an unbroken line of trenches extended from the Belgian ports through northern France past the fortress of Verdun and on to the Swiss frontier. In the face of this unexpected stalemate, slaughter on the western front began in earnest. The defenders on both sides dug in behind rows of trenches, mines, and barbed wire. For days and even weeks ceaseless shelling by heavy artillery supposedly "softened up" the enemy in a given area (and also signaled the coming attack). Then young draftees and their junior officers went "over the top" of the trenches in frontal attacks on the enemy's line.

The cost in lives was staggering; the gains in territory were minuscule. The massive French and British offensives during 1915 never gained more than three miles of blood-soaked earth from the enemy. In the Battle of the Somme in the summer of 1916, the British and French gained an insignificant 125 square miles at the cost of 600,000 dead or wounded, and the Germans lost 500,000 men. In that same year the unsuccessful German campaign against Verdun cost 700,000 lives on both sides. British poet Siegfried Sassoon (1886–1967) wrote of the Somme offensive, "I am staring at a sunlit picture of Hell."

The year 1917 was equally terrible. The hero of Erich Remarque's great novel *All Quiet on the Western Front* (1929) describes a typical attack:

We see men living with their skulls blown open; we see soldiers run with their two feet cut off. . . . Still the little piece of convulsed earth in which we lie is held. We have yielded

The Tragic Absurdity of Trench Warfare   Soldiers charge across a scarred battlefield and overrun an enemy trench. The dead defender on the right will fire no more. But this is only another futile charge that will yield much blood and little land. A whole generation is being decimated by the slaughter. *(By courtesy of the Trustees of the Imperial War Museum)*

no more than a few hundred yards of it as a prize to the enemy. But on every yard there lies a dead man.

Such was war on the western front.

The war of the trenches shattered an entire generation of young men. Millions who could have provided political creativity and leadership after the war were forever missing. Moreover, those who lived through the holocaust were maimed, shell-shocked, embittered, and profoundly disillusioned. The young soldiers went to war believing in the world of their leaders and elders

the pre-1914 world of order, progress, and patriotism. Then, in Remarque's words, the "first bombardment showed us our mistake, and under it the world as they had taught it to us broke in pieces."

The Widening War

On the eastern front slaughter did not degenerate into suicidal trench warfare. With the outbreak of the war, the "Russian steamroller" immediately moved into eastern Germany. Very badly damaged by the Germans

Otto Dix: War   Returning to Germany after the war, Dix was haunted by the horrors he had seen. This vivid expressionist masterpiece, part of a triptych painted in 1929–1932, probes the tormented memory of endless days in muddy trenches and dugouts, living with rats and lice and the constant danger of exploding shells, snipers, and all-out attack. Many who escaped death or dismemberment were mentally wounded forever by their experiences. *(Staatliche Kunstsammlungen Dresden)*

under General Paul von Hindenburg and General Erich Ludendorff at the Battle of Tannenberg and the Battle of the Masurian Lakes in August and September 1914, Russia never threatened Germany again (Map 29.3). On the Austrian front enormous armies seesawed back and forth, suffering enormous losses. Austro-Hungarian armies were repulsed twice by little Serbia in bitter fighting. But with the help of German forces, they reversed the Russian advances of 1914 and forced the

Russians to retreat deep into their own territory in the eastern campaign of 1915. A staggering 2.5 million Russians were killed, wounded, or taken prisoner that year.

These changing tides of victory and hopes of territorial gains brought neutral countries into the war. Italy, a member of the Triple Alliance since 1882, had declared its neutrality in 1914 on the grounds that Austria had launched a war of aggression. Then, in May 1915, Italy joined the Triple Entente of Great Britain, France, and

ATLANTIC OCEAN

Entente and its Allies
Central Powers
Neutral nations
X Major battles

0   150   300 Km.

Moscow

Petrograd
(St. Petersburg)

Treaty of Brest-Litovsk,
March 1918

RUSSIA

Kiev

Armistice line,
Dec. 1917

Helsinki
FINLAND

Riga

Masurian Lakes
1914
Tannenberg 1914
Brest-Litovsk
Warsaw
POLAND
GALICIA

ROMANIA
Bucharest

BULGARIA

SERBIA
Sarajevo

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY
Vienna

Caporetto
1917

Berlin
GERMANY
Kiel
DENMARK

SWEDEN

NORWAY

Jutland
1916

Baltic Sea

North Sea

Black Sea

Constantinople
OTTOMAN EMPIRE
Gallipoli
1915
Dardanelles

GREECE

ALBANIA
MONTENEGRO

ITALY
Rome

Mediterranean Sea

SWITZERLAND
LUXEMBOURG
NETHERLANDS
BELGIUM
Paris
Seine
FRANCE

GREAT
BRITAIN
London

IRELAND

British blockade line

Inset map

NETHERLANDS
Antwerp
Brussels
BELGIUM
Ghent
Ostend
Passchendaele
Ypres
FLANDERS
Dover
Calais

GERMANY
Cologne
Aix-la-Chapelle
Liège
Coblenz

Rhine

Arras
Amiens
St. Quentin
Compiègne
Reims
Château-Thierry
Paris
FRANCE
Chalons-sur-Marne

Verdun
ARGONNE FOREST
Sedan
ARDENNES
LUXEMBOURG
LORRAINE
Nancy
Épinal
Strasbourg
ALSACE
Mulhouse
Basel

Meuse
Moselle
Marne

Germany, 1914
German offensive, 1914
Farthest German advance,
September 1914
Front at beginning of 1915
German offensive,
Summer 1918
Armistice line,
November 1918

0   25   50 Mi.

Indian Soldiers Soldiers from the so-called warrior castes had long been a critical factor in imperial Britain's global power. These Indian troops, preparing for the Battle of the Somme in 1916, ironically appear to be out for a pleasant bicycling excursion. Dispatched to France in October 1914, most Indian soldiers were moved to western Asia in 1915 to fight against the Ottoman Empire. *(By courtesy of the Trustees of the Imperial War Museum)*

Russia in return for promises of Austrian territory. Bulgaria also declared its neutrality in 1914. But after the Ottoman Empire joined in October 1914 with Austria and Germany, by then known as the Central Powers, Bulgaria weighed enticing promises from all sides. In September 1915 it decided to follow the Ottoman Empire's lead in order to settle old scores with Serbia (see Map 29.3).

The entry of the Ottoman Turks carried the war into the Middle East, a momentous development. Heavy fighting between the Ottomans and Russia saw bloody battle lines seesawing back and forth. In 1915 British forces tried to take the Dardanelles and Constantinople from Turkey but were badly defeated. The British were more successful at inciting Arab nationalists against their Turkish overlords. An enigmatic British colonel, soon known to millions as Lawrence of Arabia, helped lead the Arab revolt in early 1917. In 1918 British armies totally smashed the old Ottoman state, drawing primarily on imperial forces from Egypt, India, Australia, and New Zealand. Thus war brought revolutionary change to the Middle East (see pages 956, 959).

War also spread to some parts of East Asia and Africa. Instead of revolting as the Germans hoped, the colonial subjects of the British and French supported their foreign masters, providing critical supplies and fighting in armies in Europe and in the Ottoman Empire. They also helped local British and French commanders seize Germany's colonies around the globe. The Japanese, allied in Asia with the British since 1902, similarly

MAP 29.3 The First World War in Europe The trench war on the western front was concentrated in Belgium and northern France, while the war in the east encompassed an enormous territory.

used the war to grab German outposts in the Pacific Ocean and on the Chinese mainland, infuriating Chinese patriots and heightening long-standing tensions between China and Japan. More than a million Africans served in the various armies of the warring powers, with more than double that number serving as porters to carry equipment. The French, facing a shortage of young men, made especially heavy use of colonial troops. The spectacle of Europeans fighting each other to protect their nations' freedom and their individual rights had a profound impact on the minds of these soldiers. African-American soldiers serving in France also were affected by their experiences in the war.

Another crucial development in the expanding conflict came in April 1917 when the United States declared war on Germany. American intervention grew out of the war at sea, sympathy for the Triple Entente, and the increasing desperation of total war. At the beginning of the war Britain and France had established a total naval blockade to strangle the Central Powers. No neutral ship was permitted to sail to Germany with any cargo. The blockade annoyed Americans, but effective propaganda about German atrocities in occupied Belgium as well as lush profits from selling war supplies to Britain and France blunted American indignation.

Moreover, in early 1915 Germany launched a counter-blockade using the murderously effective submarine, a new weapon that sank ships without the traditional niceties of fair warning under international law. In May 1915 a German submarine sank the British passenger liner *Lusitania,* which was also carrying arms and munitions. More than a thousand lives, including 139 Americans, were lost. President Woodrow Wilson protested vigorously. Germany was forced to relax its submarine warfare for almost two years; the alternative was almost certain war with the United States.

Early in 1917 the German military command—confident that improved submarines could starve Britain into submission before the United States could come to its rescue—resumed unrestricted submarine warfare. Like the invasion of Belgium, this was a reckless gamble. "German submarine warfare against commerce," President Wilson told a sympathetic Congress and people, "is a warfare against mankind." Thus the last uncommitted great nation, as fresh and enthusiastic as Europe had been in 1914, entered the world war in April 1917, almost three years after it began. Eventually the United States was to tip the balance in favor of the Triple Entente and its allies.

THE HOME FRONT

Before looking at the last year of the Great War, let us turn our attention to the people on the home front. They were tremendously involved in the titanic struggle. War's impact on them was no less massive than on the men crouched in the trenches.

Mobilizing for Total War

In August 1914 most people had greeted the outbreak of hostilities enthusiastically. In every country the masses believed that their nation was in the right and was defending itself from aggression. With the exception of a few extreme left-wingers, even socialists supported the war. A German socialist volunteered for the front, explaining to fellow members of the Reichstag that "to shed one's blood for the fatherland is not difficult: it is enveloped in romantic heroism."[3] Everywhere the support of the masses and working class contributed to national unity and an energetic war effort.

By mid-October generals and politicians had begun to realize that more than patriotism would be needed to win the war, whose end was not in sight. Each country experienced a relentless, desperate demand for men and weapons. And each quickly faced countless shortages, for prewar Europe had depended on foreign trade and a great international division of labor. In each country economic life and organization had to change, and change fast, to keep the war machine from sputtering to a stop. And change they did.

In each country a government of national unity began to plan and control economic and social life in order to wage "total war." Free-market capitalism was abandoned, at least "for the duration." Instead, government planning boards established priorities and decided what was to be produced and consumed. Rationing, price and wage controls, and even restrictions on workers' freedom of movement were imposed by government. Only through such regimentation could a country make the greatest possible military effort. Thus, though there were national variations, the great nations all moved toward planned economies commanded by the established political leadership.

The economy of total war blurred the old distinction between soldiers on the battlefield and civilians at home. The war was a war of whole peoples and entire populations. Based on tremendously productive industrial economies not confined to a single nation,

total war yielded an effective—and therefore destructive—war effort on all sides. (See the feature "Listening to the Past: The Experience of War" on pages 950–951.)

However awful the war was, the ability of governments to manage and control highly complicated economies strengthened the cause of socialism. With the First World War socialism became for the first time a realistic economic blueprint rather than a utopian program. Germany illustrates the general trend. It also went furthest in developing a planned economy to wage total war.

As soon as war began, the talented, foresighted, Jewish industrialist Walter Rathenau convinced the German government to set up the War Raw Materials Board to ration and distribute raw materials. Under Rathenau's direction every useful material from foreign oil to barnyard manure was inventoried and rationed. Moreover, the board launched successful attempts to produce substitutes, such as synthetic rubber and synthetic nitrates, needed to make explosives and essential to the blockaded German war machine. An aggressive recycling campaign, including everything from fruit peels to women's hair, augmented these efforts. Food was also rationed in accordance with physical need. Men and women doing hard manual work were given extra rations. During the last two years of the war only children and expectant mothers received milk rations. At the same time, Germany failed to tax the war profits of private firms heavily enough. This failure contributed to massive deficit financing, inflation, the growth of a black market, and the eventual re-emergence of class conflict.

Following the terrible Battles of Verdun and the Somme in 1916, Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg was driven from office in 1917 by military leaders Hindenburg and Ludendorff, who became the real rulers of Germany. They decreed the ultimate mobilization for total war: all agriculture, industry, and labor must be "used exclusively for the conduct of War."[4] Thus in December 1916 military leaders rammed through the Reichstag the Auxiliary Service Law, which required all males between seventeen and sixty to work only at jobs considered critical to the war effort.

Waging Total War   A British war plant strains to meet the insatiable demand for trench-smashing heavy artillery shells. Quite typically, many of these defense workers are women. *(By courtesy of the Trustees of the Imperial War Museum)*

Although women and children were not specifically mentioned, this forced-labor law was also aimed at them. Many women already worked in war factories, mines, and steel mills, where they labored, like men, at the heaviest and most dangerous jobs. With the passage of the Auxiliary Service Law, many more women followed. Children were organized by their teachers into garbage brigades to collect every scrap of useful materials. Potatoes gave way to turnips, and people averaged little more than a thousand calories a day. Thus in Germany total war led to the establishment of history's first "totalitarian" society, and war production increased while some people starved to death.

Great Britain mobilized for total war less rapidly and less completely than Germany, for it could import materials from its empire and from the United States. By 1915, however, a serious shortage of shells had led to the establishment of the Ministry of Munitions under David Lloyd George. The ministry organized private industry to produce for the war, controlled profits, allocated labor, fixed wage rates, and settled labor disputes. By December 1916 the British economy was largely planned and regulated directly by the state. Great Britain had followed successfully in Germany's footsteps.

The Social Impact

The social impact of total war was no less profound than the economic impact, though again there were important national variations. The insatiable needs of the military created a tremendous demand for workers. Jobs were available for everyone. This situation—seldom, if ever, seen before 1914, when unemployment and poverty had been facts of urban life—brought about momentous changes.

One such change was greater power and prestige for labor unions. Having proved their loyalty in August 1914, labor unions cooperated with war governments on work rules, wages, and production schedules in return for real participation in important decisions. This entry of labor leaders into policy-making councils paralleled the entry of socialist leaders into the war governments.

The role of women changed dramatically. In every country large numbers of women left home and domestic service to work in industry, transportation, and offices. Moreover, women became highly visible—not only as munitions workers but as bank tellers, mail carriers, even police officers. Women also served as nurses and doctors at the front. In general, the war greatly expanded the range of women's activities and changed attitudes toward women. As a direct result of women's

many-sided war effort, Britain, Germany, and Austria granted women the right to vote immediately after the war. Women also showed a growing spirit of independence during the war, as they started to bob their hair, shorten their skirts, and smoke in public.

War promoted greater social equality, blurring class distinctions and lessening the gap between rich and poor. This blurring was most apparent in Great Britain, where wartime hardship was never extreme. In fact, the bottom third of the population generally lived better than they ever had, for the poorest gained most from the severe shortage of labor. English writer Robert Roberts recalled how his parents' tiny grocery store in the slums of Manchester thrived during the war as never before—when people who had scrimped to buy bread and soup bones were able to afford fancy cakes and thick steaks. In continental European countries greater equality was reflected in full employment, rationing according to physical needs, and a sharing of hardships. There, too, society became more uniform and more egalitarian, in spite of some war profiteering.

Finally, death itself had no respect for traditional social distinctions. It savagely decimated both the young aristocratic officers who led the charge and the mass of drafted peasants and unskilled workers who followed. Death, however, often spared the aristocrats of labor—the skilled workers and foremen. Their lives were too valuable to squander at the front, for they were needed to train the newly recruited women and older unskilled men laboring valiantly in war plants at home.

Growing Political Tensions

During the first two years of war most soldiers and civilians supported their governments. Even in Austria-Hungary—the most vulnerable of the belligerents, with its competing nationalities—loyalty to the state and monarchy remained astonishingly strong through 1916. Belief in a just cause, patriotic nationalism, the planned economy, and a sharing of burdens united peoples behind their various national leaders.

Each government employed rigorous censorship to control public opinion, and each used both crude and subtle propaganda to maintain popular support. German propaganda hysterically pictured black soldiers from France's African empire raping German women. The French and British ceaselessly recounted and exaggerated German atrocities in Belgium and elsewhere. Patriotic posters and slogans, slanted news, and biased editorials inflamed national hatreds and helped sustain superhuman efforts.

By the spring of 1916, however, people were beginning to crack under the strain of total war. In April 1916 Irish nationalists in Dublin tried to take advantage of this situation and rose up against British rule in their great Easter Rebellion. A week of bitter fighting passed before the rebels were crushed and their leaders executed. Strikes and protest marches over inadequate food began to flare up on every home front. Soldiers' morale began to decline. Italian troops mutinied. Numerous French units refused to fight for a time after General Robert Nivelle's disastrous offensive of May 1917. A rising tide of war-weariness and defeatism also swept France's civilian population before Georges Clemenceau emerged as a ruthless and effective wartime leader in November 1917. Clemenceau (1841–1929) established a virtual dictatorship, pouncing on strikers and jailing without trial journalists and politicians who dared to suggest a compromise peace with Germany.

The strains were worse for the Central Powers. In October 1916 the chief minister of Austria was assassinated by a young socialist crying, "Down with Absolutism! We want peace!"[5] The following month, when feeble old Emperor Francis Joseph died, a symbol of unity disappeared. In spite of absolute censorship, political dissatisfaction and conflicts among nationalities grew. Both Czech and Yugoslav leaders demanded autonomous democratic states for their peoples. In April 1917 Austria's new chief minister summed up the situation in the gloomiest possible terms. The country and army were exhausted. Another winter of war would bring revolution and disintegration.

The strain of total war and of the Auxiliary Service Law was also evident in Germany. By 1917 the national political unity of the first two years of war was collapsing as the social conflict of prewar Germany re-emerged. A growing minority of socialists in the Reichstag began to vote against war credits. In July 1917 a coalition of socialists and Catholics passed a resolution in the Reichstag calling for a compromise "peace without annexations or reparations." Such a peace was unthinkable for conservatives and military leaders. So also was the surge in revolutionary agitation and strikes by war-weary workers that occurred in early 1917. When the bread ration was further reduced in April, more than 200,000 workers struck and demonstrated for a week in Berlin, returning to work only under the threat of prison and military discipline. Thus militaristic Germany, like its ally Austria-Hungary (and its enemy France), was beginning to crack in 1917. But it was Russia that collapsed first and saved the Central Powers—for a time.

Irish Nationalists   Organized in 1913 to press for home rule in Ireland, the unofficial Irish Citizen Army was committed to complete independence from Great Britain. Shown here beneath a defiant pro-republican banner, it fought with other militant groups in the Easter Rebellion. *(Lawrence Collection, National Library of Ireland, Dublin)*

Family Portrait   With husband Nicholas II standing behind her, the beautiful but tense Alexandra shows one of her daughters, who could not inherit the throne, to her grandmother, Queen Victoria of Britain, and Victoria's son, the future Edward VII. European monarchs were closely related by blood and breeding before 1914. *(Nicholas A. de Basily Collection, Hoover Institution)*

The Russian Revolution

The Russian Revolution of 1917, directly related to the growing tensions of World War I, had a significance far beyond the wartime agonies of a single European nation. The Russian Revolution opened a new era. For some it was Marx's socialist vision come true; for others it was the triumph of dictatorship. To all it presented a radically new prototype of state and society.

The Fall of Imperial Russia

Like its allies and its enemies, Russia embraced war with patriotic enthusiasm in 1914. At the Winter Palace, while throngs of people knelt and sang "God Save the Tsar," Tsar Nicholas II (r. 1894–1917) repeated the oath Alexander I had sworn in 1812 and vowed never to make peace as long as the enemy stood on Russian soil. Russia's lower house, the Duma, voted war credits. Conservatives anticipated expansion in the Balkans. Liberals and most socialists believed alliance with Britain and France would bring democratic reforms. For a moment Russia was united. But soon the strains of war began to take their toll.

Unprecedented artillery barrages used up Russia's supplies of shells and ammunition, and better-equipped German armies inflicted terrible losses. In 1915 substantial numbers of Russian soldiers were sent to the front without rifles; they were told to find their arms among the dead. There were 2 million Russian casualties in 1915 alone. Nevertheless, Russia's battered peasant army continued to fight courageously, and Russia moved toward full mobilization on the home front. The Duma and organs of local government took the lead, setting up special committees to coordinate defense, industry, transportation, and agriculture. These efforts improved the military situation. Yet there were many failures, and Russia mobilized less effectively for total war than the other warring nations.

The great problem was leadership. Under the constitution resulting from the revolution of 1905 (see pages 832–833), the tsar had retained complete control over the bureaucracy and the army. Legislation proposed by the Duma, which was weighted in favor of the wealthy and conservative classes, was subject to the tsar's veto. Moreover, Nicholas II fervently wished to maintain the sacred inheritance of supreme royal power, which, with the Orthodox church, was for him the key to Russia's greatness. A kindly, slightly stupid man, of whom a friend said he "would have been an ideal country gentleman, devoting his life to wife and children, his farms and his sport," Nicholas failed to form a close partnership with his citizens in order to fight the war more effectively. He relied instead on the old bureaucratic apparatus, distrusting the moderate Duma, rejecting popular involvement, and resisting calls to share power.

As a result, the Duma, the educated middle classes, and the masses became increasingly critical of the tsar's leadership. Demands for more democratic and responsive government exploded in the Duma in the summer of 1915. In September parties ranging from conservative to moderate socialist formed the Progressive bloc, which called for a completely new government responsible to the Duma instead of to the tsar. In answer, Nicholas temporarily adjourned the Duma and announced that he was traveling to the front in order to lead and rally Russia's armies.

His departure was a fatal turning point. With the tsar in the field with the troops, control of the government

was taken over by the hysterical empress, Tsarina Alexandra, and a debauched adventurer, the monk Rasputin. A minor German princess and granddaughter of England's Queen Victoria, Nicholas's wife was a devoted mother with a sick child, a strong-willed woman with a hatred of parliaments. Having constantly urged her husband to rule absolutely, Alexandra herself tried to do so in his absence. She seated and unseated the top ministers. Her most trusted adviser was "our Friend Grigori," an uneducated Siberian preacher who was appropriately nicknamed "Rasputin"—the "Degenerate."

Rasputin began his career with a sect noted for mixing sexual orgies with religious ecstasies, and his influence rested on mysterious healing powers. Alexis, Alexandra's fifth child and heir to the throne, suffered from a rare disease, hemophilia. The tiniest cut meant uncontrollable bleeding, terrible pain, and possible death. Medical science could do nothing. Only Rasputin could miraculously stop the bleeding, perhaps through hypnosis. The empress's faith in Rasputin was limitless. "Believe more in our Friend," she wrote her husband in 1916. "He lives for you and Russia." In this atmosphere of unreality the government slid steadily toward revolution.

In a desperate attempt to right the situation and end unfounded rumors that Rasputin was the empress's lover, three members of the high aristocracy murdered Rasputin in December 1916. The empress went into semipermanent shock, her mind haunted by the dead man's prophecy: "If I die or you desert me, in six months you will lose your son and your throne."[6] Food shortages in the cities worsened; morale declined. On March 8 women calling for bread in Petrograd (formerly St. Petersburg) started riots, which spontaneously spread throughout the city. From the front the tsar ordered troops to restore order, but discipline broke down, and the soldiers joined the revolutionary crowd. The Duma responded by declaring a provisional government on March 12, 1917. Three days later Nicholas abdicated.

The Provisional Government

The March revolution was joyfully accepted throughout the country. The patriotic upper and middle classes rejoiced at the prospect of a more determined and effective war effort. Workers happily anticipated better wages and more food. All classes and political parties called for liberty and democracy. They were not disappointed. After generations of arbitrary authoritarianism, the provisional government quickly established equality before the law; freedom of religion, speech, and assembly; the right of unions to organize and strike; and the rest of the classic liberal program.

But both the liberal and the moderate socialist leaders of the provisional government rejected social revolution. The reorganized government formed in May 1917, which included the fiery agrarian socialist Alexander Kerensky, who became prime minister in July, refused to confiscate large landholdings and give them to peasants, fearing that such drastic action in the countryside would only complete the disintegration of Russia's peasant army. For the patriotic Kerensky as for other moderate socialists, the continuation of war was still the all-important national duty. There would be plenty of time for land reform later, and thus all the government's efforts were directed toward a last offensive in July. Human suffering and war-weariness grew, sapping the limited strength of the provisional government.

From its first day the provisional government had to share power with a formidable rival—the Petrograd Soviet (or council) of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. Modeled on the revolutionary soviets of 1905, the Petrograd Soviet was a huge, fluctuating mass meeting of two thousand to three thousand workers, soldiers, and socialist intellectuals. This counter- or half-government issued its own radical orders, further weakening the provisional government. Most famous of these was Army Order No. 1, which stripped officers of their authority and placed power in the hands of elected committees of common soldiers.

Army Order No. 1 led to a total collapse of army discipline. Many an officer was hanged for his sins. Meanwhile, following the foolhardy summer offensive, masses of peasant soldiers began "voting with their feet," to use Lenin's graphic phrase. They began returning to their villages to help their families get a share of the land, which peasants were simply seizing as they settled old scores in a great agrarian upheaval. All across the country liberty was turning into anarchy in the summer of 1917. It was an unparalleled opportunity for the most radical and most talented of Russia's many socialist leaders, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin (1870–1924).

Lenin and the Bolshevik Revolution

From his youth Lenin's whole life had been dedicated to the cause of revolution. Born into the middle class, Lenin became an implacable enemy of imperial Russia when his older brother was executed for plotting to kill the tsar in 1887. As a law student Lenin began

THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION

1914	Russia enthusiastically enters the First World War
1915	Russia suffers 2 million casualties Progressive bloc calls for a new government responsible to the Duma rather than to the tsar Tsar Nicholas adjourns the Duma and departs for the front; Alexandra and Rasputin exert a strong influence on the government
December 1916	Rasputin is murdered
March 8, 1917	Bread riots take place in Petrograd (St. Petersburg)
March 12, 1917	Duma declares a provisional government
March 15, 1917	Tsar Nicholas abdicates without protest
April 3, 1917	Lenin returns from exile and denounces the provisional government
May 1917	Reorganized provisional government, including Kerensky, continues the war Petrograd Soviet issues Army Order No. 1, granting military power to committees of common soldiers
Summer 1917	Agrarian upheavals: peasants seize estates; peasant soldiers desert the army to participate
October 1917	Bolsheviks gain a majority in the Petrograd Soviet
November 6, 1917	Bolsheviks seize power; Lenin heads the new "provisional workers' and peasants' government"
November 1917	Lenin accepts peasant seizure of land and worker control of factories; all banks are nationalized
January 1918	Lenin permanently disbands the Constituent Assembly
February 1918	Lenin convinces the Bolshevik Central Committee to accept a humiliating peace with Germany in order to safeguard the revolution
March 1918	Treaty of Brest-Litovsk: Russia loses one-third of its population Trotsky as war commissar begins to rebuild the Russian army Government moves from Petrograd to Moscow
1918–1920	Great civil war takes place
Summer 1918	Eighteen regional governments compete for power White armies oppose the Bolshevik Revolution
1919	White armies are on the offensive but divided politically; they receive little benefit from Allied intervention
1920	Lenin and the Red Army are victorious, retaking Belorussia and Ukraine

Mass Demonstrations in Petrograd   These demonstrations in June 1917 showed a surge of working-class support for the Bolsheviks. In this photo a few banners of the Mensheviks and other moderate socialists are drowned in a sea of Bolshevik slogans. *(Sovfoto)*

searching for a revolutionary faith. He found it in Marxian socialism. Exiled to Siberia for three years because of socialist agitation, Lenin studied Marxian doctrines with religious intensity. After his release this young priest of socialism joined fellow believers in western Europe. There he lived for seventeen years and developed his own revolutionary interpretations of the body of Marxian thought.

Three interrelated ideas were central for Lenin. First, turning to the early fire-breathing Marx of 1848 and *The Communist Manifesto* for inspiration, Lenin stressed that capitalism could be destroyed only by violent revolution. He tirelessly denounced all revisionist theories of a peaceful evolution to socialism as a betrayal of Marx's revolutionary message. Lenin's second, more original idea was that a socialist revolution was possible even in a country like Russia, where capitalism was not

fully developed. There the industrial working class was small, but the peasants were poor and thus potential revolutionaries.

Lenin believed that at a given moment revolution was determined more by human leadership than by vast historical laws. Thus was born his third basic idea: the necessity of a highly disciplined workers' party, strictly controlled by a dedicated elite of intellectuals and full-time revolutionaries like Lenin himself. Unlike ordinary workers and trade-union officials, this elite would never be seduced by short-term gains. It would not stop until revolution brought it to power.

Lenin's theories and methods did not go unchallenged by other Russian Marxists. At meetings of the Russian Social Democratic Labor party in London in 1903, matters came to a head. Lenin demanded a small, disciplined, elitist party; his opponents wanted a more

democratic party with mass membership. The Russian party of Marxian socialism promptly split into two rival factions. Lenin's camp was called *Bolsheviks,* or "majority group"; his opponents were *Mensheviks,* or "minority group." Lenin's majority did not last, but Lenin did not care. He kept the fine-sounding name Bolshevik and developed the party he wanted: tough, disciplined, revolutionary.

Lenin, from neutral Switzerland, saw the war as a product of imperialistic rivalries and as a marvelous opportunity for class war and socialist upheaval. After the March revolution the German government provided the impatient Lenin, his wife, and about twenty trusted colleagues with safe passage across Germany and back into Russia in April 1917. The Germans hoped that Lenin would undermine Russia's sagging war effort. They were not disappointed.

Arriving triumphantly at Petrograd's Finland Station on April 3, Lenin attacked at once. To the great astonishment of the local Bolsheviks, he rejected all cooperation with the "bourgeois" provisional government of the liberals and moderate socialists. His slogans were radical in the extreme: "All power to the soviets"; "All land to the peasants"; "Stop the war now." Never a slave to Marxian determinism, the brilliant but not unduly intellectual Lenin was a superb tactician. The moment was now.

Yet Lenin almost overplayed his hand. An attempt by the Bolsheviks to seize power in July collapsed, and Lenin fled and went into hiding. He was charged with being a German agent, and indeed he and the Bolsheviks were getting money from Germany.[7] But no matter. In September commander in chief General Lavr Kornilov, a popular war hero "with the heart of a lion and the brains of a sheep," led a feeble attack against the provisional government. In the face of this rightist "counter-revolutionary" threat, the Bolsheviks were rearmed and redeemed. Kornilov's forces disintegrated, but Prime Minister Kerensky lost all credit with the army, the only force that might have saved him and democratic government in Russia.

Throughout the summer the Bolsheviks markedly increased their popular support, and in October they gained a fragile majority in the Petrograd Soviet. It was now Lenin's supporter Leon Trotsky (1879–1940), a spellbinding revolutionary orator and independent radical Marxist, who brilliantly executed the Bolshevik seizure of power.

Painting a vivid but untruthful picture of German and counter-revolutionary plots, Trotsky first convinced the Petrograd Soviet to form a special military-revolutionary committee in October and make him its leader. Military power in the capital passed into Bolshevik hands. Trotsky then insisted that the Bolsheviks take power in the name not of the Bolsheviks but of the more popular and democratic soviets, which were meeting in Petrograd from all over Russia in early November. On the night of November 6, militants from Trotsky's committee joined with trusty Bolshevik soldiers to seize government buildings and pounce on members of the provisional government. Then they went on to the congress of soviets. There a Bolshevik majority—roughly 390 of 650 turbulent delegates—declared that all power had passed to the soviets and named Lenin head of the new government.

The Bolsheviks came to power for three key reasons. First, by late 1917 democracy had given way to anarchy: power was there for those who would take it. Second, in Lenin and Trotsky the Bolsheviks had an utterly determined and truly superior leadership. Third, in 1917 the Bolsheviks succeeded in appealing to many soldiers and urban workers, people who were exhausted by war and eager for socialism. With time many workers would become bitterly disappointed, but for the moment they had good reason to believe that they had won what they wanted.

Dictatorship and Civil War

History is full of short-lived coups and unsuccessful revolutions. The truly monumental accomplishment of Lenin, Trotsky, and the rest of the Bolsheviks was not taking power but keeping it and conquering the chaos they had helped create. How was this done?

Lenin had the genius to profit from developments over which he and the Bolsheviks had no control. Since summer a peasant revolution had been sweeping across Russia as the tillers of the soil invaded and divided among themselves the estates of the landlords and the church. Peasant seizure of the land was not very Marxian, but it was unstoppable in 1917. Thus Lenin's first law, which supposedly gave land to the peasants, actually merely approved what peasants were already doing. Urban workers' great demand in November was direct control of individual factories by local workers' committees. This, too, Lenin rectified with a decree in November 1917.

Lenin also acknowledged that Russia had lost the war with Germany and that the only realistic goal was peace at any price. That price was very high. Germany demanded in December 1917 that the Soviet government give up all its western territories. These areas were in-

habited by Poles, Finns, Lithuanians, and other non-Russians—all those people who had been conquered by the tsars over three centuries and put into the "prison-house of nationalities," as Lenin had earlier called the Russian empire.

At first Lenin's fellow Bolsheviks would not accept such great territorial losses. But when German armies resumed their unopposed march into Russia in February 1918, Lenin had his way in a very close vote in the Central Committee of the party. A third of old Russia's population was sliced away by the German meat ax in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in March 1918. With peace Lenin had escaped the certain disaster of continued war and could pursue his goal of absolute political power for the Bolsheviks—now renamed Communists—within Russia.

In November 1917 the Bolsheviks had cleverly proclaimed their regime only a "provisional workers' and peasants' government," promising that a freely elected Constituent Assembly would draw up a new constitution. But after the Bolsheviks won less than one-fourth of the elected delegates, the Constituent Assembly met for only one day, on January 18, 1918. It was then permanently disbanded by Bolshevik soldiers acting under Lenin's orders.

With the destruction of the democratically elected Constituent Assembly, people who had risen up for self-rule in November saw that once again they were getting dictatorship from the capital. For the next three years "Long live the [democratic] soviets; down with the Bolsheviks" was a popular slogan. The officers of the old army took the lead in organizing the so-called White opposition to the Bolsheviks in southern Russia, Ukraine, Siberia, and west of Petrograd. The Whites came from many social groups and were united only by their hatred of the Bolsheviks—the Reds. By the end of 1918 White armies were on the attack. In October 1919 it appeared they might triumph, as they closed in on Lenin's government from three sides. Yet they did not. By the spring of 1920 the White armies had been almost completely defeated, and by the following year the civil war was over. Lenin had won.

Lenin and the Bolsheviks won for several reasons. Strategically, they controlled the center, while the Whites were always on the fringes and disunited. Moreover, the poorly defined political program of the Whites was vaguely conservative, and it did not unite all the foes of the Bolsheviks under a progressive, democratic banner. Most important, the Communists quickly developed a better army, an army for which the divided Whites were no match.

Bolshevik Uprising   Lenin rallies worker and soldier delegates at a midnight meeting of the Petrograd Soviet, as the Bolsheviks rise up and seize power on November 6, 1917. This painting from the 1940s idealizes Lenin, but his great talents as a revolutionary leader are undeniable. In this recreation Stalin, who actually played only a small role in the uprising, is standing behind Lenin, already his trusty right-hand man. (Sovfoto)

Once again Trotsky's leadership was decisive. Named war commissar, in March 1918 Trotsky re-established the draft and the most drastic discipline for the newly formed Red Army. Soldiers deserting or disobeying an order were summarily shot. Moreover, Trotsky effectively recruited former tsarist army officers. In short, he formed a disciplined and effective fighting force.

The Bolsheviks also mobilized the home front. Establishing "war communism"—the application of the total-war concept to a civil conflict—they seized grain from peasants, introduced rationing, nationalized all banks and industry, and required everyone to work. Although these measures contributed to a breakdown of

normal economic activity, they also served to maintain labor discipline and to keep the Red Army supplied.

"Revolutionary terror" also contributed to the Communist victory. The old tsarist secret police was reestablished as the Cheka, which hunted down and executed thousands of real or supposed foes, such as the tsar and his family and other "class enemies." Moreover, people were shot or threatened with being shot for minor nonpolitical failures. The terror caused by the secret police became a tool of the government. The Cheka sowed fear, and fear silenced opposition.

Finally, foreign military intervention in the civil war ended up helping the Communists. The Allies (the Americans, British, and Japanese) sent troops to Archangel and Vladivostok to prevent war materiel that they had sent to the provisional government from being captured by the Germans. After the Soviet government nationalized all foreign-owned factories without compensation and refused to pay all of Russia's foreign debts, Western governments, particularly that of France, began to support White armies. Yet these efforts were small and halfhearted. Allied intervention in the civil war did not aid the Whites effectively, though it did permit the Communists to appeal to the patriotic nationalism of ethnic Russians, in particular former tsarist army officers.

Together, the Russian Revolution and the Bolshevik triumph were one of the reasons why the First World War was such a great turning point in modern history. A radically new government, based on socialism and one-party dictatorship, came to power in a great European state, maintained power, and eagerly encouraged worldwide revolution. Although Russia was undoubtedly headed for some kind of political crisis before 1914, it is hard to imagine the triumph of the most radical proponents of change and reform except in a situation of total collapse. That was precisely what happened to Russia in the First World War.

THE PEACE SETTLEMENT

Victory over revolutionary Russia boosted sagging German morale, and in the spring of 1918 the Germans launched their last major attack against France. This offensive, just like those before it, failed. With breathtaking rapidity, the United States, Great Britain, and France decisively defeated Germany militarily. Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire broke apart and ceased to exist. The guns of world war finally fell silent. Then as civil war spread in Russia and as chaos engulfed

much of eastern Europe, the victorious Western Allies came together in Paris to establish a lasting peace.

Expectations were high; optimism was almost unlimited. The Allies labored intensively and soon worked out terms for peace with Germany and for the creation of the peacekeeping League of Nations. Nevertheless, the hopes of peoples and politicians were soon disappointed, for the peace settlement of 1919 turned out to be a failure. Rather than creating conditions for peace, it sowed the seeds of another war. Surely this was the ultimate tragedy of the Great War, a war that directly and indirectly cost $332 billion and left 10 million people dead and another 20 million wounded. How did this tragedy happen? Why was the peace settlement unsuccessful?

The End of the War

In early 1917 the strain of total war was showing everywhere. After the Russian Revolution in March, there were major strikes in Germany. In July a coalition of moderates passed a "peace resolution" in the Reichstag, calling for peace without territorial annexations. To counter this moderation born of war-weariness, the German military established a virtual dictatorship. The military also aggressively exploited the collapse of Russian armies, winning great concessions in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk.

With victory in the east quieting German moderates, General Ludendorff and company fell on France once more in the great spring offensive of 1918. For a time German armies pushed forward, coming within thirty-five miles of Paris. But Ludendorff's exhausted, overextended forces never broke through. They were decisively stopped in July at the second Battle of the Marne, where 140,000 fresh American soldiers saw action. Adding 2 million men in arms to the war effort by August, the late but massive American intervention decisively tipped the scales in favor of Allied victory.

By September British, French, and American armies were advancing steadily on all fronts, and on October 4 the emperor formed a new, more liberal German government to sue for peace. As negotiations over an armistice dragged on, an angry and frustrated German people finally rose up. On November 3 sailors in Kiel mutinied, and throughout northern Germany soldiers and workers began to establish revolutionary councils on the Russian soviet model. The same day Austria-Hungary surrendered to the Allies and began breaking apart. With army discipline collapsing, the German emperor abdicated and fled to Holland. Socialist leaders in

Berlin proclaimed a German republic on November 9 and simultaneously agreed to tough Allied terms of surrender. The armistice went into effect on November 11, 1918. The war was over.

The German Revolution of November 1918 resembled the Russian Revolution of March 1917. In both countries a popular uprising toppled an authoritarian monarchy, and moderate socialists took control of the government. But when Germany's radical socialists, headed by Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, tried to seize power, the moderate socialists called on the army to crush the attempted coup. Liebkneckt and Luxemburg were arrested and murdered by army leaders. Thus Germany had a political revolution, but without a communist second installment. It was Russia without Lenin's Bolshevik triumph. (See the feature "Individuals in Society: Rosa Luxemburg, Revolutionary Socialist.")

Military defeat brought political revolution to Austria-Hungary, as it had to Germany, Russia, and the Ottoman Empire (see pages 956–959). In Austria-Hungary the revolution was primarily nationalistic and republican in character. Independent Austrian, Hungarian, and Czechoslovak republics were proclaimed, and a greatly expanded Serbian monarchy united the South Slavs and took the name Yugoslavia. The prospect of firmly establishing the new national states overrode class considerations for most people in east-central Europe.

The Treaty of Versailles

The peace conference opened in Paris in January 1919 with seventy delegates representing twenty-seven victorious nations. There were great expectations. A young British diplomat later wrote that the victors "believed in nationalism, we believed in the self-determination of peoples." Indeed, "we were journeying to Paris . . . to found a new order in Europe. We were preparing not Peace only, but Eternal Peace."[8] This general optimism and idealism had been greatly strengthened by President Wilson's January 1918 peace proposal, the Fourteen Points, which stressed national self-determination and the rights of small countries.

The real powers at the conference were the United States, Great Britain, and France, for Germany was not allowed to participate and Russia was locked in civil war and did not attend. Italy was considered one of the Big Four, but its role was quite limited. Almost immediately the three great Allies began to quarrel. President Wilson was almost obsessed with creating the League of Nations. He insisted that this question come first, for he passionately believed that only a permanent international organization could protect member states from aggression and avert future wars. Wilson had his way, although Lloyd George of Great Britain and especially Clemenceau of France were unenthusiastic. They were primarily concerned with punishing Germany.

Playing on British nationalism, Lloyd George had already won a smashing electoral victory in December on the popular platform of making Germany pay for the war. "We shall," the British prime minister promised, "squeeze the orange until the pips squeak." Personally inclined to make a somewhat moderate peace with Germany, Lloyd George was to a considerable extent a captive of demands for a total victory worthy of the sacrifices of total war against a totally depraved enemy. As Rudyard Kipling summed up the general British feeling at the end of the war, the Germans were "a people with the heart of beasts."[9]

France's Georges Clemenceau, "the Tiger" who had broken wartime defeatism and led his country to victory, wholeheartedly agreed. Like most French people, Clemenceau wanted old-fashioned revenge. He also wanted lasting security for France. This, he believed, required the creation of a buffer state between France and Germany, the permanent demilitarization of Germany, and vast German reparations. He feared that sooner or later Germany with its 60 million people would attack France with its 40 million unless the Germans were permanently weakened. Moreover, France had no English Channel (or Atlantic Ocean) as a reassuring barrier against German aggression. Wilson, supported by Lloyd George, would hear none of this. Clemenceau's demands seemed vindictive, violating morality and the principle of national self-determination. By April the conference was deadlocked on the German question, and Wilson packed his bags to go home.

In the end, convinced that France should not break with its allies because France could not afford to face Germany alone in the future, Clemenceau agreed to a compromise. He gave up the French demand for a Rhineland buffer state in return for a formal defensive alliance with the United States and Great Britain. Under the terms of this alliance both Wilson and Lloyd George promised that their countries would come to France's aid in the event of a German attack. Thus Clemenceau appeared to win his goal of French security, as Wilson had won his of a permanent international organization. The Allies moved quickly to finish the settlement, believing that any adjustments would later be

Versailles, June 28, 1919   This group portrait by William Orpen features the three principal Allied leaders, seated in the center, who have finally reached an agreement. The scholarly Wilson is third from the left, next to "the Tiger," Clemenceau of France, who is turned toward the strong-willed Lloyd George of Britain. *(Courtesy of the Trustees of the Imperial War Museum)*

possible within the dual framework of a strong Western alliance and the League of Nations.

The Treaty of Versailles between the Allies and Germany was the key to the settlement, and the terms were not unreasonable as a first step toward re-establishing international order. Had Germany won, it seems certain that France and Belgium would have been treated with greater severity, as Russia had been at Brest-Litovsk. Germany's colonies were given to France, Britain, and Japan as League of Nations mandates. Germany's territorial losses within Europe were minor, thanks to Wilson. Alsace-Lorraine was returned to France. Parts of Germany inhabited primarily by Poles were ceded to the new Polish state, in keeping with the principle of national self-determination. Germany had to limit its army to 100,000 men and agree to build no military fortifications in the Rhineland (Map 29.4).

More harshly, the Allies declared that Germany (with Austria) was responsible for the war and had therefore to pay reparations equal to all civilian damages caused by the war. This unfortunate and much-criticized clause expressed inescapable popular demands for German blood, but the actual figure was not set, and there was the clear possibility that reparations might be set at a reasonable level in the future when tempers had cooled.

When presented with the treaty, the German government protested vigorously. But there was no alternative, especially considering that Germany was still starving because the Allies had not yet lifted their naval blockade. On June 28, 1919, German representatives of the ruling moderate Social Democrats and the Catholic party signed the treaty in the Sun King's Hall of Mirrors at Versailles, where Bismarck's empire had been joyously proclaimed almost fifty years before.

Rosa Luxemburg, Revolutionary Socialist

When Rosa Luxemburg (1870–1919) was arrested and then clubbed down and murdered by soldiers while being taken to jail, the left wing of European socialism lost a leading thinker and a passionate activist. But it gained an icon, a revolutionary saint.

Luxemburg grew up in Warsaw, the fifth child in a loving, nonreligious Jewish family. Speaking Polish and German at home, the mature Luxemburg identified "indignantly with Polish victims of linguistic oppression far more easily than with her fellow Jews."[1] But recent research also suggests that she was profoundly affected by the 1881 anti-Jewish riots and massacres in Russia and tsarist Poland, when middle-class Jewish families like hers huddled in terror until the Russian government decided the riots had gone far enough. These pogroms of 1881 led many Jewish intellectuals to turn to socialism. So it was with Luxemburg. She found in Marxism the promise of liberation for *all* oppressed groups and thus an end to terrible ethnic hatreds.

Smuggled out of Poland in 1889 and studying economics and socialism in Zurich with like-minded Polish exiles, one of whom became her lover and lifelong companion in revolution, Luxemburg settled in 1898 in Germany, the heartland of Marxian socialism. Small, foreign-born, and walking with a limp because of a childhood accident, she relentlessly attacked all revisions of Marxism (see page 835) and emerged in Germany as the "most prominent and influential of the party's radicals." She denounced any compromise with capitalism and stressed the absolute necessity of revolution.

Luxemburg also played a leading role in the outlawed Polish Socialist party. She thrilled to the revolution of 1905 in the tsarist empire and worked feverishly for the cause in Warsaw—"the happiest months of my life." Strengthened in her revolutionary convictions, she fought to radicalize Germany's socialists. When senior party and trade-union leaders opposed her ideas and tried to marginalize her, she went over their heads to the rank and file. A popular speaker who lectured tirelessly to enthusiastic working-class audiences, "Red Rosa" even challenged army discipline and the emperor as she condemned militarism as well as capitalism. In 1913 she told a large meeting, "If they think we are going to lift the

weapons of murder against our French and other brethren, then we shall shout: 'We will not do it!'"[2] Arrested and tried for sedition, she was sentenced to prison.

The outbreak of war put existing trends in fast-forward. Luxemburg was heartbroken when the Second International

Rosa Luxemburg, addressing a meeting of the Socialist International in 1907. *(AKG London)*

stood by impotently in all countries and Germany's Social Democrats rallied to the government. From prison she denounced her former coworkers as working-class traitors and cheered on Karl Liebknecht's tiny group of radical socialists (see page 943). After her release in November 1918, she embraced the Bolshevik Revolution and worked with heart and soul for a replay of radical revolution in Germany until her martyr's death two months later.

Rosa Luxemburg's legacy is complex, but two points seem clear. First, she personified brilliantly the resurgent radical minority in Marxian socialism after 1905, which eventually triumphed in Russia and was rejected in Germany. Second, brave and ever multinational, Luxemburg embodied the strongest element in prewar socialism's hostility toward militarism and national hatreds, an idealistic vision tragically shattered in the great break of World War I.

Questions for Analysis

1. In what ways did Rosa Luxemburg's career reflect tensions and divisions in the Marxian socialist movement in Germany and throughout Europe before and during the First World War?

2. Evaluate Luxemburg's life. Was she a success or a failure? Or was she both? Defend your conclusions in a class debate.

1. Richard Abraham, *Rosa Luxemburg: A Life for the International* (Oxford and New York: Berg, 1989), p. 20; also pp. 75, 80. This brief study is excellent.
2. J. P. Nettl, *Rosa Luxemburg*, abr. ed. (New York: Schocken Books, 1969), p. 321.

MAP 29.4 Shattered Empires and Territorial Changes After World War I   The Great War brought tremendous changes in eastern Europe. New nations were established, and a dangerous power vacuum was created between Germany and Soviet Russia.

Separate peace treaties were concluded with the other defeated powers—Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey. For the most part these treaties merely ratified the existing situation in east-central Europe following the breakup of the Austro-Hungarian Empire (see Map 29.4). Like Austria, Hungary was a particularly big loser, as its "captive" nationalities (and some interspersed Hungarians) were ceded to Romania, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Yugoslavia. Italy got some Austrian territory. The Turkish empire was broken up.

France received Lebanon and Syria. Britain took Iraq and Palestine, which was to include a Jewish national homeland first promised by Britain in 1917. Officially League of Nations mandates, these acquisitions of the Western Powers were one of the most imperialistic elements of the peace settlement. Another was mandating Germany's holdings in China to Japan (see page 970). The age of Western imperialism lived on. National self-determination remained a reality only for Europeans and their offspring.

American Rejection of the Versailles Treaty

The rapidly concluded peace settlement of early 1919 was not perfect, but within the context of war-shattered Europe it was an acceptable beginning. The principle of national self-determination, which had played such a large role in starting the war, was accepted and served as an organizing framework. Germany had been punished but not dismembered. A new world organization complemented a traditional defensive alliance of satisfied powers. The serious remaining problems could be worked out in the future. Moreover, Allied leaders had seen speed as essential for another reason: they detested Lenin and feared that his Bolshevik Revolution might spread. They realized that their best answer to Lenin's unending calls for worldwide upheaval was peace and tranquillity for war-weary peoples.

There were, however, two great interrelated obstacles to such peace: Germany and the United States. Plagued by communist uprisings, reactionary plots, and popular disillusionment with losing the war at the last minute, Germany's moderate socialists and their liberal and Catholic supporters faced an enormous challenge. Like French republicans after 1871, they needed time (and luck) if they were to establish firmly a peaceful and democratic republic. Progress in this direction required understanding yet firm treatment of Germany by the victorious Western Allies, particularly by the United States.

However, the U.S. Senate and, to a lesser extent, the American people rejected Wilson's handiwork. Republican senators led by Henry Cabot Lodge refused to ratify the Treaty of Versailles without changes in the articles creating the League of Nations. The key issue was the League's power—more apparent than real—to require member states to take collective action against aggression. Lodge and others believed that this requirement gave away Congress's constitutional right to declare war. In failing health Wilson, with narrow-minded self-righteousness, rejected all attempts at compromise.

In doing so, he ensured that the treaty would never be ratified by the United States in any form and that the United States would never join the League of Nations. Moreover, the Senate refused to ratify Wilson's defensive alliance with France and Great Britain. America turned its back on Europe.

The Wilson-Lodge fiasco and the newfound gospel of isolationism represented a tragic and cowardly renunciation of America's responsibility. Using America's action as an excuse, Great Britain, too, refused to ratify its defensive alliance with France. Betrayed by its allies, France stood alone. Very shortly France was to take actions against Germany that would feed the fires of German resentment and seriously undermine democratic forces in the new German republic. The great hopes of early 1919 had turned to ashes by the end of the year. The Western alliance had collapsed, and a grandiose plan for permanent peace had given way to a fragile truce. For this and for what came later, the United States must share a large part of the blame.

SUMMARY

Why did World War I have such revolutionary consequences? Why was it such a great break with the past? World War I was, first of all, a war of committed peoples. In France, Britain, and Germany in particular, governments drew on genuine popular support. This support reflected not only the diplomatic origins of the war but also the way western European society had been unified under the nationalist banner in the later nineteenth century, despite the fears that the growing socialist movement aroused in conservatives. The relentlessness of total war helps explain why so many died, why so many were crippled physically and psychologically, and why Western civilization would in so many ways never be the same again. More concretely, the war swept away monarchs and multinational empires. National self-determination apparently triumphed, not only in Austria-Hungary but also in many of Russia's western borderlands. Except in Ireland and parts of Soviet Russia, the revolutionary dream of national unity, born of the French Revolution, had finally come true.

Two other revolutions were products of the war. In Russia the Bolsheviks established a radical regime, smashed existing capitalist institutions, and stayed in power with a new kind of authoritarian rule. Whether the new Russian regime was truly Marxian or socialist was questionable, but it indisputably posed a powerful,

ongoing revolutionary challenge to Europe and its colonial empires.

More subtle but quite universal in its impact was an administrative revolution. This revolution, born of the need to mobilize entire societies and economies for total war, greatly increased the power of government in the West. And after the guns grew still, government planning and wholesale involvement in economic and social life did not disappear in Europe. Liberal market capitalism and a well-integrated world economy were among the many casualties of the administrative revolution, and greater social equality was everywhere one of its results. Thus even in European countries where a communist takeover never came close to occurring, society still experienced a great revolution.

Finally, the "war to end war" brought not peace but only a fragile truce. In the West the Allies failed to maintain their wartime solidarity. Germany remained unrepentant and would soon have more grievances to nurse. Moreover, the victory of national self-determination in eastern Europe created a power vacuum between a still-powerful Germany and a potentially mighty communist Russia. A vast area lay open to military aggression from two sides.

NOTES

1. M. Beloff, quoted in *U.S. News & World Report,* March 8, 1976, p. 53.

2. Quoted in J. Remak, *The Origins of World War I* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1967), p. 84.

3. Quoted in J. E. Rodes, *The Quest for Unity: Modern Germany, 1848–1970* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1971), p. 178.

4. Quoted in F. P. Chambers, *The War Behind the War, 1914–1918* (London: Faber & Faber, 1939), p. 168.

5. Quoted in R. O. Paxton, *Europe in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1975), p. 109.

6. Quoted in Chambers, *The War Behind the War, 1914–1918,* pp. 302, 304.

7. A. B. Ulam, *The Bolsheviks* (New York: Collier Books, 1968), p. 349.

8. H. Nicolson, *Peacemaking 1919* (New York: Grosset & Dunlap Universal Library, 1965), pp. 8, 31–32.

9. Quoted ibid., p. 24.

SUGGESTED READING

E. Hobsbawm, *The Age of Extremes: A History of the World, 1914–1991* (1996), offers a provocative interpretation of the "short twentieth century," with a good description of war and revolution. O. Hale, *The Great Illusion, 1900–1914*

(1971), is a thorough account of the prewar era. Remak's volume, cited in the Notes; J. Joll, *The Origins of the First World War* (1992); and L. Lafore, *The Long Fuse* (1971), are recommended studies of the causes of the First World War. A. J. P. Taylor, *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848–1919* (1954), is an outstanding survey of diplomatic developments, with an exhaustive bibliography. V. Steiner, *Britain and the Origins of the First World War* (1978), and G. Kennan, *The Decline of Bismarck's European Order: Franco-Russian Relations, 1875–1890* (1979), are also major contributions. K. Jarausch's *The Enigmatic Chancellor* (1973) is an important study on Bethmann-Hollweg and German policy in 1914. M. Gilbert, *The First World War: A Complete History* (1994), is comprehensive. C. Falls, *The Great War* (1961), is the best brief introduction to military aspects of the war. B. Tuchman, *The Guns of August* (1962), is a marvelous account of the dramatic first month of the war and the beginning of military stalemate. G. Ritter provides an able study in *The Schlieffen Plan* (1958). J. Winter, *The Experience of World War I* (1988), is a strikingly illustrated history of the war, and A. Horne, *The Price of Glory: Verdun 1916* (1979), is a moving account of the famous siege. J. Ellis, *Eye-Deep in Hell* (1976), is a vivid account of trench warfare, whereas J. Keegan's fascinating *Face of Battle* (1976) examines soldiers and warfare in a long-term perspective. V. Brittain's *Testament of Youth,* the moving autobiography of an English nurse in wartime, shows lives buffeted by new ideas and personal tragedies.

F. L. Carsten, *War Against War* (1982), considers radical movements in Britain and Germany. The best single volume on the home fronts is still the one by Chambers mentioned in the Notes. M. Higonnet, J. Jensen, and M. Weitz, eds., *Behind the Lines: Gender and the Two World Wars* (1987), examines the changes that the war brought for women and for relations between the sexes. A. Marwick, *War and Change in Twentieth-Century Europe* (1990), is a useful synthesis. G. Feldman, *Army, Industry, and Labor in Germany, 1914–1918* (1966), shows the impact of total war and military dictatorship on Germany. Three excellent collections of essays—R. Wall and J. Winter, eds., *The Upheaval of War: Family, Work, and Welfare in Europe, 1914–1918* (1988); J. Roth, ed., *World War I* (1967); and R. Albrecht-Carrié, ed., *The Meaning of the First World War* (1965)—probe the enormous consequences of the war for people and society. The debate over Germany's guilt and aggression, which has been reopened in recent years, may be best approached through G. Feldman, ed., *German Imperialism, 1914–1918* (1972), and A. Hillgruber, *Germany and the Two World Wars* (1981). In addition to Erich Maria Remarque's great novel *All Quiet on the Western Front,* Henri Barbusse, *Under Fire* (1917), and Jules Romains, *Verdun* (1939), are highly recommended for their fictional yet realistic re-creations of the war. P. Fussell, *The Great War and Modern Memory* (1975), probes all the powerful literature inspired by the war. M. Ecksteins, *Rites of Spring: The Great War and the Birth of the Modern Age* (1989), is an

imaginative cultural investigation that has won critical acclaim. C. Read, *From Tsar to Soviets: The Russian People and Their Revolution, 1917–1921* (1996), is highly recommended.

R. Suny and A. Adams, eds., *The Russian Revolution and Bolshevik Victory* (1990), presents a wide range of old and new interpretations. Ulam's work, cited in the Notes, which focuses on Lenin, is a masterful introduction to the Russian Revolution, whereas S. Fitzpatrick, *The Russian Revolution* (1982), provides a provocative reconsideration. B. Wolfe, *Three Who Made a Revolution* (1955), a collective biography of Lenin, Trotsky, and Stalin, and R. Conquest, *V. I. Lenin* (1972), are recommended. D. Volkogonov, *Lenin: A New Biography* (1994), is a lively study with some new revelations by a well-known postcommunist Russian historian. L. Trotsky wrote the colorful and exciting *History of the Russian Revolution* (1932), which may be compared with the classic eyewitness account of the young, pro-Bolshevik American J. Reed, *Ten Days That Shook the World* (1919). R. Daniels, *Red October* (1969), provides a clear account of the Bolshevik seizure of power, and R. Pipes, *The Formation of the Soviet Union* (1968), is recommended for its excellent treatment of the nationality problem during the revolution. D. Koenker, W. Rosenberg, and R. Suny, eds., *Party, State and Society in the Russian Civil War* (1989), probes the social foundations of Bolshevik victory. A. Wildman, *The End of the Russian Imperial Army* (1980), is a fine account of the soldiers' revolt, and G. Leggett, *The Cheka: Lenin's Secret Police* (1981), shows revolutionary terror in action. Boris Pasternak's justly celebrated *Doctor Zhivago* is a great historical novel of the revolutionary era. R. Massie, *Nicholas and Alexandra* (1971), is a moving popular biography of Russia's last royal family and the terrible health problem of the heir to the throne. Nicolson's study, listed in the Notes, captures the spirit of the Versailles settlement. T. Bailey, *Woodrow Wilson and the Lost Peace* (1963), and W. Widenor, *Henry Cabot Lodge and the Search for an American Foreign Policy* (1981), are also highly recommended.

The Experience of War

World War I was a "total" war: it enlisted the efforts of men, women, adults, and children, both at home and on the battlefield. It was a terrifying and painful experience for all those involved. To be sure, it was not the romantic endeavor it was purported to be. The documents below offer two different wartime experiences. The first excerpt is from a letter written by a German soldier fighting in the trenches. The second is from the diary of a Viennese woman. As you read both passages, think about the different ways war and its consequences were made real for these two people.

A German Soldier Writes from the Trenches, March 1915
Souchez, March 11th, 1915

"So fare you well, for we must now be parting," so run the first lines of a soldier-song which we often sang through the streets of the capital. These words are truer than ever now, and these lines are to bid farewell to you, to all my nearest and dearest, to all who wish me well or ill, and to all that I value and prize.

Our regiment has been transferred to this dangerous spot, Souchez. No end of blood has already flowed down this hill. A week ago the 142nd attacked and took four trenches from the French. It is to hold these trenches that we have been brought here. There is something uncanny about this hill-position. Already, times without number, other battalions of our regiment have been ordered here in support, and each time the company came back with a loss of twenty, thirty or more men. In the days when we had to stick it out here before, we had 22 killed and 27 wounded. Shells roar, bullets whistle; no dug-outs, or very bad ones; mud, clay, filth, shell-holes so deep that one could bathe in them.

This letter has been interrupted no end of times. Shells began to pitch close to us—great English 12-inch ones—and we had to take refuge in a cellar. One such shell struck the next house and buried four men, who were got out from the ruins horribly mutilated. I saw them and it was ghastly!

Everybody must be prepared now for death in some form or other. Two cemeteries have been made up here, the losses have been so great. I ought not to write that to you, but I do so all the same, because the newspapers have probably given you quite a different impression. They tell only of our gains and say nothing about the blood that has been shed, of the cries of agony that never cease. The newspaper doesn't give any description either of *how* the "heroes" are laid to rest, though it talks about "heroes' graves" and writes poems and suchlike about them. Certainly in Lens I have attended funeral-parades where a number of dead were buried in one large grave with pomp and circumstance. But up here it is pitiful the way one throws the dead bodies out of the trench and lets them lie there, or scatters dirt over the remains of those which have been torn to pieces by shells.

I look upon death and call upon life. I have not accomplished much in my short life, which has been chiefly occupied with study. I have commended my soul to the Lord God. It bears His seal and is altogether His. Now I am free to dare anything. My future life belongs to God, my present one to the Fatherland, and I myself still possess happiness and strength.

A Viennese Woman Remembers Home Front Life

Ten dekagrammes [3½ ounces] of horse-flesh per head are to be given out to-day for the week. The cavalry horses held in reserve by the military authorities are being slaughtered for lack of fodder, and the people of Vienna are for a change to get a few mouthfuls of meat of which they have so long been deprived. Horse-flesh! I should like to know whether my instinctive repugnance to horse-flesh as food is personal, or whether my dislike is shared by many other housewives. My loathing of it is based, I believe, not on a physical but on a psychological prejudice.

I overcame my repugnance, rebuked myself for being sentimental, and left the house. A soft,

steady rain was falling, from which I tried to protect myself with galoshes, waterproof, and umbrella. As I left the house before seven o'clock and the meat distribution did not begin until nine o'clock, I hoped to get well to the front of the queue.

No sooner had I reached the neighbourhood of the big market hall than I was instructed by the police to take a certain direction. I estimated the crowd waiting here for a meagre midday meal at two thousand at least. Hundreds of women had spent the night here in order to be among the first and make sure of getting their bit of meat. Many had brought with them improvised seats—a little box or a bucket turned upside down. No one seemed to mind the rain, although many were already wet through. They passed the time chattering, and the theme was the familiar one: What have you had to eat? What are you going to eat? One could scent an atmosphere of mistrust in these conversations: they were all careful not to say too much or to betray anything that might get them into trouble.

At length the sale began. Slowly, infinitely slowly, we moved forward. The most determined, who had spent the night outside the gates of the hall, displayed their booty to the waiting crowd: a ragged, quite freshly slaughtered piece of meat with the characteristic yellow fat. [Others] alarmed those standing at the back by telling them that there was only a very small supply of meat and that not half the people waiting would get a share of it. The crowd became very uneasy and impatient, and before the police on guard could prevent it, those standing in front organized an attack on the hall which the salesmen inside were powerless to repel. Everyone seized whatever he could lay his hands on, and in a few moments all the eatables had vanished. In the confusion stands were overturned, and the police forced back the aggressors and closed the gates. The crowds waiting outside, many of whom had been there all night and were soaked through, angrily demanded their due, whereupon the mounted police made a little charge, provoking a wild panic and much screaming and cursing. At length I reached home, depressed and disgusted, with a broken umbrella and only one galosh.

We housewives have during the last four years grown accustomed to standing in queues; we have also grown accustomed to being obliged to go home with empty hands and still emptier stomachs. Only very rarely do those who are sent away disappointed give cause for police intervention. On the other hand, it happens more and more frequently

Germans wait in line for their meager rations in Berlin in 1916. *(Corbis)*

that one of the pale, tired women who have been waiting for hours collapses from exhaustion. The turbulent scenes which occurred to-day inside and outside the large market hall seemed to me perfectly natural. In my dejected mood the patient apathy with which we housewives endure seemed to me blameworthy and incomprehensible.

Questions for Analysis

1. How does the soldier see the war he is in? Is it a grand patriotic effort? Or is it a story of senseless bloodshed and loss of life?

2. How did the soldiers cope with the reality of war in the trenches?

3. How does the experience of the Viennese woman differ from the soldier's?

4. Were the women who pillaged the food hall "blameworthy" or "reprehensible," as the Viennese woman says?

Sources: Alfons Ankenbrand, in *German Students' War Letters*, ed. A. F. Wedd (London: Methuen, 1929), pp. 72–73; *Blockade: The Diary of an Austrian Middle-Class Woman, 1914–1924*, trans. Winifred Ray (New York: Ray Long & Richard Smith, 1932), pp. 63–68

30

Nationalism in Asia, 1914–1939

Turks celebrating victory at Smyrna, October 1922. *(Hulton Getty/ Liaison)*

From Asia's perspective the First World War was largely a European civil war that shattered the united front of Western imperialism and convulsed prewar relationships throughout Asia. Most crucially, the war speeded the development of modern nationalism in Asia. Before 1914, the nationalist gospel of anti-imperialist political freedom and racial equality had already won converts among Asia's westernized, educated elites. In the 1920s and 1930s it increasingly won the allegiance of the masses. As in Europe in the nineteenth century, nationalism in Asia between 1914 and 1939 became a mass movement with potentially awesome power.

There were at least three reasons for the upsurge of nationalism in Asia. First and foremost, nationalism provided the most effective means of organizing the anti-imperialist resistance both to direct foreign rule and to indirect Western domination. Second, nationalism called for fundamental changes and challenged old political and social practices and beliefs. Thus modernizers used it as a weapon in their ongoing contest for influence and power with conservative traditionalists. Third, nationalism spread because it gave both leaders and followers a vision of a shining future for a rejuvenated people. Thus nationalism provided an ideology to ennoble the sacrifices that the struggle for rejuvenation would require.

The spread of nationalism also had its dark side. As in Europe (see page 783), nationalists in Asia developed a strong sense of "we" and "they." "They" were often the enemy—the oppressor. White-skinned European imperialists were just such a "they," and nationalist feeling generated the power to destroy European empires and challenge foreign economic domination. But, as in Europe, nationalism in Asia also stimulated bitter conflicts and wars between peoples, in two different ways.

First, it stimulated conflicts between relatively homogeneous peoples in large states, rallying, for example, Chinese against Japanese and vice versa. Second, nationalism often heightened tensions between ethnic (or religious) groups within states, especially states with a variety of peoples, like British India or the Ottoman Empire. Such states had been formed by authoritarian rulers and their armies and bureaucracies, very much like the Austro-Hungarian and Russian empires before 1914. When their rigid rule declined or snapped, increasingly self-conscious and nationalistic peoples might easily quarrel, seeking to divide the existing state or to dominate the enemy "they" within its borders.

Although modern nationalism has everywhere exhibited certain shared characteristics, it has never been monolithic. In Asia especially, the range of historical experience has been enormous, and the new and often narrow ideology of nationalism was grafted onto old, rich, and complex civilizations. Between the outbreak of the First and Second World Wars each Asian country developed a distinctive national movement, rooted in its unique culture and history. Each nation's people created its own national reawakening, which renovated thought and culture as well as politics and economics.

- How did modern nationalism—the dominant force in most of the world in the twentieth century—develop in Asia between the First and Second World Wars?
- How did national movements arise in different countries, and how did some of these parallel movements come into brutal conflict?

These are the questions that this chapter will seek to answer.

THE FIRST WORLD WAR AND WESTERN IMPERIALISM

Every Asian national movement shared a burning desire for genuine freedom from foreign imperialism. The First World War had a profound effect on these aspirations by altering relations between Asia and Europe.

In the words of a distinguished Indian historian, "the Great War of 1914–1918 was from the Asian point of view a civil war within the European community of nations."[1] For four years Asians watched the haughty bearers of what Kipling had called "the White Man's Burden" (see page 852) vilifying and destroying each other. Far from standing united and supremely self-confident, the Western nations were clawing at each other in total disarray. The impact of this spectacle was enormous. Japan's defeat of imperial Russia in 1904 (see page 871) had shown that an Asian power could beat a European Great Power; now for the first time Asians saw the entire West as divided and vulnerable.

In the East Asian countries of China and Japan few people particularly cared who won the vicious family quarrel in distant Europe. In India and French Indochina enthusiasm was also limited, but the impact of the war was unavoidably greater. The British and the

French were driven by the harsh logic of total war to draft their colonial subjects into the conflict. They uprooted hundreds of thousands of Asians to fight the Germans and the Ottoman Turks. This too had major consequences. An Indian or Vietnamese soldier who fought in France and came in contact there with democratic and republican ideas was likely to be less willing to accept foreign rule when he returned home.

The British and the French also made rash promises to gain the support of colonial peoples during the war. British leaders promised Jewish nationalists in Europe a homeland in Palestine, even as they promised Arab nationalists independence from the Ottoman Empire. In India the British were forced in 1917 to announce a new policy of self-governing institutions in order to counteract Indian popular unrest fanned by wartime inflation and heavy taxation. After the war the nationalist genie that the colonial powers had called on refused to slip meekly back into the bottle.

The war aims of President Wilson also raised the hopes of peoples under imperial rule. In January 1918 Wilson proposed to make peace on the basis of his Fourteen Points (see page 943), whose key idea was national self-determination for the peoples of Europe and the Ottoman Empire. Wilson also proposed that in all colonial questions "the interests of native populations be given equal weight with the desires of European governments," and he seemed to call for national self-rule. This subversive message had enormous appeal for educated Asians, fueling their hopes of freedom.

Military service and Wilsonian self-determination also fired the hopes of some Africans and some visionary American black supporters of African freedom. The First World War, however, had less impact on European imperialism in sub-Saharan Africa than in Asia and the Arab world. For sub-Saharan Africa, the Great Depression and the Second World War were to prove much more influential in the growth of nationalist movements (see pages 1102–1104).

Once the Allies had won the war, they tried to shift gears and re-establish or increase their political and economic domination in Asia and Africa. Although fatally weakened, Western imperialism remained very much alive in 1918. Part of the reason for its survival was that President Wilson was certainly no revolutionary. At the Versailles Peace Conference he proved willing to compromise on colonial questions in order to achieve some of his European goals and the creation of the League of Nations. Also, Allied statesmen and ordinary French and British citizens quite rightly believed that their colonial empires had contributed to their ultimate vic-

tory over the Central Powers. They were in no mood to give up such valuable possessions voluntarily. Finally, the victors remained convinced of the superiority of their civilization. They believed that their rule was best for colonial peoples. A few "discontented" Asian or African intellectuals might agitate for self-rule, but Europeans generally believed that the "humble masses" were grateful for the law and order brought by the white man's administration. If pressed, Europeans said that such administration was preparing colonial subjects for eventual self-rule, but only in the distant future.

The compromise at Versailles between Wilson's vague, moralistic idealism and the European preoccupation with "good administration" was the establishment of a system of League of Nations mandates over Germany's former colonies and the old Ottoman Empire. Article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant, which was part of the Treaty of Versailles, assigned territories "inhabited by peoples incapable of governing themselves" to various "developed nations." "The well-being and development of such peoples" was declared "a sacred trust of civilization." A Permanent Mandates Commission was created to oversee the developed nations' fulfillment of their international responsibility; most of the members of the Permanent Mandates Commission came from European countries that had colonies. Thus the League elaborated a new principle—development toward the eventual goal of self-government—but left its implementation to the colonial powers themselves.

The mandates system demonstrated that Europe was determined to maintain its imperial power and influence. It is no wonder that patriots throughout Asia were bitterly disappointed after the First World War. They saw France, Great Britain, and other nations—industrialized Japan was the only Asian state to obtain mandates—grabbing Germany's colonies as spoils of war and extending the existing system of colonial protectorates in Muslim North Africa into the territories of the old Ottoman Empire. Yet Asian patriots were not about to give up. They preached national self-determination and struggled to build mass movements capable of achieving freedom and independence.

In this struggle they were encouraged and sometimes inspired by Soviet communism. Immediately after seizing power in 1917, Lenin and his fellow Bolsheviks declared that the Asian peoples conquered by the tsars, now inhabitants of the new Soviet Union, were complete equals of the Russians with a right to their own development. (In actuality this equality hardly existed, but the propaganda was effective nonetheless.) The

Delegates to the Peace Conference of 1919   Standing in the foreground is Prince Faisal, third son of King Hussein of Hejaz and frustrated spokesman for the Arab cause at Versailles. The British officer T. E. Lawrence—popularly known as Lawrence of Arabia because of his daring campaign against the Turks in World War I—is second from the right in the middle row. *(By courtesy of the Trustees of the Imperial War Museum)*

Communists also denounced European and American imperialism and pledged to support revolutionary movements in all colonial countries, even when they were primarily movements of national independence led by "middle-class" intellectuals instead of by revolutionary workers. Foreign political and economic exploitation was the immediate enemy, they said, and socialist revolution could wait until after Western imperialism had been defeated.

The example, ideology, and support of Soviet communism exerted a powerful influence in the 1920s and 1930s, particularly in China and French Indochina. A nationalistic young Vietnamese man who had pleaded the cause of Vietnamese independence unsuccessfully at the Versailles Peace Conference described his feelings when he read Lenin's statement on national self-determination for colonial peoples, adopted by the Communist Third International in 1920:

These resolutions filled me with great emotion, enthusiasm, and faith. They helped me see the problem clearly. My joy was so great I began to cry. Alone in my room I wrote the following words, as if I were addressing a great crowd: "My dear compatriots, so miserable and oppressed, here is what we need. Here is the path to our liberation."

The young nationalist was Ho Chi Minh (1890–1969), who was to fight a lifetime to create an independent, communist Vietnam.

The appeal of nationalism in Asia was not confined to territories under direct European rule. The extraordinary growth of international trade after 1850 had drawn millions of peasants and shopkeepers throughout Asia into the Western-dominated world economy, disrupting local markets and often creating hostility toward European businessmen. Moreover, Europe and the United States had forced even the most solid Asian states, China and Japan, to accept unequal treaties and humiliating limitations on their sovereignty. Thus the nationalist promise of genuine economic independence and true political equality with the West appealed as powerfully in old but weak states like China as in colonial territories like British India.

Finally, as in Russia after the Crimean War or in Japan after the Meiji Restoration, the nationalist creed went hand in hand with acceptance of modernization by the educated elites. Modernization promised changes that would enable old societies to compete effectively with the world's leading nations.

THE MIDDLE EAST

The most flagrant attempt to expand the scope of Western imperialism occurred in what is usually called the Middle East but is perhaps more accurately termed West Asia—that vast expanse that stretches eastward from the Suez Canal and Turkey's Mediterranean shores across the Tigris-Euphrates Valley and the Iranian Plateau to the Arabian Sea and the Indus Valley. There the British and the French successfully encouraged an Arab revolt in 1916 and destroyed the Ottoman Empire. The conquering Europeans then sought to replace the Turks as principal rulers throughout the region, even in Turkey itself. Turkish, Arab, and Iranian nationalists, as well as Jewish nationalists arriving from Europe, reacted violently. They struggled to win dignity and nationhood, and as the Europeans were forced to make concessions, they sometimes came into sharp conflict with each other, most notably in Palestine.

The First World War and the Arab Revolt

Long subject to European pressure, the Ottoman Empire became increasingly weak and autocratic in the late nineteenth century (see pages 854–855). The combination of declining international stature and domestic tyranny eventually led to an upsurge of revolutionary activity among idealistic exiles and young army officers who wanted to seize power and save the Ottoman state. These patriots, the so-called Young Turks, succeeded in the revolution of 1908, and subsequently they were determined to hold together the remnants of the vast multiethnic empire. Defeated by Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece in the Balkan War of 1912, and stripped of practically all territory in Europe, the Young Turks redoubled their efforts in Asia. The most important of their Asian possessions were Syria—consisting of modern-day Lebanon, Syria, Israel, and Jordan—and Iraq. The Ottoman Turks also claimed the Arabian peninsula but exercised only loose control there.

For centuries the largely Arabic populations of Syria and Iraq had been tied to their Ottoman rulers by their common faith in Islam (though there were Christian Arabs as well). Yet beneath the surface, ethnic and linguistic tensions simmered between Turks and Arabs, who were as different as Chinese and Japanese or French and Germans. As early as 1883, a Frenchman who had traveled widely in the Arab provinces claimed:

Everywhere I came upon the same abiding and universal sentiment: hatred of the Turks. The notion of concerted action to throw off the detested yoke is gradually shaping itself. . . . An Arab movement, newly-risen, is looming in the distance; a race hitherto downtrodden will presently claim its due place in the destinies of Islam.[3]

The actions of the Young Turks after 1908 made the embryonic "Arab movement" a reality. Although some Turkish reformers argued for an Ottoman federalism that would give equal political rights to all ethnic and religious groups within the empire, the majority successfully insisted on a narrow Turkish nationalism. They further centralized the Ottoman Empire and extended the sway of the Turkish language, culture, and race. In 1909 the Turkish government brutally slaughtered thousands of Armenian Christians, a prelude to the wholesale destruction of more than a million Armenians during the heavy fighting with Russia in the First World War. Meanwhile, the Arab revolt gathered strength. By 1914 a large majority of Arab leaders believed that armed conflict with their Turkish masters was inevitable.

In close contact with Europeans for centuries, the Turks willingly joined forces with Germany and Austria-Hungary in late 1914. The Young Turks were pro-German because the Germans had helped reform the Ottoman armies before the war and had built important railroads, like the one to Baghdad. Alliance with Germany permitted the Turks to renounce immediately the limitations on Ottoman sovereignty that the

Europeans had imposed in the nineteenth century, and it offered the prospect of settling old scores with Russia, the Turks' historic enemy.

The Young Turks' fatal decision to side with the Central Powers pulled the entire Middle East into the European civil war and made it truly a world conflict. While Russia attacked the Ottomans in the Caucasus, the British had to protect Egypt and the Suez Canal, the lifeline to India. Thus Arab leaders opposed to Ottoman rule suddenly found an unexpected ally in Great Britain. The foremost Arab leader was Hussein ibn-Ali (1856–1931), a direct descendant of the prophet Muhammad through the house of Quraysh. As the *sharif,* or chief magistrate, of Mecca, the holiest city in the Muslim world, Hussein governed much of the Ottoman Empire's territory along the Red Sea, an area known as the Hejaz (Map 30.1). Basically anti-Turkish, Hussein refused to second the Turkish sultan's call for a holy war against the Triple Entente. His refusal pleased the British, who feared that such calls would trigger a Muslim revolt in India.

In 1915 Hussein managed to win vague British commitments for an independent Arab kingdom. The British attempt to take the Dardanelles and capture Constantinople in 1915 failed miserably, and Britain (and Russia) badly needed a new ally on the Ottoman front. Thus in 1916 Hussein revolted against the Turks, proclaiming himself king of the Arabs. Hussein joined forces with the British under T. E. Lawrence, who in 1917 led Arab tribesmen and Indian soldiers in a highly successful guerrilla war against the Turks on the Arabian peninsula. In September 1918 British armies and their Arab allies smashed into Syria. This offensive culminated in the triumphal entry of Hussein's son Faisal into Damascus.

Similar victories were eventually scored in the Ottoman province of Iraq. Britain occupied the southern Iraqi city of Basra in 1914 and captured Baghdad in 1917. Throughout Syria and Iraq there was wild Arab rejoicing. Many patriots expected a large, unified Arab state to rise from the dust of the Ottoman collapse. Within two years, however, many Arab nationalists felt bitterly betrayed by Great Britain and its allies. The issues involved are complex and controversial, but it is undeniable that this bitterness left a legacy of hatred toward the West.

Part of the reason for the Arabs' bitterness was that Britain and France had signed secret wartime treaties to divide and rule the old Ottoman Empire. In the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916, Britain and France had secretly agreed that France would receive modern-day Lebanon, Syria, and much of southern Turkey, and

Britain would receive Palestine, Jordan, and Iraq. The Sykes-Picot Agreement contradicted British (and later Wilsonian) promises concerning Arab independence after the war. When Britain and France set about implementing these secret plans, Arab nationalists felt cheated and betrayed.

A related source of Arab bitterness was Britain's wartime commitment to a Jewish homeland in Palestine. The Balfour Declaration of November 1917, made by the British foreign secretary Arthur Balfour, declared:

His Majesty's Government views with favor the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish People, and will use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.

As careful reading reveals, the Balfour Declaration made contradictory promises to European Jews and Middle Eastern Arabs. It has been a subject of passionate debate ever since 1917.

Some British Cabinet members apparently believed such a declaration would appeal to German, Austrian, and American Jews and thus help the British war effort. Others sincerely supported the Zionist vision of a Jewish homeland. These supporters also believed that such a homeland would be grateful to Britain and help maintain British control of the Suez Canal. In any event, Arabs were dismayed.

In 1914 Jews accounted for about 11 percent of the predominantly Arab population in the three Ottoman administrative units that would subsequently be lumped together by the British to form Palestine. The "National Home for the Jewish People" mentioned in the Balfour Declaration implied to the Arabs—and to the Zionist Jews as well—the establishment of some kind of Jewish state that would be incompatible with majority rule. But a state founded on religious and ethnic exclusivity was out of keeping with both Islamic and Ottoman tradition, which had historically been more tolerant of religious diversity and minorities than had the Christian monarchs or nation-states in Europe.

Despite strong French objections, Hussein's son Faisal (1885–1933) was allowed to attend the Versailles Peace Conference, but his effort to secure an independent state embracing all Arabs came to nothing. The independence of the kingdom of Hejaz was confirmed, but in return Faisal was forced to accept Franco-British

Black Sea

Istanbul
(Constantinople)

Batum

Ceded by Soviet Union
in 1921

SOVIET UNION

Kars

Ankara

ARMENIANS

Baku

AZERBAIJANIS

TURKEY

Izmir
(Smryna)

Tabriz

Crete

K U R D S

Aleppo

Teheran

Cyprus
(U.K.)

SYRIA
(French Mandate)

*Mediterranean
Sea*

Beirut

Damascus

Euphrates

Tigris

Baghdad

**PERSIA
(IRAN)**

PALESTINE
(British Mandate)

Amman

IRAQ
(British Mandate)

Kut el Amara

Jerusalem

TRANSJORDAN
(British Mandate)

Basra

Cairo

KUWAIT

NEUTRAL
ZONE

NEUTRAL
ZONE

EGYPT
(Occupied 1882;
independent 1922)

(Independent 1916; to Nejd 1925)

HEJAZ

Boundary undefined

BAHRAIN

Persian Gulf

QATAR

Riyadh

Medina

**NEJD
(SAUDI ARABIA)**

**TRUCIAL
OMAN**

Mecca

Red Sea

ASIR
(Independent 1917;
to Nejd 1920)

ANGLO-EGYPTIAN SUDAN

Boundary undefined

HADHRAMAUT

YEMEN

ERITREA

ADEN

Gulf of Aden

**FRENCH
SOMALILAND**

ABYSSINIA

Ottoman Empire in 1914

British Protectorates in 1914

Areas controlled under mandates from
the League of Nations, 1920

International boundaries, 1923

0   200   400 Km.

0   200   400 Mi

**BRITISH
SOMALILAND**

demands for mandates in Syria, Iraq, and Palestine. (The Saudis had attacked Hussein in 1916, and they conquered his kingdom of Hejaz in 1924–1925, incorporating it with the Nejd in 1932 to form Saudi Arabia.) The British mandate in Palestine formally incorporated the Balfour Declaration and its commitment to a Jewish national home. On his return to Syria, Faisal's followers repudiated the agreement he had reluctantly accepted. In March 1920 they met as the Syrian National Congress and proclaimed Syria independent with Faisal as king. A similar congress declared Iraq an independent kingdom.

Western reaction to events in Syria and Iraq was swift and decisive. A French army stationed in Lebanon attacked Syria, taking Damascus in July 1920. Faisal fled and the French took over. Meanwhile, the British put down an uprising in Iraq with bloody fighting and established effective control there. Western imperialism appeared to have replaced Turkish rule in the Middle East (see Map 30.1).

The Turkish Revolution

In November 1918 the Allied fleet entered Constantinople, the Ottoman capital. A young English official vividly describes the strange and pathetic situation he encountered:

I found the Ottoman Empire utterly smashed, her vast territories stripped into pieces, and her conquered populations blinded and bewildered by their sudden release. The Turks were worn out, dead-tired, and without bitterness awaited their fate. . . . The debris of the old order waited to be constructed into a new system.[4]

The Allies' "new system" was blatant imperialism, and it proved harsher for the defeated Turks than for the "liberated" Arabs. A treaty forced on the helpless sultan dismembered Turkey and reduced it to a puppet state. Great Britain and France occupied parts of Turkey, and

Mustafa Kemal The father of modern Turkey explains his radical reform of the written Turkish language. Impeccably elegant European dress symbolizes Kemal's conception of a modernized Turkey. *(Stock Montage)*

MAP 30.1 The Partition of the Ottoman Empire, 1914–1923 The decline of the mighty Ottoman Empire began in 1699, when the Habsburgs conquered Hungary, and it accelerated after 1805, when Egypt became virtually independent. By 1914 the Ottoman Turks had been pushed out of the Balkans, and their Arab provinces were on the edge of revolt; that revolt erupted in the First World War and contributed greatly to the Ottomans' defeat. When the Allies then attempted to implement their plans, including independence for the Armenian people, Mustafa Kemal arose to forge in battle the modern Turkish state.

Italy and Greece claimed shares as well. There was a sizable Greek minority in western Turkey, and Greek nationalists cherished the "Great Idea" of incorporating this territory into a modern Greek empire modeled on long-dead Christian Byzantium. In 1919 Greek armies carried by British ships landed on the Turkish coast at Smyrna. The sultan ordered his exhausted troops not to resist, and Greek armies advanced into the interior Turkey seemed finished.

But Turkey produced a great leader and revived to become an inspiration to the entire Middle East Mustafa Kemal (1881–1938), the father of modern Turkey, was a military man. The son of a petty government official and sympathetic to the Young Turk movement, Kemal had distinguished himself in the Great

Greek Exodus   In the port city of Smyrna in 1922, Greeks are evacuated after Turkish victory over the Greek and British invaders. After three years of fighting, Mustafa Kemal ended the Greek idea of establishing a modern empire that would include part of Turkey. *(Hulton Getty/Liaison)*

War by directing the successful defense of the Dardanelles against British attack. After the armistice, Mustafa Kemal watched with anguish the Allies' aggression and the sultan's cowardice. In early 1919 he moved from Constantinople to central Turkey and began working to unify the Turkish resistance.

The sultan, bowing to Allied pressure, initially denounced Kemal, but the cause of national liberation proved more powerful. The catalyst was the Greek invasion and attempted annexation of much of western Turkey. A young woman who was to play a major role in the Turkish revolution describes feelings she shared with countless others:

After I learned about the details of the Smyrna occupation by Greek armies, I hardly opened my mouth on any subject except when it concerned the sacred struggle. . . . I sud-

denly ceased to exist as an individual. I worked, wrote and lived as a unit of that magnificent national madness.[5]

Refusing to acknowledge the Allied dismemberment of their country, the Turks battled on through 1920 despite staggering defeats. The next year the Greeks, egged on by the British, advanced almost to Ankara, the nationalist stronghold in central Turkey. There Mustafa Kemal's forces took the offensive and won a great victory. The Greeks and their British allies sued for peace. After long negotiations the resulting Treaty of Lausanne (1923) solemnly abolished the hated Capitulations, which the European powers had imposed in the nineteenth century to give their citizens special privileges in the Ottoman Empire, and recognized the territorial integrity of a truly independent Turkey. Turkey lost only its former Arab provinces.

Mustafa Kemal, a nationalist without religious faith, believed that Turkey should modernize and secularize along Western lines. His first moves were political. Drawing on his prestige as a war hero, Kemal called on the somewhat reluctant National Assembly to depose the sultan and establish a republic. He had himself elected president and moved the capital from cosmopolitan Constantinople (soon to be renamed Istanbul) to Ankara in the Turkish heartland. Kemal savagely crushed the demands for independence of ethnic minorities like the Armenians and the Kurds, but he realistically abandoned all thought of winning back lost Arab territories. He focused instead on internal affairs, creating a one-party system—partly inspired by the Bolshevik example—in order to work his will.

The most radical of Kemal's changes pertained to religion and culture. For centuries most of the intellectual and social activities of believers had been sternly regulated by Islamic religious authorities, in keeping with the sacred laws. Profoundly influenced by the example of western Europe, Mustafa Kemal set out, like the philosophes of the Enlightenment, to limit the place of religion and religious leaders in daily affairs. Like Russia's Peter the Great, he employed dictatorial measures rather than reason to reach his goal. Kemal and his followers simply decreed a revolutionary separation of church and state. Religious courts were abolished, replaced by secular law codes that were inspired by European models. Religious schools gave way to state schools that taught such secular subjects as science, mathematics, and social sciences.

To dramatize the break with the past, Mustafa Kemal struck down many entrenched patterns of behavior. Women, traditionally secluded and inferior to males in Islamic society, received the right to vote. Marriage was now governed by civil law on a European model, rather than by the Islamic code. Women were allowed to seek divorces, and no man could have more than one wife at a time. Men were forbidden to wear the tall red fez of the Ottoman era as headgear; government employees were ordered to wear business suits and felt hats, erasing the visible differences between Muslims and "infidel" Europeans. The old Arabic script was replaced with a new Turkish alphabet based on Roman letters, which moved the written language closer to the spoken vernacular and facilitated massive government efforts to spread literacy after 1928. Finally, in 1935, family names on the European model were introduced. The National Assembly granted Mustafa Kemal the surname Atatürk, which means "father of the Turks."

By the time of his death in 1938, Atatürk and his supporters had consolidated their revolution. Government-sponsored industrialization was fostering urban growth and new attitudes, encouraging Turks to embrace business and science. Poverty persisted in rural areas, as did some religious discontent among devout Muslims. But like the Japanese after the Meiji Restoration, the Turkish people had rallied around the nationalist banner to repulse European imperialism and were building a modern secular nation-state.

Iran and Afghanistan

In Persia (renamed Iran in 1935), strong-arm efforts to build a unified modern nation ultimately proved less successful than in Turkey.

In the late nineteenth century Iran was also subject to extreme foreign pressure, which stimulated efforts to reform the government as a means of reviving Islamic civilization. In 1906 a nationalistic coalition of merchants, religious leaders, and intellectuals revolted. The despotic shah was forced to grant a constitution and establish a national assembly, the *Majlis*. Nationalist hopes ran high.

Yet the Iranian revolution of 1906 was doomed to failure, largely because of European imperialism. Without consulting Iran, Britain and Russia in 1907 simply divided the country into spheres of influence. Britain's sphere ran along the Persian Gulf; the Russian sphere encompassed the whole northern half of Iran (see Map 30.1). Thereafter Russia intervened constantly. It blocked reforms, occupied cities, and completely dominated the country by 1912. When Russian power temporarily collapsed in the Bolshevik Revolution, British armies rushed into the power vacuum. By bribing corrupt Iranians liberally, Great Britain in 1919 negotiated a treaty allowing the installation of British "advisers" in every department of the government.

The Majlis refused to ratify the treaty, and the blatant attempt to make Iran a British satellite aroused the national spirit. In 1921 reaction against the British brought to power a military dictator, Reza Shah Pahlavi (1877–1944), who proclaimed himself shah in 1925 and ruled until 1941.

Inspired throughout his reign by the example of Turkey's Mustafa Kemal, the patriotic, religiously indifferent Reza Shah had three basic goals: to build a modern nation, to free Iran from foreign domination, and to rule with an iron fist. The challenge was enormous. Iran was a vast, backward country of deserts, mountain barriers, and rudimentary communications. Most of the rural population was poor and illiterate, and among the Persian majority were sizable ethnic minorities with their own aspirations. Furthermore, Iran's powerful

THE MIDDLE EAST, 1914–1939

1914	Ottoman Empire enters First World War on Germany's side
1916	Allies agree secretly to partition Ottoman Empire
1916–1917	Arab revolt against Turkish rule grows
November 1917	Balfour Declaration pledges British support for a Jewish homeland in Palestine
October 1918	Arabs and British triumph as Ottoman Empire collapses
1919	Treaty of Versailles divides old Ottoman Empire into League of Nations mandates
1919	Mustafa Kemal mounts nationalist struggle against foreign occupation
1920	Faisal proclaimed king of Syria but quickly deposed by the French, who establish their mandate in Syria
early 1920s	Tide of Jewish immigration surges into British mandate of Palestine
1923	Treaty of Lausanne recognizes independent Turkey Mustafa Kemal begins to secularize Turkish society
1925	Reza Shah Pahlavi takes power in Iran and rules until 1941
1932	Iraq gains independence in return for military alliance with Great Britain
1936	Syrian nationalists sign treaty with France in return for promises of independence
late 1930s	Tensions mount between Arabs and Jews in Palestine

religious leaders hated Western (Christian) domination but were no less opposed to a more secular, less Islamic society.

To realize his vision of a strong Iran, the energetic shah created a modern army, built railroads, and encouraged commerce and industry. He won control over ethnic minorities such as the Kurds in the north and Arab tribesmen on the border with Iraq. He withdrew many of the privileges granted to foreigners and raised taxes on the powerful Anglo-Persian Oil Company, which had been founded in 1909 to exploit the first great oil strike in the Middle East. Yet Reza Shah was less successful than Atatürk.

Because the European-educated elite in Iran was smaller than the comparable group in Turkey, the idea of re-creating Persian greatness on the basis of a secularized society attracted relatively few determined sup-

porters. Many powerful religious leaders turned against Reza Shah, and he became increasingly brutal, greedy, and tyrannical, murdering his enemies and lining his pockets. His support of Hitler's Nazi Germany also exposed Iran's tenuous and fragile independence to the impact of European conflicts.

Afghanistan, meanwhile, was nominally independent in the nineteenth century, but the British imposed political restrictions and constantly meddled in the country's affairs. In 1919 the new, violently anti-British amir Amanullah (1892–1960) declared a holy war on the British government in India and won complete independence for the first time. Amanullah then decreed revolutionary reforms designed to hurl his primitive country into the twentieth century. The result was tribal and religious revolt, civil war, and retreat from reform. Islam remained both religion and law. A powerful

but primitive patriotism had enabled Afghanistan to win political independence from the West, but modest efforts to build a modern society met with little success.

The Arab States and Palestine

The establishment of French and British mandates at gunpoint forced Arab nationalists to seek independence by gradual means after 1920. Arab nationalists were indirectly aided by Western taxpayers, who wanted cheap—that is, peaceful—empires. As a result, Arabs won considerable control over local affairs in the mandated states, except Palestine, though the mandates remained European satellites in international and economic affairs.

The wily British chose Faisal, whom the French had so recently deposed in Syria, as king of Iraq. Faisal obligingly signed an alliance giving British advisers broad behind-the-scenes control. The king also accepted British ownership of Iraq's oil fields, consequently giving the West a stranglehold on the Iraqi economy. Given the severe limitations imposed on him, Faisal (r. 1921–1933) proved to be an able ruler, gaining the support of his people and encouraging moderate reforms. In 1932 he secured Iraqi independence at the price of a long-term military alliance with Great Britain.

Egypt, occupied by Great Britain ever since 1882 (see page 857) and a British protectorate since 1914, pursued a similar path. Following intense nationalist agitation after the Great War, Great Britain in 1922 proclaimed Egypt formally independent but continued to occupy the country militarily. In 1936, the British agreed to a treaty restricting their troops to their big bases in the Suez Canal Zone.

The French were less compromising in Syria. They practiced a policy of divide-and-rule, carving out a second mandate in Lebanon and generally playing off ethnic and religious minorities against each other. Lebanon eventually became a republic, dominated by a very slender Christian majority and under French protection.

Reuven Rubin: First Fruits (or First Pioneers) (1923)   Whereas Jerusalem was the center of Jewish religious culture and conservative art in the 1920s, the new coastal city of Tel Aviv sprang up secular, and it gloried in avant-garde modern art (see pages 991–993). In this painting Rubin, a leader of Tel Aviv's modernist school, depicts Jewish pioneers in a stark, two-dimensional landscape and conveys an exotic "Garden of Eden" flavor. Arriving from Romania, Rubin was bowled over by Palestine. "The world about me became clear and pure: life was formless, blurred, primitive." *(Courtesy, Rubin House, Tel Aviv)*

Arab nationalists in Syria finally won promises of Syrian independence in 1936 in return for a treaty of friendship with France.

In short, the Arab states gradually freed themselves from Western political mandates but not from the Western military threat or from pervasive Western influence. Of great importance, large Arab landowners and urban merchants increased their wealth and political power after 1918, and they often supported the Western hegemony, from which they benefited greatly. Western control over the newly discovered oil fields by foreign companies helped to convince radical nationalists that economic independence and genuine freedom had not yet been achieved.

Relations between the Arabs and the West were complicated by the tense situation in the British mandate of Palestine, and that situation deteriorated in the interwar years. Both Arabs and Jews denounced the British, who tried unsuccessfully to compromise with both sides. The anger of Arab nationalists, however, was aimed primarily at Jewish settlers. The key issue was Jewish migration from Europe to Palestine.

A small Jewish community had survived in Palestine ever since the destruction of Jerusalem and the dispersal of the Jews in Roman times. But Jewish nationalism, known as Zionism, was a recent phenomenon of European origin. The Dreyfus affair (see page 827) and anti-Jewish riots in Russia had convinced a cultured Austrian journalist named Theodore Herzl (1860–1904) that even nonreligious Jews would never be fully accepted in Europe. He believed that only the re-creation of a Jewish state could guarantee Jews dignity and security. Under Herzl's leadership, the Zionist movement encouraged Jews from all over the world to settle in the Palestine region, but until 1921 the great majority of Jewish emigrants preferred the United States.

After 1921 the situation changed radically. An isolationist United States drastically limited immigration from eastern Europe, where war and revolution had caused chaos and kindled anti-Semitism. Moreover, the British began honoring the Balfour Declaration despite Arab protests. Thus the number of Jewish immigrants to Palestine from turbulent Europe grew rapidly. In the 1930s German and Polish persecution created a mass of Jewish refugees. By 1939 the Jewish population of Palestine had increased almost fivefold since 1914 and accounted for about 30 percent of all inhabitants.

Jewish settlers in Palestine faced formidable economic and political difficulties. Much of the land purchased by the Jewish National Fund was productive. But many of the sellers of such land were wealthy absentee Arab landowners who had little interest in the welfare of their Arab tenants (see page 855). When the new Jewish owners subsequently replaced those age-old Arab tenants with Jewish settlers, Arab farmers and intellectuals burned with a sense of injustice. Moreover, most Jewish immigrants came from urban backgrounds and preferred to establish new cities like Tel Aviv or to live in existing towns, where they competed with the Arabs. The land issue combined with economic and cultural friction to harden Arab protest into hatred. Anti-Jewish riots and even massacres ensued.

The British gradually responded to Arab pressure and tried to slow Jewish immigration. This effort satisfied neither Jews nor Arabs, and by 1938 the two communities were engaged in an undeclared civil war. On the eve of the Second World War, the frustrated British proposed an independent Palestine as well as a cap of seventy-five thousand additional Jewish immigrants. The reason for this low number was to permanently limit the Jews to being only about one-third of Palestine's total population. Zionists felt themselves in grave danger.

In the face of adversity Jewish settlers from many different countries gradually succeeded in forging a cohesive community. Hebrew, which for centuries had been used only in religious worship, was revived as a living language to bind the Jews in Palestine together. Despite its slow beginnings, rural development achieved often spectacular results. The key unit of agricultural organization was the *kibbutz,* a collective farm on which each member shared equally in the work, rewards, and defense of the farm. Men and women labored side by side, a nursery cared for the children, and a common dining hall served meals. Some cooperative farms turned arid grazing land into citrus groves and irrigated gardens. An egalitarian socialist ideology also characterized industry, which grew rapidly and was owned largely by the Jewish trade unions. By 1939 a new but old nation was emerging in the Middle East.

TOWARD SELF-RULE IN INDIA

The national movement in British India grew out of two interconnected cultures, Hindu and Muslim, which came to see themselves as fundamentally different in rising to challenge British rule. Nowhere has the power of modern nationalism, both to unify and to divide, been more strikingly demonstrated than in India.

Promises and Repression (1914–1919)

Indian nationalism had emerged in the late nineteenth century (see page 865), and when the First World War began, the British feared revolt. Instead, somewhat like Europe's equally mistrusted socialist workers, Indians supported the war effort. About 1.2 million Indian soldiers and laborers volunteered for duty and served in Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. The British government in India and the native Indian princes sent large supplies of food, money, and ammunition. In return, the British opened more good government jobs to Indians and made other minor concessions.

As the war in distant Europe ground on, however, inflation, high taxes, food shortages, and a terrible influenza epidemic created widespread suffering and discontent. The prewar nationalist movement revived, stronger than ever, and the moderate and radical wings of the Indian National Congress joined forces. Moreover, in 1916 the Hindus leading the Congress party hammered out an alliance—the Lucknow Pact—with India's Muslim League. Founded in 1906 to uphold Muslim interests, the league had grown out of fears arising from the fact that under British rule the once-dominant Muslim minority had fallen behind the Hindu majority, especially in the Western education necessary to secure good jobs in the government. The Lucknow Pact forged a powerful united front of Hindus and Muslims and called for putting India on equal footing with self-governing white British dominions like Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.

The British response was contradictory. On the one hand, the secretary of state for India made the unprecedented announcement in August 1917 that British policy in India called for the "gradual development of self-governing institutions and the progressive realization of responsible government." The means of achieving this great step forward were spelled out in late 1919 in the Government of India Act, which established a dual administration: part Indian and elected, part British and authoritarian. Such noncontroversial activities as agriculture, health, and education were transferred from British to Indian officials who were accountable to elected provincial assemblies. More sensitive matters like taxes, police, and the courts remained solely in British hands.

The positive impact of this reform, so typical of the British tradition of gradual political change, was seriously undermined by old-fashioned authoritarian rule. Despite the unanimous opposition of the elected Indian members, the British in 1919 rammed the repressive Rowlatt Acts through India's Imperial Legislative Council. These acts indefinitely extended wartime "emergency measures" designed to curb unrest and root out "conspiracy." The result was a wave of rioting across India.

Under these tense conditions an unsuspecting crowd of some ten thousand gathered to celebrate a Hindu religious festival in an enclosed square in Amritsar, a city in the northern province of Punjab. Without the knowledge of the crowd, the local English commander, General Reginald Dyer, had banned all public meetings that very day. Dyer marched his native Gurkha troops onto the field and, without warning, ordered them to fire into the unarmed mass at point-blank range until the ammunition ran out. The Amritsar Massacre, killing 379 and wounding 1,137, shattered wartime hopes in a frenzy of postwar reaction. India seemed to stand on the verge of more violence and repression and, sooner or later, terrorism and guerrilla war. That India took a different path to national liberation was due largely to Mohandas "Mahatma" Gandhi (1869–1948), who became the most fascinating and influential Indian of modern times.

Hindu Society and Mahatma Gandhi

By the time of Gandhi's birth in 1869, the Indian subcontinent was firmly controlled by the British. Part of the country was directly ruled by British (and subordinate Indian) officials, ultimately answerable to the British Parliament in London. These areas included Bengal and its teeming capital Calcutta in eastern India, Bombay and its hinterland in western India, the Punjab in the northwest, and Madras on the southeast coast (see Map 34.1 on page 1092). So-called protected states were more sheltered from European ideas and from the world economy. There many of the old ways remained intact. The native prince—usually known as the *maharaja*—remained the titular ruler, though he was bound to the British by unequal treaties and had to accept the "advice" of the British resident assigned to his court.

It was in just such a tiny backwater protected state that Gandhi grew up. His father was a member of the merchant caste. But the Indian caste system has always been more flexible and dynamic than unsympathetic Westerners have wanted to believe, and for six generations the heads of Gandhi's family had served as hereditary prime ministers in various minuscule realms on the

British Repression After the Amritsar Massacre of 1919 British repression in northern India was harsh and sadistic. Assisted by obedient native policemen wielding heavy clubs, these British officers are inflicting the kind of pain and humiliation that would soon fuel Gandhi's nationalist movement. *(J. C. Allen)*

Kathiawar peninsula, north of Bombay on the Arabian Sea.

The extended (or joint) family, which had for generations been the most important unit of Indian society, powerfully influenced young Gandhi. Gandhi's father was the well-to-do head of the clan, which included five brothers and their wives, children, and children's children. The big three-story ancestral home swarmed with relatives. A whole community crowded into the labyrinth of tiny rooms and spilled out into the open courtyards. In such a communal atmosphere, patience, kindness, and a good-natured love of people were essential virtues. The aggressive, solitary individualism so prized in Europe and North America would have threatened group harmony. So it was for Gandhi.

In the Hindu family the woman was subordinate but respected. She was "worshipped as a mother, venerated as a wife, loved as a sister, but not much regarded as a woman." Her duty was "to worship her husband, to bear and rear his children."[6] Every Hindu girl married young, often before puberty; her husband was chosen by her parents. The young bride moved into her father-in-law's house. Marriage was a sacrament that could not be dissolved by divorce or even by death. Widows were forbidden by custom to remarry. More generally, a woman's fate was linked to that of the family, in which she was the trusted guardian of orthodox Hindu values.

Gandhi's mother was the ideal Hindu housewife. Married as a young illiterate girl to a forty-two-year-old man whose first wives had died without male children,

Putali Ba bore three boys and a girl. According to Gandhi, his ever-cheerful mother was "the first to rise and the last to go to bed . . . and she never made any distinction between her own children and other children in the family."[7] Very devoted but undogmatic in religious matters, Putali Ba fasted regularly and exercised a strong influence on her precocious son. Gandhi was married at thirteen to a local girl who became his lifelong companion.

After his father's death, Gandhi decided to study law in England. No member of his subcaste had ever done so, and the local elders declared Gandhi an outcaste, claiming that Hindu practices would not be possible in alien England. Gandhi disagreed. To win over his wife and anxious mother, he swore that he would not touch meat, women, or wine in the foreign land. Gandhi kept his word. After passing the English bar, he returned to India. But his practice in Bombay failed, and in 1893 he decided to try his luck as a lawyer for wealthy Indian merchants in South Africa. It was a momentous decision.

The Roots of Militant Nonviolence

Soon after arriving in South Africa, the elegant young lawyer in Western dress took a business trip by train. A white man entered the first-class compartment in which Gandhi was riding, took one look at him, and called the conductor. Gandhi was ordered to ride in the baggage car. When he protested, a policeman threw him off the train. Years later Gandhi recalled this experience as a critical turning point in his life. He had refused to bow to naked racial injustice.

As Gandhi's law practice flourished, he began to examine the plight of Indians in South Africa. After the British abolished black slavery in the empire, plantation owners in South Africa and elsewhere had developed a "new system of slavery."[8] They imported desperately poor Indians as indentured laborers on five-year renewable contracts. When some thrifty, hard-working Indians completed their terms and remained in South Africa as free persons and economic competitors, the Dutch and British settlers passed brutally discriminatory laws. Poor Indians had to work on white-owned plantations or return to India; rich Indians lost the vote. Gandhi undertook the legal defense of his countrymen, infuriating the whites. In 1896 a hysterical mob almost lynched the "coolie lawyer."

Meanwhile, Gandhi was searching for a spiritual theory of social action. Identifying with South Africa's black majority as well as with his own countrymen, he meditated on the Hindu pursuit of spiritual strength

"The Right Path to Liberty"   This Indian National Congress poster draws upon Indian culture to build support for nationalism. All Indian communities are marching toward freedom, but Gandhi, Nehru, and others are in prison and a bridge has collapsed. Yet the Hindu deity Krishna reassures anxious Mother India: with a little more sacrifice the journey will be complete. *(British Library)*

through fasting, sexual abstinence, devotion to duty, and reincarnation. He also studied Christian teachings. Gradually Gandhi developed and articulated a weapon for the weak that he called *Satyagraha*. Gandhi conceived of Satyagraha, loosely translated as "Soul Force," as a means of striving for truth and social justice through love, suffering, and conversion of the oppressor. Its tactic is courageous nonviolent resistance. Satyagraha owed a good deal to the Christian Gospels, for Christ's call to "love your enemies" touched Gandhi to the core.

As the undisputed leader of South Africa's Indians before the First World War, Gandhi put his philosophy into action. When the white government of South Africa severely restricted Asians' immigration and internal freedom of movement, he led a campaign of mass resistance. Thousands of Indian men and women

marched across forbidden borders and peacefully withstood beatings, arrest, and imprisonment.

In 1914, South Africa's exasperated whites agreed to many of the Indians' demands. A law was passed abolishing discriminatory taxes on Indian traders, recognizing the legality of non-Christian marriages, and permitting the continued immigration of free Indians. Satyagraha—militant nonviolence in pursuit of social justice—had proved itself a powerful force in Gandhi's hands.

Gandhi Leads the Way

In 1915 Gandhi returned to India. His reputation had preceded him: the masses hailed him as a *Mahatma*, or "Great Soul"—a Hindu title of veneration for a man of great knowledge and humanity—and the name stuck. Feeling his way into Indian affairs, Gandhi, dressed in peasant garb, crisscrossed India on third-class trains, listening to common folk and talking to Congress party leaders. Moved by the wretched misery of the very poor, he led some sharecroppers against British landowners and organized a strike of textile workers in his native Gujarat. But it was the aftermath of the Amritsar Massacre that catapulted Gandhi to leadership of the national movement in India.

Drawing on his South African experience, Gandhi in 1920 launched a national campaign of nonviolent resistance to British rule. Denouncing British injustice, he urged his countrymen to boycott British goods and jobs and honors. He told peasants not to pay taxes or buy heavily taxed liquor. Gandhi electrified the people. The result was nothing less than a revolution in Indian politics.

The nationalist movement had previously touched only the tiny, prosperous, Western-educated elite. Now both the illiterate masses of village India and the educated classes heard a voice that seemed to be in harmony with their profoundest values. Even Gandhi's renunciation of sex—with his wife's consent—accorded with a popular Hindu belief attributing special power to those who do not squander their life force in sexual intercourse. Gandhi's call for militant nonviolence was particularly appealing to the masses of Hindus who were not members of the warrior caste or the so-called military races and who were traditionally passive and nonviolent. The British had regarded ordinary Hindus as cowards. Gandhi told them that they could be courageous and even morally superior:

What do you think? Wherein is courage required—in blowing others to pieces from behind a cannon, or with a smiling face to approach a cannon and be blown to pieces? Who is the true warrior—he who keeps death always as a bosom-friend, or he who controls the death of others? Believe me that a man devoid of courage and manhood can never be a passive resister.[9]

Gandhi made Congress into a mass political party, welcoming members from every ethnic group and cooperating closely with the Muslim minority.

In 1922 some Indian resisters turned to violence. A mob murdered twenty-two policemen, and savage riots broke out. Gandhi abruptly called off his campaign. Arrested for fomenting rebellion, Gandhi told the British judge that he had committed "a Himalayan blunder to believe that India had accepted nonviolence."[10] Released from prison after two years, Gandhi set up a commune, established a national newspaper, and set out to reform Indian society and improve the lot of the poor. He welcomed the outcaste untouchables into his fellowship. He worked to help child widows, promote native cottage industry producers, and end the use of alcohol. For Gandhi moral improvement, social progress, and the national movement went hand in hand.

The resistance campaign of 1920–1922 left the British severely shaken. Although moderate Indians had participated effectively in the system of dual government, the commission formed by the British in 1927 to consider further steps toward self-rule included no Indian members. Indian resentment was intense. In 1929 the radical nationalists, led by the able and aristocratic Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964), pushed through the National Congress a resolution calling for virtual independence within a year. The British stiffened, and Indian radicals talked of a bloody showdown.

In this tense situation Gandhi masterfully reasserted his leadership. To satisfy the extremists, he took a hard line toward the British, but he controlled the extremists by insisting on nonviolent methods. He then organized another massive resistance campaign, this time against the hated salt tax, which affected every Indian family. Gandhi himself led fifty thousand people in a spectacular march to the sea to make salt without paying a tax, in defiance of the law. Gandhi was arrested, but his followers continued the march to the sea. Demonstrating peacefully at the salt pans and disregarding orders to disperse, they were then beaten senseless by policemen in a brutal and well-publicized encounter. The marchers did not even raise their arms to protect themselves. "They went down like ten-pins. . . . The survivors, without breaking ranks, silently and doggedly marched on until struck down."[11] (See the feature "Lis-

Gandhi in Lancashire   When Gandhi came to Britain for negotiations in 1931, these textile workers cheered him. The Great Depression had sent unemployment soaring, but many British workers told Gandhi that they could understand why he had organized an effective boycott against the sale of British cloth in India. *(Corbis)*

tening to the Past: Nonviolent Resistence in India" on pages 982–983.)

Over the next few months sixty thousand protesters followed Gandhi to jail. But this time there was very little rioting. Finally, in 1931, the frustrated, unnerved British released Gandhi from jail and sat down to negotiate with him, as an equal, over self-rule for India. There were many complications, including the determined opposition of diehard imperialists like Winston Churchill. But in 1935 the negotiations resulted in a new constitution, which greatly strengthened India's parliamentary representative institutions. It was virtually a blueprint for independence, which would come quickly after World War II.

Gandhi inspired people far beyond India's borders. Martin Luther King, Jr., was later to be deeply influenced by his tactics and philosophy of nonviolent social action. Gandhi did much to transform the elitist nationalism of Indian intellectuals into a mighty mass movement with social as well as political concerns. Above all, Gandhi nurtured national identity and self-respect. As Nehru summed it up, Gandhi "instilled courage and manhood in India's people; . . . courage is the one sure foundation of character, he had said: without courage there is no morality, no religion, no love."[12]

Despite his best efforts, Gandhi failed to heal a widening split between Hindus and Muslims. The

development of an Indian nationalism based largely on Hindu symbols and customs increasingly disturbed the Muslim minority. Tempers mounted, and atrocities were committed by both sides. By the late 1930s the leaders of the Muslim League were calling for the creation of a Muslim nation in British India, a "Pakistan" or "land of the pure." As in Palestine, the rise of conflicting nationalisms in India was to lead to tragedy (see pages 1093–1094).

TURMOIL IN EAST ASIA

Because of the efforts of the Meiji reformers, nationalism and modernization were well developed in Japan by 1914. Not only was Japan capable of competing politically and economically with the world's leading nations, but it had already begun building its own empire and proclaiming its special mission in Asia. China lagged far behind, but after 1912 the pace of nationalist development there began to quicken.

In the 1920s the Chinese nationalist movement managed to win a large measure of political independence from the imperialist West and promoted extensive modernization. But these achievements were soon undermined by internal conflict and war with an expanding Japan. Nationalism also flourished elsewhere in Asia, scoring a major victory in the Philippine Islands.

The Rise of Nationalist China

The revolution of 1911–1912, which overthrew the Manchu Dynasty (see page 872), opened an era of unprecedented change for Chinese society. Before the revolution many progressive Chinese had realized that fundamental technological and political reforms were necessary to save the Chinese state and to meet the many-sided Western challenge. Most had hoped, however, to preserve the traditional core of Chinese civilization and culture. The fall of the two-thousand-year-old dynastic system shattered such hopes. If the emperor himself was no longer sacred, what was? Everything was open to question and to alteration.

The central figure in the revolution was a crafty old military man, Yuan Shigai (Yüan Shih-k'ai). Called out of retirement to save the dynasty, Yuan (1859–1916) betrayed the Manchus and convinced the revolutionaries that he was a strong man who could unite the country peacefully and prevent foreign intervention. Once elected president of the republic, however, Yuan con-

centrated on building his own power. In 1913 he used military force to dissolve China's parliament and ruled as a dictator. China's first modern revolution had failed.

The extent of the failure became apparent only after Yuan's death in 1916. The central government in Beijing (Peking) almost disintegrated. For more than a decade power resided in a multitude of local military leaders, the so-called warlords. Most warlords were men of strong, flamboyant personality, capable of building armies by preying on the peasantry and of winning Beijing's recognition of them as local governors. None of them proved able to establish either a new dynasty or a modern state. Their wars, taxes, and corruption created only terrible suffering.

Foreign imperialism intensified the agony of warlordism. Although China declared its neutrality in 1914, Japan used the Great War in Europe as an opportunity to seize Germany's holdings on the Shandong (Shantung) Peninsula and in 1915 forced China to accept Japanese control of Shandong and southern Manchuria (see Map 30.2). Japan's expansion angered China's growing middle class and enraged China's young patriots. On May 4, 1919, five thousand students in Beijing exploded against the decision of the Versailles Peace Conference to leave the Shandong Peninsula in Japanese hands. This famous incident launched the May Fourth Movement, which opposed both foreign domination and warlord government.

The May Fourth Movement and the anti-imperialism of Bolshevik Russia renewed the hopes of Chinese nationalists. Struggling for a foothold in southern China, Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925) decided in 1923 to ally his Nationalist party, or Guomindang (Kuomintang), with the Communist Third International and the newly formed Chinese Communist party. The result was the first of many so-called national liberation fronts, in keeping with Lenin's blueprint for (temporarily) uniting all anticonservative, anti-imperialist forces in a common revolutionary struggle. In an effort to develop a disciplined party apparatus and a well-indoctrinated party army, Sun reorganized the Nationalist party along Bolshevik lines.

Sun, however, was no Communist. In his *Three Principles of the People,* elaborating on the official Nationalist party ideology—nationalism, democracy, and people's livelihood—nationalism remained of prime importance:

Compared to the other peoples of the world we have the greatest population and our civilization is four thousand years old; we should be advancing in the front rank with

EAST ASIA, 1911–1939

1911–1912	Revolution in China overthrows Manchu Dynasty and establishes republic
1915	Japan seizes German holdings in China and expands into southern Manchuria
May 4, 1919	Demonstration by Chinese students against Versailles Peace Conference and Japan sparks broad nationalist movement
1920s	New Culture Movement challenges traditional Chinese values
1922	Japan signs naval agreement with Western powers
1923	Sun Yat-sen allies the Nationalist party with Chinese Communists Kita Ikki advocates ultranationalism in Japan
1925–1928	Jiang Jieshi, leader of the Nationalist party, attacks warlord government and seeks to unify China
1927	Jiang Jieshi purges his Communist allies Mao Zedong recognizes the revolutionary potential of the Chinese peasantry
1930–1934	Nationalists campaign continually against the Chinese Communists
1931	Mukden Incident leads to Japanese occupation of Manchuria
1932	Japan proclaims Manchuria an independent state
1934	Mao leads Communists on Long March to new base in northwestern China The Philippines gain self-governing commonwealth status from United States
1936	Japan allies with Germany in anticommunist pact
1937	Japanese militarists launch general attack on China

the nations of Europe and America. But the Chinese people have only family and clan solidarity, they do not have national spirit. Therefore even though we have four hundred million people gathered together in one China, in reality they are just a heap of loose sand. Today we are the poorest and weakest nation in the world, and occupy the lowest position in international affairs. . . . If we do not earnestly espouse nationalism and weld together our four hundred million people into a strong nation, there is a danger of China's being lost and our people being destroyed. If we wish to avert this catastrophe, we must espouse nationalism and bring this national spirit to the salvation of the country.[13]

Democracy, in contrast, had a less exalted meaning. Sun equated it with firm rule by the Nationalists, who would promote the people's livelihood through land reform and welfare measures. Sun was in some ways a traditional Chinese rebel and reformer who wanted to re-establish order and protect the peasants.

Sun's plan was to use the Nationalist party's revolutionary army to crush the warlords and reunite China under a strong central government. When Sun unexpectedly died in 1925, this task was assumed by Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek), the young Japanese-educated director of the party's army training school. In 1926 and 1927 Jiang (1887–1975) led enthusiastic Nationalist armies in a highly successful attack on warlord governments in central and northern China. Preceded by teams of party propagandists, the well-disciplined Nationalist armies were welcomed by the people. In a series of complicated moves, the Nationalists

Inspiring Young Radicals   *La Jeunesse,* like *New Youth,* was one of several extremely influential journals founded and edited by Chen Duxiu (1879–1942). Chen lashed out at antiquated Chinese traditions, but he also became disillusioned with Western democracy and helped to found the Chinese Communist party in 1920. Note the hammer and sickle, the symbol of international communism. *(Museum of the Revolution, Beijing)*

consolidated their rule in 1928 and established a new capital at Nanjing (Nanking). Foreign states recognized the Nanjing government, and superficial observers believed China to be truly reunified.

In fact, national unification was only skin deep. China remained a vast agricultural country plagued by foreign concessions, regional differences, and a lack of modern communications. Moreover, Japan was opposed to a China strong enough to challenge Japan's stranglehold on Manchuria. And the uneasy alliance between the Nationalist party and the Chinese Communist party had turned into a bitter, deadly rivalry. Justifiably fearful of Communist subversion of the Nationalist government and encouraged by his military success and by wealthy Chinese capitalists, Jiang decided in April 1927 to liquidate his left-wing "allies" in a bloody purge. Secret agents raided Communist cells without warning, and soldiers gunned down suspects on sight. Chinese Communists went into hiding and vowed revenge.

China's Intellectual Revolution

Nationalism was the most powerful idea in China between 1911 and 1929, but it was only one aspect of a complex intellectual revolution that hammered at traditional Chinese thought and custom, advocated cultural renaissance, and pushed China into the modern world. Two other currents in that intellectual revolution, generally known as the New Culture Movement, were significant.

The New Culture Movement was founded by young Western-oriented intellectuals in Beijing during the May Fourth era. These intellectuals fiercely attacked China's ancient Confucian ethics, which subordinated subjects to rulers, sons to fathers, and wives to husbands. Confucius had lived in a distant feudal age, they said; his teachings were totally inappropriate to modern life. In such widely read magazines as *New Youth* and *New Tide,* the modernists provocatively advocated new and anti-Confucian virtues: individualism, democratic equality, and the critical scientific method. They also promoted the use of simple, understandable written language, a language freed from classical scholarship and literary conventions, as a means to clear thinking and mass education. China, they said, needed a whole new culture, a radically different world-view.

The most influential of these intellectuals championing liberalism was Hu Shi (1891–1962). Educated on a scholarship in the United States, the mature Hu Shi envisioned a vague and uninspiring future. The liberation and reconstruction of China was possible, he said, but it would have to occur gradually, "bit by bit, drop by drop." Hu personified the limitations of the Western liberal tradition in China.

The other major current growing out of the New Culture Movement was Marxian socialism. It too was Western in origin, "scientific" in approach, and materialist in its denial of religious belief and Confucian family ethics. But while liberalism and individualism reflected the bewildering range of Western thought since the Enlightenment, Marxian socialism offered Chinese intellectuals the certainty of a single all-encompassing creed. As one young Communist exclaimed: "I am now able to impose order on all the ideas which I could not reconcile; I have found the key to all the problems which appeared to me self-contradictory and insoluble."[14]

Marxism was undeniably Western and therefore modern. But it also provided a means of criticizing

Western dominance, thereby salving Chinese pride. Chinese Communists could blame China's pitiful weakness on rapacious foreign capitalistic imperialism. Thus Marxism, as modified by Lenin and applied by the Bolsheviks in the Soviet Union, appeared as a means of catching up with the hated but envied West. For Chinese believers, it promised salvation soon.

Chinese Communists could and did interpret Marxism-Leninism to appeal to the masses—the peasants. Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) in particular recognized quickly the enormous revolutionary potential of the Chinese peasantry, impoverished and oppressed by parasitic landlords. A member of a prosperous, hardworking peasant family, Mao (1893–1976) converted to Marxian socialism in 1918 while employed as an assistant librarian at Beijing University. He began his revolutionary career as an urban labor organizer. In 1925 protest strikes by Chinese textile workers against their Japanese employers unexpectedly spread from the big coastal cities to rural China, prompting Mao to reconsider the peasants. Investigating the rapid growth of radical peasant associations in Hunan province, Mao argued passionately in a 1927 report that

the force of the peasantry is like that of the raging winds and driving rain. It is rapidly increasing in violence. No force can stand in its way. The peasantry will tear apart all nets which bind it and hasten along the road to liberation. They will bury beneath them all forces of imperialism, militarism, corrupt officialdom, village bosses and evil gentry. Every revolutionary party, every revolutionary comrade will be subjected to their scrutiny and be accepted or rejected by them.[15]

The task of Communists was to harness the peasant hurricane and use its elemental force to destroy the existing order and take power. Mao's first experiment in peasant revolt—the Autumn Harvest Uprising of September 1927—was no more successful than the abortive insurrections of urban workers launched by his more orthodox comrades. But Mao learned quickly. He advocated equal distribution of land and broke up his forces into small guerrilla groups. After 1928 he and his supporters built up a self-governing Communist soviet, centered at Ruijin (Juichin) in southeastern China, and dug in against Nationalist attacks.

China's intellectual revolution stimulated profound changes in popular culture and family life. For many centuries Confucian reverence for the family and family ties had helped to stabilize traditional Chinese society and had given life meaning. The Confucian principle of subordination had suffused family life—subordination

Mao Zedong   Adapting Marxian theory to Chinese reality, Mao concentrated on the revolutionary potential of the peasantry. Here the forty-year-old Mao is preaching his gospel to representatives of poor peasants in southern China in 1933. *(Wide World Photos)*

of the individual to the group, of the young to the old, of the wife to the husband.

After the revolution of 1911 there was an accelerating trend toward greater freedom and equality for Chinese women. Foot binding was outlawed and attacked in public campaigns as cruel and uncivilized. Arranged marriages and polygamy declined. Marriage for love became increasingly common, and unprecedented educational and economic opportunities gradually opened up for women. Thus rising nationalism and the intellectual revolution interacted with monumental changes in Chinese family life. (See the feature "Individuals in Society: Ning Lao: A Chinese Working Woman.")

From Liberalism to Ultranationalism in Japan

The efforts of the Meiji reformers (see page 869) to build a powerful nationalistic state and resist Western imperialism were spectacularly successful and deeply impressive to Japan's fellow Asians. The Japanese, alone

Ning Lao: A Chinese Working Woman

The tough and resilient Ning Lao (right) with Ida Pruitt. *(From Ida Pruitt,* A Daughter of Han. *Reproduced by permission)*

The voice of the poor and uneducated is often muffled in history. Thus *A Daughter of Han,* a rare autobiography of an illiterate workingwoman as told to an American friend, offers unforgettable insights into the evolution of ordinary Chinese life and family relations.

Ning Lao was born in 1867 to poor parents in the northern city of Penglai on the Shandong Peninsula. Her foot binding was delayed to age nine, "since I loved so much to run and play." When the bandages were finally drawn tight, "my feet hurt so much that for two years I had to crawl on my knees."[1] Her arranged marriage at age fourteen was a disaster. She found that her husband was a drug addict ("in those days everyone took opium to some extent") who sold everything to pay for his habit. Yet "there was no freedom then for women," and "it was no light thing for a woman to leave her house" and husband. Thus Ning Lao endured her situation until her husband sold their four-year-old daughter to buy opium. Taking her remaining baby daughter, she fled.

Taking off her foot bandages, Ning Lao became a beggar. Her feet began to spread, quite improperly, but she walked without pain. And the beggar's life was "not the hardest one," she thought, for a beggar woman could go where she pleased. To care better for her child, Ning Lao became a servant and a cook in prosperous households. Some of her mistresses were concubines (secondary wives taken by rich men in middle age), and she concluded that concubinage resulted in nothing but quarrels and heartache. Hot tempered and quick to take offense and leave an employer, the hard-working woman always found a new job quickly. In time she became a peddler of luxury goods to wealthy women confined to their homes.

The two unshakable values that buoyed Ning Lao were a tough, fatalistic acceptance of life—"Only fortune that comes of itself will come. There is no use to seek for it"—and devotion to her family. She eventually returned to her husband, who had mellowed, seldom took opium, and was "good" in those years. "But I did not miss him when he died. I had my newborn son and I was happy. My house was established. . . . Truly all my life I spent thinking of my family." Her lifelong devotion was reciprocated by her son and granddaughter, who cared for her well in her old age.

Ning Lao's remarkable life story encompasses both old and new Chinese attitudes toward family life. Her son moved to the capital city of Beijing, worked in an office, and had only one wife. Her granddaughter, Su Teh, studied in missionary schools and became a college teacher and a determined foe of arranged marriages. She personified the trend toward greater freedom for Chinese women.

Generational differences also highlighted changing political attitudes. When the Japanese invaded China and occupied Beijing in 1937, Ning Lao thought that "perhaps the Mandate of Heaven had passed to the Japanese . . . and we should listen to them as our new masters." Her nationalistic granddaughter disagreed. She urged resistance and the creation of a new China, where the people governed themselves. Leaving to join the guerrillas in 1938, Su Teh gave her savings to her family and promised to continue to help them. One must be good to one's family, she said, but one must also work for the country.

Questions for Analysis

1. Compare the lives of Ning Lao and her granddaughter. In what ways were they different and similar?

2. In a broader historical perspective, what do you find most significant about Ning Lao's account of her life? Why?

1. Ida Pruitt, *A Daughter of Han: The Autobiography of a Chinese Working Woman* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1945), p. 22. Other quotations are from pages 83, 62, 71, 182, 166, 235, and 246.

among the peoples of Asia, had mastered modern industrial technology by 1910 and fought victorious wars against both China and Russia. The First World War brought more triumphs. Japan easily seized Germany's Asian holdings and held on to most of them as League of Nations mandates. The Japanese economy expanded enormously. Profits soared as Japan won new markets that wartime Europe could no longer supply.

In the early 1920s Japan seemed to make further progress on all fronts. Most Japanese nationalists believed that Japan had a semidivine mission to enlighten and protect Asia, but some were convinced that they could achieve their goal peacefully. In 1922 Japan signed a naval arms limitation treaty with the Western powers and returned some of its control over the Shandong Peninsula to China. These conciliatory moves reduced tensions in East Asia. At home Japan seemed

headed toward genuine democracy. The electorate expanded twelvefold between 1918 and 1925 as all males over twenty-five won the vote. Two-party competition was intense, and cabinet ministers were made responsible to the lower house. Japanese living standards were the highest in Asia. Literacy was universal.

Japan's remarkable rise, however, was accompanied by serious problems. Japan had a rapidly growing population, but natural resources were scarce. As early as the 1920s Japan was exporting manufactured goods in order to pay for imports of food and essential raw materials. Deeply enmeshed in world trade, Japan was vulnerable to every boom and bust. These conditions reinforced the widespread belief that colonies and foreign expansion were matters of life and death for Japan.

Also, rapid industrial development had created an imbalanced "dualistic" economy. The modern sector

Japanese Suffragists   In the 1920s Japanese women pressed for political emancipation in demonstrations like this one, but they did not receive the right to vote until 1946. Like these suffragists, some young women adopted Western fashions. Most workers in modern Japanese textile factories were also women. *(Mansell/Time Inc.)*

consisted of a handful of giant conglomerate firms, the *zaibatsu,* or "financial combines." A zaibatsu firm like Mitsubishi employed thousands of workers and owned banks, mines, steel mills, cotton factories, shipyards, and trading companies, all of which were closely interrelated. Zaibatsu firms had enormous economic power and dominated the other sector of the economy, which consisted of an unorganized multitude of peasant farmers and craftsmen. The result was financial oligarchy, corruption of government officials, and a weak middle class.

Behind the façade of party politics, the old and new elites—the emperor, high government officials, big businessmen, and military leaders—were jockeying savagely for the real power. Cohesive leadership, which had played such an important role in Japan's modernization by the Meiji reformers, had ceased to exist. By far the most serious challenge to peaceful progress, however, was fanatical nationalism. As in Europe, ultranationalism first emerged in Japan in the late nineteenth century but did not flower fully until the First World War and the 1930s.

Though often vague, Japan's ultranationalists shared several fundamental beliefs. They were violently anti-Western. They rejected democracy, big business, and Marxian socialism, which they blamed for destroying the older, superior Japanese practices that they wanted to restore. Reviving old myths, they stressed the emperor's godlike qualities and the samurai warrior's code of honor and obedience. Despising party politics, they assassinated moderate leaders and plotted armed uprisings to achieve their goals. Above all else, the ultranationalists preached foreign expansion. Like Western imperialists shouldering "the White Man's Burden," Japanese ultranationalists thought their mission was a noble one. "Asia for the Asians" was their self-satisfied rallying cry. As the famous ultranationalist Kita Ikki wrote in 1923:

Our seven hundred million brothers in China and India have no other path to independence than that offered by our guidance and protection. . . . The noble Greece of Asian culture [Japan] must complete her national reorganization on the basis of her own national polity. At the same time, let her lift the virtuous banner of an Asian league and take the leadership in a world federation which must come.[16]

The ultranationalists were noisy and violent in the 1920s, but it took the Great Depression of the 1930s to tip the scales decisively in their favor. The worldwide depression hit Japan like a tidal wave in 1930. Exports and wages collapsed; unemployment and raw suffering soared. Starving peasants ate the bark off trees and sold their daughters to brothels. The ultranationalists blamed the system, and people listened.

Japan Against China

Among those who listened with particular care were young Japanese army officers in Manchuria, the underpopulated, resource-rich province of northeastern China, controlled by the Japanese army since its victory over Russia in 1905. Many junior Japanese officers in Manchuria came from the peasantry and were distressed by the stories of rural suffering they heard from home. They also knew that the budget and prestige of the Japanese army had declined in the prosperous 1920s.

Most worrisome of all to the young officers was the rise of Chinese nationalism. This new political force challenged the control that Japan exercised over Manchuria through Chinese warlords that they controlled. In response, junior Japanese officers in Manchuria, in cooperation with top generals in Tokyo, secretly manufactured an excuse for aggression in late 1931. They blew up some tracks on a Japanese-owned railroad near the city of Mukden and then quickly occupied all of Manchuria in "self-defense."

In 1932 Japan proclaimed Manchuria an independent state and installed a member of the old Manchu Dynasty as puppet emperor. When the League of Nations condemned its aggression in Manchuria, Japan resigned in protest. Politics in Japan became increasingly chaotic. The army, though reporting directly to the emperor of Japan, was clearly an independent force subject to no outside control.

For China the Japanese conquest of Manchuria was disastrous. Japanese aggression in Manchuria drew attention away from modernizing efforts. The Nationalist government promoted a massive boycott of Japanese goods but lost interest in social reform. Above all, the Nationalist government after 1931 completely neglected land reform and the grinding poverty of the Chinese peasants. As in many poor agricultural societies throughout history, Chinese peasants paid roughly half of their crops to their landlords as rent. Ownership of land was very unequal. One careful study estimated that fully half of the land was owned by a mere 4 percent of the families, usually absentee landlords living in cities. Poor peasants and farm laborers—70 percent of the rural population—owned only one-sixth of the land.

As a result, peasants were heavily in debt and chronically underfed. Eggs and meat accounted for only 2 percent of the food consumed by poor and middle

Japanese Soldiers Celebrating Victory
Shanghai, China's leading port, fell to
the invading Japanese in November
1937. These jubilant infantry troops
have successfully stormed the city's
North Station. In China, the Japanese
won the battles but they could not win
the war. *(Ullstein Bilderdienst)*

income peasants. A contemporary Chinese economist
spelled out the revolutionary implications: "It seems
clear that the land problem in China today is as acute as
that of eighteenth-century France or nineteenth-cen-
tury Russia."[17] Mao Zedong certainly agreed.

Having abandoned land reform, partly because they
themselves were often landowners, the Nationalists un-
der Jiang Jieshi devoted their energies between 1930
and 1934 to five great campaigns of encirclement and
extermination against the Communists' rural power
base in southeastern China. In 1934 they closed in for
the kill, only to miss again. In one of the most incredi-
ble sagas of modern times, the main Communist army
broke out of the Nationalist encirclement, beat off at-
tacks, and retreated 6,000 miles in twelve months to a
remote region on the northwestern border (Map 30.2).
Of the estimated 100,000 men and women who began
the Long March, only from 8,000 to 10,000 reached

the final destination. There Mao built up his forces
once again, established a new territorial base, and won
the support of local peasants by undertaking land re
form.

In 1937 the Japanese military and the ultranational
ists were in command and decided to use a minor inci
dent near Beijing as a pretext for a general attack. The
Nationalist government, which had just formed a
united front with the Communists in response to the
demands of Chinese patriots, fought hard but could not
halt the Japanese. By late 1938 Japanese armies occu
pied sizable portions of coastal China (see Map 30.2
But the Nationalists and the Communists had retreated
to the interior, and both refused to accept defeat. The
determination of the Communist guerrillas equaled
that of the Nationalists, and their political skill would
prove superior. In 1939, as Europe edged toward an
other great war, the undeclared war between China and

U.S.S.R.

MANCHURIA

Qiqihar

Jiamusi

OUTER MONGOLIA
(Independent 1924)

Harbin

Shenyang
(Mukden)

Jinzhou

Baotou

Zhangjiakou
(Kalgan)

Beijing

KOREA
(Japanese 1910-1945)

Tianjin

Lüshun
(Port Arthur)

Taiyuan

Lanzhou

Yenan

SHANDONG

Jinan

Qingdao

SHAANXI

Xi'an

Luoyang

Zhengzhou

CHINA

Xuzhou

Nanjing

Chengdu

Shanghai

SICHUAN

Yangzi

Wuhan

Hangzhou

Chongqing

Zunyi

Nanchang

Changsha

Kiangsi Soviet under
Mao Zedong and
Chu Teh, 1929–1934

Guiyang

HUNAN

Kunming

Ji'an

Xiamen
(Amoy)

TAIWAN

PACIFIC

Canton uprising

Shantou

OCEAN

BURMA

Guangzhou
(Canton)

Hailufeng Soviet,
1927–1928

Hong Kong
(British)

FRENCH
INDOCHINA

Areas under Communist control before Nov. 1934

Areas under Communist control, 1929–1938

Areas occupied by Japan by end of 1938

Route of the Long March, Oct. 1934–Oct. 1935: Main forces from Ji'an

Other forces

Japan bogged down in a savage stalemate. The bloody undeclared war provided a spectacular example of conflicting nationalisms, convulsing China and setting the stage for further Japanese aggression in South Asia.

Southeast Asia

The tide of nationalism was also rising in Southeast Asia. Like their counterparts in India, China, and Japan, nationalists in Southeast Asia urgently wanted genuine political independence and freedom from foreign rule. In both French Indochina and the Dutch East Indies, local nationalists, inspired by events elsewhere in Asia, pressed their own demands. In both cases they ran up against an imperialist stone wall.

In the words of one historian, "Indochina was governed by Frenchmen for Frenchmen, and the great liberal slogans of liberty, equality, and fraternity were not considered to be export goods for overseas dominions."[18] This uncompromising attitude stimulated the growth of an equally stubborn communist opposition under Ho Chi Minh, which despite ruthless repression emerged as the dominant anti-French force.

In the East Indies—modern Indonesia—the Dutch made some concessions after the First World War, establishing a people's council with very limited lawmaking power. But in the 1930s the Dutch cracked down hard, jailing all the important nationalist leaders. Like the French, the Dutch were determined to hold on.

In the Philippines, however, a well-established nationalist movement achieved greater success. As in colonial Latin America, the Spanish in the Philippines had been indefatigable missionaries. By the late nineteenth century 80 percent of the Filipino population was Catholic. Filipinos shared a common cultural heritage as well as a common racial origin. Education, especially for girls, was quite advanced for Southeast Asia, and in 1843 a higher percentage of people could read in the Philippines than in Spain itself. Economic development helped to create a westernized elite, which turned first to reform and then to revolution in the 1890s. As in Egypt or Turkey, long-standing intimate contact with Western civilization created a strong nationalist movement at an early date.

Filipino nationalists were bitterly disillusioned when the United States, having taken the Philippines from Spain in the Spanish-American War of 1898, ruthlessly beat down a patriotic revolt and denied the universal Filipino desire for independence. The Americans claimed that the Philippines were not ready and might be seized by Germany or Britain. As the imperialist power in the Philippines, the United States encouraged education and promoted capitalistic economic development. As in British India, an elected legislature was given some real powers. In 1919 President Wilson even promised eventual independence, though subsequent Republican administrations saw it as a distant goal.

As in India and French Indochina, demands for independence grew. One important contributing factor was American racial attitudes. Americans treated Filipinos as inferiors and introduced segregationist practices borrowed from the American South. American racism made passionate nationalists of many Filipinos. However, it was the Great Depression that had the most radical impact on the Philippines.

As the United States collapsed economically, the Philippines suddenly appeared to be a liability rather than an asset. American farm groups lobbied for protection from cheap Filipino sugar. To protect American jobs, labor unions demanded an end to Filipino immigration. In 1934 Congress made the Philippines a self-governing commonwealth and scheduled independence for 1944. Sugar imports were reduced, and immigration was limited to only fifty Filipinos per year.

Like Britain and France in the Middle East, the United States was determined to hold on to its big military bases in the Philippines as it permitted increased local self-government and promised eventual political independence. Some Filipino nationalists denounced the continued presence of U.S. fleets and armies. Others were less certain that the American presence was the immediate problem. Japan was fighting in China and expanding economically into the Philippines and throughout Southeast Asia. By 1939 a new threat to Filipino independence appeared to come from Asia itself.

MAP 30.2 The Chinese Communist Movement and the War with Japan, 1927–1938   After urban uprisings ordered by Stalin failed in 1927, Mao Zedong succeeded in forming a self-governing Communist soviet in mountainous southern China. Relentless Nationalist attacks between 1930 and 1934 finally forced the Long March to Yenan, where the Communists were well positioned for guerrilla war against the Japanese.

SUMMARY

The Asian revolt against the West began before the First World War. But only after 1914 did Asian nationalist

movements broaden their bases and become capable of challenging Western domination effectively. These mass movements sought human dignity as well as political freedom. Generally speaking, Asian nationalists favored modernization and adopted Western techniques and ideas even as they rejected Western rule. Everywhere Asian nationalists had to fight long and hard, though their struggle gained momentum from growing popular support and the encouragement of the Soviet Union.

Asia's nationalist movements arose out of separate historical experiences and distinct cultures. Variations on the common theme of nationalism were evident in Turkey, the Arab world, India, China, Japan, and the Philippines. This diversity helps explain why Asian peoples became defensive in their relations with one another while rising against Western rule. Like earlier nationalists in Europe, Asian nationalists developed a strong sense of "we" and "they"; "they" included other Asians as well as Europeans. Nationalism meant freedom, modernization, and cultural renaissance, but it nonetheless proved a mixed blessing.

NOTES

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17. Quoted in O. Lang, *Chinese Family and Society* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1946), p. 70.

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SUGGESTED READING

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For Southeast Asia, see D. G. E. Hall, *A History of South-East Asia,* 4th ed. (1981); J. Pluvier, *South-East Asia from Colonialism to Independence* (1974); and the Suggested Reading for Chapter 34. Two more recommended works are M. Osborne, *Southeast Asia: An Illustrated History,* expanded ed. (1988), and D. R. Sardesa, *Southeast Past and Present,* 2d ed. (1989).

Nonviolent Resistance in India

Mahatma Gandhi developed a powerful spiritual theory of social action. Drawing on both Hindu and Christian morality, Gandhi taught that the weak and unarmed could combine love and courage to overcome oppression and injustice. Gandhi's chosen tactic was nonviolent resistance, which challenged British rule in India with illegal protest marches and mass civil disobedience. Nonviolent resistance demanded tremendous self-discipline from protesters because they had to "turn the other cheek" and accept great pain and suffering.

The first protest campaign, in 1920–1922, ended in violence, and Gandhi felt compelled to call it off. In 1930 Gandhi launched a new round of nonviolent disobedience, which focused on the hated salt tax. Gandhi was jailed, but his army of peaceful resisters continued the struggle and did not give in to violence.

One eyewitness was Webb Miller, an American correspondent dispatched from London to cover the story in India. Arriving in India by air on the weekly passenger service after fifteen days and sixteen thousand miles, Miller met with Congress party leaders and caught up with the protesters near the sea. There he saw the dramatic climax of the salt-tax demonstrations, foiled the British censorship, and got the story out to the world's newspapers. The following account comes from Webb's 1936 autobiography.

After plodding about six miles across country [from the nearest railroad station] . . . I reached the assembling place of the Gandhi followers. Several long, open, thatched sheds . . . buzzed like a beehive with some 2,500 Congress or Gandhi men dressed in the regulation uniform of rough homespun cotton dhotis and triangular Gandhi caps. . . . I was warmly welcomed by young college-educated, English-speaking men and escorted to Mme. Naidu. The famous Indian poetess . . . explained that she was busy martialing her forces for the demonstration against the salt pans. . . . She was educated in England and spoke English fluently.

Mme. Naidu called for prayer before the march started and the entire assemblage knelt. She exhorted them: "Gandhi's body is in jail but his soul is with you. India's prestige is in your hands. You must not use any violence under any circumstances. You will be beaten but you must not resist; you must not even raise a hand to ward off blows." Wild, shrill cheers terminated her speech.

Slowly and in silence the throng commenced the half-mile march to the salt deposits. . . .

The salt deposits were surrounded by ditches filled with water and guarded by four hundred native Surat police in khaki shorts and brown turbans. Half a dozen British officials commanded them. The police carried *lathis*—five-foot clubs tipped with steel. Inside the stockade twenty-five native riflemen were drawn up.

In complete silence the Gandhi men drew up and halted a hundred yards from the stockade. A picked column advanced from the crowd, waded the ditches, and approached the barbed-wire stockade, which the Surat police surrounded, holding their clubs at the ready. Police officials ordered the marchers to disperse. . . . The column silently ignored the warning and slowly walked forward.

Suddenly, at a word of command, scores of native policemen rushed upon the advancing marchers and rained blows on their heads with their steel-shod *lathis*. Not one of the marchers even raised an arm to fend off the blows. They went down like ten-pins. From where I stood I heard the sickening whacks of the clubs on unprotected skulls. The waiting crowd of watchers groaned and sucked in their breaths in sympathetic pain at every blow.

Those struck down fell sprawling, unconscious or writhing in pain with fractured skulls or broken shoulders. In two or three minutes the ground was quilted with bodies. Great patches of blood widened on their white clothes. The survivors, without breaking ranks, silently and doggedly marched on until struck down. When every one of

the first column had been knocked down stretcher-bearers rushed up unmolested by the police and carried off the injured to a thatched hut which had been arranged as a temporary hospital.

Then another column formed while the leaders pleaded with them to retain their self-control. They marched slowly toward the police. Although every one knew that within a few minutes he would be beaten, perhaps killed, I could detect no signs of wavering or fear. They marched steadily with heads up, without the encouragement of music or cheering or any possibility that they might escape serious injury or death. The police rushed out and methodically and mechanically beat down the second column. There was no fight, no struggle; the marchers simply walked forward until struck down. There were no outcries, only groans after they fell. . . .

At times the spectacle of unresisting men being methodically bashed into a bloody pulp sickened me so much that I had to turn away. The Western mind finds it difficult to grasp the idea of nonresistance. I felt an indefinable sense of helpless rage and loathing, almost as much against the men who were submitting unresistingly to being beaten as against the police wielding the clubs, and this despite the fact that when I came to India I sympathized with the Gandhi cause.

Several times the leaders nearly lost control of the waiting crowd. They rushed up and down, frantically pleading with and exhorting the intensely excited men to remember Gandhi's instructions. It seemed that the unarmed throng was on the verge of launching a mass attack upon the police. . . . [But this did not happen.] Group after group walked forward, sat down, and submitted to being beaten into insensibility without raising an arm to fend off the blows. . . .

Hour after hour stretcher-bearers carried back a stream of inert, bleeding bodies . . . to the temporary hospital. . . . I counted 320 injured, many still insensible with fractured skulls, others writhing in agony from kicks in the testicles and stomach. . . .

I was the only foreign correspondent who had witnessed the amazing scene—a classic example of "Satyagraha" or nonviolent civil disobedience. . . . My story of the beatings at Dharasana caused a

Gandhi chose the Indian spinning wheel as a symbol of national rejuvenation. *(Wide World Photos)*

sensation when it appeared in the 1,350 newspapers served by the United Press throughout the world. . . . Representatives of the Gandhi movement in the United States printed it as a leaflet and distributed more than a quarter of a million copies.

Questions for Analysis

1. What happened at this demonstration against the salt tax in India? What seems most important to you?

2. How did Miller react to what he saw? Do you share his reaction? Why or why not?

3. Gandhi believed that nonviolent resistance required great courage. Do you agree or disagree? Why?

4. What are the strengths and weaknesses of nonviolent resistance as a strategy of social action?

Source: Webb Miller, *I Found No Peace: The Journal of a Foreign Correspondent* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1925), pp. 192–196, 198–199.

31

The Age of Anxiety in the West

Dust, a painting of the Great Depression by the American painter Ben Shahn. *(Courtesy, Kennedy Galleries, New York © Vaga)*

When Allied diplomats met in Paris in early 1919 with their optimistic plans for building a lasting peace, most looked forward to happier times. They hoped that life would return to normal after the terrible trauma of total war. They hoped that once again life would make sense in the familiar prewar terms of peace, prosperity, and progress. These hopes were in vain. The Great Break—the First World War and the Russian Revolution—had mangled too many things beyond repair. Life would no longer fit neatly into the old molds. Thus in the 1920s and 1930s, as Asians developed renewed self-confidence and forged powerful nationalist movements directed against Western domination (see Chapter 30), great numbers of men and women in the West felt themselves increasingly adrift in a strange, uncertain, and uncontrollable world. They saw themselves living in an age of anxiety, an age of continual crisis (which would last until the early 1950s). In almost every area of human experience, they went searching for ways to put meaning back into life.

- What did such doubts and searching mean for Western thought, art, and culture?
- How did leaders deal with the political dimensions of uncertainty and try to re-establish real peace and prosperity between 1919 and 1939?
- Why did those leaders fail?

These are the questions this chapter will explore.

UNCERTAINTY IN MODERN THOUGHT

A complex revolution in thought and ideas was under way in Western society before the First World War, but only small, unusual groups were aware of it. After the war new and upsetting ideas began to spread through the entire population. Western society began to question and even abandon many cherished values and beliefs that had guided it since the eighteenth-century Enlightenment and the nineteenth-century triumph of industrial development, scientific advances, and evolutionary thought.

Before 1914 most people in the West still believed in progress, reason, and the rights of the individual. Progress was a daily reality, apparent in the rising standard of living, the taming of the city, and the steady increase in popular education. Such developments also encouraged the comforting belief in the logical universe of Newtonian physics as well as faith in the ability of a rational human mind to understand that universe through intellectual investigation. And just as there were laws of science, so were there laws of society that rational human beings could discover and then wisely act on. At the same time, the rights of the individual were not just taken for granted; they were actually increasing. Well-established rights were gradually spreading to women and workers, and new "social rights," such as old-age pensions, were emerging. In short, before World War I most Europeans and North Americans had a moderately optimistic view of the world, and with good reason.

Nevertheless, since the 1880s a small band of serious thinkers and creative writers had been attacking these well-worn optimistic ideas. These critics rejected the general faith in progress and the power of the rational human mind. An expanding chorus of thinkers echoed and enlarged their views after the experience of history's most destructive war—a war that suggested to many that human beings were a pack of violent, irrational animals quite capable of tearing the individual and his or her rights to shreds. Disorientation and pessimism were particularly acute in the 1930s, when the rapid rise of harsh dictatorships and the Great Depression transformed old certainties into bitter illusions.

No one expressed this state of uncertainty better than French poet and critic Paul Valéry (1871–1945) in the early 1920s. Speaking of the "crisis of the mind," Valéry noted that Europe was looking at its future with dark foreboding:

The storm has died away, and still we are restless, uneasy, as if the storm were about to break. Almost all the affairs of men remain in a terrible uncertainty. We think of what has disappeared, and we are almost destroyed by what has been destroyed; we do not know what will be born, and we fear the future, not without reason. . . . Doubt and disorder are in us and with us. There is no thinking man, however shrewd or learned he may be, who can hope to dominate this anxiety, to escape from this impression of darkness.[1]

In the midst of economic, political, and social disruptions, Valéry saw the "cruelly injured mind," besieged by doubts and suffering from anxieties. In this general intellectual crisis of the twentieth century, the implications of new ideas and discoveries in philosophy, physics, psychology, and literature played a central role

"The War, as I Saw It"   This was the title of a series of grotesque drawings that appeared in 1920 in *Simplicissimus,* Germany's leading satirical magazine. Nothing shows better the terrible impact of World War I than this profoundly disturbing example of expressionist art. (*Caroline Buckler*)

Modern Philosophy

Among those thinkers in the late nineteenth century who challenged the belief in progress and the general faith in the rational human mind, German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900) was particularly influential. The son of a Lutheran minister, Nietzsche utterly rejected Christianity. In 1872 in his first great work he argued that ever since classical Athens, the West had overemphasized rationality and stifled the passion and animal instinct that drive human activity and true creativity. Nietzsche went on to question all values. He claimed that Christianity embodied a "slave morality" that glorified weakness, envy, and mediocrity. In Nietzsche's most famous line, a wise fool proclaims that

"God is dead," murdered by lackadaisical modern Christians who no longer really believe in Him. Nietzsche viewed the pillars of conventional morality—reason, democracy, progress, respectability—as outworn social and psychological constructs whose influence was suffocating self-realization and excellence.

Nietzsche painted a dark world, foreshadowing perhaps his loss of sanity in 1889. The West was in decline; false values had triumphed. The only hope for the individual was to accept the meaninglessness of human existence and then make that very meaninglessness a source of self-defined personal integrity and hence liberation. This would at least be possible for a few superior individuals, who could free themselves from the humdrum thinking of the masses and become true heroes. Little

read during his active years, Nietzsche attracted growing attention in the early twentieth century, and his influence remains enormous to this day.

Growing dissatisfaction with established ideas before 1914 was apparent in other important thinkers. In the 1890s French philosophy professor Henri Bergson (1859–1941) argued that immediate experience and intuition were as important as rational and scientific thinking for understanding reality. Another thinker who agreed about the limits of rational thinking was French socialist Georges Sorel (1847–1922). Sorel, rejecting democracy, frankly characterized Marxian socialism as an inspiring but unprovable religion rather than a rational scientific truth. Socialism would come to power, he believed, through a great, violent strike of all working people, which would miraculously shatter capitalist society.

The First World War accelerated the revolt against established certainties in philosophy, but that revolt went in two very different directions. In English-speaking countries, the main development was the acceptance of logical empiricism (or logical positivism) in university circles. In continental Europe, where esoteric and remote logical empiricism did not win many converts, the primary development in philosophy was existentialism.

Logical empiricism was truly revolutionary. It rejected most of the concerns of traditional philosophy, from the existence of God to the meaning of happiness, as nonsense and hot air. This outlook began primarily with Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951), who later immigrated to England, where he trained numerous disciples.

Wittgenstein argued in his pugnacious *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (Essay on Logical Philosophy) in 1922 that philosophy is only the logical clarification of thoughts and that it therefore becomes the study of language, which expresses thoughts. In Wittgenstein's opinion the great philosophical issues of the ages—God, freedom, morality, and so on—are quite literally senseless, a great waste of time, for statements about them can be neither tested by scientific experiments nor demonstrated by the logic of mathematics. Logical empiricism drastically reduced the scope of philosophical inquiry. Anxious people could find few, if any, answers in this direction.

Some looked for answers in *existentialism*. Highly diverse and even contradictory, existential thinkers were loosely united in a courageous search for moral values in a world of terror and uncertainty. Theirs were true voices of the age of anxiety.

Most existential thinkers in the twentieth century were atheists. Often inspired by Nietzsche, they did not believe a Supreme Being had established humanity's fundamental nature and given life its meaning. In the words of the famous French existentialist Jean-Paul Sartre (1905–1980), human beings simply exist: "They turn up, appear on the scene." Only after they "turn up" do they seek to define themselves. Honest human beings are terribly alone, for there is no God to help them. They are hounded by despair and the meaninglessness of life. The crisis of the existential thinker epitomized the modern intellectual crisis—the shattering of traditional beliefs in God, reason, and progress.

Existentialists did recognize that human beings, unless they kill themselves, must act. Indeed, in the words of Sartre, "man is condemned to be free." There is therefore the possibility—indeed, the necessity—of giving meaning to life through actions, of defining oneself through choices. To do so, individuals must become "engaged" and choose their own actions courageously and consistently and in full awareness of their responsibility for their own behavior.

It was in France during and immediately after World War II that existentialism came of age. With Hitler's barbarous wartime regime, people had to choose whether to join the resistance, accepting the dangers and hardships of that choice, or abet the murderous Nazis. Sartre himself was active in the resistance; he and his colleagues offered a powerful answer to the profound moral issues of the day.

The Revival of Christianity

The loss of faith in human reason and in continual progress also led to a renewed interest in the Christian view of the world. Christianity and religion in general had been on the defensive in intellectual circles since the Enlightenment. In the years before 1914 some theologians, especially Protestant ones, had felt the need to interpret Christian doctrine and the Bible so that they did not seem to contradict science, evolution, and common sense. Christ was therefore seen primarily as the greatest moral teacher, and the "supernatural" aspects of his divinity were strenuously played down. For example, the young Albert Schweitzer (1875–1965), later a famous medical missionary, in his *Quest of the Historical Jesus* (1906) argued that Christ was merely a mortal human whose teachings were only temporary rules to prepare himself and his disciples for the end of the world. Indeed, some modern theologians were embarrassed by the miraculous, unscientific aspects of Christianity and turned away from them.

Especially after World War I, a number of thinkers and theologians began to revitalize the fundamentals of

Christianity. Sometimes described as Christian existentialists because they shared the loneliness and despair of atheistic existentialists, they stressed human beings' sinful nature, the need for faith, and the mystery of God's forgiveness. The revival of fundamental Christian belief was fed by rediscovery of the work of nineteenth-century Danish religious philosopher Søren Kierkegaard (1813–1855). Having rejected formalistic religion, Kierkegaard had eventually resolved his personal anguish over his imperfect nature by making a total religious commitment to a remote and majestic God.

Similar ideas were brilliantly developed by Swiss Protestant theologian Karl Barth (1886–1968). Barth maintained that religious truth is made known to human beings only through God's grace. Sinful creatures whose reason and will are hopelessly flawed, people have to accept God's Word and the supernatural revelation of Jesus Christ with awe, trust, and obedience. Lowly mortals should not expect to "reason out" God and his ways.

Among Catholics the leading existential Christian thinker was Gabriel Marcel (1887–1973), who found in the Catholic church an answer to what he called the postwar "broken world." Catholicism and religious belief provided the hope, humanity, honesty, and piety for which he hungered. Flexible and gentle, Marcel and his countryman Jacques Maritain (1882–1973) denounced anti-Semitism and supported closer ties with non-Catholics.

After 1914 religion became much more relevant and meaningful to thinking people than it had been before the Great War. Many illustrious individuals turned to religion between about 1920 and 1950. Poets T. S. Eliot and W. H. Auden, novelists Evelyn Waugh and Aldous Huxley, historian Arnold Toynbee, Oxford professor C. S. Lewis, psychoanalyst Karl Stern, physicist Max Planck, and philosopher Cyril Joad were all either converted to religion or attracted to it for the first time. (See the feature "Listening to the Past: A Christian View of Evil" on pages 1006–1007.) Religion, often of a despairing, existential variety, was one meaningful answer to terror and anxiety. In the words of another famous Roman Catholic convert, English novelist Graham Greene, "One began to believe in heaven because one believed in hell."[2]

The New Physics

Ever since the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century, scientific advances and their implications had greatly influenced the beliefs of thinking people. By the late nineteenth century science was one of the main pillars supporting Western society's optimistic and rationalistic view of the world. Darwin's concept of evolution had been accepted and assimilated in most intellectual circles. Progressive minds believed that science was based on hard facts and controlled experiments. Science seemed to have achieved an unerring and almost completed picture of reality. Unchanging natural laws seemed to determine physical processes and permit useful solutions to more and more problems. All this was comforting, especially to people who were no longer committed to traditional religious beliefs. And all this was challenged by the new physics.

An important first step toward the new physics was the discovery at the end of the nineteenth century that atoms were not like hard, permanent little billiard balls. They were actually composed of many far-smaller, fast-moving particles, such as electrons and protons. Polish-born physicist Marie Curie (1867–1934) and her French husband discovered that radium constantly emits subatomic particles and thus does not have a constant atomic weight. Building on this and other work in radiation, German physicist Max Planck (1858–1947) showed in 1900 that subatomic energy is emitted in uneven little spurts, which Planck called "quanta," and not in a steady stream, as previously believed. Planck's discovery called into question the old sharp distinction between matter and energy and challenged the old view of atoms as the stable, basic building blocks of nature.

In 1905 German-born Jewish genius Albert Einstein (1879–1955) went further in undermining Newtonian physics. His famous theory of special relativity postulated that time and space are relative to the viewpoint of the observer and that only the speed of light is constant for all frames of reference in the universe. In order to make his revolutionary and paradoxical idea somewhat comprehensible to the nonmathematical layperson, Einstein later used analogies involving moving trains. For example, if a woman in the middle of a moving car gets up and walks forward to the door, she has moved relative to the train, a half car length. But relative to an observer on the embankment, she has moved farther. The closed framework of Newtonian physics was quite limited compared to that of Einsteinian physics, which unified an apparently infinite universe with the incredibly small, fast-moving subatomic world. Moreover, Einstein's theory stated clearly that matter and energy are interchangeable and that even a particle of matter contains enormous levels of potential energy.

The 1920s opened the "heroic age of physics," in the apt words of one of its leading pioneers, Ernest Rutherford (1871–1937). Breakthrough followed breakthrough. In 1919 Rutherford showed that the atom could be split. By 1944 seven subatomic particles had been identified, of which the most important was the neutron. The neutron's capacity to pass through other atoms allowed for even more intense experimental bombardment of matter, leading to chain reactions of unbelievable force. This was the road to the atomic bomb.

Although few nonscientists understood this revolution in physics, the implications of the new theories and discoveries, as presented by newspapers and popular writers, were disturbing to millions of men and women in the 1920s and 1930s. The new universe was strange and troubling. It seemed to lack any absolute objective reality. Everything was said to be "relative"—that is, dependent on the observer's frame of reference. Moreover, science seemed to have little to do with human experience and human problems. When, for example, Planck was asked what science could contribute to resolving conflicts of values, his response was simple: "Science is not qualified to speak to this question."

Freudian Psychology

With physics presenting an uncertain universe so unrelated to ordinary human experience, questions about the power and potential of the human mind assumed special significance. The findings and speculations of leading psychologist Sigmund Freud were particularly disturbing.

Munch: The Dance of Life   Like his contemporary Sigmund Freud, the expressionist painter Edvard Munch studied the turmoil and fragility of human thought and action. Solitary figures struggling with fear and uncertainty dominate his work. Here the girl in white represents innocence, the tense woman in black stands for mourning and rejection, and the woman in red evokes the joy of passing pleasure. *(© Munch-museet, Oslo kommunes kunstsamlinger. Photo: Jacques Lathion, Nasjongalleriet, Oslo)*

Before Freud, poets and mystics had probed the unconscious and irrational aspects of human behavior. But most professional, "scientific" psychologists assumed that human behavior was the result of rational calculation—of "thinking"—by the single, unified conscious mind. Basing his insights on the analysis of dreams and of hysteria, Freud developed a very different view of the human psyche beginning in the late 1880s.

According to Freud, human behavior is basically irrational. The key to understanding the mind is the primitive, irrational unconscious, which he called the *id*. The unconscious is driven by sexual, aggressive, and pleasure-seeking desires and is locked in a constant battle with the other parts of the mind: the rationalizing conscious (the *ego*), which mediates what a person *can* do, and ingrained moral values (the *superego*), which specify what a person *should* do. Human behavior is a product of a fragile compromise between instinctual drives and the controls of rational thinking and moral values. Since the instinctual drives are extremely powerful, the ever-present danger for individuals and whole societies is that unacknowledged drives will overwhelm the control mechanisms in a violent, distorted way. Yet Freud also agreed with Nietzsche that the mechanisms of rational thinking and traditional moral values can be too strong. They can repress sexual desires too effectively, crippling individuals and entire peoples with guilt and neurotic fears.

Freudian psychology and clinical psychiatry had become an international movement by 1910, but only after 1918 did they receive popular attention, especially in the Protestant countries of northern Europe and in the United States. Many interpreted Freud as saying that the first requirement for mental health is an uninhibited sex life. This popular interpretation reflected and encouraged growing sexual experimentation, particularly among middle-class women. For more serious students the psychology of Freud and his followers drastically undermined the old, easy optimism about the rational and progressive nature of the human mind.

Twentieth-Century Literature

The general intellectual climate of pessimism, relativism, and alienation was also articulated in literature. Novelists developed new techniques to express new realities. The great nineteenth-century novelists had typically written as all-knowing narrators, describing realistic characters and their relationship to an understandable, if sometimes harsh, society. In the twentieth century most major writers adopted the limited, often confused viewpoint of a single individual. Like Freud, these novelists focused their attention on the complexity and irrationality of the human mind, where feelings, memories, and desires are forever scrambled. The great French novelist Marcel Proust (1871–1922), in his semi-autobiographical *Remembrance of Things Past* (1913–1927), recalled bittersweet memories of childhood and youthful love and tried to discover their innermost meaning as he withdrew from the present to dwell on the past.

Serious novelists also used the stream-of-consciousness technique to explore the psyche. In *Jacob's Room* (1922) Virginia Woolf (1882–1941) created a novel made up of a series of internal monologues, in which ideas and emotions from different periods of time bubble up as randomly as from a patient on a psychoanalyst's couch. William Faulkner (1897–1962), perhaps America's greatest twentieth-century novelist, used the same technique in *The Sound and the Fury* (1922), much of whose intense drama is confusedly seen through the eyes of an idiot. The most famous stream-of-consciousness novel—and surely the most disturbing novel of its generation—is *Ulysses,* which Irish novelist James Joyce (1882–1941) published in 1922. Into an account of an ordinary day in the life of an ordinary man, Joyce weaves an extended ironic parallel between his hero's aimless wanderings through the streets and pubs of Dublin and the adventures of Homer's hero Ulysses on his way home from Troy. Abandoning conventional grammar and blending foreign words, puns, bits of knowledge, and scraps of memory together in bewildering confusion, the language of *Ulysses* is intended to mirror modern life itself: a gigantic riddle waiting to be unraveled.

As creative writers turned their attention from society to the individual and from realism to psychological relativity, they rejected the idea of progress. Some even described "anti-utopias," nightmare visions of things to come. In 1918 an obscure German high school teacher named Oswald Spengler (1880–1936) published *The Decline of the West,* which quickly became an international sensation. According to Spengler, every culture experiences a life cycle of growth and decline. Western civilization, in Spengler's opinion, was in its old age, and death was approaching in the form of conquest by the yellow race. T. S. Eliot (1888–1965), in his famous poem *The Waste Land* (1922), depicts a world of growing desolation, although after his conversion to Anglo-Catholicism in 1927 Eliot came to hope cautiously for humanity's salvation. No such hope appeared in the work of Franz Kafka (1883–1924), whose novels *The*

Trial (1925) and *The Castle* (1926) as well as several of his greatest short stories portray helpless individuals crushed by inexplicably hostile forces.

Englishman George Orwell (1903–1950) had seen the nightmarish reality of the Nazi state and its Stalinist counterpart by 1949 when he wrote perhaps the ultimate in anti-utopian literature: *1984*. Orwell set the action in the future. Big Brother—the dictator—and his totalitarian state use a new kind of language, sophisticated technology, and psychological terror to strip a weak individual of his last shred of human dignity. The supremely self-confident chief of the Thought Police tells the tortured, broken, and framed Winston Smith, "If you want a picture of the future, imagine a boot stamping on a human face—forever."[3] A phenomenal bestseller, *1984* spoke to millions of people in the closing years of the age of anxiety.

MODERN ART AND MUSIC

Throughout the twentieth century there has been considerable unity in the arts. The "modernism" of the immediate prewar years and the 1920s is still strikingly modern. Like the scientists who were partaking of the same culture, creative artists rejected old forms and old values. Modernism in art and music meant constant experimentation and a search for new kinds of expression. And though many people find the many and varied modern visions of the arts strange, disturbing, and even ugly, the twentieth century, so dismal in many respects, will probably stand as one of Western civilization's great artistic eras.

Architecture and Design

Modernism in the arts was loosely unified by a revolution in architecture. This revolution intended nothing less than a transformation of the physical framework of urban society according to a new principle: *functionalism*. Buildings, like industrial products, should be useful and "functional"—that is, they should serve, as well as possible, the purpose for which they were made. Thus architects and designers had to work with engineers, town planners, and even sanitation experts. Moreover, they had to throw away useless ornamentation and find beauty and aesthetic pleasure in the clean lines of practical constructions and efficient machinery. Franco-Swiss genius Le Corbusier (1887–1965) insisted that "a house is a machine for living in."[4]

The United States, with its rapid urban growth and lack of rigid building traditions, pioneered in the new architecture. In the 1890s the Chicago school of architects, led by Louis H. Sullivan (1856–1924), used cheap steel, reinforced concrete, and electric elevators to build skyscrapers and office buildings lacking almost any exterior ornamentation. Europeans were inspired by these and other American examples of functional construction, like the massive, unadorned grain elevators of the Midwest.

In Europe architectural leadership centered in German-speaking countries until Hitler took power in 1933. In 1911 twenty-eight-year-old Walter Gropius (1883–1969) broke sharply with the past in his design of the Fagus shoe factory at Alfeld, Germany—a clean, light, elegant building of glass and iron. After the First World War Gropius merged the schools of fine and applied arts at Weimar into a single, interdisciplinary school, the Bauhaus. The Bauhaus brought together many leading modern architects, artists, designers, and theatrical innovators. Working as an effective, inspired team, they combined the study of fine art, such as painting and sculpture, with the study of applied art in the crafts of printing, weaving, and furniture making. Throughout the 1920s the Bauhaus, with its stress on functionalism and good design for everyday life, attracted enthusiastic students from all over the world. It had a great and continuing impact.

Modern Painting and Music

Modern painting grew out of a revolt against French impressionism. The *impressionism* of such French painters as Claude Monet (1840–1926), Pierre Auguste Renoir (1841–1919), and Camille Pissarro (1830–1903) was, in part, a kind of "superrealism." Leaving exact copying of objects to photography, these artists sought to capture the momentary overall feeling, or impression, of light falling on a real-life scene before their eyes. By 1890, when impressionism was finally established, a few artists known as *postimpressionists*, or sometimes as *expressionists*, were already striking out in new directions. After 1905 art increasingly took on a nonrepresentational, abstract character, a development that reached its high point after World War II.

Though individualistic in their styles, postimpressionists were united in their desire to know and depict unseen, inner worlds of emotion and imagination. Like modern novelists, they wanted to express a complicated psychological view of reality as well as an overwhelming emotional intensity. In *The Starry Night* (1889), for

example, the great Dutch expressionist Vincent van Gogh (1853–1890) painted the vision of his mind's eye. Flaming cypress trees, exploding stars, and a cometlike Milky Way swirl together in one great cosmic rhythm. Paul Gauguin (1848–1903), the French stockbroker-turned-painter, pioneered in expressionist techniques, though he used them to infuse his work with tranquillity and mysticism. In 1891 he fled to the South Pacific in search of unspoiled beauty and a primitive life. Gauguin believed that the form and design of a picture were important in themselves and that the painter need not try to represent objects on canvas as the eye actually saw them.

Fascination with form, as opposed to light, was characteristic of postimpressionism and expressionism. Paul Cézanne (1839–1906), who had a profound influence on twentieth-century painting, was particularly committed to form and ordered design. He told a young painter, "You must see in nature the cylinder, the sphere, and the cone."[5] As Cézanne's later work became increasingly abstract and nonrepresentational, it also moved away from the traditional three-dimensional perspective toward the two-dimensional plane, which has characterized much of modern art.

In 1907 a young Spaniard in Paris, Pablo Picasso (1881–1973), founded another movement—*cubism.* Cubism concentrated on a complex geometry of zig-

zagging lines and sharply angled, overlapping planes. About three years later came the ultimate stage in the development of abstract, nonrepresentational art. Artists such as the Russian-born Wassily Kandinsky (1866–1944) turned away from nature completely. "The observer," said Kandinsky, "must learn to look at [my] pictures . . . as form and color combinations . . . as a representation of mood and not as a representation of *objects.*"[6]

In the 1920s and 1930s the artistic movements of the prewar years were extended and consolidated. The most notable new developments were *dadaism* and *surrealism.* Dadaism attacked all accepted standards of art and behavior, delighting in outrageous conduct. A famous example of dadaism is a reproduction of Leonardo da Vinci's *Mona Lisa* in which the famous woman with the mysterious smile sports a mustache and is ridiculed with an obscene inscription. After 1924 many dadaists were attracted to surrealism, which became very influential in art in the late 1920s and 1930s. Surrealists painted a fantastic world of wild dreams and complex symbols, where watches melted and giant metronomes beat time in precisely drawn but impossible alien landscapes.

Refusing to depict ordinary visual reality, surrealist painters made powerful statements about the age of

Picasso: Guernica   In this rich, complex work a shrieking woman falls from a burning house on the far right. On the left a woman holds a dead child, while toward the center are fragments of a warrior and a screaming horse pierced by a spear. Picasso has used only the mournful colors of black, white, and gray. (*© Copyright ARS, NY. Museo Nacional Centro de Arte Reina Sofía, Madrid, Spain*)

anxiety. Picasso's 26-foot-long mural *Guernica* (see the illustration) masterfully unites several powerful strands in twentieth-century art Inspired by the Spanish civil war (see page 1025), the painting commemorates the bombing of the ancient Spanish town of Guernica by fascist planes, which took the lives of a thousand people in a single night of terror. Combining the free distortion of expressionism, the overlapping planes of cubism, and the surrealist fascination with grotesque subject matter, *Guernica* is what Picasso meant it to be: an unforgettable attack on "brutality and darkness."

Developments in modern music were strikingly parallel to those in painting. Composers, too, were attracted by the emotional intensity of expressionism. The ballet *The Rite of Spring* by composer Igor Stravinsky (1882–1971) practically caused a riot when it was first performed in Paris in 1913 by Sergei Diaghilev's famous Russian dance company. The combination of pulsating, dissonant rhythms from the orchestra pit and an earthy representation of lovemaking by the dancers on the stage seemed a shocking, almost pornographic enactment of a primitive fertility rite.

After the experience of the First World War, when irrationality and violence seemed to pervade the human experience, expressionism in opera and ballet flourished. Some composers turned their backs on long-established musical conventions. As abstract painters arranged lines and color but did not draw identifiable objects, so modern composers arranged sounds without creating recognizable harmonies. Led by Viennese composer Arnold Schönberg (1874–1951), they abandoned traditional harmony and tonality. The musical notes in a given piece were no longer united and organized by a key; instead they were independent and unrelated. Schönberg's twelve-tone music of the 1920s arranged all twelve notes of the scale in an abstract, mathematical pattern, or "tone row." This pattern sounded like no pattern at all to the ordinary listener. Accustomed to the harmonies of classical and romantic music, audiences generally resisted modern atonal music.

MOVIES AND RADIO

Until after World War II at the earliest, these revolutionary changes in art and music appealed mainly to a minority of "highbrows" and not to the general public. That public was primarily and enthusiastically wrapped up in movies, radio, and advertising. The long-declining traditional arts and amusements of people in villages

The Great Dictator   In 1940 the renowned actor and director Charlie Chaplin abandoned the little tramp to satirize the "great dictator," Adolf Hitler. Chaplin had strong political views and made a number of films with political themes as the escapist fare of the Great Depression gave way to the reality of the Second World War. *(The Museum of Modern Art/Still Film Archives)*

and small towns almost vanished, replaced by standardized, commercial entertainment.

Moving pictures were first shown as a popular novelty in naughty peepshows—"What the Butler Saw " and penny arcades in the 1890s, especially in Paris. The first movie houses date from an experiment in Los Angeles in 1902. They quickly attracted large audiences and led to the production of short, silent action films such as the eight-minute *Great Train Robbery* of 1903. American directors and business people then set up "movie factories," at first in the New York area and then after 1910 in Los Angeles. These factories churned out two short films each week. On the eve of the First World War, full-length feature films such as the Italian *Quo Vadis* and the American *Birth of a Nation*, coupled with improvements in the quality of pictures, suggested the screen's vast possibilities.

During the First World War the United States became the dominant force in the rapidly expanding silent-film industry. In the 1920s Mack Sennett (1884–1960) and his zany Keystone Kops specialized in short, slapstick comedies noted for frantic automobile chases, custard-pie battles, and gorgeous bathing beauties. Screen stars such as Mary Pickford and Lillian Gish, Douglas Fairbanks and Rudolf Valentino, had their own "fan clubs" and became household names. But in the 1920s Charlie Chaplin (1889–1978), a funny little Englishman working in Hollywood, was unquestionably the king of the "silver screen." In his enormously popular role as a lonely tramp, complete with baggy trousers, battered derby, and an awkward, shuffling walk, Chaplin symbolized the "gay spirit of laughter in a cruel, crazy world."[7] Chaplin also demonstrated that in the hands of a genius the new medium could combine mass entertainment and artistic accomplishment.

The early 1920s were also the great age of German films. Protected and developed during the war, the large German studios excelled in bizarre expressionist dramas, beginning with *The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari* in 1919. Unfortunately, their period of creativity was short-lived. By 1926 American money was drawing the leading German talents to Hollywood and consolidating America's international domination. Film making was big business, and European theater owners were forced to book whole blocks of American films to get the few pictures they really wanted. This system put European producers at a great disadvantage until "talkies" permitted a revival of national film industries in the 1930s, particularly in France.

Whether foreign or domestic, motion pictures became the main entertainment of the masses until after the Second World War. The greatest appeal of motion pictures was that they offered ordinary people a temporary escape from the hard realities of international tensions, uncertainty, unemployment, and personal frustrations. The appeal of escapist entertainment was especially strong during the Great Depression. Millions flocked to musical comedies featuring glittering stars such as Ginger Rogers and Fred Astaire and to the fanciful cartoons of Mickey Mouse and his friends.

Radio became possible with the transatlantic "wireless" communication of Guglielmo Marconi (1874–1937) in 1901 and the development of the vacuum tube in 1904, which permitted the transmission of speech and music. But only in 1920 were the first major public broadcasts of special events made in Great Britain and the United States. Singing from London in English, Italian, and French, "the world's very best, the soprano Nellie Melba,"[8] was heard simultaneously all over Europe on June 16, 1920. This historic event captured the public's imagination. The meteoric career of radio was launched.

Every major country quickly established national broadcasting networks. In the United States such networks were privately owned and were financed by advertising. In Great Britain Parliament set up an independent, public corporation, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), supported by licensing fees. Elsewhere in Europe the typical pattern was direct control by the government. Whatever the institutional framework, radio became popular and influential. By the late 1930s more than three out of every four households in both democratic Great Britain and dictatorial Germany had at least one cheap, mass-produced radio.

Radio was particularly well suited for political propaganda. Dictators such as Mussolini and Hitler controlled the airwaves and could reach enormous national audiences with their frequent, dramatic speeches. In democratic countries politicians such as President Franklin Roosevelt and Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin effectively used informal "fireside chats" to bolster their support.

Motion pictures also became powerful tools of indoctrination, especially in countries with dictatorial regimes. Lenin encouraged the development of Soviet film making, believing that the new medium was essential to the social and ideological transformation of the country. Beginning in the mid-1920s a series of epic films, the most famous of which were directed by Sergei Eisenstein (1898–1948), brilliantly dramatized the communist view of Russian history.

In Germany Hitler turned to a young and immensely talented woman film maker, Leni Riefenstahl (b. 1902), for a masterpiece of documentary propaganda, *The Triumph of the Will,* based on the Nazi party rally at Nuremberg in 1934. Riefenstahl combined stunning aerial photography, joyful crowds welcoming Hitler, and mass processions of young Nazi fanatics. Her film was a brilliant and all-too-powerful documentary of Germany's "Nazi rebirth." The new media of mass culture were potentially dangerous instruments of political manipulation.

THE SEARCH FOR PEACE AND POLITICAL STABILITY

As established patterns of thought and culture were challenged and mangled by the ferocious impact of

World War I, so also was the political fabric stretched and torn by the consequences of the great conflict. The Versailles settlement had established a shaky truce, not a solid peace. Thus national leaders faced a gigantic task as they struggled with uncertainty and sought to create a stable international order within the general context of intellectual crisis and revolutionary artistic experimentation.

The pursuit of real and lasting peace proved difficult for many reasons. Germany hated the Treaty of Versailles. France was fearful and isolated. Britain was undependable, and the United States had turned its back on European problems. Eastern Europe was in ferment, and no one could predict the future of communist Russia. In addition, the international economic situation was poor and greatly complicated by war debts and disrupted patterns of trade. Yet for a time, from 1925 to late 1929, it appeared that peace and stability were within reach. When the subsequent collapse of the 1930s mocked these hopes, the disillusionment of liberals in the democracies was intensified.

Germany and the Western Powers

Germany was the key to lasting peace. Yet to Germans of all political parties, the Treaty of Versailles represented a harsh, dictated peace, to be revised or repudiated as soon as possible. The treaty had neither broken nor reduced Germany, which was potentially still the strongest country in Europe. Thus the treaty had fallen between two stools: too harsh for a peace of reconciliation, too soft for a peace of conquest.

Moreover, France and Great Britain did not see eye to eye on Germany. By the end of 1919 France wanted to stress the harsh elements in the Treaty of Versailles. Most of the war in the West had been fought on French soil, and the expected costs of reconstruction, as well as repaying war debts to the United States, were staggering. Thus French politicians believed that massive reparations from Germany were a vital economic necessity. America's failure to ratify the treaty left many French leaders believing that strict implementation of all provisions of the Treaty of Versailles was France's last best hope. Large reparation payments could hold Germany down indefinitely, and France would realize its goal of security.

The British soon felt differently. Prewar Germany had been Great Britain's second-best market in the entire world, and after the war a healthy, prosperous Germany appeared to be essential to the British economy. Indeed, many English people agreed with the analysis of the young English economist John Maynard Keynes (1883–1946). In his famous *Economic Consequences of the Peace* (1919) Keynes argued that astronomical reparations and harsh economic measures would indeed reduce Germany to the position of an impoverished second-rate power but such impoverishment would increase economic hardship in all countries. Only a complete revision of the foolish treaty could save Germany—and Europe. Keynes's attack stirred deep guilt feelings about Germany in the English-speaking world, feelings that often paralyzed English and American leaders in their relations with Germany and its leaders between the First and Second World Wars.

The British were also suspicious of France's army—momentarily the largest in Europe—and the British and the French were also on cool terms because of conflicts relating to their League of Nations mandates in the Middle East (see page 954). While French and British leaders drifted in different directions, the Allied reparations commission completed its work. In April 1921 it announced that Germany had to pay the enormous sum of 132 billion gold marks ($33 billion) in annual installments of 2.5 billion gold marks. Facing possible occupation of more of its territory, the young German republic—known as the Weimar Republic—made its first payment in 1921. Then in 1922, wracked by rapid inflation and political assassinations and motivated by hostility and arrogance as well, the Weimar Republic announced its inability to pay more. It proposed a moratorium on reparations for three years, and the implication was that thereafter reparations would be either drastically reduced or eliminated entirely.

The British were willing to accept a moratorium on reparations, but the French were not. Led by their tough-minded, legalistic prime minister, Raymond Poincaré (1860–1934), they decided they had to either call Germany's bluff or see the entire peace settlement dissolve to France's great disadvantage. So, despite strong British protests, in early January 1923, armies of France and its ally Belgium began to occupy the Ruhr district, the heartland of industrial Germany, creating the most serious international crisis of the 1920s.

Strengthened by a wave of patriotism, the German government ordered the people of the Ruhr to stop working and start passively resisting the French occupation. The coal mines and steel mills of the Ruhr grew silent, leaving 10 percent of Germany's total population in need of relief. The French answer to passive resistance was to seal off not only the Ruhr but also the entire Rhineland from the rest of Germany, letting in only enough food to prevent starvation.

"Hands off the Ruhr"   The French occupation of the Ruhr to collect reparations payments raised a storm of patriotic protest in Germany. This anti-French poster of 1923 turns Marianne, the personification of French republican virtue, into a vicious harpy. *(International Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis)*

By the summer of 1923 France and Germany were engaged in a great test of wills. French armies could not collect reparations from striking workers at gunpoint. But French occupation was paralyzing Germany and its economy and had turned rapid German inflation into runaway inflation. Faced with the need to support the striking Ruhr workers and their employers, the German government began to print money to pay its bills. Prices soared. People went to the store with a big bag of paper money; they returned home with a handful of groceries. German money rapidly lost all value, and so did any thing else with a stated fixed value.

Runaway inflation brought about a social revolution. The accumulated savings of many retired and middle-class people were wiped out. Catastrophic inflation cruelly mocked the old middle-class virtues of thrift, caution, and self-reliance. Many Germans felt betrayed. They hated and blamed the Western governments, their own government, big business, the Jews, the workers, and the communists for their misfortune. They were psychologically prepared to follow radical leaders in a crisis.

In August 1923, as the mark fell and political unrest grew throughout Germany, Gustav Stresemann (1878–1929) assumed leadership of the government. Stresemann adopted a compromising attitude. He called off passive resistance in the Ruhr and in October agreed in principle to pay reparations but asked for a re-examination of Germany's ability to pay. Poincaré accepted. His hard line was becoming increasingly unpopular with French citizens, and it was hated in Britain and the United States.

More generally, in both Germany and France power was finally passing to the moderates, who realized that continued confrontation was a destructive, no-win situation. Thus after five years of hostility and tension, culminating in a kind of undeclared war in the Ruhr in 1923, Germany and France decided to give compromise and cooperation a try. The British, and even the Americans, were willing to help. The first step was a reasonable compromise on the reparations question.

Hope in Foreign Affairs (1924–1929)

The reparations commission appointed an international committee of financial experts headed by American banker Charles G. Dawes to re-examine reparations from a broad perspective. The resulting Dawes Plan (1924) was accepted by France, Germany, and Britain. Germany's yearly reparations were reduced and depended on the level of German economic prosperity. Germany would also receive large loans from the United States to promote German recovery. In short, Germany would get private loans from the United States and pay reparations to France and Britain, thus enabling those countries to repay the large sums they owed the United States.

This circular flow of international payments was complicated and risky, but for a while it worked. The German republic experienced a spectacular economic recovery. By 1929 Germany's wealth and income were 50 percent greater than in 1913. With prosperity and large, continual inflows of American capital, Germany

easily paid about $1.3 billion in reparations in 1927 and 1928, enabling France and Britain to pay the United States. In this way the Americans, who did not have armies but who did have money, belatedly played a part in the general economic settlement that, though far from ideal, facilitated the worldwide recovery of the late 1920s.

This economic settlement was matched by a political settlement. In 1925 the leaders of Europe signed a number of agreements at Locarno, Switzerland. Germany and France solemnly pledged to accept their common border, and both Britain and Italy agreed to fight either France or Germany if one invaded the other. Stresemann also agreed to settle boundary disputes with Poland and Czechoslovakia by peaceful means, and France promised those countries military aid if Germany attacked them. For years a "spirit of Locarno" gave Europeans a sense of growing security and stability in international affairs.

Other developments also strengthened hopes. In 1926 Germany joined the League of Nations, where Stresemann continued his "peace offensive." In 1928 fifteen countries signed the Kellogg-Briand Pact, initiated by French prime minister Aristide Briand and U.S. secretary of state Frank B. Kellogg. This multinational pact "condemned and renounced war as an instrument of national policy." The signing states agreed to settle international disputes peacefully. The pact fostered the cautious optimism of the late 1920s and also encouraged the hope that the United States would accept its responsibilities as a great world power and contribute to European stability.

Domestic politics also offered reason to hope. During the occupation of the Ruhr and the great inflation, republican government in Germany had appeared on the verge of collapse. In 1923 communists momentarily entered provincial governments, and in November an obscure nobody named Adolf Hitler leaped onto a table in a beer hall in Munich and proclaimed a "national socialist revolution." But Hitler's plot to seize control of the government was poorly organized and easily crushed, and Hitler was sentenced to prison, where he outlined his theories and program in his book *Mein Kampf* (My Struggle). Throughout the 1920s, Hitler's National Socialist party attracted support only from a few fanatical anti-Semites, ultranationalists, and disgruntled former servicemen.

The moderate businessmen who tended to dominate the various German coalition governments believed that economic prosperity demanded good relations with the Western Powers, and they supported parlia-

mentary government at home. Elections were held regularly, and as the economy boomed, republican democracy appeared to have growing support among a majority of Germans.

There were, however, sharp political divisions in the country. Many unrepentant nationalists and monarchists populated the right and the army. Members of Germany's Communist party were noisy and active on the left. The Communists, directed from Moscow, reserved their greatest hatred and sharpest barbs for their cousins the Social Democrats, whom they endlessly accused of betraying the revolution. The working classes were divided politically, but most supported the nonrevolutionary but socialist Social Democrats.

The situation in France had numerous similarities to that in Germany. Communists and socialists battled for the support of the workers. After 1924 the democratically elected government rested mainly in the hands of coalitions of moderates, and business interests were well represented. France's great accomplishment was rapid rebuilding of its war-torn northern region. The expense of this undertaking, however, led to a large deficit and substantial inflation by 1926. The government proceeded to slash spending and raise taxes, restoring confidence in the economy. Good times prevailed until 1930.

Despite political shortcomings, France attracted artists and writers from all over the world in the 1920s. Much of the intellectual and artistic ferment of the times flourished in Paris. As writer Gertrude Stein (1874–1946), a leader of the large colony of American expatriates living in Paris, later recalled, "Paris was where the twentieth century was."[9] More generally, France appealed to foreigners and to the French as a harmonious combination of small businesses and family farms, of bold innovation and solid traditions.

Britain, too, faced challenges after 1920. The wartime trend toward greater social equality continued, however, helping maintain social harmony. The great problem was unemployment, which throughout the 1920s hovered around 12 percent. The state provided unemployment benefits and supplemented those payments with subsidized housing, medical aid, and increased old-age pensions. These and other measures kept living standards from seriously declining, defused class tensions, and pointed the way toward the welfare state that Britain established after World War II.

Relative social harmony was accompanied by the rise of the Labour party as a determined champion of the working classes and of greater social equality. Committed to moderate, "revisionist" socialism, the Labour

An American in Paris The young Josephine Baker suddenly became a star when she brought an exotic African eroticism to French music halls in 1925. American blacks and Africans had a powerful impact on entertainment in Europe in the 1920s and 1930s. *(Hulton Getty/Liaison)*

party replaced the Liberal party as the main opposition to the Conservatives. In 1924 and 1929 the Labour party under Ramsay MacDonald (1866–1937) governed the country with the support of the smaller Liberal party. Yet Labour moved toward socialism gradually and democratically, so that the middle classes were not overly frightened as the working classes won new benefits.

The Conservatives under Stanley Baldwin (1867–1947) showed the same compromising spirit on social issues. In spite of such conflicts as the 1926 strike by hard-pressed coal miners, which ended in an unsuccessful general strike, social unrest in Britain was limited in the 1920s and 1930s. In 1922 Britain granted southern, Catholic Ireland full autonomy after a bitter guerrilla war, thereby removing another source of prewar friction. Thus developments in both international relations and in the domestic politics of the leading democracies gave cause for cautious optimism in the late 1920s.

THE GREAT DEPRESSION (1929–1939)

Like the Great War, the Great Depression must be spelled with capital letters. Economic depression was nothing new. Depressions occurred throughout the nineteenth century with predictable regularity, as they recur in the form of recessions and slumps to this day. What was new about this depression was its severity and duration. It struck the entire world with ever-greater intensity from 1929 to 1933, and recovery was uneven and slow. Only with the Second World War did the depression disappear in much of the world.

The social and political consequences of prolonged economic collapse were enormous all around the world. Subsequent military expansion in Japan has already been described (see page 871), and later chapters will examine a similarly powerful impact on Latin America and Africa. In Europe and the United States the de

pression shattered the fragile optimism of political leaders in the late 1920s. Mass unemployment made insecurity a reality for millions of ordinary people, who had paid little attention to the intellectual crisis or to new directions in art and ideas. In desperation, people looked for leaders who would "do something." They were willing to support radical attempts to deal with the crisis by both democratic leaders and dictators.

The Economic Crisis

Though economic activity was already declining moderately in many countries by early 1929, the crash of the stock market in the United States in October of that year really started the Great Depression. The American stock market boom, which had seen stock prices double between early 1928 and September 1929, was built on borrowed money. Many wealthy investors, speculators, and people of modest means had bought stocks by paying only a small fraction of the total purchase price and borrowing the remainder from their stockbrokers. Such buying "on margin" was extremely dangerous. When prices started falling, the hard-pressed margin buyers started selling all at once. The result was a financial panic. Countless investors and speculators were wiped out in a matter of days or weeks.

The general economic consequences were swift and severe. Stripped of wealth and confidence, battered investors and their fellow citizens reduced their purchases of goods. Production began to slow down, and unemployment began to rise. Soon the entire American economy was caught in a vicious, spiraling decline.

The financial panic in the United States triggered a worldwide financial crisis, and that crisis resulted in a drastic decline in production in country after country. Throughout the 1920s American bankers and investors had lent large amounts of capital not only to Germany but also to many other countries. Many of these loans were short-term, and once panic broke, New York bankers began recalling them. It became very hard for European business people to borrow money, and the panicky public began to withdraw its savings from the banks, leading to general financial chaos. The recall of private loans by American bankers also accelerated the collapse in world prices, as business people around the world dumped industrial goods and agricultural commodities in a frantic attempt to get cash to pay what they owed. This brought further havoc to many Asian, African, and Latin American economies. The demand for their exports of agricultural products and raw materials collapsed, bankruptcies soared, and unemployment surged.

The financial chaos led to a general crisis of production. Between 1929 and 1933 world output of goods fell by an estimated 38 percent. As this happened, each country turned inward and tried to go it alone. Country after country followed the example of the United States when it raised protective tariffs to their highest levels ever in 1930 and tried to seal off shrinking national markets for American producers only. Within this context of fragmented and destructive economic nationalism, recovery finally began in 1933.

Although opinions differ, two factors probably best explain the relentless slide to the bottom from 1929 to early 1933. First, the international economy lacked a leadership able to maintain stability when the crisis came. Specifically, as a noted American economic historian concludes, the seriously weakened British, the traditional leaders of the world economy, "couldn't and the United States wouldn't" stabilize the international economic system in 1929.[10] The United States, which had momentarily played a positive role after the occupation of the Ruhr, cut back its international lending and erected high tariffs.

The second factor was poor national economic policy in almost every country. Governments generally cut their budgets and reduced spending when they should have run large deficits in an attempt to stimulate their economies. Since World War II such a "counter-cyclical policy," advocated by John Maynard Keynes, has become a well-established weapon against depression. But in the 1930s orthodox economists generally regarded Keynes's prescription with horror.

Mass Unemployment

The need for large-scale government spending was tied to mass unemployment. As the financial crisis led to cuts in production, workers lost their jobs and had little money to buy goods. This led to still more cuts in production and still more unemployment, until millions were out of work. In Britain unemployment had averaged 12 percent in the 1920s; between 1930 and 1935 it averaged more than 18 percent. In Japan 3 million people were out of work. Far worse was the case of the United States. In the 1920s unemployment there had averaged only 5 percent; in 1932 it soared to about 33 percent of the entire labor force: 14 million people were out of work. Only by pumping new money into the economy could the government increase demand and break the vicious cycle of decline.

Along with economic effects, mass unemployment posed a great social problem that mere numbers cannot

Isaac Soyer: Employment Agency (1937)   The frustration and agony of looking for work against long odds are painfully evident in this American masterpiece. The time-killing, pensive resignation, and dejection seen in the three figures are only aspects of the larger problem. One of three talented brothers born in Russia and trained as artists in New York, Isaac Soyer worked in the tradition of American realism and concentrated on people and the influence of their environment. *(Oil on canvas, 34¼ × 45 in. Collection of Whitney Museum of American Art, Purchase 37.44)*

adequately express. Millions of people lost their spirit and dignity in an apparently hopeless search for work. Homes and ways of life were disrupted in millions of personal tragedies. In 1932 the workers of Manchester, England, appealed to their city officials—a typical appeal echoed throughout the Western world:

We tell you that thousands of people . . . are in desperate straits. We tell you that men, women, and children are going hungry. . . . We tell you that great numbers are being rendered distraught through the stress and worry of trying to exist without work. . . .

If you do not do this—if you do not provide useful work for the unemployed—what, we ask, is your alternative? Do not imagine that this colossal tragedy of unemployment is *going on endlessly without some fateful catastrophe. Hungry men are angry men.*[11]

Mass unemployment was a terrible time bomb preparing to explode.

The New Deal in the United States

Of all the major industrial countries, only Germany was harder hit by the Great Depression, or reacted more radically to it, than the United States. Depression was so traumatic in the United States because the 1920s had been a period of complacent prosperity. The Great Depression and the response to it marked a major turning point in American history.

President Herbert Hoover (1895–1972) and his administration initially reacted to the stock market crash and economic decline with dogged optimism and limited action. But when the full force of the financial crisis struck Europe in the summer of 1931 and boomeranged back to the United States, people's worst fears became reality. Banks failed; unemployment soared. In 1932 industrial production fell to about 50 percent of its 1929 level. In these tragic circumstances Franklin Delano Roosevelt (1882–1945), an inspiring wheelchair-bound aristocrat previously crippled by polio, won a landslide electoral victory in 1932 with grand but vague promises of a "New Deal for the forgotten man."

Roosevelt's basic goal was to reform capitalism in order to preserve it. In his words, "A frank examination of the profit system in the spring of 1933 showed it to be in collapse; but substantially everybody in the United States, in public office and out of public office, from the very rich to the very poor, was as determined as was my Administration to save it."[12] Roosevelt rejected socialism and government ownership of industry in 1933. To right the situation he chose forceful government intervention in the economy.

In this choice Roosevelt was flexible, pragmatic, and willing to experiment. Roosevelt and his "brain trust" of advisers adopted policies echoing the American experience in World War I, when the American economy had been thoroughly planned and regulated.

Innovative programs promoted agricultural recovery, a top priority. As in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, American farmers were hard hit by the Depression. Roosevelt's decision to leave the gold standard and devalue the dollar was designed to raise American prices and save farmers. The Agricultural Adjustment Act (1933) aimed at raising prices and farm income by restricting the acreage farmers could cultivate and then paying them cash for the set-asides. These measures worked, at least for a while, and grateful farmers overwhelmingly supported Roosevelt in the 1936 election.

The most ambitious attempt to control and plan the economy was the National Recovery Administration (NRA). Intended to reduce competition and fix prices and wages for everyone's benefit, the NRA broke with the cherished American tradition of free competition and aroused conflicts among business people, consumers, and bureaucrats. It did not work well and was declared unconstitutional in 1935.

Roosevelt and his advisers then attacked the key problem of mass unemployment. The federal government accepted the responsibility of employing directly as many people as financially possible. New agencies were created to undertake a vast range of public works projects. The most famous of these was the Works Progress Administration (WPA), set up in 1935. One-fifth of the entire labor force worked for the WPA at some point in the 1930s, constructing public buildings, bridges, and highways. The WPA was enormously popular, and the hope of a job with the government helped check the threat of social revolution in the United States.

Such relief programs were part of the New Deal's fundamental commitment to use the federal government to provide for the welfare of all Americans. This commitment marked a profound shift from the traditional stress on family support and community responsibility. Embraced by a large majority in the 1930s, this shift proved to be one of the New Deal's most enduring legacies.

Eleanor Roosevelt, the president's wife, worked tirelessly and successfully to create and mobilize support for enlightened government action. Scarred by her own griefs, this extraordinary first lady radiated warmth and compassion in endless travels, talks, newspaper columns, and photos. She humanized the New Deal programs for millions of Americans. She was no distant bureaucrat; she was a friend who really cared. (See the feature "Individuals in Society: Eleanor Roosevelt: Pain, Compassion, Self-Realization.")

Other social measures aimed in the same direction. Following the path blazed by Germany's Bismarck in the 1880s (see page 827), the U.S. government in 1935 established a national social security system, with old-age pensions and unemployment benefits, to protect many workers against some of life's uncertainties. The National Labor Relations Act of 1935 gave union organizers the green light by declaring collective bargaining to be the policy of the United States. Following some bitter strikes, such as a sit-down strike at General Motors in early 1937, union membership more than doubled, from 4 million in 1935 to 9 million in 1940. In general, between 1935 and 1938 government rulings and social reforms chipped away at the privileges of the wealthy and tried to help ordinary people.

Yet despite undeniable accomplishments in social reform, the New Deal was only partly successful as a response to the Great Depression. At the height of the recovery in May 1937, 7 million workers were still unemployed. The economic situation then worsened seriously in the recession of 1937 and 1938. Production fell sharply, and although unemployment never again reached the 15 million mark of 1933, it hit 11 million in 1938 and was still a staggering 10 million when war

Eleanor Roosevelt: Pain, Compassion, Self-Realization

Eleanor Roosevelt in 1932, serving to needy women in the kitchen of New York restaurant. *(Corbis)*

Few individuals in the twentieth century have been as admired or as influential as Eleanor Roosevelt (1884–1962). Yet her strengths were not inborn; rather they emerged slowly out of suffering, crisis, and personal growth.

Born into New York's gilded upper class, Eleanor experienced much sorrow as a child. Her beautiful socialite mother mocked her as unattractive and dreary, while her father spiraled downward into alcoholism and self-destruction. Orphaned at ten and assigned to an austere grandmother, she blossomed briefly in her late teens. Though drawn to social work, she followed convention and "entered society." Still shy and lacking in self-esteem, she fell in love with Franklin Roosevelt, a handsome distant cousin. They were married in a lavish wedding when Eleanor was twenty-one. Her uncle Theodore Roosevelt, president of the United States, gave her away.

Eleanor Roosevelt made a total commitment to marriage and her husband's career. Flanked by nurses and servants, she bore six children in ten years. As a politician's wife and young matron, she also hosted innumerable social functions. Relishing occasional volunteer service, she became, as she later reflected, a "completely dependent person." Ever serious and not very romantic, she and her insensitive, fun-loving husband drifted apart.

In 1918, when she was thirty-four, she discovered by accident that Franklin had been having a four-year love affair with her personal secretary. She felt totally betrayed. As she recalled later, "The bottom dropped out of my own particular world, and I faced myself, my surroundings, my world, honestly for the first time."[1] Taking stock and "really growing up," she told her husband that he could either have a divorce or break off the affair forever. As Franklin reluctantly turned away from divorce and passionate love to save his political future, a tried-in-the-fire Eleanor gradually went her own way, developing her own interests. Nursing Franklin with total devotion in 1921 when he was struck by polio, she transformed their failed marriage into a professional partnership.

Grief enlarged Eleanor's power to love and serve, and in the 1920s she developed her potential and honed her skills.[2] She formed deep friendships with leading women social reformers and made their cause her own. And she matured as a savvy politician within the New York Democratic party, pressing her issues and keeping the Roosevelt name alive.

Eleanor subsequently used the White House as a stage for her exceptional abilities. First, she worked effectively from inside, forming her own entourage and helping women and political allies get key government jobs. Second, blessed with wonderful health and unfailing energy, she sold the New Deal to the American people. Traveling widely as the immobilized president's "eyes and ears," she pressed her husband in public and private to act more energetically for "people programs" and black civil rights. When in the 1930s blacks shifted massively and permanently from the "party of Lincoln" to the "party of Roosevelt" (and southern segregation), even though they made little progress toward full civil rights, they did so in part because they knew that *Mrs.* Roosevelt supported their cause.

Eleanor Roosevelt grew to be a great humanitarian and an inspiring public figure. While Franklin mobilized politicians, she galvanized social reformers. And in their joint creation of a new kind of government, the idols of millions rekindled a bit of their early affection.

Questions for Analysis

1. How did Eleanor Roosevelt grow as a person and a public figure? How do you explain this growth?
2. What kind of programs and New Deal policies did she favor? Was she a moderate or a radical?

1. Joseph Lash, *Eleanor and Franklin* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1971), p. 226.
2. Lois Scharf, *Eleanor Roosevelt: First Lady of American Liberalism* (Boston: Twayne, 1987), pp. 57–82; also see pp. 82–112, 135–145.

broke out in Europe in September 1939. The New Deal brought fundamental reform, but it never did pull the United States out of the depression.

The Scandinavian Response to the Depression

Of all the Western democracies, the Scandinavian countries under socialist leadership responded most successfully to the challenge of the Great Depression. Having grown steadily in number in the late nineteenth century, the socialists became the largest political party in Sweden and then in Norway after the First World War. In the 1920s they passed important social reform legislation for both peasants and workers, gained practical administrative experience, and developed a unique kind of socialism. Flexible and nonrevolutionary, Scandinavian socialism grew out of a strong tradition of cooperative community action. Even before 1900, Scandinavian agricultural cooperatives had shown how individual peasant families could join together for everyone's benefit. Labor leaders and capitalists were also inclined to work together.

When the economic crisis struck in 1929, socialist governments in Scandinavia built on this pattern of cooperative social action. Sweden in particular pioneered in the use of large-scale deficits to finance public works and thereby maintain production and employment. Scandinavian governments also increased social welfare benefits, from old-age pensions and unemployment insurance to subsidized housing and maternity allowances. All this spending required a large bureaucracy and high taxes, first on the rich and then on practically everyone. Yet both private and cooperative enterprise thrived, as did democracy. Some observers saw Scandinavia's welfare socialism as an appealing "middle way" between sick capitalism and cruel communism or fascism.

Recovery and Reform in Britain and France

In Britain MacDonald's Labour government and then, after 1931, the Conservative-dominated coalition government followed orthodox economic theory. The budget was balanced, but unemployed workers received barely enough welfare to live. Despite government lethargy, the economy recovered considerably after 1932. By 1937 total production was about 20 percent higher than in 1929. In fact, for Britain the years after 1932 were actually somewhat better than the 1920s had been, quite the opposite of the situation in the United States and France.

This good but by no means brilliant performance reflected the gradual reorientation of the British econ-

Scandinavian Socialism In Scandinavia socialists championed cooperation and practical welfare measures, playing down strident rhetoric and theories of class conflict. The Oslo Breakfast, depicted in the lower part of this poster, exemplified the Scandinavian approach. It provided every schoolchild in the Norwegian capital with a good breakfast free of charge. (*Universitetsbiblioteket i Oslo*)

omy. After going off the gold standard in 1931 and establishing protective tariffs in 1932, Britain concentrated increasingly on the national, rather than the international, market. The old export industries of the Industrial Revolution, such as textiles and coal, continued to decline, but new industries, such as automobiles and electrical appliances, grew in response to British home demand. Moreover, low interest rates encouraged a housing boom. These developments encouraged Britain to look inward and avoid unpleasant foreign questions.

Because France was relatively less industrialized and more isolated from the world economy, the Great Depression came there late. But once the depression hit France, it stayed and stayed. Decline was steady until

1935, and a short-lived recovery never brought production or employment back up to predepression levels. Economic stagnation both reflected and heightened an ongoing political crisis. There was no stability in government. As before 1914, the French parliament was made up of many political parties, which could never cooperate for very long. In 1933, for example, five coalition cabinets formed and fell in rapid succession.

The French lost the underlying unity that had made government instability bearable before 1914. Fascist-type organizations agitated against parliamentary democracy and looked to Mussolini's Italy and Hitler's Germany for inspiration. In February 1934 French fascists and semifascists rioted and threatened to overturn the republic. At the same time, the Communist party and many workers opposed to the existing system were looking to Stalin's Russia for guidance. The vital center of moderate republicanism was sapped from both sides.

Frightened by the growing strength of the fascists at home and abroad, the Communists, the Socialists, and the Radicals formed an alliance—the Popular Front—for the national elections of May 1936. Their clear victory reflected the trend toward polarization. The number of Communists in the parliament jumped dramatically from 10 to 72, and the Socialists, led by Léon Blum, became the strongest party in France, with 146 seats. The really quite moderate Radicals slipped badly, and the conservatives lost ground to the semifascists.

In the next few months Blum's Popular Front government made the first and only real attempt to deal with the social and economic problems of the 1930s in France. Inspired by Roosevelt's New Deal, the Popular Front encouraged the union movement and launched a far-reaching program of social reform, complete with paid vacations and a forty-hour workweek. Popular with workers and the lower middle class, these measures were quickly sabotaged by rapid inflation and cries of revolution from fascists and frightened conservatives. Wealthy people sneaked their money out of the country, labor unrest grew, and France entered a severe financial crisis. Blum was forced to announce a "breathing spell" in social reform.

The fires of political dissension were also fanned by civil war in Spain. Communists demanded that France support the Spanish republicans, while many French conservatives would gladly have joined Hitler and Mussolini in aiding the attack of Spanish fascists. Extremism grew, and France itself was within sight of civil war. Blum was forced to resign in June 1937, and the Popular Front quickly collapsed. An anxious and divided France drifted aimlessly once again, preoccupied by Hitler and German rearmament.

SUMMARY

After the First World War Western society entered a complex and difficult era—truly an age of anxiety. Intellectual life underwent a crisis marked by pessimism, uncertainty, and fascination with irrational forces. Ceaseless experimentation and rejection of old forms characterized art and music, while motion pictures and radio provided a new, standardized entertainment for the masses. Intellectual and artistic developments that before 1914 had been confined to small avant-garde groups gained wider currency, as did the insecure state of mind they expressed.

Politics and economics were similarly disrupted. In the 1920s political leaders groped to create an enduring peace and rebuild the prewar prosperity, and for a brief period late in the decade they seemed to have succeeded. Then the Great Depression shattered that fragile stability. Uncertainty returned with redoubled force in the 1930s. The international economy collapsed, and unemployment struck millions worldwide. The democracies turned inward as they sought to cope with massive domestic problems and widespread disillusionment. Generally speaking, they were not very successful. The old liberal ideals of individual rights and responsibilities, elected government, and economic freedom, even when they managed to survive, seemed ineffective and outmoded to many. And in many countries these ideals were abandoned completely.

NOTES

1. P. Valéry, *Variety,* trans. M. Cowley (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1927), pp. 27–28.
2. G. Greene, *Another Mexico* (New York: Viking Press, 1939), p. 3.
3. G. Orwell, *1984* (New York: New American Library, 1950), p. 220.
4. C. E. Jeanneret-Gris (Le Corbusier), *Towards a New Architecture* (London: J. Rodker, 1931), p. 15.
5. Quoted in A. H. Barr, Jr., *What Is Modern Painting?* 9th ed. (New York: Museum of Modern Art, 1966), p. 27.
6. Quoted ibid., p. 25.
7. R. Graves and A. Hodge, *The Long Week End: A Social History of Great Britain, 1918–1939* (New York: Macmillan, 1941), p. 131.
8. Quoted in A. Briggs, *The Birth of Broadcasting,* vol. 1 (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), p. 47.
9. Quoted in R. J. Sontag, *A Broken World, 1919–1939* (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), p. 129.
10. C. P. Kindleberger, *The World in Depression, 1929–1939* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), p. 292.

11. Quoted in S. B. Clough et al., eds., *Economic History of Europe: Twentieth Century* (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), pp. 243–245.

12. Quoted in D. Dillard, *Economic Development of the North Atlantic Community* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967), p. 591.

SUGGESTED READING

Among general works, E. Wiskemann's *Europe of the Dictators, 1919–1945* (1966), and Sontag's study cited in the Notes are particularly recommended. The latter has an excellent bibliography. A. Bullock, ed., *The Twentieth Century* (1971), is a lavish visual feast combined with penetrating essays on major developments since 1900. Two excellent accounts of contemporary history—one with a liberal and the other with a conservative point of view—are R. Paxton, *Europe in the Twentieth Century,* 3d ed. (1997), and P. Johnson, *Modern Times: The World from the Twenties to the Eighties* (1983). Crucial changes in thought before and after World War I are discussed in three rewarding intellectual histories: S. Kern, *The Culture of Time and Space, 1880–1918;* M. Berman, *All That Is Solid Melts into Air: The Experience of Modernity* (1982); and G. Masur, *Prophets of Yesterday* (1961). R. Stromberg, *European Intellectual History Since 1789* (1986), and F. Baumer, *Modern European Thought: Continuity and Change in Ideas, 1600–1950* (1970), are recommended general surveys. W. Kaufmann, *Nietzsche* (1974), is a sympathetic and justly famous study, and S. Aschheim, *The Nietzsche Legacy in Germany, 1890–1990* (1992), considers the range of responses to the pioneering philosopher. W. Barrett, *Irrational Man: A Study in Existential Philosophy* (1958), is still useful.

N. Cantor, *The American Century: Varieties of Culture in Modern Times* (1997), is a pugnacious and stimulating survey. J. Rewald's *The History of Impressionism* (1961) and *Post-Impressionism* (1956) are excellent, as is the work by Barr cited in the Notes. P. Collaer, *A History of Modern Music* (1961), and H. R. Hitchcock, *Architecture: Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (1958), are good introductions. T. Wolfe, *From Bauhaus to My House* (1981), is a lively critique of modern architecture. L. Barnett, *The Universe and Dr. Einstein* (1952), is a fascinating study of the new physics. A. Storr, *Freud* (1989), and P. Rieff, *Freud* (1956), consider the man and how his theories have stood the test of time. In *Civilization and Its Discontents* (1930), which is highly recommended, S. Freud explores his theory of instinct and repression, arguing that society's necessary repression of instinctual drives will always leave people unhappy. M. White, ed., *The Age of Analysis* (1955), opens up basic questions of twentieth-century psychology and philosophy. H. Liebersohn, *Fate and Utopia in German Sociology* (1988), analyzes developments in German social science. J. Willett, *The New Sobriety: Art and Politics in the Weimar Period, 1917–1933* (1978), and P. Gay, *Weimar Culture* (1970), consider the artistic renaissance and the political culture in Germany in the 1920s. M. Marrus, ed., *Emergence of Leisure* (1974), is a pioneering inquiry into an important aspect of mass culture. H. Daniels-Rops, *A Fight for God,* 2 vols. (1966), is a sympathetic history of the Catholic church between 1870 and 1939.

G. Ambrosius and W. Hibbard, *A Social and Economic History of Twentieth-Century Europe* (1989), provides a good survey; C. Maier, *Recasting Bourgeois Europe* (1975), is an ambitious comparative study of social classes and conflicts in France, Germany, and Italy after World War I. P. Fritzsche, *Rehearsals for Fascism: Populism and Political Mobilization in Weimar Germany* (1990); R. Wohl, *The Generation of 1914* (1979); and R. Kuisel, *Capital and State in Modern France: Renovation and Economic Management* (1982), are three important studies on aspects of the postwar challenge. S. Reynolds, *France Between the Wars: Gender and Politics* (1996), and J. Keiger, *Raymond Poincaré* (1996), are major reconsiderations of French politics from different perspectives. H. James, *The German Slump: Politics and Economics, 1924–1936* (1986), is an excellent analysis of economic recovery and subsequent collapse. M. Childs, *Sweden: The Middle Way* (1961), applauds Sweden's efforts at social reform. L. Scharf, *Eleanor Roosevelt: First Lady of American Liberalism* (1987), and J. Youngs, *Eleanor Roosevelt: A Personal and Public Life* (1985), are both recommended, as is Roosevelt's own account, *This Is My Story* (1937). In addition to the contemporary works discussed in the text, the crisis of the interwar period comes alive in R. Crossman, ed., *The God That Failed* (1950), in which famous Western writers tell why they were attracted to and later repelled by communism; J. Ortega y Gasset's renowned *The Revolt of the Masses* (1932); and F. A. Hayek's *The Road to Serfdom* (1944), a famous warning of the dangers to democratic freedoms.

In addition to Kindleberger's excellent study of the Great Depression cited in the Notes, there is J. Galbraith's very lively and understandable account of the stock market collapse, *The Great Crash* (1955). P. Temin, *Lessons from the Great Depression* (1987), is an excellent evaluation. J. Garraty, *Unemployment in History* (1978), is noteworthy, though novels best portray the human tragedy of economic decline. Winifred Holtby, *South Riding* (1936), and Walter Greenwood, *Love on the Dole* (1933), are moving stories of the Great Depression in England; Hans Fallada, *Little Man, What Now?* (1932), is the classic counterpart for Germany. Also highly recommended as commentaries on English life between the wars are N. Gray, *The Worst of Times: An Oral History of the Great Depression in Britain* (1985), and George Orwell, *The Road to Wigan Pier* (1972). Among French novelists, André Gide painstakingly examines the French middle class and its values in *The Counterfeiters,* and the great existentialist Albert Camus is at his unforgettable best in *The Stranger* (1942) and *The Plague* (1947).

A Christian View of Evil

The English philosopher C. E. M. Joad (1891–1953) stands out among intellectuals who turned toward religion in the age of anxiety. As a university student, he shed his faith and became a militant rationalist who was "frequently in demand for lectures and articles which adopted an attitude hostile to revealed religion in general, and to the Christian Church in particular." Only after intense reflection did Joad retrace his steps and come to reaccept Christianity. Ever the serious intellectual, he described and analyzed his "spiritual odyssey" in closely reasoned and influential writings.

The following selection is taken from God and Evil, *published in 1942 when Hitler's empire posed the problem of human depravity in the starkest terms. Reconsidering the modern secular faith in the primacy of environmental influences and in the perfectibility of humankind, Joad found these beliefs wanting. He reaffirmed the Christian focus on sin and the need for God's grace to escape from evil and find salvation.*

There is, we are told, a revival of interest in religious matters. . . . In this revival of interest I have shared. . . . As a young man at Oxford, I participated, as was natural to my age and generation, in prolonged and frequent discussions of religion which, finding me a Christian, left me as they did many of my generation, an agnostic, an agnostic who entertained a deep-seated suspicion of all dogmatic creeds. . . .

As an agnostic, I felt convinced of two things: first, . . . within the sphere of religion that we did not and probably could not know the truth; secondly, in regard to the so-called religious truths that I had been taught, as, for example, that God created the world as stated in Genesis [and] . . . sent His Son into it to redeem mankind, that it was improbable that they were true and certain that they could not be *known* to be true. In the confidence of this conviction I proceeded, to all intents

and purposes, to turn my back upon the whole subject. . . .

It was only after the coming of the Nazis that my mind began again to turn in the direction of religion. . . . [With] the outbreak of [the Second World] war the subject leapt straight into the forefront of my consciousness where it has remained ever since. . . .

I take it [my spiritual odyssey] to be not untypical. From conversations and discussions, especially with students, I surmise that the revival of interest in religion is widespread. . . . This topical relevance of religion derives from two sources. [First, there is] the relation between religion and politics. This connection . . . subsists at all times, but in quiet times of peace it usually remains implicit. The peculiar circumstances of the last twenty-five years have, however, combined to thrust it into the foreground of men's consciousness. . . . Thus times of revolutionary political change are also times of religious questioning and discussion.

The other source of the specifically topical interest in religion is . . . the obtrusiveness of evil. [Perhaps] there is no more evil abroad in Western civilization than there was at the end of the last century, but it cannot be denied that what there is of it is more obtrusive. I am not referring to evils arising from the relation between the sexes upon which the Church has laid such exclusive stress. . . . I mean the evils of cruelty, savagery, oppression, violence, egotism, aggrandisement, and lust for power. So pervasive and insistent have these evils become that it is at times difficult to avoid concluding that the Devil has been given a longer rope than usual, . . . [and] it becomes correspondingly more difficult to explain it away by the various methods which have been fashionable during the last twenty years.

There was, for example, the explanation of evil in terms of economic inequality and injustice. So-

cialist writers had taught my generation that bad conditions were the cause of human wretchedness . . . and also of human wickedness. Poverty . . . was the supreme sin; supreme if only because it was the source of all the others. . . .

And the moral [of this teaching]? That evil is due to bad social conditions. Now you can reform bad social conditions by Act of Parliament, substituting comfort, cleanliness, security, and financial competence for discomfort, dirt, insecurity, and want. Therefore, presumably, you can make men virtuous . . . by Act of Parliament.

There was a later explanation of evil in terms of early psychological maltreatment and consequent psychological maladjustment. Evil, then, according to this view, was the result not of bad social, but of bad psychological conditions; not so much of an imperfect society, as of an imperfect family, an ill-directed nursery, and a wrongly run school. Reform society, said the Socialist, and evil will disappear. Reform the school and the family, the psychoanalysts added, and society will reform itself and, once again, evil will disappear. . . .

The contemporary view of evil is untenable. . . . Evil is not *merely* a by-product of unfavourable circumstances; it is too widespread and too deep-seated to admit of any such explanation; so widespread, so deep-seated that one can only conclude that what the religions have always taught is true, and that evil is endemic in the heart of man. . . . The intellectual blunder [of the comfortable and secure late nineteenth century was] . . . denying what we had traditionally been taught, the doctrine of original sin. . . .

For the simple truth is that one cannot help oneself. . . . For one cannot help but know that one's character is *not* strong enough, one's efforts *not* efficacious, at least, that they are not, if unaided. . . . There are two alternatives [to giving in to evil].

The first, since the world is evil, is to escape from it and to find, first in withdrawal, and, as an ultimate hope, in Nirvana, the true way of life. The second is to face evil and to seek to overcome it. . . . The first is the way of the East, the second of Christianity. My temperament and disposition incline me to the second, but the second I know to be impossible unless I am assisted from without. By the grace of God we are assured, such assistance may be obtained and evil may be overcome; otherwise, there is no resource and no resistance.

The British philosopher Cyril Edwin Mitchinson Joad (1891–1953). *(Hulton Getty/Liaison)*

Questions for Analysis

1. How did Joad account for a renewed interest in religious matters?

2. Joad concentrated on the problem of evil in human affairs. What did he mean by "evil"? Was it becoming more powerful in his time?

3. What, according to Joad, were the usual explanations for the existence of evil? What was his view of these explanations?

4. In Joad's view how does the Christian doctrine of original sin relate to the problem of evil? How can the Christian overcome sin and evil?

Source: C. E. M. Joad, *God and Evil* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1943), pp. 9–20, 103–104. Copyright © 1943 by Harper and Brothers.

32 Dictatorships and the Second World War

The era of anxiety and economic depression was also a time of growing strength for political dictatorship. In Europe, as in Japan and China in the 1930s, popularly elected governments and basic civil liberties declined drastically. On the eve of the Second World War, liberal democratic governments were surviving only in Great Britain, France, the Low Countries, the Scandinavian nations, and neutral Switzerland. Elsewhere in Europe, various kinds of strongmen ruled. Dictatorship seemed the wave of the future. Thus the decline in liberal political institutions and the intellectual crisis were related elements in the general crisis of European civilization.

The West's era of dictatorship is a highly disturbing chapter in the history of civilization. The key development was not only the resurgence of authoritarian rule but also the rise of a particularly ruthless and dynamic tyranny. This new kind of tyranny reached its full realization in the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany in the 1930s. Stalin and Hitler mobilized their peoples for enormous undertakings and ruled with unprecedented severity. Hitler's mobilization was ultimately directed toward racial aggression and territorial expansion, and his sudden attack on Poland in 1939 started World War II. Hitler's successes then encouraged the Japanese to expand their stalemated campaign in China into a vast war in the Pacific, with their attack on Pearl Harbor and their advance into South Asia.

Nazi armies and Japanese imperialists were defeated by a great coalition, and today we want to believe that the era of totalitarian dictatorship was a terrible accident, that Stalin's slave labor camps and Hitler's gas chambers "can't happen again." But the cruel truth is that horrible atrocities continue to plague the world in our time. The Khmer Rouge inflicted genocide on its people in Kampuchea, and civil war in Bosnia and Rwanda led to ethnically motivated atrocities recalling the horrors of the Second World War. And there are other examples. Thus it is vital that we understand Europe's era of brutal dictatorship in order to guard against the possibility of its recurrence.

- What was the nature of twentieth-century dictatorship and authoritarian rule?
- How did people live in the most extreme states: the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany?
- How did the rise of aggressive dictatorships result in another world war?

These are the questions this chapter will seek to answer.

AUTHORITARIAN STATES

Both conservative and radical dictatorships swept through Europe in the 1920s and the 1930s. Although these two types of dictatorship shared some characteristics and sometimes overlapped in practice, they were in essence profoundly different. Conservative authoritarian regimes were an old story in Europe. Radical dictatorships were a new and frightening development.

Conservative Authoritarianism

The traditional form of antidemocratic government in European history was conservative authoritarianism. Like Catherine the Great in Russia and Metternich in Austria, the leaders of such governments tried to prevent major changes that would undermine the existing social order. To do so, they relied on obedient bureaucracies, vigilant police departments, and trustworthy armies. They forbade popular participation in government or else severely limited it to natural allies such as landlords, bureaucrats, and high church officials. They persecuted liberals, democrats, and socialists as subversive radicals, often consigning them to jail or exile.

Yet old-fashioned authoritarian governments were limited in their power and in their objectives. They had neither the ability nor the desire to control many aspects of their subjects' lives. Preoccupied with the goal of mere survival, these governments largely limited their demands to taxes, army recruits, and passive acceptance. As long as the people did not try to change the system, they often had considerable personal independence.

After the First World War, this kind of authoritarian government revived, especially in the less-developed eastern part of Europe. There the parliamentary regimes that had been founded on the wreckage of empires in 1918 fell one by one. By early 1938 only economically and socially advanced Czechoslovakia remained true to liberal political ideals. Conservative dictators also took over in Spain and Portugal. There were several reasons for this development.

These lands lacked a strong tradition of self-government, with its necessary restraint and compromise. Moreover, many of these new states, such as Yugoslavia, were torn by ethnic conflicts that threatened their very existence. Dictatorship appealed to nationalists and military leaders as a way to repress such

tensions and preserve national unity. Large landowners and the church were still powerful forces in these largely agrarian areas, and they often looked to dictators to save them from progressive land reform or communist agrarian upheaval. So did some members of the middle class, which was small and weak in eastern Europe. Finally, though some kind of democracy managed to stagger through the 1920s in Austria, Bulgaria, Romania, Greece, Estonia, and Latvia, the Great Depression delivered the final blow to those countries in 1936.

Although some of the conservative authoritarian regimes adopted certain Hitlerian and fascist characteristics in the 1930s, their general aims were limited. They were concerned more with maintaining the status quo than with mobilizing the masses or forcing society into rapid change or war. This tradition continued into our own time, especially in some of the military dictatorships that ruled in Latin America until recently.

Radical Dictatorships

While conservative authoritarianism predominated in the smaller states of central and eastern Europe by the mid-1930s, radical dictatorships emerged in the Soviet Union, in Germany, and to a lesser extent in Italy. Although most scholars agree that the leaders of these radical dictatorships violently rejected parliamentary restraint and liberal values and exercised unprecedented control over the masses, there has always been controversy and debate over how best to interpret and explain these regimes.

Three leading interpretations of radical dictatorships will concern us here. The first interpretation relates the radical dictatorships to the rise of modern totalitarianism. The second interpretation focuses on the idea of fascism as the unifying impulse. The third stresses the limitations of such broad generalizations and the uniqueness of each regime. Each school of interpretation has strengths and weaknesses.

The concept of *totalitarianism* as an explanation of radical twentieth-century dictatorships emerged in the 1920s and 1930s, although it is frequently and mistakenly seen as developing only after 1945 during the cold war.[1] In 1924 Mussolini spoke of the "fierce totalitarian will" of his movement in Italy. In the 1930s many British, American, and German writers-in-exile used the concept of totalitarianism to link Italian and German fascism with Soviet communism under a common antiliberal umbrella. The alliance between Hitler and Stalin in 1939 reinforced this explanation.

Early writers believed that modern totalitarianism burst on the scene with the revolutionary total-war effort of 1914 to 1918. The war called forth a tendency to subordinate all institutions and all classes to one supreme objective: victory. As French thinker Elie Halévy put it in 1936, the varieties of modern totalitarian tyranny—fascism, Nazism, and communism—could be thought of as "feuding brothers" with a common father: the nature of modern war.[2]

Writers such as Halévy believed that the crucial experience of World War I was carried further by Lenin and the Bolsheviks during the Russian civil war. Lenin showed that a dedicated minority could make a total effort and that institutions and human rights could be subordinated to the needs of a single group—the Communist party—and its leader, Lenin. Thus he provided a model for single-party dictatorship and modern totalitarianism, which reached maturity in the 1930s in the Stalinist Soviet Union and in Nazi Germany.

As numerous Western political scientists and historians argued in the 1950s and 1960s, the totalitarian state used modern technology and communications to exercise complete political power. But it did not stop there. Increasingly, the state took over and tried to control just as completely the economic, social, intellectual, and cultural aspects of people's lives. Deviation from the norm even in art or family behavior could become a crime. In theory, nothing was politically neutral; nothing was outside the scope of the state.

This vision of total state control represented a radical revolt against liberalism. Classical liberalism (see page 782) sought to limit the power of the state and protect the sacred rights of the individual. Liberals stood for rationality, peaceful progress, economic freedom, and a strong middle class. All of that disgusted totalitarians as sentimental slop. They believed in willpower, preached conflict, and worshiped violence. They believed that the individual was infinitely less valuable than the state and that there were no lasting rights, only temporary rewards for loyal and effective service.

Unlike old-fashioned authoritarianism, modern totalitarianism was based not on an elite but on people who had become engaged in the political process, usually through a commitment to nationalism or socialism. Thus totalitarian societies were fully mobilized societies moving toward some goal and possessing boundless dynamism. As soon as one goal was achieved at the cost of enormous sacrifice, another arose at the leader's command to take its place. Thus totalitarianism was in the end a *permanent* revolution, an *unfinished* revolution, in

which rapid, profound change imposed from on high went on forever.

A second group of writers developed the concept of *fascism* to explain the rise of radical dictatorships outside the Soviet Union. A term of pride for Mussolini and Hitler, who used it to describe the supposedly "total" and revolutionary character of their movements, fascism was severely criticized by these writers. They linked it to reactionary forces, decaying capitalism, and domestic class conflict. Orthodox Marxists first argued that fascism was the way powerful capitalists sought to create a mass nationalist movement capable of destroying the revolutionary working class, thereby protecting the enormous profits that capitalists reaped through war and territorial expansion. Both orthodox Marxists

and less doctrinaire socialists rejected the totalitarian interpretation, discerning in communist regimes at least some elements of the genuine socialism they desired.

Recent comparative studies of fascist movements all across Europe have shown that they shared many characteristics, including extreme, often expansionist nationalism; antipathy to socialism and a desire to destroy working-class movements; alliances with powerful capitalists and landowners; mass parties that appealed especially to the middle class and the peasantry; a dynamic and violent leader; and glorification of war and the military.

Historians today often adopt a third interpretive approach, which emphasizes the uniqueness of developments in each country. This approach has been both

Nazi Mass Rally, 1936   This picture captures the essence of the totalitarian interpretation of dynamic modern dictatorship. The uniformed members of the Nazi party have willingly merged themselves into a single force and await the command of the godlike leader. *(Wide World Photos)*

reflected and encouraged in recent years by an outpouring of specialized historical studies on Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Soviet Union that challenge parts of the overarching totalitarian and fascist interpretations. To this third school of historians, differences in historical patterns are often more important than striking but frequently superficial similarities.

Four tentative judgments concerning these debates about radical dictatorships in the twentieth century seem appropriate. First, as is often the case in history, the leading interpretations are rather closely linked to the political passions and the ideological commitments of the age. Thus in the 1930s and in the early cold war, modern Western "bourgeois-liberal" observers, worried by the dual challenge of the Nazi and Soviet dictatorships, often found the totalitarian explanation convincing. At the same time, Marxist, socialist, and New Left writers easily saw profound structural differences between the continued capitalism in fascist countries and the socialism established in the Soviet Union.

Second, as a noted scholar has recently concluded, the concept of totalitarianism retains real value. It correctly highlights that both Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Soviet Union made an unprecedented "total claim" on the belief and behavior of their respective citizens.[3] Third, antidemocratic, antisocialist movements sprang up all over Europe, but only in Italy and Germany (and some would say Spain) were they able to take power. Studies of fascist movements seeking power locate common elements, but they do not explain what fascist governments actually did. Fourth, the problem of Europe's radical dictatorships is complex, and there are few easy answers.

STALIN'S SOVIET UNION

Lenin's harshest critics claim that he established the basic outlines of a modern totalitarian dictatorship after the Bolshevik Revolution and during the Russian civil war. If this is so, then Joseph Stalin (1879–1953) certainly finished the job. A master of political infighting, Stalin cautiously consolidated his power and eliminated his enemies in the mid-1920s. Then in 1928, as undisputed leader of the ruling Communist party, he launched the first five-year plan—the "revolution from above," as he so aptly termed it.

The five-year plans were extremely ambitious. Often incorrectly considered a mere set of economic measures to speed the Soviet Union's industrial development, the five-year plans marked the beginning of a renewed attempt to mobilize and transform Soviet society along socialist lines. Their ultimate goal was to generate new attitudes, new loyalties, and a new socialist humanity. The means Stalin and the small Communist party elite chose in order to do so were constant propaganda, enormous sacrifice, and unlimited violence and state control. Thus many historians argue that the Soviet Union in the 1930s became a dynamic, modern totalitarian state.

From Lenin to Stalin

By spring 1921 Lenin and the Bolsheviks had won the civil war, but they ruled a shattered and devastated land. Many farms were in ruins, and food supplies were exhausted. In southern Russia drought combined with the ravages of war to produce the worst famine in generations. By 1920, according to the government, from 50 to 90 percent of the population in seventeen provinces was starving. Industrial production also broke down completely. In 1921, for example, output of steel and cotton textiles was only about 4 percent of what it had been in 1913. The Bolsheviks had destroyed the economy as well as their foes.

In the face of economic disintegration, riots by peasants and workers, and an open rebellion by previously pro-Bolshevik sailors at Kronstadt, the tough but ever-flexible Lenin changed course. In March 1921 he announced the New Economic Policy (NEP), which re-established limited economic freedom in an attempt to rebuild agriculture and industry. Peasant producers were permitted to sell their surpluses in free markets, and private traders and small handicraft manufacturers were now allowed to reappear. Heavy industry, railroads, and banks, however, remained wholly nationalized.

The NEP was shrewd and successful both politically and economically. Politically, it was a necessary but temporary compromise with the Soviet Union's overwhelming peasant majority. Realizing that his government was not strong enough to take land from the peasants, Lenin made a deal with the only force capable of overturning his government. Economically, the NEP brought rapid recovery. In 1926 industrial output surpassed the level of 1913, and Soviet peasants were producing almost as much grain as before the war.

As the economy recovered and the government partially relaxed its censorship and repression, an intense struggle for power began in the inner circles of the Communist party, for Lenin had left no chosen succes-

Lenin and Stalin in 1922
Lenin re-established limited economic freedom throughout Russia in 1921, but he ran the country and the Communist party in an increasingly au thoritarian way. Stalin carried the process much further and eventually built a regime based on harsh dictatorship. *(Sovfoto)*

sor when he died in 1924. The principal contenders were the stolid Stalin and the flamboyant Trotsky.

The son of a shoemaker, Joseph Dzhugashvili—later known as Stalin—studied for the priesthood but was expelled from his theological seminary, probably for rude rebelliousness. By 1903 he had joined the Bolsheviks and he engaged in many revolutionary activities in southern Russia before the First World War.

Stalin was a good organizer but a poor speaker and writer, with no experience outside Russia. Trotsky, a great and inspiring leader who had planned the 1917 takeover (see page 940) and then created the victorious Red Army, appeared to have all the advantages. Yet it was Stalin who succeeded Lenin. Stalin won because he was more effective at gaining the all-important support of the party, the only genuine source of power in the one-party state. Rising to general secretary of the party's Central Committee just before Lenin's first stroke in 1922, Stalin used his office to win friends and allies with jobs and promises.

The practical Stalin also won because he appeared better able than the brilliant Trotsky to relate Marxian teaching to Soviet realities in the 1920s. Stalin developed a theory of "socialism in one country" that was more appealing to the majority of communists than Trotsky's doctrine of "permanent revolution." Stalin argued that the Russian-dominated Soviet Union had the ability to build socialism on its own. Trotsky maintained that socialism in the Soviet Union could succeed only if revolution occurred quickly throughout Europe. To many communists, especially Soviet communists, Trotsky's views seemed to sell their country short and

to promise risky conflicts with capitalist countries. Stalin's willingness to push socialism at home appealed to many young militants in the party who had come to detest the capitalist-appearing NEP.

With cunning skill Stalin gradually achieved absolute power between 1922 and 1927. First, he allied with Trotsky's personal enemies to crush Trotsky, who was expelled from the Soviet Union in 1929 and eventually was murdered in Mexico in 1940, undoubtedly on Stalin's order. Second, Stalin aligned with the moder ates, who wanted to go slow at home, to suppress Trot sky's radical followers. Third, having defeated all the radicals, he turned against his allies, the moderates, and destroyed them as well. Stalin's final triumph came at the party congress of December 1927, which con demned all "deviation from the general party line" for mulated by Stalin. The dictator was then ready to launch his revolution from above—the real revolution for millions of ordinary citizens.

The Five-Year Plans

The party congress of 1927 marked the end of the NEP and the beginning of the era of socialist five-year plans. The first five-year plan had staggering economic objec tives. In just five years, total industrial output was to in crease by 250 percent. Heavy industry, the preferred sector, was to grow even faster; steel production, for ex ample, was to jump almost 300 percent. Agricultural production was slated to increase by 150 percent, and one-fifth of the peasants in the Soviet Union were scheduled to give up their private plots and join social

ist collective farms. In spite of warnings from moderate communists that these goals were unrealistic, Stalin raised them higher as the plan got under way. By 1930 economic and social change was sweeping the country.

Stalin unleashed his "second revolution" for a variety of interrelated reasons. There were, first of all, ideological considerations. Like Lenin, Stalin and his militant supporters were deeply committed to socialism as they understood it. Purely economic motivations were also important. Although the economy had recovered, it seemed to have stalled in 1927 and 1928. A new socialist offensive seemed necessary if industry and agriculture were to grow rapidly.

Political considerations were most important. Internationally, there was the old problem of catching up with the advanced and presumably hostile capitalist nations of the West. Stalin said in 1931, when he pressed for ever-greater speed and sacrifice, "We are fifty or a hundred years behind the advanced countries. We must make good this distance in ten years. Either we do it, or we shall go under."[4]

Domestically, there was the problem of the peasants. For centuries the peasants had wanted to own the land, and finally they had it. Sooner or later, the communists reasoned, the peasants would become conservative little capitalists and pose a threat to the regime. Therefore, Stalin decided on a preventive war against the peasantry in order to bring it under the absolute control of the state.

That war was *collectivization*—the forcible consolidation of individual peasant farms into large, state-controlled enterprises. Beginning in 1929 peasants all over the Soviet Union were ordered to give up their land and animals and become members of collective farms, although they continued to live in their own homes. As for the *kulaks,* the better-off peasants, Stalin instructed party workers to "liquidate them as a class." Stripped of land and livestock, the kulaks were generally not even permitted to join the collective farms. Many starved or were deported to forced-labor camps for "re-education."

Since almost all peasants were in fact poor, the term *kulak* soon meant any peasant who opposed the new system. Whole villages were often attacked. One conscience-stricken colonel in the secret police confessed to a foreign journalist,

I am an old Bolshevik. I worked in the underground against the Tsar and then I fought in the Civil War. Did I do all that in order that I should now surround villages with machine guns and order my men to fire indiscriminately into crowds of peasants? Oh, no, no![5]

Forced collectivization of the peasants led to economic and human disaster. Large numbers of peasants slaughtered their animals and burned their crops in sullen, hopeless protest. Between 1929 and 1933 the number of horses, cattle, sheep, and goats in the Soviet Union fell by at least half. Nor were the state-controlled collective farms more productive. The output of grain barely increased between 1928 and 1938, when it was almost identical to the output of 1913. Collectivized agriculture was unable to make any substantial financial contribution to Soviet industrial development during the first five-year plan.

The human dimension of the tragedy was absolutely staggering. Stalin himself confided to Winston Churchill at Yalta in 1945 that 10 million people had died in the course of collectivization. In Ukraine the drive against peasants snowballed into a general assault on Ukrainians as reactionary nationalists and enemies of socialism. Thus in 1932, as collectivization and deportations continued, Stalin and his associates set levels of grain deliveries for the Ukrainian collective farms at excessively high levels, and they refused to relax those quotas or even allow food relief when Ukrainian communist leaders reported that starvation was occurring. The result was a terrible man-made famine in Ukraine in 1932 and 1933, which probably claimed 6 million lives.

Collectivization was a cruel but real victory for communist ideologues. By 1938, 93 percent of peasant families had been herded onto collective farms. Regimented as employees of the state and dependent on the state-owned tractor stations, the collectivized peasants were no longer even a potential political threat to the regime.

Yet, as recent research shows, peasants fought back with indirect daily opposition and forced the supposedly all-powerful state to make modest compromises. Peasants secured the right to limit a family's labor on the state-run farms and to cultivate tiny, grudgingly tolerated family plots, which provided them with much of their food. In 1938 these family plots produced 22 percent of all Soviet agricultural produce on only 4 percent of all cultivated land, eloquent testimony to the quiet resistance of the weak in the countryside.

The industrial side of the five-year plans was more successful—indeed, quite spectacular. Soviet industry produced about four times as much in 1937 as it had in 1928. No other major country had ever achieved such rapid industrial growth. Heavy industry led the way; consumer industry grew quite slowly. A new heavy industrial complex was built almost from scratch in western Siberia. Industrial growth also went hand in hand

Life in a Forced-Labor Camp   This rare photo from about 1933 shows the reality of de
ported peasants and other political prisoners building the Stalin–White Sea Canal in far north
ern Russia, with their bare hands and under the most dehumanizing conditions. In books and
plays Stalin's followers praised the project as a model for the regeneration of "reactionaries"
and "Kulak exploiters" through the joys of socialist work. *(David King Collection)*

with urban development, and more than 25 million people migrated to cities during the 1930s.

The great industrialization drive, concentrated between 1928 and 1937, was an awe-inspiring achievement purchased at enormous sacrifice. The sudden creation of dozens of new factories (and the increasingly voracious military) demanded tremendous resources. The money was collected from the people by means of heavy, hidden sales taxes.

Two other factors contributed importantly to rapid industrialization: firm labor discipline and foreign engineers. Between 1930 and 1932 trade unions lost most of their power. The government could assign workers to any job anywhere in the country, and individuals could not move without the permission of the police. When factory managers needed more hands, they called on their counterparts on the collective farms, who sent them millions of "unneeded" peasants over the years.

Foreign engineers were hired to plan and construct many of the new factories. Highly skilled American engineers, hungry for work in the depression years, were particularly important until newly trained Soviet experts began to replace them after 1932. The gigantic mills of the new Siberian steel industry were modeled on America's best. Thus Stalin's planners harnessed even the skill and technology of capitalist countries to promote the surge of socialist industry.

Life and Culture in Soviet Society

The aim of Stalin's five-year plans was to create a new kind of society and human personality as well as a strong industrial economy and a powerful army. Stalin and his helpers were good Marxian economic determinists. Once everything was owned by the state, they believed, a socialist society and a new kind of human being would inevitably emerge. Their utopian vision of a new

humanity floundered, but they did build a new society, whose broad outlines existed into the mid-1980s. Life in this society had both good and bad aspects.

Because consumption was reduced to pay for investment, there was no improvement in the average standard of living. Indeed, the average nonfarm wage fell by 50 percent between 1928 and 1932, and rose only slightly thereafter. Collectivized peasants experienced greater declines.

Life was hard in Stalin's Soviet Union. The masses of people lived primarily on black bread and wore old, shabby clothing. There were constant shortages in the stores, although very heavily taxed vodka was always readily available. A shortage of housing was a particularly serious problem. A relatively lucky family received one room for all its members and shared both a kitchen and a toilet with others on the floor. Less fortunate people built scrap-lumber shacks in shantytowns.

Life was hard but by no means hopeless. Idealism and ideology had real appeal for many communists, who saw themselves heroically building the world's first socialist society while capitalism crumbled and fascism rose in the West. This optimistic belief in the future of the Soviet Union also attracted many disillusioned Westerners to communism in the 1930s.

On a more practical level Soviet workers did receive some important social benefits, such as old-age pensions, free medical services, free education, and daycare centers for children. Unemployment was almost unknown. Finally, there was the possibility of personal advancement.

The keys to improving one's position were specialized skills and technical education. Rapid industrialization required massive numbers of trained experts, such as skilled workers, engineers, and plant managers. Thus the Stalinist state broke with the egalitarian policies of the 1920s and provided tremendous incentives to those who could serve its needs. A growing technical and managerial elite joined with the political and artistic elites in a new upper class, whose members were rich, powerful, and insecure. Thus millions struggled for an education. One young man summed it up: "In Soviet Russia there is no capital except education. If a person does not want to become a collective farmer or just a cleaning woman, the only means you have to get something is through education."[6]

The radical transformation of Soviet society had a profound impact on women's lives. Marxists had traditionally believed that both capitalism and the middle-class husband exploited women. The Russian Revolution of 1917 immediately proclaimed complete equality of rights for women. In the 1920s divorce and abortion were made easily available, and women were urged to work outside the home and liberate themselves sexually. After Stalin came to power, sexual and familial liberation was played down, and the most lasting changes for women involved work and education.

Young women were constantly told that they had to be fully equal to men. Peasant women in Russia had long experienced backbreaking physical labor in the countryside, and with the advent of the five-year plans, millions of women also toiled in factories and in heavy construction, building dams, roads, and steel mills in summer heat and winter frost. Many of the opportunities open to men through education were also open to women. Determined women pursued their studies and entered the ranks of the better-paid specialists in industry and science. Medicine practically became a woman's profession. By 1950, 75 percent of all doctors in the Soviet Union were women.

Soviet society gave women great opportunities, but it demanded great sacrifices as well. The vast majority of women simply *had* to work outside the home. Wages were so low that it was almost impossible for a family or couple to live only on the husband's earnings. Men continued to dominate the very best jobs. In any event, the massive mobilization of women was a striking characteristic of the Soviet state.

Culture lost its autonomy in the 1930s and became thoroughly politicized through constant propaganda and indoctrination. Party activists lectured workers in factories and peasants on collective farms, while newspapers, films, and radio broadcasts endlessly recounted socialist achievements and capitalist plots. Whereas the 1920s had seen considerable experimentation in modern art and theater, writers and artists who could effectively combine genuine creativity and political propaganda became the darlings of the regime. It became increasingly important for the successful writer and artist to glorify Russian nationalism. Russian history was rewritten so that early tsars such as Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great became worthy forerunners of the greatest Russian leader of all—Stalin.

Stalinist Terror and the Great Purges

In the mid-1930s the great offensive to build socialism and a new socialist personality culminated in ruthless police terror and a massive purging of the Communist party. The top members of the party and government publicly supported Stalin's initiatives, but there was some grumbling in the party. In late 1934 Stalin's number two man, Sergei Kirov, was suddenly and mysteriously murdered. Although Stalin himself probably

ordered Kirov's murder, he used the incident to launch a reign of terror.

In August 1936 sixteen prominent Old Bolsheviks confessed to all manner of plots against Stalin in spectacular public trials in Moscow. Then in 1937 the secret police arrested a mass of lesser party officials and newer members, also torturing them and extracting more confessions for more show trials. In addition to the party faithful, union officials, managers, intellectuals, army officers, and countless ordinary citizens were struck down. In all at least 8 million people were probably arrested, and millions of these were executed or never returned from prisons and forced-labor camps.

Stalin and the remaining party leadership recruited 1.5 million new members to take the place of those purged. Thus more than half of all Communist party members in 1941 had joined since the purges. "These new men were 'thirty-something' products of the Second Revolution of the 1930s, Stalin's upwardly mobile yuppies, so to speak."[7] Often sons (and daughters) of workers, they had usually studied in the new technical schools, and they soon proved capable of managing the government and large-scale production. One of the most important products of the great purges, this new

generation of Stalin-formed Communists would serve the leader effectively until his death in 1953, and they would govern the Soviet Union until the early 1980s.

Stalin's mass purges remain baffling, for almost all historians believe that those purged posed no threat and confessed to crimes they had not committed. Certainly the highly publicized purges sent a warning to the people: no one was secure; everyone had to serve the party and its leader with redoubled devotion. Some Western scholars have also argued that the terror reflected a fully developed totalitarian state, which must always be fighting real or imaginary enemies.

The long-standing interpretation that puts the blame for the great purges on Stalin's cruelty or madness has nevertheless been challenged in recent years. Revisionist historians argue that Stalin's fears were exaggerated but genuine and that they were shared by many in the party and in the general population. Bombarded with ideology and political slogans, the population responded energetically to Stalin's directives. Investigations and trials snowballed into a mass hysteria, a new witch-hunt.[8] In short, in this view of the 1930s, a popular but deluded Stalin found large numbers of willing collaborators for crime as well as for achievement.

Factory Workers Endorse the Moscow Trials   Voicing opposition in public was a one-way ticket to a forced-labor camp. Yet revisionist historians also argue that genuine fears of foreign plots and widespread resentment of privileged elites created considerable popular support for the great purges among ordinary Soviet citizens. *(David King Collection)*

MUSSOLINI AND FASCISM IN ITALY

Mussolini's movement and his seizure of power in 1922 were important steps in the rise of dictatorships in Europe between the two world wars. Like all the future dictators, the young Mussolini hated liberalism and wanted to destroy it in Italy. At the same time, he and his supporters were the first to call themselves "fascists"—revolutionaries determined to create a certain kind of totalitarian state. Few scholars today would argue that Mussolini succeeded. His dictatorship was brutal and theatrical, but it remained a halfway house between conservative authoritarianism and modern totalitarianism.

The Seizure of Power

In the early twentieth century Italy was a liberal state with civil rights and a constitutional monarchy. On the eve of the First World War the parliamentary regime finally granted universal male suffrage. But there were serious problems. Much of the Italian population was still poor, and many peasants were more attached to their villages and local interests than to the national state. Moreover, the papacy, many devout Catholics, conservatives, and landowners remained strongly opposed to the middle-class lawyers and politicians who ran the country largely for their own benefit. Relations between church and state were often tense. Class differences were also extreme, and by 1912 the powerful revolutionary socialist movement was led by the radical wing of the Socialist party.[9]

The war worsened the political situation. Having fought on the side of the Allies almost exclusively for purposes of territorial expansion, the parliamentary government bitterly disappointed Italian nationalists with Italy's modest gains at Versailles. Workers and peasants also felt cheated: to win their support during the war, the government had promised social and land reform, which it did not deliver after the war.

The Russian Revolution inspired and energized Italy's revolutionary socialist movement, and radical workers and peasants began occupying factories and seizing land in 1920. These actions scared and mobilized the property-owning classes. Moreover, after the war the pope lifted his ban on participation by Catholics in Italian politics, and a strong Catholic party quickly emerged. Thus by 1921 revolutionary socialists, antiliberal conservatives, and frightened property owners were all opposed—though for different reasons—to the liberal parliamentary government.

Into these crosscurrents of unrest and fear stepped the blustering, bullying Benito Mussolini (1883–1945). Son of a village schoolteacher and a poor blacksmith, Mussolini began his political career as a Socialist party leader and radical newspaper editor before World War I. In 1914, powerfully influenced by antidemocratic cults of violent action, the young Mussolini urged that Italy join the Allies, a stand for which he was expelled from the Italian Socialist party. Later Mussolini fought at the front and was wounded in 1917. Returning home, he began organizing bitter war veterans like himself into a band of fascists—from the Italian word for "a union of forces."

At first Mussolini's program was a radical combination of nationalist and socialist demands, including territorial expansion, benefits for workers, and land reform for peasants. It competed directly with the well-organized Socialist party and failed to get off the ground. When Mussolini saw that his violent verbal assaults on rival Socialists won him growing support from conservatives and the frightened middle classes, he shifted gears in 1920. In thought and action Mussolini was a striking example of the turbulent uncertainty of the age of anxiety.

Mussolini and his growing private army of Black Shirts began to grow violent. Typically, a band of fascist toughs would roar off in trucks at night and swoop down on a few isolated Socialist organizers, beating them up and force-feeding them almost deadly doses of castor oil. Few people were killed, but Socialist newspapers, union halls, and local Socialist party headquarters were destroyed. Mussolini's toughs pushed Socialists out of the city governments of northern Italy.

A skillful politician, Mussolini allowed his followers to convince themselves that they were not just opposing the "Reds" but also making a real revolution of their own, forging a strong, dynamic movement that would help the little people against the established interests. With the government breaking down in 1922, largely because of the chaos created by his direct-action bands, Mussolini stepped forward as the savior of order and property. Striking a conservative note in his speeches and gaining the sympathetic neutrality of army leaders, Mussolini demanded the resignation of the existing government and his own appointment by the king. In October 1922, to force matters, a large group of fascists marched on Rome to threaten the king and force him to call on Mussolini. The threat worked. Victor Emmanuel III (r. 1900–1946), who had no love for the old liberal politicians, asked Mussolini to form a new cabinet. Thus, after widespread violence and a threat of armed uprising, Mussolini seized power "legally." He

was immediately granted dictatorial authority for one year by the king and the parliament.

The Regime in Action

Mussolini became dictator on the strength of Italians' rejection of parliamentary government coupled with fears of Soviet-style revolution. At first Mussolini's goals were not clear. But in 1924 he responded to another crisis by declaring his desire to "make the nation Fascist," and he then imposed a series of repressive measures. Freedom of the press was abolished, elections were fixed, and the government ruled by decree. Mussolini arrested his political opponents, disbanded all independent labor unions, and put dedicated Fascists in control of Italy's schools. He created a fascist youth movement, fascist labor unions, and many other fascist organizations. He trumpeted his goal in a famous slogan of 1926: "Everything in the state, nothing outside the state, nothing against the state." By the end of that year Italy was a one-party dictatorship under Mussolini's unquestioned leadership.

Mussolini, however, did not complete the establishment of a modern totalitarian state. His Fascist party never became all-powerful. It never destroyed the old power structure, as the Communists did in the Soviet Union; nor did it succeed in dominating the old power structure, as the Nazis did in Germany. Membership in the Fascist party was more a sign of an Italian's respectability than a commitment to radical change. Interested primarily in personal power, Mussolini was content to compromise with the old conservative classes that controlled the army, the economy, and the state. He never tried to purge these classes or even move very vigorously against them. He controlled and propagandized labor but left big business to regulate itself, profitably and securely. There was no land reform.

Mussolini also drew increasing support from the Catholic church. In the Lateran Agreement of 1929, he recognized the Vatican as a tiny independent state, and he agreed to give the church heavy financial support. The pope expressed his satisfaction and urged Italians to support Mussolini's government.

Nothing better illustrates Mussolini's unwillingness to harness everyone and everything for dynamic action than his treatment of women. He abolished divorce and told women to stay at home and produce children. To promote that goal he decreed a special tax on bachelors in 1934. In 1938 women were limited by law to a maximum of 10 percent of the better-paying jobs in industry and government. Italian women appear not to have

Mussolini A charismatic orator with a sure touch for emotional propaganda, Mussolini loved settings that linked fascist Italy to the glories of imperial Rome. Poised to address a mass rally in Rome shortly after his thugs had murdered the leader of the Socialist opposition, Mussolini then called for ninety thousand more volunteers to join his gun-toting fascist militia. Members of the militia stand as an honor guard in front of the podium. *(Popperfoto/Archive Photos)*

changed their attitudes or behavior in any important way under fascist rule.

Mussolini's government did not pass racial laws until 1938 and did not persecute Jews savagely until late in the Second World War, when Italy was under Nazi control. Nor did Mussolini establish a truly ruthless police state. Only twenty-three political prisoners were condemned to death between 1926 and 1944. In spite of

much pompous posing by the chauvinist leader and in spite of mass meetings, salutes, and a certain copying of Hitler's aggression in foreign policy after 1933, Mussolini's fascist Italy, though repressive and undemocratic, was never really totalitarian.

⏚ Hitler and Nazism in Germany

The most frightening dictatorship developed in Nazi Germany. A product of Hitler's evil genius, as well as of Germany's social and political situation and the general attack on liberalism and rationality in the age of anxiety, the Nazi movement shared some of the characteristics of Mussolini's Italian model and was a form of fascism. The Nazi dictatorship smashed or took over most independent organizations, mobilized the economy, and persecuted the Jewish population. Thus Nazism asserted an unlimited claim over German society and put all ultimate power in the hands of its endlessly aggressive leader—Adolf Hitler. The aspirations of Nazism were truly totalitarian.

The Roots of Nazism

Nazism grew out of many complex developments, of which the most influential were extreme nationalism and racism. These two ideas captured the mind of the young Hitler, and it was he who dominated Nazism for as long as it lasted.

Born the fourth child of a successful Austrian customs official and an indulgent mother, Adolf Hitler (1889–1945) spent his childhood in small towns in Austria. A good student in grade school, Hitler did poorly in high school and dropped out at age fourteen after the death of his father. After four years of unfocused loafing, Hitler finally left for Vienna, where he lived a comfortable, lazy life on his generous orphan's pension and found most of the perverted beliefs that guided his life.

In Vienna Hitler soaked up extreme German nationalism, which was particularly strong there. Austro-German nationalists believed Germans to be a superior people and the natural rulers of central Europe. They often advocated union with Germany and violent expulsion of "inferior" peoples as the means of maintaining German domination of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

Hitler was deeply impressed by Vienna's mayor, Karl Lueger (1844–1910). With the help of the Catholic trade unions, Lueger had succeeded in winning the support of the little people of Vienna, and he showed

Hitler the enormous potential of anticapitalist and antiliberal propaganda.

From Lueger and others Hitler eagerly absorbed virulent anti-Semitism, racism, and hatred of Slavs. He developed an unshakable belief in the crudest, most exaggerated distortions of the Darwinian theory of survival, the superiority of Germanic races, and the inevitability of racial conflict. Anti-Semitism and racism became Hitler's most passionate convictions, his explanation for everything. The Jews, he claimed, directed an international conspiracy of finance capitalism and Marxian socialism against German culture, German unity, and the German race. Hitler's belief was totally irrational, but he never doubted it.

Although he moved to Munich in 1913 to avoid being drafted into the Austrian army, the lonely Hitler greeted the outbreak of the First World War as a salvation. He later wrote in his autobiography, *Mein Kampf,* that, "overcome by passionate enthusiasm, I fell to my knees and thanked heaven out of an overflowing heart." The struggle and discipline of war gave life meaning, and Hitler served bravely as a dispatch carrier on the western front.

When Germany was suddenly defeated in 1918, Hitler's world was shattered. Not only was he a fanatical nationalist, but war was his reason for living. Convinced that Jews and Marxists had "stabbed Germany in the back," he vowed to fight on.

In late 1919 Hitler joined a tiny extremist group in Munich called the German Workers' party, which promised unity under a uniquely German "national socialism" that would abolish the injustices of capitalism and create a mighty "people's community." By 1921 Hitler had gained absolute control of this small but growing party. He was already a master of mass propaganda and political showmanship. His most effective tool was the mass rally, a kind of political revival meeting, where he often worked his audience into a frenzy with wild attacks on the Versailles treaty, the Jews, war profiteers, and Germany's Weimar Republic.

Party membership multiplied tenfold after early 1922. In late 1923 the Weimar Republic seemed on the verge of collapse, and Hitler, inspired by Mussolini's recent easy victory, decided on an armed uprising in Munich. Despite the failure of the poorly organized plot and Hitler's arrest, Nazism had been born.

Hitler's Road to Power

At his trial Hitler violently denounced the Weimar Republic, and he gained enormous publicity and attention. Moreover, he learned from his unsuccessful revolt.

Hitler concluded that he had to undermine, rather than overthrow, the government and come to power legally through electoral competition. He forced his more violent supporters to accept his new strategy. He also used his brief prison term to dictate *Mein Kampf.* There he expounded on his basic themes: "race," with a stress on anti-Semitism; "living space," with a sweeping vision of war and conquered territory; and the leader-dictator *(Führer),* with unlimited, arbitrary power.

In the years of prosperity and relative stability between 1924 and 1929, Hitler concentrated on building his National Socialist German Workers' party, or Nazi party. By 1928 the party had 100,000 highly disciplined members under Hitler's absolute control. To appeal to the middle-class voters, Hitler de-emphasized the anti-capitalist elements of national socialism and vowed to fight Bolshevism.

Yet the Nazis remained a small splinter group in 1928, when they received only 2.6 percent of the vote in the general elections and twelve seats in the Reichstag. There the Nazi deputies pursued the legal strategy of using democracy to destroy democracy.

The Great Depression, shattering economic prosperity from 1929 on, presented Hitler with a fabulous opportunity. Unemployment jumped from 1.3 million in 1929 to 5 million in 1930. By the end of 1932 an incredible 43 percent of the labor force was unemployed. Industrial production fell by one-half between 1929 and 1932. No factor contributed more to Hitler's success than the economic crisis. Never very interested in economics before, Hitler began promising German voters economic as well as political and international salvation.

Above all, Hitler rejected free-market capitalism and advocated government programs to bring recovery. Hitler pitched his speeches especially to middle- and lower-middle-class groups—small business people, officeworkers, artisans, and peasants—as well as to skilled workers striving for middle-class status. Seized by panic as bankruptcies increased, unemployment soared, and the communists made dramatic election gains, great numbers of middle- and lower-middle-class people "voted their pocketbooks,"[10] as new research argues convincingly, and deserted the conservative and moderate parties for the Nazis. In the election of 1930 the Nazis won 6.5 million votes and 107 seats, and in July 1932 the Nazis gained 14.5 million votes—38 percent of the total—and became the largest party in the Reichstag.

The appeal to pocketbook interests was particularly effective in the early 1930s because Hitler appeared more mainstream, playing down his anti-Jewish hatred and racist nationalism. A master of mass propaganda and psychology, he had written in *Mein Kampf* that the

Hitler in Opposition   Hitler returns the salute of his Brown Shirts in this photograph from the third party day rally in Nuremberg in 1927. The Brown Shirts formed a private army within the Nazi movement, and their uniforms, marches, salutes, and vandalism helped keep Hitler in the public eye in the 1920s. *(Courtesy, Bison Books, London)*

masses were the "driving force of the most important changes in this world" and were themselves driven by fanaticism and not by knowledge. To arouse such hysterical fanaticism, he believed that all propaganda had to be limited to a few simple, endlessly repeated slogans. But now when he harangued vast audiences with wild oratory and simple slogans, he featured "national rebirth" and the "crimes" of the Versailles treaty. And many uncertain individuals, surrounded by thousands of enthralled listeners, found a sense of belonging as well as hope for better times.

Hitler and the Nazis also appealed strongly to German youth. Indeed, in some ways the Nazi movement was a mass movement of young Germans. Hitler himself was only forty in 1929, and he and most of his top aides were much younger than other leading German politicians. "National Socialism is the organized will of the youth," proclaimed the official Nazi slogan, and the battle cry of Gregor Strasser, a leading Nazi organizer, was "Make way, you old ones."[11] In 1931 almost 40 percent of Nazi party members were under thirty, compared with 20 percent of Social Democrats. National recovery, exciting and rapid change, and personal advancement were the appeals of Nazism to millions of German youths.

— Another reason Hitler came to power was that normal democratic government broke down as early as May 1930. Unable to gain the support of a majority in the Reichstag, Chancellor (chief minister) Heinrich Brüning convinced the president, the aging war hero General Hindenburg, to authorize rule by decree. Intending to use this emergency measure indefinitely, Brüning was determined to overcome the economic crisis by cutting back government spending and ruthlessly forcing down prices and wages. Brüning's ultraorthodox policies intensified the economic collapse in Germany and convinced many voters that the country's republican leaders were stupid and corrupt, thereby adding to Hitler's appeal.

The continuation of the struggle between the Social Democrats and the Communists, right up until the moment Hitler took power, was another aspect of the breakdown of democratic government. The Communists refused to cooperate with the Social Democrats, even though the two parties together outnumbered the Nazis in the Reichstag, even after the elections of 1932. German Communists (and the still complacent Stalin) were blinded by hatred of socialists and by ideology: the Communists believed that Hitler's fascism represented the last agonies of monopoly capitalism and that a communist revolution would soon follow his taking power. Disunity on the left was undoubtedly another nail in the republic's coffin.

Finally, Hitler excelled in the dirty, backroom politics of the decaying Weimar Republic. That, in fact, brought him to power. In complicated infighting in 1932, he cleverly succeeded in gaining additional support from key people in the army and big business. These people thought they could use Hitler for their own advantage to get increased military spending, fat contracts, and tough measures against workers. Many conservative and nationalistic politicians thought similarly. They thus accepted Hitler's demand to join the government only if he became chancellor. There would be only two other National Socialists and nine solid conservatives as ministers, and in such a coalition government, they reasoned, Hitler could be used and controlled. On January 30, 1933, Adolf Hitler, leader of the largest party in Germany, was legally appointed chancellor by Hindenburg.

The Nazi State and Society

Hitler moved rapidly and skillfully to establish an unshakable dictatorship. Continuing to maintain legal appearances, he immediately called for new elections. In the midst of a violent electoral campaign, the Reichstag building was partly destroyed by fire. Hitler screamed that the Communist party was responsible, and he convinced President Hindenburg to sign dictatorial emergency acts that practically abolished freedom of speech and assembly as well as most personal liberties.

When the Nazis won only 44 percent of the vote in the elections, Hitler immediately outlawed the Communist party and arrested its parliamentary representatives. Then on March 23, 1933, the Nazis used threats and blackmail to help push through the Reichstag the so-called Enabling Act, which gave Hitler absolute dictatorial power for four years. Armed with the Enabling Act, Hitler and the Nazis moved to smash or control all independent organizations. Germany soon became a one-party state, where elections were farces. Hitler and the Nazis took over the government bureaucracy intact, installing many Nazis in top positions. At the same time, they created a series of overlapping Nazi party organizations responsible solely to Hitler.

As recent research shows, the resulting system of dual government was riddled with rivalries, contradictions, and inefficiencies. The Nazi state lacked the all-encompassing unity that its propagandists claimed and was sloppy and often disorganized, but this fractured system suited Hitler and his purposes. He could play the established bureaucracy against his private, personal "party government" and maintain his freedom of action. Hitler could concentrate on general principles and the big decisions, which he always made.

In the economic sphere one big decision outlawed strikes and abolished independent labor unions, which were replaced by the Nazi Labor Front. Professional people—doctors and lawyers, teachers and engineers—also saw their previously independent organizations swallowed up in Nazi associations. Publishing houses and universities were put under Nazi control, and passionate students and pitiful professors burned forbidden books in public squares. Modern art and

architecture were ruthlessly prohibited. Life became violently anti-intellectual. As the cynical Goebbels put it, "When I hear the word 'culture' I reach for my gun."[12] By 1934 a brutal dictatorship characterized by frightening dynamism and obedience to Hitler was already largely in place.

Only the army retained independence, and Hitler moved ruthlessly and skillfully to establish his control there, too. The Nazi storm troopers (the SA), the quasi-military band of 3 million toughs in brown shirts who had fought communists and beaten up Jews before the Nazis took power, expected top positions in the army and even talked of a "second revolution" against capitalism. Needing to preserve good relations with the army and with big business, Hitler decided that the SA leaders had to be eliminated. On the night of June 30, 1934, he struck. Hitler's elite personal guard—the SS—arrested and shot without trial roughly a thousand SA leaders and assorted political enemies. Shortly thereafter army leaders swore a binding oath of "unquestioning obedience . . . to the Leader of the German State and People, Adolf Hitler." The SS grew rapidly. Under its methodical, inhuman leader, Heinrich Himmler (1900–1945), the SS joined with the political police, the Gestapo, to expand its network of special courts and concentration camps. Nobody was safe.

From the beginning Jews were a special object of Nazi persecution. By the end of 1934 most Jewish lawyers, doctors, professors, civil servants, and musicians had lost their jobs and the right to practice their professions. In 1935 the infamous Nuremberg Laws classified as Jewish anyone having one or more Jewish grandparents and deprived Jews of all rights of citizenship. By 1938 roughly one-quarter of Germany's half million Jews had emigrated, sacrificing almost all their property in order to leave Germany.

In late 1938 the attack on the Jews accelerated. A well-organized wave of violence destroyed homes, synagogues, and businesses, after which German Jews were rounded up and made to pay for the damage. It became very difficult for Jews to leave Germany. Some Germans privately opposed these outrages, but most went along or looked the other way. Although this lack of response reflected the individual's helplessness in a totalitarian state, it was more certainly a sign of the strong popular support Hitler's government enjoyed.

Hitler's Popularity

Hitler had promised the masses economic recovery—"work and bread"—and he delivered. Breaking with Brüning's do-nothing policies, Hitler immediately launched a large public works program to pull Germany out of the depression. Work began on superhighways, offices, gigantic sports stadiums, and public housing. In 1936 Germany turned decisively toward rearmament, and government spending began to concentrate on the military. The result was that unemployment dropped steadily, and by 1938 there was a shortage of workers. Thus everyone had work, and between 1932 and 1938 the standard of living for the average employed worker increased moderately. The profits of business rose sharply. For millions of people economic recovery was tangible evidence that Nazi promises were more than show and propaganda.

For the masses of ordinary German citizens who were not Jews, Slavs, Gypsies, Jehovah's Witnesses, communists, or homosexuals, Hitler's government meant greater equality and more opportunities. In 1933 barriers between classes in Germany were generally high. Hitler's rule introduced changes that lowered these barriers. For example, stiff educational requirements, which favored the well-to-do, were relaxed. The new Nazi elite included many young and poorly educated dropouts, rootless lower-middle-class people like Hitler who rose to the top with breathtaking speed. More generally, the Nazis tolerated privilege and wealth only as long as they served the needs of the party.

Yet few historians today believe that Hitler and the Nazis brought about a real social revolution, as an earlier generation of scholars often argued. Quantitative studies show that the well-educated classes held on to most of their advantages and that only a modest social leveling occurred in the Nazi years. It is significant that the Nazis shared with the Italian fascists the stereotypic view of women as housewives and mothers. Only under the relentless pressure of war did they reluctantly mobilize large numbers of German women for work in offices and factories.

Hitler's rabid nationalism, which had helped him gain power, continued to appeal to Germans after 1933. Thus in later years, when Hitler went from one foreign triumph to another and a great German empire seemed within reach, the majority of the population was delighted and kept praising the Führer's actions well into the war.

Not all Germans supported Hitler, however, and a number of German groups actively resisted him after 1933. Tens of thousands of political enemies were imprisoned, and thousands were executed. In the first years of Hitler's rule, the principal resisters were the communists and the socialists in the trade unions. But the expansion of the SS system of terror after 1935 smashed

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The Glorification of Gender Difference The Nazi state favored traditional roles for women, believing that they should keep house and raise families, preferably large ones. Thus this propaganda poster starkly informs young women that their job is motherhood. Young men entering the State Labor Service are depicted as happy, self-confident "soldiers of work," bonding together and preparing for battle. *(AKG London)*

most of these leftists. A second group of opponents arose in the Catholic and Protestant churches. However, their efforts were directed primarily at preserving genuine religious life, not at overthrowing Hitler. Finally in 1938 (and again from 1942 to 1944), some high-ranking army officers, who feared the consequences of Hitler's reckless aggression, plotted against him, unsuccessfully.

NAZI EXPANSION AND THE SECOND WORLD WAR

Although economic recovery and somewhat greater opportunity for social advancement won Hitler sup-

port, they were only byproducts of the Nazi regime. The guiding and unique concepts of Nazism remained space and race—the territorial expansion of the superior German race. As Germany regained its economic strength and as independent organizations were brought under control, Hitler formed alliances with Mussolini and Japan and began expanding. German expansion was facilitated by the uncertain, divided, pacific Western democracies, which tried to buy off Hitler to avoid war.

Yet war inevitably broke out, in both western and eastern Europe, for Hitler's ambitions were essentially unlimited. On both war fronts Nazi soldiers scored enormous successes until late 1942, establishing a horrifyingly vast empire of death and destruction. Hitler's victories prompted Japan to attack the United States and overrun much of Southeast Asia. Yet reckless aggression by Germany and Japan also raised a mighty coalition determined to smash the aggressors. Led by Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union, the Grand Alliance—to use Winston Churchill's favorite term—functioned quite effectively in military terms. Thus the Nazi and Japanese empires proved short-lived.

Aggression and Appeasement (1933–1939)

Hitler realized that his aggressive policies had to be carefully camouflaged at first, for Germany's army was limited by the Treaty of Versailles to only a hundred thousand men. As he told a group of army commanders in February 1933, the early stages of his policy of "conquest of new living space in the East and its ruthless Germanization" had serious dangers. If France had real leaders, Hitler said, it would "not give us time but attack us, presumably with its eastern satellites."[13] To avoid such threats to his plans, Hitler loudly proclaimed his peaceful intentions to all the world. Nevertheless, he felt strong enough to walk out of a sixty-nation disarmament conference and withdraw from the League of Nations in October 1933. The Nazi determination to rearm was out in the open.

Following this action Hitler sought to incorporate independent Austria into a greater Germany. But a worried Mussolini, who had initially greeted Hitler as a fascist little brother, massed his troops on the Brenner Pass and threatened to fight. When in March 1935 Hitler established a general military draft and declared the "unequal" disarmament clauses of the Treaty of Versailles null and void, other countries appeared to understand the danger. With France taking the lead, Italy and Great

Britain protested strongly and warned against future aggressive actions.

But the emerging united front against Hitler quickly collapsed. Britain adopted a policy of appeasement, granting Hitler everything he could reasonably want (and more) in order to avoid war. The first step was an Anglo-German naval agreement in June 1935 that broke Germany's isolation. The second step came in March 1936 when Hitler suddenly marched his armies into the demilitarized Rhineland, brazenly violating the Treaties of Versailles and Locarno. This was the last good chance to stop the Nazis, for Hitler had ordered his troops to retreat if France resisted militarily. But an uncertain France would not move without British support, and the occupation of German soil by German armies seemed right and just to Britain (Map 32.1). With a greatly improved strategic position, Germany handed France a tremendous psychological defeat.

British appeasement, which practically dictated French policy, lasted far into 1939. It was motivated by British feelings of guilt toward Germany and the pacifism of a population still horrified by the memory of the First World War. As in Germany, many powerful conservatives in Britain underestimated Hitler. They also believed that Soviet communism was the real danger and that Hitler could be used to stop it. Such strong anticommunist feelings made an alliance between the Western Powers and Stalin unlikely.

As Britain and France opted for appeasement and the Soviet Union watched all developments suspiciously, Hitler found powerful allies. In 1935 the bombastic Mussolini decided that imperial expansion was needed to revitalize Italian fascism. From Italian colonies on the east coast of Africa, he attacked the independent African kingdom of Ethiopia. The Western Powers and the League of Nations piously condemned Italian aggression, but Hitler supported Italy energetically and thereby overcame Mussolini's lingering doubts about the Nazis. The result in 1936 was an agreement on close cooperation between Italy and Germany, the so-called Rome-Berlin Axis. Japan, which had been expanding into Manchuria since 1931, soon joined the Axis alliance.

At the same time, Germany and Italy intervened in the Spanish civil war (1936–1939). Their support eventually helped General Francisco Franco's fascist movement defeat republican Spain. Spain's only official aid came from the Soviet Union, for public opinion in Britain and especially in France was hopelessly divided on the Spanish question.

In late 1937, while proclaiming peaceful intentions to the British and their gullible prime minister, Neville Chamberlain, Hitler moved forward with his plans to

Cartoon by David Low Low's biting criticism of appeasing leaders appeared shortly after Hitler remilitarized the Rhineland. Appeasement also appealed to millions of ordinary citizens in Britain and France, who wanted to avoid at any cost another great war. *(Reproduced by permission of London Evening/Solo Standard)*

MAP 32.1 The Growth of Nazi Germany, 1933–1939   Until March 1939 Hitler brought ethnic Germans into the Nazi state, then turned on the Slavic peoples he had always hated. He stripped Czechoslovakia of its independence and prepared for an attack on Poland in September 1939.

crush Austria and Czechoslovakia as the first step in his long-contemplated drive to the east for living space. By threatening Austria with invasion, Hitler forced the Austrian chancellor in March 1938 to put local Nazis in control of the government. The next day German armies moved in unopposed, and Austria became two provinces of Greater Germany (see Map 32.1).

Simultaneously, Hitler began demanding that the pro-Nazi, German-speaking minority of western Czecho-

slovakia—the Sudetenland—be turned over to Germany. Democratic Czechoslovakia, however, was prepared to defend itself. Moreover, France had been Czechoslovakia's ally since 1924, and if France fought, the Soviet Union was pledged to help. War appeared inevitable, but appeasement triumphed again. In September 1938 Prime Minister Chamberlain flew to Germany three times in fourteen days. In these negotiations, to which the Soviet Union was deliberately not invited,

1919	Treaty of Versailles is signed J. M. Keynes publishes *Economic Consequences of the Peace*
1919–1920	U.S. Senate rejects the Treaty of Versailles
1921	Germany is billed $33 billion in reparations
1922	Mussolini seizes power in Italy Germany proposes a moratorium on reparations
January 1923	France and Belgium occupy the Ruhr; Germany orders passive resistance to the occupation
October 1923	Stresemann agrees to reparations based on Germany's ability to pay
1924	Dawes Plan: German reparations are reduced and put on a sliding scale; large U.S. loans to Germany are recommended to promote German recovery Occupation of the Ruhr ends Adolf Hitler dictates *Mein Kampf*
1924–1929	Spectacular German economic recovery occurs; circular flow of international funds enables sizable reparations payments
1925	Treaties of Locarno promote European security and stability
1926	Germany joins the League of Nations
1928	Kellogg-Briand Pact renounces war as an instrument of international affairs
1929	Young Plan further reduces German reparations U.S. stock market crashes
1929–1933	Great Depression rages
1931	Japan invades Manchuria
1932	Nazis become the largest party in the Reichstag
January 1933	Hitler is appointed chancellor of Germany
March 1933	Reichstag passes the Enabling Act, granting Hitler absolute dictatorial power
October 1933	Germany withdraws from the League of Nations
July 1934	Nazis murder the Austrian chancellor
1935	Nuremberg Laws deprive Jews of all rights of citizenship
March 1935	Hitler announces German rearmament
June 1935	Anglo-German naval agreement is signed
October 1935	Mussolini invades Ethiopia and receives Hitler's support
March 1936	German armies move unopposed into the demilitarized Rhineland
July 1936	Civil war breaks out in Spain
1937	Japan invades China Rome-Berlin Axis in effect
March 1938	Germany annexes Austria
September 1938	Munich Conference: Britain and France agree to German seizure of the Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia
March 1939	Germany occupies the rest of Czechoslovakia; appeasement ends in Britain
August 1939	Nazi-Soviet nonaggression pact is signed
September 1, 1939	Germany invades Poland
September 3, 1939	Britain and France declare war on Germany

Chamberlain and the French agreed with Hitler that the Sudetenland should be ceded to Germany immediately. Returning to London from the Munich Conference, Chamberlain told cheering crowds that he had secured "peace with honor . . . peace for our time." Sold out by the Western Powers, Czechoslovakia gave in.

Confirmed once again in his opinion of the Western democracies as weak and racially degenerate, Hitler accelerated his aggression. In a shocking violation of his solemn assurances that the Sudetenland was his last territorial demand, Hitler sent his armies to occupy the remainder of Czechoslovakia in March 1939. The effect on Western public opinion was electrifying. For the first time, there was no possible rationale of self-determination for Nazi aggression, because Hitler was treating the Czechs and Slovaks as captive peoples. Thus when Hitler used the question of German minorities in Danzig as a pretext to confront Poland, a suddenly militant Chamberlain declared that Britain and France would fight if Hitler attacked his eastern neighbor. Hitler did not take these warnings seriously and decided to press on.

In an about-face that stunned the world, Hitler offered and Stalin signed a ten-year Nazi-Soviet nonaggression pact in August 1939. Each dictator promised to remain neutral if the other became involved in war. An attached secret protocol, which became known only after the war, ruthlessly divided eastern Europe into German and Soviet zones "in the event of a political territorial reorganization." The nonaggression pact itself was enough to make Britain and France cry treachery, for they, too, had been negotiating with Stalin. But Stalin had remained distrustful of Western intentions, and Hitler had offered territorial gain.

For Hitler, everything was set. He told his generals on the day of the nonaggression pact, "My only fear is that at the last moment some dirty dog will come up with a mediation plan." On September 1, 1939, German armies and warplanes smashed into Poland from three sides. Two days later Britain and France, finally true to their word, declared war on Germany. The Second World War had begun.

Hitler's Empire (1939–1942)

Using planes, tanks, and trucks in the first example of a *blitzkrieg,* or "lightning war," Hitler's armies crushed Poland in four weeks. The Soviet Union quickly took its part of the booty—the eastern half of Poland and the Baltic states of Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia. French

and British armies dug in in the west; they expected another war of attrition and economic blockade.

In spring 1940 the lightning war struck again. After occupying Denmark, Norway, and Holland, German motorized columns broke through southern Belgium, split the Franco-British forces, and trapped the entire British army on the beaches of Dunkirk. By heroic efforts the British were able to withdraw their troops but not their equipment.

France was taken by the Nazis. Aging marshal Henri-Philippe Pétain formed a new French government—the so-called Vichy government—to accept defeat, and German armies occupied most of France. By July 1940 Hitler ruled practically all of western continental Europe; Italy was an ally, the Soviet Union a friendly neutral (Map 32.2). Only Britain, led by the uncompromising Winston Churchill (1874–1965), remained unconquered.

Germany sought to gain control of the air, the necessary first step for an amphibious invasion of Britain. In the Battle of Britain, up to a thousand German planes attacked British airfields and key factories in a single day, dueling with British defenders high in the skies. Losses were heavy on both sides. Then in September Hitler angrily turned from military objectives to indiscriminate bombing of British cities in an attempt to break British morale. British aircraft factories increased production, and the heavily bombed people of London defiantly dug in. In September and October 1940 Britain was beating Germany three to one in the air war. There was no possibility of immediate German invasion of Britain.

In these circumstances, the most reasonable German strategy would have been to attack Britain through the eastern Mediterranean, taking Egypt and the Suez Canal and pinching off Britain's supply of oil. By April 1941 Germany had already moved to the southeast, conquering Greece and Yugoslavia and forcing Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria into alliances. But Hitler was not a reasonable person. His lifetime obsession with a vast eastern European empire for the "master race" dictated policy. So in June 1941 German armies suddenly attacked the Soviet Union along a vast front. By October Leningrad was practically surrounded, Moscow was besieged, and most of Ukraine had been conquered. But the Soviets did not collapse, and when a severe winter struck German armies that were outfitted in summer uniforms, the invaders were stopped.

Stalled in Russia, Hitler had come to rule a vast European empire stretching from the outskirts of Moscow to the English Channel. He and the top Nazi leadership

began building their "New Order," and they continued their efforts until their final collapse in 1945. In doing so, they showed what Nazi victory would have meant.

Hitler's New Order was based firmly on the guiding principle of Nazi totalitarianism: racial imperialism. Within this New Order the Nordic peoples—the Dutch, Norwegians, and Danes—received preferential treatment, for they were racially related to the Germans. The French, an "inferior" Latin people, occupied the middle position. All the occupied territories of western and northern Europe, however, were to be exploited with increasing intensity.

Slavs in the conquered territories to the east were treated with harsh hatred as "subhumans." At the height of success in 1941 and 1942, Hitler set the tone. He painted for his intimate circle the fantastic vision of a vast eastern colonial empire where Poles, Ukrainians, and Russians would be enslaved and forced to die out, while Germanic peasants resettled the resulting abandoned lands. But he needed countless helpers, and these accomplices came forth. Himmler and the elite corps of SS volunteers, supported (or condoned) by military commanders and German policemen in the oc-

cupied territories, pressed relentlessly to implement this program of destruction and to create a "mass settlement space" for Germans.

Finally, the Nazi state condemned all European Jews to extermination, along with many Gypsies, Jehovah's Witnesses, and captured communists. After the fall of Warsaw the Nazis began deporting all German Jews to occupied Poland, and in 1941 expulsion spiraled into extermination on the Russian front. Himmler's special SS killing squads and regular army units forced Soviet Jews to dig giant pits, which became mass graves as the victims were lined up on the edge and cut down by machine guns. Then in late 1941 Hitler and the Nazi leadership, in some still-debated combination, ordered the SS to stop all Jewish emigration from Europe and speeded up planning for mass murder. All over the Nazi empire Jews were systematically arrested, packed like cattle onto freight trains, and dispatched to extermination camps. (See the feature "Listening to the Past: Witness to the Holocaust" on pages 1040–1041.

There the victims were taken by force or deception to "shower rooms," which were actually gas chambers. For fifteen to twenty minutes came the terrible screams

Prelude to Murder This photo captures the terrible inhumanity of Nazi racism. Frightened and bewildered families from the soon-to-be-destroyed Warsaw ghetto are being forced out of their homes by German soldiers for deportation to concentration camps. There they face murder in the gas chambers. *(Roger-Viollet)*

Hitler's Greater Germany
Allied with Germany
Occupied by Germany and its allies
Grand Alliance
Neutral nations
Major battles

ATLANTIC

North Sea

IRELAND
NORTHERN IRELAND
GREAT BRITAIN
Battle of Britain Fall 1940
London
Dunkirk
Invasion of Normandy June 6, 1944

NORWAY
Oslo
SWEDEN
Stockholm
DENMARK
Copenhagen

FINLAND
Helsinki
Leningrad
Riga
Pinsk

SOVIET UNION
Moscow
Smolensk Tula
Kiev
Stalingrad
Russian front, Nov. 1942
Nov. 1941

Baku

GERMANY
Berlin
Posen
Warsaw
Cracow
Vienna
Bologna
Relief front Feb. 1945

NETHERLANDS
BELGIUM
Battle of the Bulge Dec. 1944
Paris
FRANCE
Vichy
VICHY FRANCE (occupied Nov. 1942)
SWITZERLAND

SLOVAKIA
HUNGARY
Budapest
CROATIA
SERBIA
YUGOSLAVIA
ROMANIA
Bucharest
BULGARIA
Sofia
ALBANIA
GREECE
Athens

ITALY
Rome
Monte Casino May 1944
Salerno Sept. 1943
Sicily
Sicily July 1943
MALTA (Gr. Br.)
Crete

Mediterranean Sea

Black Sea
Yalta
Ankara
TURKEY
CYPRUS
SYRIA
PALESTINE (Br. Mandate)
TRANS-JORDAN (Br. Mandate)
Cairo
EGYPT
El Alamein Summer 1942

PORTUGAL
Lisbon
SPAIN
Madrid
GIBRALTAR (Gr. Br.)
SP. MOROCCO
FRENCH MOROCCO
Casablanca Nov 1942

ALGERIA (Vichy France)
TUNISIA
Rommel defeated in Tunisia (May 1943)
LIBYA

UKRAINE

0   200   400 Km
0   200   400 Mi.

and gasping sobs of men, women, and children choking to death on poison gas. Then, only silence. Special camp workers quickly yanked the victims' gold teeth from their jaws, and the bodies were then cremated, or sometimes boiled for oil to make soap. The extermination of European Jews was the ultimate monstrosity of Nazi racism and racial imperialism. By 1945, 6 million Jews had been murdered.

Who was responsible for this terrible crime? An older generation of historians usually laid most of the guilt on Hitler and the Nazi leadership. Ordinary Germans had little knowledge of the extermination camps, it was argued, and those who cooperated had no alternative given the brutality of Nazi terror and totalitarian control. But in recent years many studies have revealed a much broader participation of German people in the Holocaust and popular indifference (or worse) to the fate of the Jews.

Yet in most occupied countries, local non-German officials also cooperated in the arrest and deportation of Jews to a large extent. As in Germany, only a few exceptional bystanders, like those in the French village of Le Chambon, did not turn a blind eye. (See the feature "Individuals in Society: Le Chambon, a Refuge for the Persecuted.") Thus some scholars have concluded that the key for most Germans (and most people in occupied countries) was that they felt no personal responsibility for Jews, and therefore they were not prepared to help them. This meant that many individuals, conditioned by Nazi racist propaganda but also influenced by peer pressure and brutalizing wartime violence, were psychologically prepared to perpetrate ever-greater crimes. They were ready to plumb the depths of evil and to spiral downward from mistreatment to arrest to mass murder.

The War in the Pacific, 1940–1942

By late 1938, 1.5 million Japanese troops were bogged down in China in a war they could not win (see page 977). Thus Japanese leaders followed events in Europe closely, looking for alliances and actions that might deliver them from their Chinese quagmire. Joined with Germany since 1936 in a pact against international communism, Japan expected a combined attack with Germany on the Soviet Union. But Japan's unsuccessful Siberian border war in 1939 and Hitler's unexpected pact with Stalin scuttled these plans. Then Hitler's victories in 1940 suddenly opened still greater opportunities, as European empires in Southeast Asia appeared vulnerable. In September 1940 Japan signed a formal alliance with Germany and Italy and promptly invaded northern French Indochina.

Japan's invasion of Indochina worsened relations with the United States, which had repeatedly condemned Japanese aggression in China. President Franklin Roosevelt now demanded that Japan withdraw from China, keeping only Manchuria. This was completely unacceptable to Japan, and in July 1941 the Japanese moved into southern Indochina. The United States responded by cutting off the sale of U.S. oil to Japan, thereby reducing Japan's oil supplies by 90 percent. Japanese leaders believed increasingly that war with the United States was inevitable, for Japan's battle fleet would run out of fuel in eighteen months, and its industry would be crippled. After much debate Japanese leaders decided to launch a surprise attack on the United States. They hoped to disable their Pacific rival and gain time to build a defensible Asian empire.

The Japanese attack on the U.S. naval base at Pearl Harbor in the Hawaiian Islands was a complete surprise but a limited success. On December 7, 1941, the Japanese sank or crippled every American battleship, but by chance all the American aircraft carriers were at sea and escaped unharmed. This enabled rapid American recovery, because aircraft carriers quickly dominated the Pacific war. More important, most Americans felt superior to the Japanese, and they were humiliated by this unexpected defeat. Pearl Harbor brought Americans together in a spirit of anger and revenge. Hitler immediately declared war on the United States.

Simultaneously, Japanese armies successfully attacked European and American colonies in Southeast Asia. Japanese armies were small (because most soldiers remained in China), but they were well trained, well led, and highly motivated. In the Netherlands East Indies a Japanese army defeated a Dutch force four times as large, while another outnumbered army took the British colonies of Hong Kong, Malaya, and Singapore. During the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese also attacked the Philippines and destroyed most American aircraft stationed there, although American forces did not surrender until May 1942. By that time Japan held a vast empire in Southeast Asia and the western Pacific (Map 32.3).

The Japanese claimed that they were freeing Asians from Western imperialism, and they called their empire

MAP 32.2 World War II in Europe   The map shows the extent of Hitler's empire at its height, before the Battle of Stalingrad in late 1942 and the subsequent advances of the Allies until Germany surrendered on May 7, 1945.

Le Chambon, a Refuge for the Persecuted

André and Magda Trocmé, resista[...] leaders at Le Chambon, in a famil[...] snapshot taken shortly before 194[...] *(Papers of André and Magda Trocmé,* *Swarthmore College Peace Collection*

On a cold night in February 1943, French officials arrived in Le Chambon-sur-Lignon in southern France. Known as a "nest of Jews in Protestant country," Le Chambon was a mountainous town of three thousand people that hid Jews and openly said so to the government.[1] Now the officials had finally come to arrest the Protestant minister André Trocmé, the assistant minister Edouard Theis, and the local school principal—the leaders of this defiant cell. Watching silently, the villagers demonstrated their unmistakable solidarity. They lined the streets, sang "A Mighty Fortress Is Our God," and then fell in behind their friends as they passed. As on other occasions, the people of Le Chambon showed the moral courage that would cause others in the region to search their hearts and examine their own conduct toward Jews.

Imprisoned in a camp with communists and resistance fighters, the three men led religious services, discussion groups, and classes that attracted prisoners and even guards. The camp administration, perhaps fearing that its authority was being subverted, offered the three men freedom in return for a signed oath of obedience to the Vichy government, which ruled southern France in collaboration with the Nazi occupiers in the north. Trocmé and his companions refused, but they were mysteriously released the next day. Returning home, Trocmé believed that the village had influential friends in the government.

The strength of the villagers and the quality of their leadership, so clearly evident in these confrontations with the state in early 1943, help explain how Le Chambon became one of the safest places for Jews in Europe in the first two years of the Nazi occupation and how it and the surrounding area successfully sheltered about thirty-five hundred Jewish refugees. Pastors Trocmé and Theis were inspired rebels who wanted to live an active, dangerous Christian love. They conceived of Le Chambon as a city of refuge for the innocent and as a means of overcoming evil with good through nonviolence. Magda Trocmé, André's spirited wife and the mother of four young children, was equally important. Warm and practical, she instinctively aided those in need. She welcomed Jews arriving at the parsonage, housed them, and helped find families to shelter them. She carried on after André himself fled in late 1943 to escape arrest by the Gestapo. Within the village, prayer meetings became conspiracies of goodness. A Jewish refugee printer forged papers and ration cards for the guests, and Theis and the local network helped them escape to Switzerland.

If the how is clear, the why is less so. Certainly a collective memory of persecution helped the Protestants of Le Chambon and nearby villages to identify with the Jews and feel a moral responsibility for their fate. They, too, were a tiny minority in France, the descendants of Protestant refugees who had fled to the mountains and been hounded and executed. But non-Protestants also joined the cause. Above all, the Trocmés, Theis, and the villagers responded because they had a strong moral philosophy rooted in their Christian belief. They believed that they should not obey evil laws but rather abide by God's commandments. They considered it evil to harm anyone, for God had instructed them to love and care for each other. Finally, Le Chambon was broadly representative of other exceptional groups and individuals who worked to help Jews in Nazi Europe. The common experience showed that a sense of moral responsibility was crucial, and that goodness, like evil, is contagious in life-and-death ethical situations.

Questions for Analysis

1. What did the people of Le Chambon-sur-Lignon do? Why did they do it?

2. What is the larger significance of the town's actions in terms of the Holocaust? Debate the idea that "goodness, like evil, is contagious."

1. Philip Hallie, *Lest Innocent Blood Be Shed: The Story of the Village of Le Chambon and How Goodness Happened There* (New York: Harper & Row, 1979), p. 18. In addition to this moving study, see *Weapons of Spirit* (1986), a documentary film by Pierre Sauvage.

MAP 32.3 World War II in the Pacific   Japanese forces overran an enormous amount of territory in 1942, which the Allies slowly recaptured in a long, bitter struggle. As this map shows, Japan still held a large Asian empire in August 1945, when the unprecedented devastation of atomic warfare suddenly forced it to surrender.

the Greater Asian Co-prosperity Sphere. Initially they tapped currents of nationalist sentiment, and most local populations were glad to see the Western Powers go. But Asian faith in "co-prosperity" and support for Japan steadily declined, for three interrelated reasons.

First, although the Japanese set up anticolonial governments and promised genuine independence, real power always rested with Japanese military commanders and their superiors in Tokyo. The "independent" governments established in the Philippines, French In-

dochina, Burma, and the Dutch East Indies were shams. Moreover, the Japanese never treated local populations as equals. They were, at best, treated as children who needed Japanese guidance.

Second, the Japanese occupiers exploited local peoples for Japan's wartime needs. They cut wages, imposed supply quotas on raw materials, and drafted local people for military and labor service. Ships left for Japan laden with rice, oil, and raw materials, but they returned empty.

Finally, the Japanese often exhibited great cruelty toward prisoners of war and civilians, especially the Chinese. After the fall of Hong Kong in December 1941, for example, wounded prisoners were murdered and burned, and there was a mass rape of nurses. Recurring cruel behavior also aroused local populations against the invaders.

The Grand Alliance

While the Nazis and the Japanese built their savage empires, the Allies faced the hard fact that chance, rather than choice, had brought them together. Stalin had been cooperating fully with Hitler between August 1939 and June 1941, and only the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 had overwhelmed powerful isolationism in the United States. The Allies' first task was to overcome their mutual suspicions and build an unshakable alliance on the quicksand of accident. By means of three interrelated policies they succeeded.

First, U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt accepted the contention of Winston Churchill (Chamberlain's successor as British prime minister) that the United States should concentrate first on defeating Hitler. Only after victory in Europe was achieved would the United States turn toward the Pacific for an all-out attack on Japan, the lesser threat. The promise of huge military aid under America's policy of "Europe first" helped solidify the anti-Hitler coalition.

Second, within the European framework the Americans and the British put immediate military needs first. They consistently postponed until after the war tough political questions relating to the eventual peace settlement and thereby avoided conflicts that might have split the alliance.

Third, to further encourage mutual trust, the Allies adopted the principle of the "unconditional surrender" of Germany and Japan. This policy cemented the Grand Alliance because it denied Hitler any hope of dividing his foes. Of great importance for the postwar shape of Europe, it meant that Soviet and Anglo-American armies would almost certainly come together to divide all of Germany, and most of the European continent, among the victorious allies. It also meant that Japan would fight to the bitter end.

The military resources of the Grand Alliance were awesome. The strengths of the United States were its mighty industry, its large population, and its national unity. Even before the attack on Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt had directed military aid to Britain and the Soviet Union, and in the course of the war the United States equipped its own armies and also gave its allies about $50 billion in arms and equipment. Gearing up rapidly for all-out war in 1942, the United States acquired a unique capacity to wage global war. In 1943 it outproduced not only Germany, Italy, and Japan but also all of the rest of the world combined.[14]

Too strong to lose and too weak to win standing alone, Britain continued to make a great contribution as well. The British economy was totally and effectively mobilized, and the sharing of burdens through rationing and heavy taxes on war profits maintained social harmony. Moreover, by early 1943 the Americans and the British were combining small aircraft carriers with radar-guided bombers to rid the Atlantic of German submarines. Britain, the impregnable floating fortress, became a gigantic frontline staging area for the decisive blow to the heart of Germany.

As for the Soviet Union, so great was its strength that it might well have defeated Germany without Western help. In the face of the German advance, whole factories and populations were successfully evacuated to eastern Russia and Siberia. There war production was reorganized and expanded, and the Red Army was increasingly well supplied. The Red Army was also well led, for a new generation of talented military leaders quickly arose to replace those so recently purged. Most important of all, Stalin drew on the massive support and heroic determination of the Soviet people, especially those in the central Russian heartland. Broad-based Russian nationalism, as opposed to narrow communist ideology, became the powerful unifying force in what the Soviet people appropriately called the "Great Patriotic War of the Fatherland."

Finally, the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union were not alone. They had the resources of much of the world at their command. And, to a greater or lesser extent, they were aided by a growing resistance movement against the Nazis throughout Europe, even in Germany. Thus although Ukrainian peasants often welcomed the Germans as liberators, the barbaric occupation policies of the Nazis quickly drove them to join and support behind-the-lines guerrilla forces. More generally, after the Soviet Union was invaded in June 1941, communists throughout Europe took the lead in the underground resistance, joined by a growing number of patriots, Christians, and agents sent by governments-in-exile in London.

The Tide of Battle

Barely halted at the gates of Moscow and Leningrad in 1941, the Germans renewed their offensive against the

Soviet Union in July 1942, driving toward the southern city of Stalingrad and occupying most of the city in a month of incredibly savage house-to-house fighting.

Then in November 1942 Soviet armies counterattacked. They quickly rolled over Romanian and Italian troops to close a trap surrounding the entire German Sixth Army of 300,000 men. By the end of January 1943 only 123,000 soldiers were left to surrender. Hitler, who had refused to allow a retreat, had suffered a catastrophic defeat. In the summer of 1943 the larger, better-equipped Soviet armies took the offensive and began moving forward (see Map 32.2).

In 1942 the tide also turned in the Pacific. In April 1942 the Japanese devised a complicated battle plan to take Port Moresby in New Guinea and also destroy U.S. aircraft carriers in an attack on Midway Island.

Well informed of these plans because they had broken the Japanese code, the Americans avoided decoys and skillfully deployed the smaller number of ships at their disposal. The result was a decisive naval victory. First, in the Battle of the Coral Sea in May 1942, an American carrier force fought its Japanese counterpart to a draw, thereby stopping the Japanese advance on Port Moresby and relieving Australia from the threat of invasion. This engagement was followed in June 1942 by the Battle of Midway, in which American carrier-based pilots sank all four of the attacking Japanese aircraft carriers and established overall American equality with Japan in the Pacific. In August 1942 American marines attacked Guadalcanal in the Solomon Islands. Badly hampered by the policy of "Europe first," the Americans and their Australian allies nevertheless began

"**Follow Me!**"   This painting by Charles McBarron, Jr., shows the action at Red Beach on October 20, 1944, in the Battle of Leyte Gulf in the Philippine Islands. It captures the danger and courage of U.S. troops, which had to storm well-fortified Japanese positions again and again in their long island-hopping campaign. The officer exhorts his men, and death is all around. *(The Granger Collection, New York)*

The Normandy Invasion, Omaha Beach Airborne paratroopers landed behind German coastal fortifications around midnight, and American and British forces hit several beaches at daybreak as Allied ships and bombers provided cover. American troops secured full control of Omaha Beach by nightfall, but at a price of three thousand casualties. Allied airpower prevented the Germans from bringing up reserves and counterattacking. *(Corbis)*

"island hopping" toward Japan. Japanese forces were on the defensive.

The war in the Pacific was extremely brutal—a "war without mercy," in the words of a leading American scholar—and atrocities were committed on both sides.[15] Knowing of Japanese atrocities in China and the Philippines, both the U.S. Marines and army troops seldom took Japanese prisoners after the Battle of Guadalcanal, killing even those rare Japanese soldiers who offered to surrender. American forces moving across the central and western Pacific in 1943 and 1944 faced unyielding resistance on tiny islands such as Tarawa, Kwajalein, and New Britain, and this resistance hardened the hearts of American servicemen and their leaders as American casualties kept rising. A product of spiraling violence, mutual hatred, and dehumanizing racial stereotypes, the war without mercy intensified as it moved toward Japan.

In North Africa the war had been seesawing back and forth since 1940 (see Map 32.2). In the summer of 1942 combined German and Italian armies were finally defeated by British forces at the Battle of El Alamein, only seventy miles from Alexandria. Almost immediately thereafter an Anglo-American force landed in Morocco and Algeria. These French possessions, which

were under the control of Pétain's Vichy French government, quickly went over to the side of the Allies.

Having driven the Axis powers from North Africa by the spring of 1943, Allied forces maintained the initiative by invading Sicily and then mainland Italy. Mussolini was deposed by a war-weary people, and the new Italian government publicly accepted unconditional surrender in September 1943. Italy, it seemed, was liberated. But then German commandos in a daring raid rescued Mussolini and put him at the head of a puppet government. German armies seized Rome and all of northern Italy. Fighting continued in Italy.

Indeed, bitter fighting continued in Europe for almost two years. Germany, less fully mobilized for war than Britain in 1941, applied itself to total war in 1942 and enlisted millions of German women and millions of prisoners of war and slave laborers from all across occupied Europe in that effort. Between early 1942 and July 1944 German war production actually tripled in spite of heavy bombing by the British and American air forces. German resistance against Hitler also failed. After an unsuccessful attempt on Hitler's life in July 1944, SS fanatics brutally liquidated thousands of Germans. Terrorized at home and frightened by the prospect of

unconditional surrender, the Germans fought on with suicidal stoicism.

On June 6, 1944, American and British forces under General Dwight Eisenhower landed on the beaches of Normandy, France, in history's greatest naval invasion. In a hundred dramatic days more than 2 million men and almost a half million vehicles pushed inland and broke through German lines. Rejecting proposals to strike straight at Berlin in a massive attack, Eisenhower moved forward cautiously on a broad front. Not until March 1945 did American troops cross the Rhine and enter Germany.

The Soviets, who had been advancing steadily since July 1943, reached the outskirts of Warsaw by August 1944. For the next six months they moved southward into Romania, Hungary, and Yugoslavia. In January 1945 the Red Army again moved westward through Poland, and on April 26 they met American forces on the Elbe River. The Allies had closed their vise on Nazi Germany and overrun Europe. As Soviet forces fought their way into Berlin, Hitler committed suicide in his bunker, and on May 7 the remaining German commanders capitulated.

Allied advances in the Pacific paralleled those in Europe. In October 1944 American forces under General Douglas MacArthur landed on the island of Leyte in the Philippines. The Japanese believed that they could destroy MacArthur's troops and transport ships before the main American fleet arrived. The result was the four-day Battle of Leyte Gulf, the greatest battle in naval history, with 282 ships involved. The Japanese lost 13 large warships, including 4 aircraft carriers, while the Americans lost only 3 small ships in their great triumph. The Japanese navy was practically finished.

In spite of all their defeats, Japanese troops continued to fight with enormous courage and determination. Indeed, the bloodiest battles of the Pacific war took place on Iwo Jima in February 1945 and on Okinawa in June 1945. MacArthur believed the conquest of Japan might cost a million American casualties. In fact, Japan was almost helpless, its industry and dense, fragile wooden cities largely destroyed by incendiary bombing and uncontrollable hurricanes of fire. In early 1945 labor discipline broke down and absenteeism soared. Yet the Japanese seemed determined to fight on, if only with bamboo spears, ever ready to die for a hopeless cause.

On August 6 and 9, 1945, the United States dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan. Mass bombing of cities and civilians, one of the terrible new practices of World War II, had ended in the final

A Hiroshima Survivor Remembers Yasuko Yamagata was seventeen when she saw the brilliant blue-white "lightning flash" that became a fiery orange ball consuming everything that would burn. Thirty years later Yamagata painted this scene, her most unforgettable memory of the atomic attack. An incinerated woman, poised as if running with her baby clutched to her breast, lies near a water tank piled high with charred corpses. (*From a public exhibition assembled by the Japan Broadcasting Corporation*)

nightmare—unprecedented human destruction in a single blinding flash. On August 14, 1945, the Japanese announced their surrender. The Second World War, which had claimed the lives of more than 50 million soldiers and civilians, was over.

SUMMARY

The Second World War marked the climax of the tremendous practical and spiritual maladies of the age of anxiety, maladies that led in many lands to the rise of dictatorships. Many of these dictatorships were variations on conservative authoritarianism, but there was also a fateful innovation—a new kind of radical dictatorship that was exceptionally dynamic and theoretically unlimited in its actions.

When apprehensive middle-class liberals in the West faced the rise of these new dictatorships, they often focused on their perceived similarities. Liberals fastened on the violent, profoundly antiliberal, and apparently totalitarian character of these brutal challengers, linking the one-party socialism of Lenin and Stalin with the one-party fascism of Mussolini and Hitler. In contrast, the political left usually insisted on the differences between the revolutionary socialist tradition—triumphing, however imperfectly, in the Bolsheviks' Soviet Union—and the reactionary and capitalist nature of European fascist movements and fascist governments in Italy and Germany. Currently, a growing number of historians are stressing the limitations of both the totalitarian and the fascist interpretations and are concentrating instead on the uniqueness of developments in each regime.

Hitler's Nazism appears increasingly as a uniquely evil and nihilistic system. Nazism had fascist origins, but German fascism in power ultimately presented only superficial similarities with fascism in Italy. As for Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Soviet Union, both asserted a total claim on the lives of their citizens, posed ambitious goals, and demanded popular support. This combination gave both dictatorships their awesome power and dynamism. That dynamism, however, was channeled in quite different directions. Stalin and the Communist party aimed at building their kind of socialism and the new socialist personality at home. Hitler and the Nazi elite aimed at unlimited territorial and racial aggression on behalf of a "master race"; domestic recovery was only a means to that end.

Nazi racism and unlimited aggression made war inevitable, first with the western European democracies, then with hated eastern neighbors, and finally with the United States. Plunging Europe into the ultimate

nightmare, unlimited aggression unwittingly forged a mighty coalition that smashed the racist Nazi empire and its leader. In the words of the ancient Greeks, he whom the gods would destroy, they first make mad.

NOTES

1. I. Kershaw, *The Nazi Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation,* 2d ed. (London: Edward Arnold, 1989), pp. 20–23.
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3. Kershaw, *The Nazi Dictatorship,* p. 34.
4. Quoted in A. G. Mazour, *Soviet Economic Development: Operation Outstrip, 1921–1965* (Princeton, N.J.: Van Nostrand, 1967), p. 130.
5. Quoted in I. Deutscher, *Stalin: A Political Biography,* 2d ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 325.
6. Quoted in H. K. Geiger, *The Family in Soviet Russia* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 156.
7. M. Malia, *The Soviet Tragedy: A History of Socialism in Russia* (New York: Free Press, 1994), p. 248.
8. R. Thurston, *Life and Terror in Stalin's Russia, 1934–1941* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1996), esp. pp. 16–106; and Malia, *The Soviet Tragedy,* pp. 227–270.
9. R. Vivarelli, "Interpretations on the Origins of Fascism," *Journal of Modern History* 63 (March 1991): 41.
10. W. Brustein, *The Logic of Evil: The Social Origins of the Nazi Party, 1925–1933* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1996), pp. 52, 182.
11. Quoted in K. D. Bracher, *The German Dictatorship: The Origins, Structure and Effects of National Socialism* (New York: Praeger, 1970), pp. 146–147.
12. Quoted in R. Stromberg, *An Intellectual History of Modern Europe* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1966), p. 393.
13. Quoted in Bracher, *The German Dictatorship,* p. 289.
14. H. Willmott, *The Great Crusade: A New Complete History of the Second World War* (New York: Free Press, 1989), p. 255.
15. J. Dower, *War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War* (New York: Pantheon, 1986).

SUGGESTED READING

The historical literature on fascist and totalitarian dictatorships is rich and fascinating. Kershaw's work, cited in the Notes, provides an excellent survey of this literature and is highly recommended. P. Brooker, *Twentieth-Century Dictatorships: The Ideological One-Party State* (1995), compares leading examples throughout the world, and A. Gleason, *Totalitarianism: The Inner History of the Cold War* (1995), is

an important recent study. H. Arendt, *The Origins of Total-itarianism* (1951), is a classic interpretation. F. L. Carsten, *The Rise of Fascism* (1982), and W. Laqueur, ed., *Fascism* (1976), are also recommended.

Malia's work, cited in the Notes, is a provocative re-assessment of Soviet history and an excellent introduction to scholarly debates. It may be compared with the fine syn-thesis by M. Lewin, *The Making of the Soviet System* (1985). R. Stites, *The Women's Liberation Movement in Rus-sia: Feminism, Nihilism, and Bolshevism, 1860–1930* (1978), and the works by Geiger and Deutscher, cited in the Notes, are highly recommended. R. McNeal, *Stalin: Man and Ruler* (1988), is useful. S. Cohen, *Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution* (1973), examines the leading spokes-man of moderate communism, who was destroyed by Stalin. R. Conquest, *The Great Terror: A Reassessment* (1990), is an excellent account of Stalin's purges of the 1930s, and A. Solzhenitsyn, *The Gulag Archipelago* (1964), passion-ately condemns Soviet police terror. Three important re-considerations of Soviet purges, peasants, and urban life are Thurston's revisionist work, cited in the Notes; S. Fitz-patrick, *Stalin's Peasants: Resistance and Survival in the Russian Village After Collectivization* (1994); and S. Kotkin, *Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as Civilization* (1995). Arthur Koestler, *Darkness at Noon* (1956), is a famous fictional ac-count of Stalin's trials of the Old Bolsheviks. R. Conquest, *The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror-Famine* (1986), authoritatively recounts Soviet collec-tivization and the human-made famine. J. Scott, *Behind the Urals* (1973), an eyewitness account of an American steel-worker in the Soviet Union in the 1930s, is recommended.

A. De Grand, *Italian Fascism: Its Origins and Develop-ment* (1989), and A. Lyttelton, *The Seizure of Power: Fascism in Italy, 1919–1929*, 2d ed. (1987), are excellent studies of Italy under Mussolini. D. Mack Smith, *Mussolini* (1982), is authoritative. I. Silone, *Bread and Wine* (1937), is a moving novel by a famous opponent of dictatorship in Italy. E. Morante, *History* (1978), a fictional account of one family's divergent reactions to Mussolini's rule, is recommended. H. Thomas, *The Spanish Civil War* (1977), is an excellent account. In the area of foreign relations, G. Kennan, *Rus-sia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin* (1961), is justly fa-mous; A. L. Rowse, *Appeasement* (1961), powerfully denounces the policies of the appeasers. R. Paxton, *Vichy France* (1973), tells a controversial story extremely well.

On Germany, F. Stern, *The Politics of Cultural Despair* (1963), and W. Smith, *The Ideological Origins of Nazi Im-perialism* (1986), are fine complementary studies on the origins of Nazism. Bracher's work, cited in the Notes, re-mains an outstanding account of Hitler's Germany. Two major studies by influential German historians are M. Brozat, *The Nazi State* (1981), and H. Mommsen, *From Weimar to Auschwitz* (1991). W. Shirer, *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich* (1960), is a gripping popular account of an American journalist who experienced Nazi Germany first-hand. A. Bullock, *Hitler and Stalin* (1993), is a fascinating comparison by a master biographer. I. Kershaw, *The "Hitler Myth": Image and Reality in the Third Reich* (1987), is a pro-vocative reassessment of the limits of Hitler's power. M. Mayer, *They Thought They Were Free* (1955), probes the minds of ten ordinary Nazis and why they believed that Hitler was their liberator. A. Speer, *Inside the Third Reich* (1970), contains the fascinating recollections of Hitler's wizard of the armaments industry. C. Koonz, *Mothers in the Fatherland: Women, the Family, and Nazi Politics* (1987), and D. Peukert, *Inside Nazi Germany: Conformity, Opposi-tion, and Racism in Everyday Life* (1987), are pioneering forays into the social history of the Nazi era. G. Mosse, *To-ward the Final Solution* (1978), is a powerful history of Eu-ropean racism. Moving accounts of the Holocaust include M. Gilbert, *The Holocaust: The History of the Jews During the Second World War* (1985), and R. Hilberg, *The Destruc-tion of the European Jews, 1933–1945*, 3 vols., rev. ed. (1985), a monumental scholarly achievement. M. Marrus, *The Holocaust in History* (1987), is an excellent interpretive survey by a leading authority. Two brilliant works on Ger-man participants are C. Browning, *Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland* (1992), and E. Staub, *The Roots of Evil: The Origins of Genocide and Other Group Violence* (1989), a profound study by a noted psychologist. Especially recommended are E. Weisel, *Night* (1961), a brief and compelling autobiographical account of a young Jew in a Nazi concentration camp, and A. Frank, *The Diary of Anne Frank*, a remarkable personal ac-count of a Jewish girl in hiding during the Nazi occupation of Holland. A. Fraser, *The Gypsies* (1992), considers a mis-understood people decimated by Nazi terror.

J. Campbell, *The Experience of World War II* (1989), is attractively illustrated and captures the drama of global conflict, as does J. Keegan, *The Second World War* (1990). G. Wright, *The Ordeal of Total War, 1939–1945* (1990), and C. Emsley, *World War II and Its Consequences* (1990), are also recommended. Willmott's work, cited in the Notes, is a comprehensive overview of military developments. Two dramatic studies of special aspects of the war in Europe are A. Dallin, *German Rule in Russia, 1941–1945* (1981), which analyzes the effects of Nazi occupation policies on the Soviet population, and L. Collins and D. La Pierre, *Is Paris Burning?* (1965), a best-selling account of the libera-tion of Paris and Hitler's plans to destroy the city. A. Iriye, *The Origins of the Second World War in Asia and the Pacific* (1987), probes relations between Japan and the United States, and R. Spector, *Eagle Against the Sun* (1988), is an engaging account of the military conflict in the Pacific. Dower, cited in the Notes, is a powerful analysis of Amer-ican attitudes and behavior toward the Japanese, while J. Hsuing and S. Levine, eds., *China's Bitter Victory: The War with Japan, 1937–1945* (1992), investigates various aspects of the long struggle.

Witness to the Holocaust

The Second World War brought mass murder to the innocent. The Nazis and their allies slaughtered 6 million Jews in addition to about 5 million Slavs, Gypsies, Jehovah's Witnesses, homosexuals, and mentally ill persons. On the Russian front, some Jews were simply mowed down with machine guns, but most Jews were arrested in their homelands and taken in freight cars to unknown destinations, which were in fact extermination camps. The most infamous camp— really two camps on different sides of a railroad track—was Auschwitz-Birkenau in eastern Poland. There 2 million people were murdered in gas chambers.

The testimony of camp survivors helps us comprehend the unspeakable crime known to history as the Holocaust. One eyewitness was Marco Nahon, a Greek Jew and physician who escaped extermination at Auschwitz-Birkenau along with several thousand other slave laborers in the camp. The following passage is taken from Birkenau: The Camp of Death, *which Nahon wrote in 1945 after his liberation. Conquered by Germany in 1941, Greece was divided into German, Italian, and Bulgarian zones of occupation. The Nahon family lived in Dimotika in the Bulgarian zone.*

Early in March 1943, disturbing news arrives from Salonika [in the German occupation zone]: the Germans are deporting the Jews [of Salonika]. They lock them up in railway cattlecars . . . and send them to an unknown destination—to Poland, it is said. . . . Relatives and friends deliberate. What can be done in the face of this imminent threat? . . . My friend Vitalis Djivré speaks with conviction: "We must flee, cross over into Turkey at once, go to Palestine, Egypt—anywhere at all—but leave immediately." . . . A few friends and I held a completely different opinion. . . . [I say that] I am not going to emigrate. They are going to take us away to Germany or Poland [to work]? If so, I'll work. . . . It is certain that the Allies will be the victors, and once the war is over, we'll go back home. . . .

Until the end we were deaf to all the warnings. . . . [None of the warnings] would be regarded as indicating the seriousness of the drama in preparation. But does not the human mind find inconceivable the total extermination of an innocent population? In this tragic error lay the main cause, the sole cause, of our perdition. . . .

On Monday May 10, 1943, the bugles awaken us at a very early hour. We [have already been arrested and] today we are leaving for Poland. . . . As soon as a freight car has been packed to capacity with people, it is quickly locked up, and immediately the remaining passengers are pushed into the next one. . . .

Every two days the train stops in some meadow in open country. The car doors are flung open, and the whole transport spreads out in the fields. Men and women attend to their natural needs, side by side, without any embarrassment. Necessity and common misfortune have made them part of one and the same family. . . .

We are now in a small station in Austria. Our car door half opens; a Schupo [German police officer] is asking for the doctor. . . . He leads me to the rear of the convoy and shuts me inside the car where the woman is in labor. She is very young; this is her first child. The car, like all the others, is overcrowded. The delivery takes place in deplorable conditions, in front of everybody—men, women, and children. Fortunately, everything turns out well, and a few hours later a baby boy comes into the world. The new mother's family is very happy and passes candy around. Surely no one realizes that two days later the mother and her baby and more than half of the company will pass through the chimney of a crematorium at Birkenau.

It is May 16, 1943. We have reached the end of our journey [and arrived at Auschwitz-Birkenau]. The train stops along a wooden platform. Through the openings of the cars we can see people wearing strange costumes of blue and white stripes [the prisoners who work in the camp]. We immediately

notice that they are doing nothing voluntarily but are moving and acting on command. . . . The people in stripes . . . line us up five by five, the women on one side, the men on the other. I lose sight of my wife and little girl in the crowd. I will never see them again.

They make us march, swiftly as always, before a group of [German] officers. One of them, without uttering a word and with the tip of his forefinger, makes a rapid selection. He is, as we know later on, the Lagerarzt, the SS medical doctor of the camp [the notorious Dr. Mengele]. They call him here the "Angel of Death." [Mengele divides the men into two groups: those who are young and sturdy for work in the camp, and those who are old, sick, and children. The women are also divided and only healthy young women without children are assigned to work. All those not selected for work] are immediately loaded on trucks and driven off somewhere. Where? Nobody knows yet. . . .

[After being assigned to a crude windowless barrack,] we must file before the . . . scribes, who are responsible for receiving and registering the transport. Each prisoner must fill out a form in which he relinquishes his identity and becomes a mere number. . . . I am given the number 122274. My son, who is next, gets 122275. This tattoo alarms us terribly. . . . Each one of us now comes to realize in the deepest part of his conscious being, and with a bitter sense of affliction, that from this moment on he is no more than an animal. . . .

After our meal [of watery soup] Léon Yahiel, a veteran among the Lager inmates, . . . gives us this little speech: "My friends, here you must . . . forget your families, your wives, your children. You must live only for yourselves and try to last as long as possible." At these words our spirits plunge into grief and despair. Forget about our families? The hint is unmistakable. Our minds are confused. . . . Our families taken away from us forever? No, it is humanly not conceivable that we should pay such a penalty without having done anything to deserve it, without any provocation.

What miserable wretches we prisoners are! We have no idea that while we entertain these thoughts, our wives, our children, our mothers and our fathers have already ceased to exist. They have arrived at Auschwitz this morning, healthy and full of life. They have now been reduced to smoke and ashes.

Jewish victims of Nazism, on the arrival platform at Auschwitz station. *(AKG London)*

Questions for Analysis

1. How did the Jews of Dimotika react in early 1943 to the news of Jews being deported? Why?

2. Describe the journey to Auschwitz-Birkenau. Did those on the train know what was awaiting them there?

3. How did the Nazis divide the Jews at Auschwitz-Birkenau? Why?

4. What did you learn from Nahon's account? What parts of his testimony made the greatest impression on you?

33

Recovery and Crisis in Europe and the Americas

The reality of the Berlin Wall, grim symbol of postwar division in Europe. *(Sahm Doherty/Liaison)*

The total defeat of the Nazis and their allies laid the basis for one of Western civilization's most remarkable recoveries. A battered western Europe dug itself out from under the rubble and fashioned a great renaissance. The Western Hemisphere, with its strong European heritage, also made exemplary progress. And the Soviet Union became more humane and less totalitarian after Stalin's death. Yet there was also a tragic setback. Dictatorship settled over eastern Europe, and the Grand Alliance against Hitler gave way to a lengthy cold war that threatened world peace.

During these cold war years the global economic boom of the 1950s and 1960s finally came to an end in the early 1970s. Domestic political stability and social harmony evaporated, and several countries experienced major crises. Serious economic difficulties returned with distressing regularity to Europe and the Americas in the 1980s and early 1990s and threatened again in 1998. These difficulties encompassed much of the globe, a trend that accelerated the knitting together of the world's peoples and regions.

The spectacular collapse of communism in eastern Europe in 1989 and the end of the cold war reinforced the trend toward global integration. Political leaders and opinion makers in the Americas and in Europe embraced visions of free-market capitalism and liberal democracy. The result was monumental change, especially in postcommunist eastern Europe, but a similar if less dramatic transformation occurred in western Europe as it moved toward greater unity in the European Union. Economic and political liberalization brought increased efficiency and more electoral competition, but it also challenged established social benefits and created considerable popular dissatisfaction in some countries.

- What were the causes of the cold war?
- How and why, in spite of the cold war, did western Europe recover so successfully from the ravages of war and Nazism?
- To what extent did communist eastern Europe and the Americas experience a similar recovery?
- Why, after a generation, did the economy shift into reverse gear, and what were some of the social consequences of the reversal?
- Why did a reform movement eventually triumph in eastern Europe in 1989 and bring an end to the cold war?

- What patterns of thought dominated in the 1990s, and how did both eastern and western Europe transform themselves?

These are the questions that this chapter will seek to answer.

THE DIVISION OF EUROPE

In 1945 triumphant American and Russian soldiers came together and embraced on the banks of the Elbe River in the heart of vanquished Germany. At home, in the United States and in the Soviet Union, the soldiers' loved ones erupted in joyous celebration. Yet victory was flawed. The Allies could not cooperate politically in peacemaking. Motivated by different goals and hounded by misunderstandings, the United States and the Soviet Union soon found themselves at loggerheads. By the end of 1947 Europe was rigidly divided. It was West versus East in a cold war that eventually was waged around the world.

The Origins of the Cold War

The most powerful allies in the wartime coalition—the Soviet Union and the United States—began to quarrel almost as soon as the unifying threat of Nazi Germany disappeared. The hostility between the Eastern and Western superpowers was the sad but logical outgrowth of military developments, wartime agreements, and long-standing political and ideological differences.

In the early phases of the Second World War, the Americans and the British made military victory their highest priority. They consistently avoided discussion of Stalin's war aims and the shape of the eventual peace settlement. For example, when Stalin asked the United States and Britain to agree to the Soviet Union moving its western border of 1938 farther west at the expense of Poland, in effect ratifying the gains that Stalin had made from his deal with Hitler in 1939, he received only a military alliance and no postwar commitments. Yet the United States and Britain did not try to take advantage of the Soviet Union's precarious position in 1942, because they feared that hard bargaining would encourage Stalin to consider making a separate peace with Hitler. They focused instead on the policy of unconditional surrender to solidify the alliance.

By late 1943 decisions that would affect the shape of the postwar world could no longer be postponed. The conference that Stalin, Roosevelt, and Churchill held in the Iranian capital of Teheran in November 1943 thus proved of crucial importance in determining subsequent events. There the "Big Three" jovially reaffirmed their determination to crush Germany and searched for the appropriate military strategy. Churchill, fearful of the military dangers of a direct attack, argued that American and British forces should follow up their Italian campaign with an indirect attack on Germany through the Balkans. Roosevelt, however, agreed with Stalin that an American-British frontal assault through France would be better. This agreement was part of Roosevelt's general effort to meet Stalin's wartime demands whenever possible, and it had momentous political implications. It meant that Soviet armies, on their own, would liberate eastern Europe.

When the Big Three met again in February 1945 at Yalta on the Black Sea in southern Russia, advancing Soviet armies were within a hundred miles of Berlin. The Red Army had occupied not only Poland but also Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, part of Yugoslavia, and much of Czechoslovakia. The temporarily stalled American-British forces had yet to cross the Rhine into Germany. Moreover, the United States was far from defeating Japan. In short, the Soviet Union's position was strong and America's weak.

There was little the increasingly sick and apprehensive Roosevelt could do but double his bet on Stalin's peaceful intentions. It was agreed at Yalta that Germany would be divided into zones of occupation and would pay heavy reparations to the Soviet Union. At American insistence Stalin agreed to declare war on Japan after Germany was defeated. As for Poland and eastern Europe—"that Pandora's Box of infinite troubles," ac-

The Big Three   In 1945 a triumphant Winston Churchill, an ailing Franklin Roosevelt, and a determined Joseph Stalin met at Yalta in southern Russia to plan for peace. Cooperation soon gave way to bitter hostility. *(F.D.R. Library)*

cording to American secretary of state Cordell Hull—the Big Three struggled to reach an ambiguous compromise: eastern European governments were to be freely elected but pro-Russian. As Churchill put it at the time, "The Poles will have their future in their own hands, with the single limitation that they must honestly follow, in harmony with their allies, a policy friendly to Russia."[1]

This compromise broke down almost immediately. Even before the Yalta Conference, Bulgaria and Poland were controlled by communists who arrived home with the Red Army. Elsewhere in eastern Europe pro-Soviet "coalition" governments of several parties were formed, but the key ministerial posts were reserved for Moscow-trained communists.

At the postwar Potsdam Conference of July 1945, the long-avoided differences over eastern Europe finally surged to the fore. The compromising Roosevelt had died and been succeeded by the more assertive Harry Truman, who demanded immediate free elections throughout eastern Europe. Stalin refused point-blank. "A freely elected government in any of these East European countries would be anti-Soviet," he admitted simply, "and that we cannot allow."[2]

Here, then, is the key to the much-debated origins of the cold war. American ideals, pumped up by the crusade against Hitler, and American politics, heavily influenced by millions of U.S. voters of eastern European heritage, demanded free elections in Soviet-occupied eastern Europe. Stalin, who had lived through two enormously destructive German invasions, wanted absolute military security from Germany and its potential eastern European allies, once and for all. Suspicious by nature, he believed that only communist states could be truly dependable allies. By the middle of 1945 there was no way short of war that the United States could determine political developments in eastern Europe, and war was out of the question. Stalin was bound to have his way.

West Versus East

The American response to Stalin's exaggerated conception of security was to "get tough." In May 1945 Truman abruptly cut off all aid to Russia. In October he declared that the United States would never recognize any government established by force against the free will of its people. In March 1946 former British prime minister Churchill ominously informed an American audience that an "iron curtain" had fallen across the European continent, dividing Germany and all of Eu-

rope into two antagonistic camps. Emotional, moralistic denunciations of Stalin and communist Russia emerged as part of American political life. Yet the United States also responded to the popular desire to "bring the boys home" and demobilized with great speed. When the war against Japan ended in September 1945, there were 12 million Americans in the armed forces; by 1947 there were only 1.5 million, as opposed to 6 million for the Soviet Union. Some historians have argued that American leaders believed that the atomic bomb gave the United States all the power it needed, but "getting tough" really meant "talking tough."

Stalin's agents quickly reheated what they viewed as the "ideological struggle against capitalist imperialism." The large, well-organized Communist parties of France and Italy challenged their own governments with violent criticisms and large strikes. The Soviet Union also put pressure on Iran, Turkey, and Greece, while a bitter civil war raged in China. By the spring of 1947 it appeared to many Americans that Stalin was determined to export communism by subversion throughout Europe and around the world.

The United States responded to this challenge with the Truman Doctrine, which was aimed at "containing" communism in areas already occupied by the Red Army. Truman told Congress in March 1947, "I believe it must be the policy of the United States to support free people who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressure." To begin, Truman asked Congress for military aid to Greece and Turkey. Then, in June, Secretary of State George C. Marshall offered Europe economic aid—the Marshall Plan—to help it rebuild.

Stalin refused Marshall Plan assistance for all of eastern Europe. He purged the last remaining noncommunist elements from the coalition governments of eastern Europe and established Soviet-style, one-party communist dictatorships. Thus, when Stalin blocked all traffic through the Soviet zone of Germany to Berlin, the former capital, which the occupying powers had also divided into sectors at the end of the war, the Western allies acted firmly but not provocatively. Hundreds of planes began flying over the Soviet roadblocks around the clock, supplying provisions to thwart Soviet efforts to swallow up the West Berliners. After 324 days the Soviets backed down: containment seemed to work. In 1949, therefore, the United States formed an anti-Soviet military alliance of Western governments: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Stalin countered by tightening his hold on his satellites, later united in the Warsaw Pact. Europe was divided into two hostile blocs.

The Berlin Airlift   Standing in the rubble of their bombed-out city, a German crowd in the American sector awaits the arrival of a U.S. transport plane flying in over the Soviet blockade in 1948. The crisis over Berlin was a dramatic indication of growing tensions among the Allies, which resulted in the division of Europe into two hostile camps. *(Walter Sanders,* LIFE MAGAZINE © *Time Inc.)*

As tensions rose in Europe, the cold war spread to Asia. In 1945 Korea, like Germany, was divided into Soviet and American zones of occupation as the defeated Japanese surrendered. Plans to unify Korea faded, and in 1948 the country was divided into a communist north and an anticommunist south. In late 1949 the Communists triumphed in China (see page 1083), frightening and angering many Americans, who saw new evidence of a powerful worldwide communist conspiracy. When the Russian-backed communist forces of North Korea invaded South Korea in the spring of 1950, President Truman acted swiftly. American-led United Nations forces under General Douglas MacArthur intervened. The cold war had become very hot.

The Korean War was bitterly fought and extremely bloody. Initially, the well-equipped North Koreans almost conquered the entire peninsula, but the South Koreans and the Americans rallied and drove their foes all the way to the Chinese border. At that point China suddenly intervened, and its armies pushed the South Koreans and Americans back south. The war then seesawed back and forth near where it had begun, as President Truman rejected General MacArthur's call to attack China and fired him instead. In 1953 a fragile truce was finally negotiated, and the fighting stopped.

Thus the United States extended its policy of containing communism to Asia but drew back from an invasion of communist China and possible nuclear war.

RENAISSANCE AND CRISIS IN WESTERN EUROPE

As the cold war divided Europe into two blocs, the future appeared bleak on both sides of the iron curtain. Economic conditions were the worst in generations. Politically, Europe was weak and divided, a battleground for cold war ambitions. Moreover, European empires were crumbling in the face of nationalism in Asia and Africa. Yet western Europe recovered to enjoy unprecedented economic prosperity and peaceful social transformation. Then, in the early 1970s, the cycle turned abruptly. A downturn in the world economy hit western Europe hard with serious social and psychological consequences.

The Postwar Challenge

After the war economic conditions in western Europe were terrible. Runaway inflation and black markets tes

tified to severe shortages and hardships. Many believed that Europe was simply finished.

Suffering was most intense in defeated Germany. The major territorial change of the war had moved the Soviet Union's border far to the west. Poland was in turn compensated for this loss to the Soviets with land taken from Germany (Map 33.1). To solidify these changes in boundaries, 13 million people were driven from their homes throughout eastern Europe and forced to resettle in a greatly reduced Germany. The Russians were also seizing factories and equipment as reparations, even tearing up railroad tracks and sending the rails to the Soviet Union. Conditions were not much better in the Western zones, for the Western allies also treated the German population with great severity at first. By the spring of 1947 refugee-clogged, hungry, prostrate Germany was on the verge of total collapse and threatening to drag down the rest of Europe.

Yet western Europe was not finished. The Nazi occupation and the war had discredited old ideas and old leaders. All over Europe many people were willing to change and experiment, and new groups and new leaders were coming to the fore to guide these aspirations. Progressive Catholics and their Christian Democrat political parties were particularly influential. In Italy and Germany antifascist Alcide De Gasperi and anti-Nazi Konrad Adenauer took power, steadfastly rejecting totalitarianism and narrow nationalism and placing their faith in democracy and cooperation. The socialists and the communists, active in the resistance against Hitler, also emerged from the war with increased power and prestige, especially in France and Italy. They, too, provided fresh leadership and pushed for social change and economic reform with considerable success. In the immediate postwar years welfare measures such as family allowances, health insurance, and increased public housing were enacted throughout much of continental Europe. Social reform complemented political transformation, creating solid foundations for a great European renaissance.

The United States also supplied strong and creative leadership, providing western Europe with both massive economic aid in the Marshall Plan and ongoing military protection through NATO, which featured American troops stationed permanently in Europe and the American nuclear umbrella. As Marshall Plan aid poured in, the battered economies of western Europe began to turn the corner in 1948, and Europe entered a period of unprecedented economic progress that lasted into the late 1960s. There were many reasons for this brilliant economic performance. American aid helped the process get off to a fast start. Moreover, eco

nomic growth became a basic objective of all western European governments, for leaders and voters were determined to avoid a return to the dangerous and demoralizing stagnation of the 1930s. Thus governments generally accepted Keynesian economics (see page 999) and sought to stimulate their economies.

The governments also adopted a variety of imaginative and successful strategies. In postwar West Germany, Minister of Economy Ludwig Erhard, a roly-poly, cigar-smoking former professor, broke decisively with the straitjacketed Nazi economy. Erhard bet on the free-market economy while maintaining the extensive social welfare network inherited from the Hitler era. West German success renewed respect for free-market capitalism. The French innovation was a new kind of planning. A planning commission set ambitious but flexible goals for the French economy and used the nationalized banks to funnel money into key industries. France combined flexible planning and a "mixed" state and private economy to achieve the most rapid economic development in its long history.

Another factor was the workforce, ready to work hard for low wages and the hope of a better future. Moreover, although many consumer products had been invented or perfected since the late 1920s, during the Great Depression and war few Europeans had been able to buy them. In 1945 the electric refrigerator, the washing machine, and the automobile were rare luxuries. There was great potential demand, which the economic system moved to satisfy. Finally, western European nations abandoned protectionism and gradually created a large, unified market known as the Common Market. This historic action, which certainly stimulated the economy, was part of a larger search for European unity.

"Building Europe" and Decolonization

Western Europe's political recovery was spectacular in the generation after 1945. Republics were reestablished in France, West Germany, and Italy. Constitutional monarchs were restored in Belgium, the Netherlands, and Norway. Democratic governments, often within the framework of multiparty politics and shifting parliamentary coalitions, took root again and thrived in an atmosphere of civil liberties and individual freedom.

A similarly extraordinary achievement was the march toward a united Europe. The Christian Democrats, with their common Catholic heritage, were particularly committed to "building Europe," and other groups shared their dedication. Many Europeans believed that

MAP 33.1 Europe After the Second World War   Both the Soviet Union and Poland took land from Germany, which the Allies partitioned into occupation zones. Those zones subsequently formed the basis of the East and West German states, as the iron curtain fell to divide both Germany and Europe. Austria was detached from Germany and also divided into four occupation zones, but the Soviets subsequently permitted Austria to be unified as a neutral state.

only unity could forestall European conflict in the future and that only a new "European nation" could reassert western Europe's influence in world affairs dominated by the United States and the Soviet Union.

The close cooperation among European states required by the Americans for Marshall Plan aid led to the creation of both the Organization of European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) and the Council of Europe in 1948. European federalists hoped that the Council of Europe would quickly evolve into a true European parliament with sovereign rights, but this did not happen. Britain, with its empire and its "special relationship" with the United States, consistently opposed giving any real political power to the council. Many old-fashioned continental nationalists and communists felt the same.

Frustrated in the direct political approach, European federalists turned toward economics as a way of working toward genuine unity. French statesmen took the lead in 1950 and called for a special international organization to control and integrate all European steel and coal production. West Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg accepted the French idea in 1952; the British would have none of it. The immediate economic goal—a single steel and coal market without national tariffs or quotas—was rapidly realized. The more far-reaching political goal was to bind the six member nations so closely together economically that war among them would become unthinkable and virtually impossible.

In 1957 the six nations of the Coal and Steel Community signed the Treaty of Rome, which created the European Economic Community, generally known as the Common Market. The first goal of the treaty was a gradual reduction of all tariffs among the six in order to create a single market almost as large as that of the United States. Other goals included common economic policies and institutions and the free movement of capital and labor. The Common Market was a great success, encouraging companies and regions to specialize in what they did best.

The development of the Common Market fired imaginations and encouraged hopes of rapid progress toward political as well as economic union. In the 1960s, however, these hopes were frustrated by a resurgence of more traditional nationalism. France took the lead once again. Charles de Gaulle, president from 1958 to 1969, was at heart a romantic nationalist, and he labored to re-create a powerful, truly independent France. Viewing the United States as the main threat to genuine French (and European) independence, he with-

drew all French military forces from the "American-controlled" NATO command as France developed its own nuclear weapons. Within the Common Market de Gaulle refused to permit the scheduled advent of majority rule. Thus throughout the 1960s the Common Market thrived economically but remained a union of sovereign states.

As Europe moved toward greater economic unity in the postwar era, its long overseas expansion was dramatically reversed. Between 1947 and 1962 almost every colonial territory gained formal independence. Future generations will almost certainly see this rolling back of Western expansion as one of world history's great turning points.

The basic cause of imperial collapse—what Europeans called *decolonization*—was the rising demand by Asian and African peoples for national self-determination and racial equality (see Chapter 34). Yet decolonization also involved the imperial powers, and looking at the process from their perspective helps explain why independence came so quickly and why a kind of neocolonialism subsequently took its place in some areas.

European empires had been based on an enormous power differential between the rulers and the ruled, a difference that had almost vanished by 1945. Not only was western Europe poor and battered, but most Europeans regarded their empires very differently after 1945 than before 1914. Empire had rested on self-confidence and self-righteousness; Europeans had believed their superiority to be not only technical and military but also spiritual and moral. The horrors of the Second World War destroyed such complacent arrogance and gave opponents of imperialism much greater influence in Europe. With its political power and moral authority in tatters, Europe could either submit to decolonization or enter into risky wars of reconquest. After 1945 many Europeans were willing to let go of their colonies more or less voluntarily and to concentrate on rebuilding at home.

They still wanted some ties with the former colonies, however. As a result, western European countries actually managed to increase their economic and cultural ties with their former African colonies in the 1960s and 1970s. They used the lure of special trading privileges with the Common Market and heavy investment in French- and English-language education to enhance a powerful Western presence in the new African states. This situation led a variety of leaders and scholars to charge that western Europe (and the United States) had imposed a system of *neocolonialism* designed to perpetuate Western economic domination and undermine

African Independence Britain's Queen Elizabeth II pays an official visit in 1961 to Ghana, the former Gold Coast colony. Accompanying the queen at the colorful welcoming ceremony is Ghana's popular Kwame Nkrumah, who was educated in black colleges in the United States and led Ghana's breakthrough to independence in 1957. *(Corbis)*

political independence, as the United States had subordinated the new nations of Latin America in the nineteenth century. At the very least, enduring influence in Africa testified to western Europe's resurgent economic and political power in international relations.

The Changing Class Structure

Rapid economic growth went a long way toward creating a more mobile and more democratic society in Europe after the Second World War. Old class barriers relaxed, and class distinctions became fuzzier.

The structure of the middle class changed. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the model for the middle class had been the independent, self-employed property owner who ran a business or practiced a liberal profession such as law or medicine. After 1945 a new breed of managers and experts required by

large corporations and government agencies replaced traditional property owners as the leaders of the middle class. Moreover, the old propertied middle class lost control of many family-owned businesses (including family farms) and joined the ranks of salaried employees. The middle class also became harder to define. The salaried specialists of the new middle class came from all social classes, even the working class. Managers and technocrats passed on the opportunity for all-important advanced education to their children, but only in rare instances could they pass on the positions they had attained. Thus the new middle class, which was based largely on specialized skills and high levels of education, was more open, democratic, and insecure than the old propertied middle class.

The structure of the lower classes also became more flexible and open. There was a mass exodus from farms and the countryside, as one of the most traditional and least mobile groups in European society drastically declined. Meanwhile, because of rapid technological change, the industrial working class ceased to expand, and job opportunities for white-collar and service employees grew rapidly. Such employees bore a greater resemblance to the new middle class of salaried specialists than to industrial workers, who were also better educated and more specialized.

European governments were reducing class tensions with a series of social reforms. Many of these reforms—such as increased unemployment benefits and more extensive old-age pensions—simply strengthened social security measures first pioneered in Bismarck's Germany. Other programs were new, such as comprehensive national health systems directed by the state. Most countries also introduced family allowances—direct government grants to parents to help them raise their children—that helped many poor families make ends meet. Most European governments gave maternity grants and built inexpensive public housing for low-income families and individuals. These and other social reforms provided a humane floor of well-being and promoted greater equality because they were paid for in part by higher taxes on the rich.

The rising standard of living and the spread of standardized consumer goods also worked to level Western society, as the percentage of income spent on food and drink declined substantially. For example, in 1948 there were only 5 million cars in western Europe, but in 1965 there were 44 million. Car ownership was democratized and came within the range of better-paid workers.

Europeans took great pleasure in the products of the "gadget revolution" as well. They filled their houses

and apartments with washing machines, vacuum cleaners, refrigerators, dishwashers, radios, TVs, and stereos. The purchase of consumer goods was greatly facilitated by installment buying. Before the Second World War Europeans had rarely bought on credit. But with the expansion of social security safeguards, reducing the need to accumulate savings for hard times, ordinary people were increasingly willing to take on debt.

The most astonishing leisure-time development in the consumer society was the blossoming of mass travel and tourism. With month-long paid vacations required by law in most European countries and widespread automobile ownership, beaches and ski resorts came within the reach of the middle class and many workers. By the late 1960s packaged tours with cheap group flights and bargain hotel accommodations had made even distant lands easily accessible.

Economic and Social Dislocation, 1970–1990

For twenty years after 1945 most Europeans were preoccupied with the possibilities of economic progress and consumerism. The more democratic class structure also helped to reduce social tension, and ideological conflict went out of style. In the late 1960s sharp criticism and social conflicts re-emerged, heralding a new era of uncertainty and crisis. Radical college students led this loud but brief protest, demanding reforms in society as well as the university. It was the appearance of economic crisis in the 1970s, however, that brought the most serious challenges for the average person.

That crisis had two main causes. The postwar international monetary system was based on the American dollar, backed by American gold reserves. By early 1971 the United States had only $11 billion in gold left, and Europe had accumulated U.S. $50 billion. Foreigners panicked and raced to exchange their dollars for gold. When President Richard Nixon stopped its sale, the value of the dollar fell sharply, and inflation accelerated worldwide. Fixed rates of exchange were abandoned, and uncertainty replaced predictability in international trade and finance.

Even more damaging was the dramatic reversal in the price and availability of energy. The postwar boom was fueled by cheap oil. By 1971 the Arab-led Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) had watched the price of crude oil decline compared with the rising price of manufactured goods. OPEC decided

Saudi Riches Enormous oil reserves make Saudi Arabia one of the most influential members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and give it one of the world's highest per capita incomes. Oil has also made rich men of Prince Fahd and King Khalid, shown here considering plans for a new urban development. *(Robert Azzi/Woodfin Camp & Associates)*

FIGURE 33.1 The Misery Index, 1970–1986   Combining rates of unemployment and inflation provided a simple but effective measure of economic hardship. This particular index represents the sum of two times the unemployment rate plus the inflation rate, reflecting the widespread belief that joblessness causes more suffering and higher prices. EEC = European Economic Community, or Common Market countries. *(Source: OECD data, as given in The Economist, June 15, 1985, p. 69.)*

to reverse that trend by presenting a united front against the oil companies. After the fourth Arab-Israeli war in October 1973 (see page 1098), crude oil prices quadrupled in a year. The rapid price rise was economically destructive, but the world's big powers did nothing. The Soviet Union, itself an oil exporter, benefited directly; the United States was immobilized by the Watergate crisis in politics (see page 1065). Thus governments, companies, and individuals had no choice other than to deal piecemeal with the so-called oil shock—which was really an earthquake.

Coming on the heels of upheaval in the international monetary system, the revolution in energy prices plunged the world into its worst economic decline since the 1930s. Unemployment rose; productivity and living standards declined. By 1976 a modest recovery was in progress, but when Iranian oil production collapsed during Iran's fundamentalist Islamic revolution (see page 1101), the price of crude oil doubled again in 1979. Unemployment and inflation rose dramatically

before another uneven recovery began in 1982. But in the summer of 1985 the unemployment rate in western Europe rose again, to its highest levels since the Great Depression. Although unemployment declined somewhat in the late 1980s, the 1990s opened with renewed recession in the United States and Europe, where it was especially severe. Global recovery was painfully slow until late 1993.

One telling measure of the troubled economy was the "misery index," first used with considerable effect by candidate Jimmy Carter in the 1976 U.S. presidential campaign. The misery index combined rates of inflation and unemployment in a single, powerfully emotional number. Figure 33.1 presents a comparison of misery indexes for the United States, Japan, and the European Economic Community (the Common Market) between 1970 and 1986. "Misery" increased on both sides of the Atlantic, but the increase was substantially greater in western Europe in the 1980s.

The most pervasive consequences of this economic stagnation in Europe were probably psychological and attitudinal. Optimism gave way to pessimism; romantic utopianism yielded to sober realism. This drastic change in mood—a complete surprise only to those who had never studied history—affected states, institutions, and individuals in countless ways.

To be sure, there were heartbreaking human tragedies—lost jobs, bankruptcies, homelessness, and mental breakdowns. But on the whole the welfare system fashioned in the postwar era prevented mass suffering and degradation through extended benefits for the unemployed, free medical care and special allowances for the needy, and a host of lesser supports. The responsive, socially concerned national state undoubtedly contributed to the preservation of political stability and democracy in the face of economic difficulties that might have brought revolution and dictatorship in earlier times.

But increased government spending was not matched by higher taxes, causing a rapid growth of budget deficits, national debts, and inflation. By the late 1970s a powerful reaction against government's ever-increasing role had set in. Growing voter dissatisfaction helped bring Conservative Margaret Thatcher (b. 1925) to power in Britain in 1979. Thatcher slowed government spending and privatized industry by selling off state-owned companies to private investors. Of great social significance, Thatcher's government encouraged low- and moderate-income renters in state-owned housing projects to buy their apartments at rock-bottom prices.

This step created a whole new class of property owners, thereby eroding the electoral base of Britain's socialist Labour party. Other Western governments introduced austerity measures to slow the seemingly inexorable growth of public spending and the welfare state.

The striking but temporary exception to the trend toward greater frugality was François Mitterrand (1916–1996) of France. After his election as president in 1981, Mitterrand led his Socialist party and communist allies on a lurch to the left, launching a vast program of nationalization and public investment designed to spend France out of economic stagnation. By 1983 this attempt had clearly failed. Mitterrand's Socialist government was then compelled to impose a wide variety of austerity measures, but the French economy continued to limp and sputter through the decade.

Individuals felt the impact of austerity at an early date, for unlike governments, they could not pay their bills by printing money and going ever further into debt. The energy crisis of the 1970s forced them to re-examine not only their fuel bills but also the whole pattern of self-indulgent materialism in the postwar era. The result in both Europe and North America was a leaner, tougher lifestyle, featuring more attention to nutrition and a passion for exercise. Correspondingly, there was less blind reliance on medical science for good health and a growing awareness that individuals had to accept a large portion of the responsibility for illness and disease.

Economic troubles also strengthened existing trends within the family. Men and women were encouraged to postpone marriage until they had put their careers on a firm foundation, so the age of marriage rose sharply for both sexes in many Western countries. Indeed, the very real threat of unemployment—or "underemployment" in a dead-end job—seemed to shape the outlook of a whole generation. The students of the 1980s were serious, practical, and often conservative. As one young woman at a French university told a reporter in 1985, "Jobs are the big worry now, so everyone wants to learn something practical."[3] In France as elsewhere, the shift away from the romantic visions and political activism of the late 1960s was astonishing.

Harder times also meant that more women entered or remained in the workforce after they married. Although attitudes related to personal fulfillment were one reason for the continuing increase—especially for well-educated, upper-middle-class women—many wives in poor and middle-class families worked outside the home because of economic necessity. As in preindustrial Europe, the wife's earnings provided the margin of survival for millions of hard-pressed families.

SOVIET EASTERN EUROPE, 1945–1991

While western Europe surged ahead economically after the Second World War, eastern Europe followed a different path. The Soviet Union under Stalin first tightened its grip on the "liberated" nations of eastern Europe and then refused to let go. Thus postwar economic recovery in eastern Europe proceeded along Soviet lines, and changes in the Soviet Union strongly influenced political and social developments. That trend remained true more than forty years later, when radical reform in the Soviet Union opened the door to popular revolution in the eastern European satellites—and ultimately to the collapse of the Soviet Union itself.

Stalin's Last Years

Americans were not the only ones who felt betrayed by Stalin's postwar actions. The "Great Patriotic War of the Fatherland" had fostered Russian nationalism and a relaxation of totalitarian terror. It also produced a rare but real unity between Soviet rulers and most Russian people. Having made a heroic war effort, the vast majority of the Soviet people hoped in 1945 that a grateful party and government would grant greater freedom and democracy. Such hopes were soon crushed.

Even before the war ended, Stalin was moving his country back toward rigid dictatorship. As early as 1944 the leading members of the Communist party were being given a new motivating slogan: "The war on Fascism ends, the war on capitalism begins."[4] By early 1946 Stalin was publicly singing the old tune that war was inevitable as long as capitalism existed. Stalin's new foreign foe in the West provided an excuse for re-establishing a harsh dictatorship. Thousands of returning soldiers and ordinary civilians were purged in 1945 and 1946, as Stalin revived the terrible forced-labor camps of the 1930s. Culture and art were purged in violent campaigns that reimposed rigid anti-Western ideological conformity. In 1949 Stalin launched a savage verbal attack on Soviet Jews, accusing them of being pro-Western and antisocialist.

In the political realm Stalin reasserted the Communist party's complete control of the government and his

absolute mastery of the party. Five-year plans were reintroduced to cope with the enormous task of economic reconstruction. Once again heavy and military industry were given top priority, and consumer goods, housing, and collectivized agriculture were neglected. Everyday life was very hard. In short, it was the 1930s all over again in the Soviet Union, although police terror was less intense.

Stalin's prime postwar innovation was to export the Stalinist system to eastern Europe. Rigid ideological indoctrination, attacks on religion, and a lack of civil liberties were soon facts of life in the one-party states of the region. Industry was nationalized, and the middle class was stripped of its possessions. Economic life was then faithfully recast in the Stalinist mold. Only Josip Tito (1892–1980), the popular resistance leader and Communist party chief of Yugoslavia, could resist Soviet domination successfully, because there was no Russian army in Yugoslavia.

Limited De-Stalinization and Stagnation

In 1953 the aging Stalin finally died. Even as his heirs struggled for power, they realized that reforms were necessary because of the widespread fear and hatred of Stalin's political terrorism. The power of the secret police was curbed, and gradually many forced-labor camps were closed. Change was also necessary for economic reasons. Agriculture was in bad shape, and shortages of consumer goods were discouraging hard work and initiative. Moreover, Stalin's belligerent foreign policy had led directly to a strong Western alliance, which isolated the Soviet Union.

On just how much change to permit, the Communist party leadership was badly split. Conservatives wanted as few changes as possible. Reformers, led by Nikita Khrushchev (1894–1971), argued for major innovations and won control of the government. Khrushchev launched an all-out attack on Stalin and his crimes. At a closed session of the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956, he described in gory detail to startled delegates how Stalin had tortured and murdered thousands of loyal Communists, bungled the country's defense by trusting Hitler, and "supported the glorification of his own person." Khrushchev's "secret speech," read to Communist party meetings throughout the country, strengthened the reform movement.

The liberalization—or "de-Stalinization," as it was called in the West—of the Soviet Union was genuine. The Communist party jealously maintained its monopoly on political power, but Khrushchev shook up the party and brought in new members. Some resources were shifted from heavy industry and the military toward consumer goods and agriculture, and controls over workers were relaxed. The Soviet Union's very low standard of living finally began to improve and continued to rise substantially throughout the booming 1960s.

De-Stalinization created great ferment among writers and intellectuals who hungered for cultural freedom. Courageous editors let the sparks fly. The writer Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn (b. 1918) created a sensation when his *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich* was published in the Soviet Union in 1962. Solzhenitsyn's novel portrays in grim detail life in a Stalinist concentration camp and is a damning indictment of the Stalinist past.

Khrushchev also de-Stalinized Soviet foreign policy. "Peaceful coexistence" with capitalism was possible, he argued, and great wars were not inevitable. Between 1955 and 1957 cold war tensions relaxed.

De-Stalinization stimulated rebelliousness in the eastern European satellites, where communist reformers and the masses sought greater liberty and national independence. Poland took the lead in 1956, when extensive rioting brought a new government that managed to win greater autonomy. Hungary experienced a real and tragic revolution. Led by students and workers—the classic urban revolutionaries—the people of Budapest installed a liberal communist reformer as their new chief in October 1956. After the new government promised free elections and renounced Hungary's military alliance with Moscow, Russian leaders ordered an invasion and crushed the revolution. Hungarians had hoped that the United States would come to their aid. When this did not occur, most people in eastern Europe concluded that their only hope was to strive for small domestic gains while following Russia obediently in foreign affairs.

By late 1962 opposition in Soviet party circles to Khrushchev's policies was strong. De-Stalinization seemed a dangerous threat. How could Khrushchev denounce the dead dictator without eventually denouncing and perhaps even arresting his still-powerful henchmen? Moreover, the widening campaign of de-Stalinization posed a clear threat to the authority of the party by producing growing criticism of the whole system. Finally, Khrushchev's policy toward the West was erratic and ultimately unsuccessful. In 1958 he had ordered the Western allies to evacuate West Berlin within six months but backed down in the face of the allies' unity. In 1961 he had forced the Americans to accept the building of a wall between East and West Berlin but

The End of Reform   In August 1968 Soviet tanks rumbled into Prague to extinguish Czechoslovakian efforts to build a humane socialism. Here people watch the massive invasion from the sidewalks, knowing full well the suicidal danger of armed resistance. *(Joseph Koudelka PP/Magnum)*

stumbled again the following year. When Khrushchev ordered missiles with nuclear warheads installed in Fidel Castro's communist Cuba in 1962, U.S. president John F. Kennedy countered with a naval blockade of Cuba. After a tense diplomatic crisis Khrushchev agreed to remove the missiles. The Soviet leader looked like a bumbling buffoon. Within two years of the Cuban fiasco he was gone in a bloodless palace revolution.

After Leonid Brezhnev (1906–1982) and his supporters took over in 1964, they started talking quietly of Stalin's "good points" and ignoring his crimes. This change informed Soviet citizens that further liberalization could not be expected. Soviet leaders, determined never to suffer Khrushchev's humiliation in the face of American nuclear superiority, also launched a massive arms buildup.

In the wake of Khrushchev's reforms the 1960s brought modest liberalization and more consumer goods to eastern Europe, as well as somewhat greater national autonomy. In January 1968 the reform elements in the Czechoslovak Communist party gained a majority and replaced a long-time Stalinist leader with Alexander Dubček (1921–1992), whose new government launched dramatic reforms. Although Dubček constantly pro

claimed his loyalty to the Warsaw Pact, the determination of the Czech reformers to build what they called "socialism with a human face" frightened hard-line Communists. Thus in August 1968, 500,000 Russian and eastern European troops occupied Czechoslovakia, and the Czech experiment in humanizing communism came to an end. Shortly afterward, Brezhnev declared the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine, according to which the Soviet Union and its allies had the right to intervene in any socialist country whenever they saw the need.

The aftermath of intervention in Czechoslovakia also brought a certain re-Stalinization of the U.S.S.R. Free expression and open protest disappeared. Dissidents were blacklisted and thus rendered unable to find a decent job. The most determined but least well-known protesters were quietly imprisoned in jails or mental institutions. Unlike in the Stalinist era, though, dictatorship was collective rather than personal, and coercion replaced uncontrolled terror. This compromise seemed to suit the leaders and a majority of the people, and the Soviet Union appeared stable in the 1970s and early 1980s.

A rising standard of living for ordinary people contributed to stability, although the economic crisis of the

Newly Elected President Mikhail Gorbachev   Gorbachev vowed in his acceptance speech before the Supreme Soviet, the U.S.S.R.'s parliament, to assume "all responsibility" for the success or failure of *perestroika*. Previous parliaments were no more than tools of the Communist party, but this one actively debated and even opposed government programs. *(Vlastimir Shone/Liaison)*

1970s greatly slowed the rate of improvement, and long lines and shortages persisted. The enduring advantages of the elite also reinforced the system. Ambitious individuals still had tremendous incentive to do as the state wished in order to gain access to special, well stocked stores, attend superior schools, and travel abroad.

Another source of stability was the enduring nationalism of ordinary Russians. Party leaders successfully identified themselves with Russian patriotism, stressing their role in saving the motherland during the Second World War and protecting it now from foreign foes, including eastern European "counter-revolutionaries." Moreover, the politically dominant Great Russians, only half of the total Soviet population, held the top positions in the Soviet Union's non-Russian republics.

Beneath this stability, however, the Soviet Union was experiencing profound changes. As a perceptive British journalist put it in 1986, "The country went through a social revolution while Brezhnev slept."[5] Three aspects of this revolution were particularly significant. First, the growth of the urban population continued rapidly in the 1960s and 1970s. In 1985 two-thirds of all Soviet citizens lived in cities, and one-fourth lived in big cities. This expanding urban population lost its old peasant ways, exchanging them for more education, better job skills, and greater sophistication. Second, the number of highly trained scientists, managers, and specialists expanded prodigiously, jumping fourfold between 1960 and 1985. Third, the education that created expertise also helped foster the growth of Soviet public opinion. Educated people read, discussed, and formed definite ideas about social questions from environmental pollution to urban transportation. They increasingly saw themselves as worthy of having a voice in society's decisions, even its political decisions. These changes set the stage for the dramatic reforms of the Gorbachev era.

The Gorbachev Era

Fundamental change in Russian history has often come in short, intensive spurts, which contrast vividly with long periods of immobility. So it was with the era of dramatic change that began with the reforms launched by Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985.

The Soviet Union's Communist party elite seemed safe in the early 1980s from any challenge from below. The party's long-established system of centralized control reached down to factories, neighborhoods, and villages. The party hierarchy continued to manipulate every aspect of national life. Organized opposition was impossible, and average people simply left politics to the bosses.

The country had serious problems, however. The massive state and party bureaucracy discouraged personal initiative and promoted economic inefficiency and apathy among the masses and the rapidly growing class of

well-educated urban experts. Therefore, when the ailing Brezhnev died in 1982, efforts were made to improve economic performance and to combat worker absenteeism and high-level corruption. These efforts set the stage for the emergence in 1985 of Mikhail Gorbachev (b. 1931), the most vigorous Soviet leader since Stalin.

Smart, charming, and tough, Gorbachev believed in communism, though he realized it was failing. He (and his intelligent, influential wife, Raisa, a professor of Marxist-Leninist thought) wanted to save the Soviet system by reforming it. And Gorbachev realized full well that success at home required better relations with the West, for the wasteful arms race had had a disastrous impact on living standards in the Soviet Union.

In his first year in office Gorbachev attacked corruption and incompetence in the upper bureaucracy, and he consolidated his power by packing the top level of the party with supporters. He also attacked alcoholism and drunkenness, scourges of Soviet society. More basically he elaborated a series of reform policies designed to revive and even remake the vast Soviet Union.

The first set of reforms was designed to transform and restructure the economy, which was falling further behind the economy of the West and failing to meet the needs of the Soviet people. To accomplish this economic restructuring, or *perestroika,* Gorbachev and his supporters permitted freer prices, more independence for state enterprises, and the setting up of some profit-seeking private cooperatives. But the reforms were rather timid, and when the economy stalled, the lack of success gradually eroded Gorbachev's popular support.

Gorbachev's bold and far-reaching campaign of openness, or *glasnost,* was much more successful. Where censorship, dull uniformity, and outright lies had long characterized public discourse, the new frankness of the government and the media led rather quickly to something approaching free speech and free expression, a veritable cultural revolution. A disaster like the Chernobyl nuclear reactor accident, which devastated part of the Ukraine and showered Europe with radioactive fallout, was reported with honesty and thoroughness. The works of long-banned and vilified Russian émigré writers sold millions of copies in new editions, and denunciations of Stalin and his terror became standard fare in plays and movies.

Democratization was the third element of Gorbachev's reform. Beginning as an attack on corruption in the Communist party and as an attempt to bring the class of educated experts into the decision-making process, it led to the first free elections in the Soviet Union since 1917. Gorbachev and the party remained in control, but a minority of critical independents were elected in April 1989 to a revitalized Congress of People's Deputies. Many top-ranking Communists who ran unopposed saw themselves defeated as angry voters struck their names from the ballot.

Democratization also encouraged demands for greater autonomy by non-Russian minorities, especially in the Baltic region and in the Caucasus. These demands certainly went beyond what Gorbachev had envisaged. But whereas China's Communist party leaders brutally massacred similar prodemocracy demonstrators in Beijing (Peking) in June 1989 (see page 1087), Gorbachev drew back from repression. Thus nationalist demands continued to grow.

Finally, the Soviet leader brought "new political thinking" to foreign affairs. He withdrew Soviet troops from Afghanistan and sought to reduce East-West tensions. Of enormous historical importance, Gorbachev pledged to respect the political choices of the peoples of eastern Europe, repudiating the Brezhnev Doctrine. By 1989 it seemed that if Gorbachev held to his word, the tragic Soviet occupation of eastern Europe might gradually wither away.

The Revolutions of 1989

Instead of gradual change, history accelerated. In 1989 a series of largely peaceful revolutions swept across eastern Europe. These revolutions overturned existing communist regimes and led to the formation of governments dedicated to democratic elections, human rights, and national rejuvenation. The face of eastern Europe changed dramatically almost overnight.

The Polish people led the way. Poland had been an unruly satellite from the beginning, and Stalin said that introducing communism to Poland was like putting a saddle on a cow. After widespread riots in 1956 Polish communists dropped their efforts to impose Soviet-style collectivization on the peasants and to break the Roman Catholic church. With an independent agriculture and a vigorous church, the communists failed to monopolize society.

They also failed to manage the economy effectively, and bureaucratic incompetence coupled with worldwide recession had put the economy of Poland into a nosedive by the mid-1970s. Then the "Polish miracle" occurred: Cardinal Karol Wojtyla, archbishop of Cracow, was elected pope, and in June 1979 he returned to his native land to preach the love of Christ and country and the "inalienable rights of man." Pope John Paul II

electrified the Polish nation, and the economic crisis became a spiritual crisis as well.

In August 1980 scattered strikes snowballed into a working-class revolt. Led by a feisty electrician and devout Catholic named Lech Walesa, the workers organized an independent trade union that they called "Solidarity." Solidarity became the union of the nation, and cultural and intellectual freedom blossomed. As economic hardship increased, grassroots radicalism and frustration mounted. In response, Communist party leader General Wojciech Jaruzelski proclaimed martial law in December 1981 and arrested Solidarity's leaders. (See the feature "Listening to the Past: A Solidarity Leader Speaks from Prison" on pages 1080–1081.)

Though outlawed and driven underground, Solidarity maintained its organization, and popular support remained strong and deep. By 1988 widespread labor unrest, raging inflation, and the refusal of outlawed Solidarity to cooperate with the military government had brought Poland to the brink of economic collapse. Profiting from Gorbachev's tolerant attitude and skillfully mobilizing its forces, Solidarity pressured Poland's frustrated Communist party leaders into another round of negotiations. The subsequent agreement legalized Solidarity and announced that free elections for some seats in the Polish parliament would be held in June 1989. Solidarity won every contested seat. A month later the editor of Solidarity's weekly newspaper was sworn in as the first noncommunist leader in eastern Europe in a generation. Soon Poland was not alone in its revolution.

In Czechoslovakia communism died in December 1989 in an almost good-humored ousting of Communist party bosses in only ten days. This so-called Velvet Revolution grew out of popular demonstrations led by students, intellectuals, and a dissident playwright turned moral revolutionary named Václav Havel. Massive street protests forced the resignation of the communist government, and as 1989 ended, Havel was elected president. (See the feature "Individuals in Society: Václav Havel, Apostle of Regeneration.")

In Romania revolution was violent and bloody. There the iron-fisted communist dictator Nicolae Ceauşescu, alone among eastern European bosses, ordered his ruthless security forces to slaughter thousands, thereby sparking an armed uprising. After Ceauşescu's forces were defeated, the tyrant and his wife were captured and executed by a military court. A coalition government emerged to govern the troubled country.

Change swept Hungary as well, when growing popular resistance forced the Communist party to renounce one-party rule and schedule free elections for early 1990. Hungarians gleefully tore down the barbed-wire "iron curtain" that separated Hungary and Austria and opened their border to refugees from East Germany.

As thousands of dissatisfied East Germans began pouring through Hungary on their way to thriving West Germany, a protest movement arose in East Germany. Some people, in huge candlelight demonstrations, tried to promote reforms to create a democratic, independent, but still socialist East Germany. These "stayers" failed to convince the "leavers," however, who continued to flee en masse. Desperately hoping to stabilize the situation, the East German government opened the Berlin Wall, and people danced for joy atop that grim symbol of the prison state. East Germany's aging Communist party leaders were swept aside, and a reform government called for general elections in March 1990. In those elections a conservative-liberal "Alliance for Germany" won and quickly negotiated an economic union with West Germany on favorable terms.

Three factors contributed to this rapid reunification. First, the opening of the Berlin Wall had a huge impact. In the first week alone almost 9 million East Germans—roughly half the country's population—poured across the border into West Germany. While almost all returned home, the joy of warm welcomes from long-lost friends and family aroused long-dormant hopes of unity among ordinary citizens. Second, West German chancellor Helmut Kohl and his closest advisers moved skillfully. Kohl reassured American, Soviet, and European leaders that they need not fear a reunified Germany. At the same time, he promised the ordinary people of bankrupt East Germany an immediate economic bonanza—a one-for-one exchange of all East German marks held in savings accounts and pensions into much more valuable West German marks. Finally, the complicated international aspect of German unification was settled when Kohl and Gorbachev signed a historic agreement in July 1990. United Germany solemnly affirmed its peaceful intentions and pledged never to develop nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons. In side agreements Germany sweetened the deal for the Soviet Union by promising to make enormous loans to Gorbachev's hard-pressed country. On October 3, 1990, East Germany merged into West Germany, forming a single nation under the West German constitution and laws.

Cold War Finale and Soviet Disintegration

The peaceful reunification of Germany accelerated the pace of agreements to reduce armaments and liquidate the cold war. With the Soviet Union's budget deficit

Václav Havel, Apostle of Regeneration

Václav Havel, playwright, dissi
dent leader, and the first post
communist president of the
Czech Republic. *(Chris
Niedenthal/Black Star)*

On the night of November 24, 1989, the revolution in Czechoslovakia reached its climax. Three hundred thousand people had poured into Prague's historic Wenceslas Square to continue the massive protests that had erupted a week earlier after the police savagely beat student demonstrators. Now all eyes were focused on a high balcony. There an elderly man with a gentle smile and a middle-aged intellectual in jeans and sport jacket stood arm in arm and acknowledged the cheers of the crowd. "Dubček-Havel," the people roared. "Dubček-Havel!" Alexander Dubček, who represented the failed promise of reform communism in the 1960s (see page 1055), was symbolically passing the torch to Václav Havel, who embodied the uncompromising opposition to communism that was sweeping the country. That very evening, the hard-line communist government resigned, and soon Havel was the unanimous choice to head a new democratic Czechoslovakia. Who was this man to whom the nation turned in 1989?

Born in 1936 into a prosperous, cultured, upper-middle-class family, the young Havel was denied admission to the university because of his class origins. Loving literature and philosophy, he gravitated to the theater, became a stagehand, and emerged in the 1960s as a leading playwright. His plays were set in vague settings, developed existential themes, and poked fun at the absurdities of life and the pretensions of communism. In his private life Havel thrived on good talk, Prague's lively bar scene, and officially forbidden rock-and-roll.

In 1968 the Soviets rolled into Czechoslovakia, and Havel watched in horror as a tank commander opened fire on a crowd of peaceful protesters in a small town. "That week," he recorded, "was an experience I shall never forget."[1] The free-spirited artist threw himself into the intellectual opposition to communism and became its leading figure for the next twenty years. The costs of defiance were enormous. Purged and blacklisted, Havel lifted barrels in a brewery and wrote bitter satires that could not be staged. In 1977 he and a few other dissidents publicly protested Czechoslovak violations of the Helsinki Accord on human rights, and in 1989 this Charter '77 group became the inspiration for Civic Forum, the democratic coalition that toppled communism. Havel spent five years in prison and was constantly harassed by the police.

Havel's thoughts and actions focused on truth, decency, and moral regeneration. In 1975, in a famous open letter to Czechoslovakia's Communist party boss, Havel wrote that the people were indeed quiet, but only because they were "driven by fear. . . . Every one has something to lose and so everyone has reason to be afraid." Thus Havel saw lies, hypocrisy, and apathy undermining and poisoning all human relations in his country. "Order has been established—at the price of a paralysis of the spirit, a deadening of the heart, and a spiritual and moral crisis in society."[2]

Yet Havel saw a way out of the communist quagmire. He argued that a profound but peaceful revolution in human values was possible. Such a revolution could lead to the moral reconstruction of Czech and Slovak society, where, in his words, "values like trust, openness, responsibility, solidarity and love" might again flourish and nurture the human spirit. Havel was a voice of hope and humanity, a voice who inspired his compatriots with a lofty vision of a moral postcommunist society. As president of his country, Havel continued to speak eloquently on the great questions of our time.

Questions for Analysis

1. Why did Havel oppose communist rule? How did his goals differ from those of Dubček and other advocates of reform communism?

2. Havel has been called a "moralist in politics." Is this a good description of him? Why? Can you think of a better one?

1. Quoted in M. Simmons, *The Reluctant President: A Politi . . Life of Václav Havel* (London: Methuen, 1991), p. 91

2. Quoted ibid., p. 110

rising rapidly in 1990, Gorbachev sought arrangements to justify massive cuts in military spending. Thus in November 1990 delegates from twenty-two European countries joined those from the United States and the Soviet Union in Paris and agreed to a scaling down of all their armed forces. The delegates also solemnly affirmed that all existing borders in Europe—from unified Germany to the Baltic republics of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, which had declared their independence from the Soviet Union that year—were legal and valid. The Paris Accord was for all practical purposes a general peace treaty, bringing an end to World War II and the cold war that followed.

The establishment of peace in Europe encouraged the United States and the Soviet Union to scrap a significant portion of their nuclear weapons. Having al-ready agreed in 1987 to remove all land-based intermediate-range missiles from Europe, they pledged in July 1991 a major mutual reduction of intercontinental ballistic missiles with their multiple nuclear warheads. In September 1991 a confident President George Bush unilaterally declared another major cut in American nuclear weapons. He also canceled the around-the-clock alert status for American bombers outfitted with atomic bombs. A floundering Gorbachev quickly followed suit. For the first time in four decades Soviet and American nuclear weapons were no longer standing ready to destroy capitalism, communism, and life itself.

The great question then became whether the Soviet Union would follow its former satellites in a popular anticommunist revolution. Near–civil war between Armenians and Azerbaijanis in the Caucasus and growing

Celebrating Victory, August 1991 A Russian soldier flashes the victory sign in front of the Russian parliament, as the last-gasp coup attempt of Communist hard-liners is defeated by Boris Yeltsin and an enthusiastic public. The soldier has cut the hammer and sickle out of the Soviet flag, consigning those famous symbols of proletarian revolution to what Trotsky once called the "garbage can of history." *(Filip Horvat/Saba)*

dissatisfaction among the Soviet peoples were part of a fluid, unstable political situation. Increasingly, the reform-minded Gorbachev stood as a moderate, besieged by those who wanted revolutionary changes and by hard-line Communist party members who longed to reverse course and clamp down.

In February 1990 the Communist party suffered a stunning defeat in local elections throughout the country. Democrats and anticommunists won clear majorities in the leading cities of the Russian Federation. When nationalists in Lithuania declared that republic's independence, Gorbachev responded by placing an economic embargo on Lithuania, but he refused to use the army to crush the separatist government. The result was a tense political stalemate, which further undermined Russian support for Gorbachev. Separating himself further from Communist party hard-liners, a hard-pressed Gorbachev asked Soviet citizens to ratify a new constitution, which formally abolished the Communist party's monopoly of political power and expanded the power of the Congress of People's Deputies. Gorbachev then convinced a majority of deputies to elect him president of the Soviet Union.

Gorbachev's eroding power and unwillingness to risk a popular election for the presidency strengthened his rival, Boris Yeltsin (b. 1931). A radical reform communist, Yeltsin was a tough and crafty Siberian who became the most prominent figure in the democratic movement in the Russian Federation. In May 1990, as leader of the Russian parliament, Yeltsin boldly announced that Russia would declare its independence from the multiethnic Soviet Union, a move that broadened the base of the anticommunist movement by skillfully joining the patriotism of ordinary Russians with the democratic aspirations of big-city intellectuals. While nationalists in the Soviet republics continued to agitate for separatism, the country's economic decline accelerated.

Gorbachev was next challenged by the old guard of the Communist party. In August 1991 a gang of hard-liners kidnapped him and his family and tried to seize the Soviet government. The attempted coup collapsed in the face of massive popular resistance, which rallied in Moscow around Yeltsin. Gorbachev was rescued and returned to power as head of the Soviet Union.

The leaders of the coup had wanted to preserve Communist party power and the multinational Soviet Union; they succeeded only in destroying both. An anticommunist revolution swept the Russian Federation as the Communist party was outlawed and its property confiscated. Locked in a personal and political duel with Gorbachev, Yeltsin and his liberal allies declared Russia independent and withdrew from the Soviet Union. All the other Soviet republics followed suit; the Soviet Union—and Gorbachev's job as its president—ceased to exist on December 25, 1991 (Map 33.2).

THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

One way to think of what historians used to call the "New World" is as a vigorous offshoot of Western civilization—an offshoot that has gradually developed its own characteristics while retaining European roots. From this perspective can be seen many illuminating parallels and divergences in the histories of Europe and the Americas. After the Second World War the Western Hemisphere experienced a many-faceted recovery, somewhat similar to that of Europe, although it began earlier, especially in Latin America. And after a generation the countries of the New World experienced their own period of turbulence and crisis. The response of many Latin American countries was to establish authoritarian military regimes until, in the late 1980s, Latin America joined with eastern Europe in turning toward elected civilian governments and in embracing economic liberalism for the first time since the 1920s.

America's Civil Rights Revolution

The Second World War ended the Great Depression in the United States and brought about a great economic boom. Unemployment practically vanished, and the well-being of Americans increased dramatically. Despite fears that peace would bring renewed depression, conversion to a peacetime economy went smoothly. As in western Europe, the U.S. economy advanced fairly steadily for a long generation.

Prosperity helps explain why postwar domestic politics consisted largely of modest adjustments to the status quo until the 1960s. Truman's upset victory in 1948 demonstrated that Americans had no interest in undoing Roosevelt's social and economic reforms. Congress proceeded to increase Social Security benefits, subsidize middle- and lower-class housing, and raise the minimum wage. These and other liberal measures consolidated the New Deal. In 1952 the Republican party and the voters turned to General Dwight D. Eisenhower (1890–1969), a national hero and self-described moderate. Some Americans came to fear that the

MAP 33.2 Russia and the Successor States   After the attempt in August 1991 to depose Gorbachev failed, an anticommunist revolution swept the Soviet Union. Led by Russia and Boris Yeltsin, the republics that formed the Soviet Union declared their sovereignty and independence. Eleven of the fifteen republics then formed a loose confederation called the Commonwealth of Independent States, but the integrated economy of the Soviet Union dissolved into separate national economies, each with its own goals and policies.

United States was becoming a "blocked society," incapable of wholesome change. This feeling contributed in 1960 to the election of the young John F. Kennedy (1917–1963), who captured the popular imagination, revitalized the old Roosevelt coalition, and modestly expanded existing liberal legislation before he was struck down by an assassin's bullet in 1963.

Belatedly and reluctantly, complacent postwar America did experience a genuine social revolution: after a long struggle African Americans (and their white supporters) threw off a deeply entrenched system of segregation, discrimination, and repression. This civil rights movement advanced on several fronts. Eloquent lawyers from the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) challenged school segregation in the courts. In 1954 they won a landmark decision in the Supreme Court, which ruled in *Brown v. Board of Education* that "separate educational facilities

are inherently unequal." Blacks effectively challenged institutionalized inequality with bus boycotts, sit-ins, and demonstrations. As civil rights leader Martin Luther King, Jr. (1929–1968), told the white power structure, "We will not hate you, but we will not obey your evil laws."[6]

In key northern states African Americans used their growing political power to gain the support of the liberal wing of the Democratic party. In a liberal landslide Lyndon Johnson (1908–1973) won the presidential election in 1964. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibited discrimination in public services and on the job. The Voting Rights Act of 1965 firmly guaranteed all blacks the right to vote. By the 1970s substantial numbers of blacks had been elected to public office throughout the southern states, proof of major changes in American race relations.

African Americans enthusiastically supported new social legislation in the mid-1960s. President Johnson

The March on Washington   This march in August 1963 marked a dramatic climax in the civil rights struggle. More than 200,000 people gathered at the Lincoln Memorial to hear the young Martin Luther King, Jr., deliver his greatest address, his "I Have a Dream" speech *(Francis Miller,* LIFE MAGAZINE © *Time Warner Inc.)*

solemnly declared "unconditional war on poverty." Congress and the administration created a host of antipoverty projects, such as medical care for the poor and aged, free preschools for poor children, and community-action programs. Thus the United States promoted in the mid-1960s the kind of fundamental social reform that western Europe had embraced immediately after the Second World War. It became more of a welfare state, as government spending for social benefits rose dramatically and approached European levels.

Youth and the Counterculture

Economic prosperity and a more democratic class structure had a powerful impact on youth throughout the Western world. The bulging cohort of youth born after World War II developed a distinctive and very international youth culture. Self-consciously different in the late 1950s, this youth culture became increasingly oppositional in the 1960s, interacting with a revival of leftist thought to create a counterculture that rebelled against parents, authority figures, and the status quo.

Young people in the United States took the lead. American college students in the 1950s were docile and often dismissed as the "Silent Generation," but some young people did revolt against the conformity and boredom of middle-class suburbs. The "beat" movement of the late 1950s expanded on the theme of revolt, and this subculture quickly spread to major American and western European cities.

Rock music helped tie this international subculture together. Rock grew out of the black music culture of rhythm and blues, which was flavored with country and western to make it more accessible to white teenagers

Artists Elvis Presley and the Beatles became enormously popular, while suggesting a personal and sexual freedom that many older people found disturbing. Then Bob Dylan, a young folksinger turned rock poet, captured the radical aspirations of some youth when he sang that "the times they are a'changing."

Several factors contributed to the emergence of the international youth culture in the 1960s. First, mass communications and youth travel linked countries and continents together. Second, the postwar baby boom meant that young people became an unusually large part of the population and could therefore exercise exceptional influence on society as a whole. Third, postwar prosperity and greater equality gave young people more purchasing power than ever before. This enabled them to set their own trends and fads in everything from music to chemical stimulants to sexual behavior. Common patterns of consumption and behavior fostered generational loyalty. Finally, prosperity meant that good jobs were readily available. Students and young job seekers had little need to fear punishment from strait-laced employers for unconventional behavior.

The youth culture practically fused with the counterculture in opposition to the established order in the late 1960s. Student protesters embraced romanticism and revolutionary idealism, dreaming of complete freedom and simpler, purer societies. The materialistic West was hopelessly rotten, but better societies were being built in the newly independent countries of Asia and Africa, or so many young radicals believed. Thus the Vietnam War took on special significance. Many politically active students in the United States and Europe believed that the older generation in general and American leaders in particular were fighting an immoral and imperialistic war against a small and heroic people that wanted only national unity and human dignity. As the war in Vietnam intensified, so did worldwide student opposition to it.

The United States in World Affairs, 1964–1991

President Johnson wanted to go down in history as a master reformer and a healer of old wounds. Instead, he opened new ones with the Vietnam War.

American involvement in Vietnam was a product of the cold war and the ideology of containment (see page 1045). After the defeat of the French in Indochina in 1954 (see page 1095), the Eisenhower administration refused to sign the Geneva Accords, which temporarily divided the country into two zones pending national unification by means of free elections. President Eisen-

hower then acquiesced in the refusal of the anticommunist South Vietnamese government to accept the verdict of elections and provided military aid to help that government resist communist North Vietnam. President Kennedy increased the number of American "military advisers" to sixteen thousand.

President Johnson greatly expanded the American role in the Vietnam conflict. As Johnson explained to his ambassador in Saigon, "I am not going to lose Vietnam. I am not going to be the President who saw Southeast Asia go the way China went."[7] American strategy was to "escalate" the war sufficiently to break the will of the North Vietnamese and their southern allies without resorting to "overkill," which might risk war with the entire Communist bloc. Thus South Vietnam received massive military aid, American forces in the South gradually grew to a half million men, and the United States bombed North Vietnam with evergreater intensity. But there was no invasion of the North or naval blockade. In the end the American strategy of limited warfare backfired. It was the Americans who grew weary and the American leadership that cracked.

The undeclared war in Vietnam, fought nightly on American television, eventually divided the nation. Initial support was strong. The politicians, the media, and the population as a whole saw the war as part of a legitimate defense against communist totalitarianism in all poor countries. But an antiwar movement quickly emerged on college campuses, where the prospect of being drafted to fight savage battles in Asian jungles made male stomachs churn. In October 1965 student protesters joined forces with old-line socialists, New Left intellectuals, and pacifists in antiwar demonstrations in fifty American cities. By 1967 a growing number of critics denounced the war as a criminal intrusion into a complex and distant civil war.

Criticism reached a crescendo after the Vietcong Tet Offensive against major South Vietnamese cities in January 1968. The attack was a military failure, but it resulted in heavy losses on both sides, and it belied Washington's claims that victory in South Vietnam was in sight. American critics of the Vietnam War quickly interpreted the bloody combat as a decisive defeat. America's leaders lost heart, and in 1968 President Johnson called for negotiations with North Vietnam and announced that he would not stand for re-election.

Elected by a razor-slim margin in 1968, Richard Nixon (1913–1994) sought to disengage America gradually from Vietnam and the accompanying national crisis. Intensifying the continuous bombardment of the

enemy while simultaneously pursuing peace talks with the North Vietnamese, President Nixon suspended the draft, so hated on college campuses, and cut American forces in Vietnam from 550,000 to 24,000 in four years. Moreover, he launched a flank attack in diplomacy. He journeyed to China in 1972 and reached a spectacular if limited reconciliation with the People's Republic of China. In doing so, Nixon took advantage of China's growing fears of the Soviet Union and undermined North Vietnam's position.

Fortified by the overwhelming endorsement of the voters in the 1972 election, Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger finally reached a peace agreement with North Vietnam in 1973. The agreement allowed remaining American forces to complete their withdrawal, and the United States reserved the right to resume bombing if the accords were broken. Fighting declined markedly in South Vietnam. The storm of crisis in the United States seemed to have passed.

On the contrary, the country reaped the Watergate whirlwind. Like some other recent American presidents, Nixon authorized domestic spying activities that went beyond the law. Going further than his predecessors, Nixon authorized special units to use various illegal means to stop the leaking of government documents to the press. One such group broke into Democratic party headquarters in Washington's Watergate building complex in June 1972 and was promptly arrested. Nixon and many of his assistants tried to hush up the bungled job, but in 1974 a beleaguered Nixon was forced to resign in disgrace.

The renewed political crisis flowing from the Watergate affair had profound consequences. First, Watergate resulted in a major shift of power away from the presidency and toward Congress, especially in foreign affairs. Therefore, as an emboldened North Vietnam launched a general invasion against South Vietnamese armies in early 1974, Congress refused to permit any American military response. After more than thirty-five years of battle, the Vietnamese communists unified their country in 1975 as a harsh dictatorial state—a second consequence of the U.S. crisis. Third, the fall of South Vietnam shook America's postwar confidence and left the country divided and uncertain about its proper role in world affairs.

One alternative to the policy of containing communism was the policy of *détente,* or progressive relaxation of cold war tensions. Détente reached its high point when all European nations (except isolationist Albania), the United States, and Canada signed the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference in 1975. These nations agreed

Anti-Vietcong Protesters   Divisions over the Vietnam War ran deep in the United States. Antiwar protesters captured the public's attention, but anti-Vietcong demonstrations like this one spoke for many Americans. Opinion polls showed that fewer than 20 percent of Americans supported withdrawal from Vietnam until after the November 1968 elections, by which time the decision to get out had been made. *(Burt Glinn/Magnum)*

that Europe's existing political frontiers could not be changed by force, and they solemnly accepted numerous provisions guaranteeing the human rights and political freedoms of their citizens.

Optimistic hopes for détente gradually faded in the later 1970s. Brezhnev's Soviet Union ignored the human rights provisions of the Helsinki agreement, and in December 1979 it invaded Afghanistan to save an unpopular Marxist regime. Thus, once again, many alarmed Americans looked to the Western alliance of NATO members to thwart communist expansion.

Jimmy Carter (b. 1924), elected president in 1976, tried to lead the Western alliance beyond verbal

condemnation of the Soviet Union, but among the European allies only Great Britain supported the American policy of economic sanctions. Some observers concluded that the alliance had lost its cohesiveness.

Yet the Western alliance endured. The U.S. military buildup launched by Jimmy Carter in his last years in office was greatly accelerated by Ronald Reagan (b. 1911), who was swept into office in 1980 by a wave of patriotism and economic discontent. Increasing defense spending enormously, the Reagan administration concentrated especially on nuclear arms and an expanded navy as keys to American power in the renewed crusade against the Soviet Union—which the president anathematized as the "evil empire"—and its allies.

The broad swing of the historical pendulum toward greater conservatism in the 1980s gave Reagan invaluable allies in Britain's strong-willed Margaret Thatcher (see page 1052) and in West Germany's distinctly pro-American Helmut Kohl (see page 1058). Coordinating military and political policies toward the Soviet bloc, the Western nations gave indirect support to ongoing efforts to liberalize authoritarian communist eastern Europe and probably helped convince Mikhail Gorbachev that endless cold war conflict was foolish and dangerous. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States—strong from the recent arms buildup, determined to influence political and economic developments on a global scale, and still flanked by many allies—emerged as the world's lone superpower.

In 1991 the United States used its military superiority on a grand scale in a quick war with Iraq in western Asia. Emerging in 1988 from an eight-year war with neighboring Iran with a big, tough army equipped by the Soviet bloc, western Europe, and the United States, Iraq's strongman Saddam Hussein (b. 1937) set out to make himself the leader of the entire Arab world. Saddam Hussein suddenly sent troops into Kuwait in August 1990 and proclaimed Iraq's annexation of its small, oil-rich neighbor.

Reacting vigorously, the United States called on the United Nations to turn back Iraqi aggression. The five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council—the United States, the Soviet Union, China, the United Kingdom, and France—agreed in August 1990 to impose a strict naval blockade on Iraq. Naval forces, led by the United States but augmented by ships from several nations, halted all trade between Iraq and the rest of the world. Receiving the support of ground units from some Arab states as well as from Great Britain and France, the United States eventually put 500,000 American soldiers in Saudi Arabia near the border of Kuwait. When a de

fiant Saddam Hussein refused to withdraw from Kuwait, the Security Council authorized the U.S.-led military coalition to attack Iraq. The American army and air force then smashed Iraqi forces in a lightning-quick desert campaign.

The spectacularly efficient operation demonstrated the awesome power of the rebuilt and revitalized U.S. military. Little wonder that in the flush of that victory and the end of the Soviet Union, President George Bush spoke of a "new world order." That order would apparently feature the United States and a cooperative United Nations working together to impose peace and security throughout the world.

Economic Nationalism in Latin America

Although the countries of Latin America exhibit striking differences, the growth of economic nationalism has been a major development throughout the region in the twentieth century. As the early nineteenth century saw Spanish and Portuguese colonies win wars of political independence, so has much of recent history been a quest for genuine economic independence.

To understand the rise of economic nationalism, one must remember that Latin American countries developed as producers of foodstuffs and raw materials that were exported to Europe and the United States in return for manufactured goods and capital investment. This exchange brought considerable economic development but exacted a heavy price: neocolonialism (see pages 887–889). Latin America became dependent on foreign markets, products, and investments. Industry did not develop, and those who profited most from economic development were large landowners, who used their advantage to enhance their social and political power.

The old international division of labor, badly shaken by World War I, was destroyed by the Great Depression. Prices and exports of Latin American commodities collapsed as Europe and the United States drastically reduced their purchases and raised tariffs to protect domestic products. With their foreign sales plummeting, Latin American countries could not buy the industrial goods they needed from abroad.

Latin America suffered the full force of the global depression. Especially in the largest Latin American countries—Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico—the result was a profound shift toward economic nationalism after 1930. The most popularly based governments worked to reduce foreign influence and gain control of their own economies and natural resources. They energeti

Brasília, Capital of the Future   Construction of Brazil's ambitious—and controversial—new capital began in 1957 with the airport, for all building materials had to be flown in until roads could be hacked through the wilderness. Laid out like a jet airliner, with the wings for apartments and stores and the fuselage for government buildings, Brasília emerged as a gigantic monument to postwar optimism and extravagance. *(Bernard Boutrit/Woodfin Camp & Associates)*

cally promoted national industry by means of high tariffs, government grants, and even state enterprise. They favored the lower middle and urban working classes with social benefits and higher wages in order to increase their purchasing power and gain their support. These efforts at recovery gathered speed during World War II and were fairly successful. By the late 1940s the factories of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile could generally satisfy domestic consumer demand for the products of light industry. In the 1950s some countries began moving into heavy industry.

Economic nationalism and the rise of industry are particularly striking in the two largest and most influential countries, Mexico and Brazil. These countries account for half of the population of Latin America.

The spasmodic, often-chaotic Mexican Revolution of 1910 overthrew the elitist, upper-class rule of the tyrant Porfirio Díaz and culminated in 1917 in a new constitution. This radical nationalistic document called for universal suffrage, massive land reform, benefits for labor, and strict control of foreign capital. Actual progress was quite modest until 1934, when a charismatic young Indian from a poor family, Lázaro Cárdenas, became president and dramatically revived the languishing revolution. Under Cárdenas many large estates were divided up among small farmers or returned undivided to Indian communities.

Meanwhile, state-supported Mexican businessmen built many small factories to meet domestic needs. In 1938, when Mexican workers became locked in a bitter

dispute with British and American oil companies, Cárdenas nationalized the petroleum industry—to the amazement of a world unaccustomed to such bold action. Finally, the 1930s saw the flowering of a distinctive Mexican culture, which proudly embraced its long-despised Indian past and gloried in the modern national revolution.

In 1940 the official, semi-authoritarian party that had governed Mexico continuously after the revolution selected the first of a series of more moderate presidents. These presidents used the full power of the state to promote industrialization through a judicious mixture of public, private, and even foreign enterprise. Following the postwar trend in Europe and the United States, the Mexican economy grew rapidly to the late 1960s, although the upper and middle classes reaped the lion's share of the benefits.

In Brazil politics was dominated by the coffee barons and by regional rivalries after the fall of Brazil's monarchy in 1889 (see page 884). Regional rivalries and deteriorating economic conditions allowed a military revolt led by Getúlio Vargas to seize control of the federal government in 1930. Vargas, a consummate politician, established a mild dictatorship that lasted until 1945. His rule was generally popular, combining effective economic nationalism and moderate social reform.

Vargas and his allies set out to industrialize. The government supported Brazilian manufacturers with high tariffs, generous loans, and labor peace encouraged by new social legislation: workers received shorter hours, pensions, health and accident insurance, paid vacations, and other benefits. Finally, Vargas shrewdly upheld the nationalist cause in his relations with the United States.

Modernization continued for the next fifteen years. The economy boomed. Presidential politics was re-established, though the military kept a watchful eye for extremism among the civilian politicians. Economic nationalism was especially vigorous under the flamboyant President Juscelino Kubitschek. Between 1956 and 1960 the government borrowed heavily from international bankers to promote industry and build the new capital of Brasília in the midst of a wilderness. Kubitschek's slogan was "Fifty Years' Progress in Five," and he meant it.

The Brazilian and Mexican formula of national economic development, varying degrees of electoral competition, and social reform was shared by some other Latin American countries, notably Argentina and Chile. By the late 1950s optimism was widespread though cautious. Economic and social progress seemed to be bringing less violent, more democratic politics to the region. These expectations were shaken by the Cuban Revolution.

Authoritarianism and Democracy in Latin America

Achieving nominal independence in 1898 as a result of the Spanish-American War, Cuba was virtually an American protectorate until the 1930s. Partly because the American army was often the real power on the island, Cuba's political institutions were weak and its politicians corrupt. Yet Cuba was one of Latin America's most prosperous countries by the 1950s, although it displayed the enormous differences between rich and poor that were typical of Latin America.

Fidel Castro (b. 1927), a magnetic leader with the gift of oratory, led his guerrilla forces to triumph in late 1958. Castro had promised a "real" revolution, and it soon became clear that "real" meant "communist." Middle-class Cubans began fleeing to Miami. Cuban relations with the Eisenhower administration deteriorated rapidly. In April 1961 the newly elected U.S. president, John Kennedy, tried to use Cuban exiles to topple Castro, but he abandoned the exiles as soon as they were put ashore at the Bay of Pigs.

After routing the Bay of Pigs forces, Castro proceeded to build his version of an authoritarian communist society. Political life in Cuba featured anti-imperialism, an alliance with the Soviet bloc, a dictatorship of the party, state ownership, and a Castro cult. Revolutionary enthusiasm was genuine among party activists, while prisons and emigration silenced opposition. The Castro regime also pursued social equality and tried to export communist revolutions throughout Latin America. The fear that Castro would succeed led the United States in 1961 to fund a new hemispheric "Alliance for Progress" intended to promote long-term economic development and social reform.

U.S. aid contributed modestly to continued Latin American economic development in the 1960s, but democratic social reforms—the other half of the Alliance for Progress formula—stalled. A growing conflict between leftist movements and ruling elites developed. In most countries the elites and their military allies won the struggle, but at the cost of imposing a new kind of conservative authoritarianism. By the late 1970s only Costa Rica, Venezuela, Colombia, and Mexico retained some measure of democratic government. Brazil, Argentina, and Chile represented the general trend.

Influential Brazil led the way. Intense political competition in the early 1960s prompted President João

Goulart to swing to the left to gain fresh support. Castroism appeared to spread in the impoverished northeast, and mass meetings of leftists were answered by huge demonstrations of conservatives. When Goulart and his followers appeared ready to use force to implement their program of breaking up landed estates and extending the vote to Brazil's many illiterates, army leaders took over in 1964 and ruled by decree. Industrialization and urbanization went forward under right-wing military rule, but social inequalities increased.

In Argentina the military had intervened in 1955 to oust the dictatorial populist and economic nationalist Juan Perón, and it had restored elected democratic government. Then, worried by a Peronist revival and heartened by the Brazilian example, the army took control in 1966 and again in 1976 after a brief civilian interlude. Each military takeover was followed by an escalation of repression. Though culturally and economically advanced, Argentina became a brutal military dictatorship.

Events in Chile were truly tragic. Chile has a long tradition of democracy and moderate reform. Thus when Salvador Allende, a doctor and the Marxist head of a coalition of communists, socialists, and radicals, won a plurality in 1970, he was duly elected president by the Chilean Congress. Allende completed the nationalization of the American-owned copper companies and proceeded to socialize private industry, accelerate the breakup of landed estates, and radicalize the poor. Marxism in action evoked a powerful backlash, and by 1973 Chile seemed headed for civil war. Then, with widespread conservative support and U.S. backing, the traditionally impartial army struck in a well-organized coup. Allende died, probably murdered, and thousands of his supporters were arrested, or worse. As in Argentina, the military imposed a harsh despotism.

The military governments that revived antidemocratic authoritarianism in Latin America blocked not only the Marxist and socialist program but most liberal and moderate reform as well. Yet the new military governments grew out of political crises that threatened national unity as well as the upper classes and big business. In such circumstances the politically conscious officer corps saw the military as the only institution capable of preventing chaos. Moreover, the new authoritarians were determined modernizers. They were often deeply committed to nationalism, industrialization, technology, and some modest social progress. They even promised free elections in the future.

That time came in the 1980s, when another democratic wave gained momentum throughout Latin America. The three Andean nations—Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador—led the way with the re-establishment of presidential parties and popularly elected governments committed to some social reform. In Argentina the military government gradually lost almost all popular support because of its "dirty war" against its own citizens, in which it imprisoned, tortured, and murdered thousands whom it arbitrarily accused of opposing the regime. In 1982, in a desperate gamble to rally the people, Argentina's military rulers seized the Falkland (or Malvinas) Islands (see Map 28.2 on page 882) from Great Britain. The British rout of Argentina's poorly led troops forced the humiliated generals to schedule national elections. The democratically elected government prosecuted the former military rulers for their crimes and laid solid foundations for liberty and political democracy.

The Brazilian military was relatively successful in its industrialization effort, but it had proved unable (or unwilling) to improve the social and economic position of the masses. In 1985, after twenty-one years of rule, the military leaders were ready to let civilian politicians have a try. Chile also turned from right-wing military dictatorship to elected government. Thus by the second half of the 1980s, 94 percent of Latin America's population lived under regimes that guaranteed elections and civil liberties.

The most dramatic developments in Central America occurred in Nicaragua. In 1979 a broad coalition of liberals, socialists, and Marxist revolutionaries drove longtime dictator Anastasio Somoza from power. The new leaders, known as the Sandinistas, wanted genuine political and economic independence from the United States, as well as thoroughgoing land reform, some state ownership of industry, and friendly ties with communist countries. These policies infuriated the Reagan administration, which tried to undermine the Sandinista government. The Nicaraguan economy collapsed, and the popularity of the Sandinista government eventually declined. Then, after a decade of rule, the Sandinistas accepted free elections and stepped down when they were defeated by a coalition of opposition parties. In 1994 Haiti, one of the last repressive dictatorships in the Americas, also established democratic rule, with the help of U.S. military intervention.

As the 1990s progressed, Latin America's popularly elected governments boldly accepted greater freedom in their economic relations with other countries. They moved decisively from tariff protection and economic nationalism toward free markets and international trade, revitalizing their economies and registering solid gains. In 1994 Mexico joined with the United States and

Return to Democracy in Argentina   Elected president in 1983 after seven years of brutal military rule, Raul Alfonsín stands with sash and rod—the symbols of authority—to take the presidential oath of office in Buenos Aires. Alfonsín's inauguration gave rise to great popular rejoicing. *(Urraca/Sygma)*

Canada in the North American Free Trade Agreement, commonly known as NAFTA. In December 1994, building on NAFTA and the Southern Common Market, which already linked Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay, a summit meeting of thirty-four governments in Miami agreed to forge a vast free-trade area incorporating every country of the Americas by 2005. No longer fearing the neocolonial power of the United States, Latin American politicians and business leaders were generally confident that their countries could compete effectively with their large northern neighbor.

THE POST–COLD WAR ERA, 1991 TO THE PRESENT

The collapse of communism in Europe opened a new era in both Western and world history. Yet the dimen

sion and significance of this new era are far from clear. A constant stream of information and events assails us, but what, we wonder, is truly significant? We are so close to what is going on that we lack vital perspective.

Still, the historian must take a stand and find patterns of development and explanation. Thus we will concentrate on two main themes of Western development in the 1990s. First, we will examine broad economic, social, and political trends that operated throughout Europe in the 1990s. These trends, which also had a powerful influence on Asia and Africa in an increasingly interconnected age, included national economies caught up in global capitalism, the defense of social achievements under attack, and a powerful resurgence of nationalism and ethnic conflict. Second, we will focus on the massive transformations taking place in eastern and western Europe, as the former Soviet bloc works to rebuild and as western Europe forges a single currency and an ever-closer economic union.

Common Patterns and Problems

The end of the cold war and the disintegration of the Soviet Union ended the division of Europe into two opposing camps. Thus, although Europe in the 1990s was a collage of diverse peoples with their own politics, cultures, and histories, the entire continent shared an underlying network of beliefs and behaviors (Map 33.3).

In economic affairs European leaders embraced, or at least accepted, a large part of the neoliberal, free-market vision of capitalist development. This was strikingly the case in eastern Europe, where states such as Poland and Hungary implemented market reforms and sought to create vibrant capitalist economies. Thus postcommunist governments in eastern Europe freed prices, turned state enterprises over to private owners, and sought to move toward strong currencies and balanced budgets. Milder doses of this same free-market medicine were administered by politicians and big business to the lackluster economies of western Europe. These moves marked a considerable modification of western Europe's still-dominant welfare capitalism.

Two factors were particularly important in explaining this shift to tough-minded capitalism, which European socialists and leftist intellectuals regularly denounced as "savage capitalism." First, Europeans were following practices and ideologies revived and enshrined in the 1980s in the United States and Great Britain (see page 1052). Western Europeans especially took American prescriptions more seriously in the 1990s because U.S. prestige and power were so high after the cold war ended and because the U.S. economy outperformed its western European counterparts. Second, the deregulation of markets and the privatization of state-controlled enterprises in different European countries were integral parts of the momentous trend toward a wide-open, wheeler-dealer global economy. The rules of this global economy, laid down by powerful Western governments, multinational corporations, and big banks and international financial organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), called for the free movement of capital and goods and services, low inflation, and limited government deficits. Accepting these rules and attempting to follow them was the price of participating in the global economy.

The freer global economy, which speeded up world economic growth, had powerful social consequences. Millions of ordinary citizens in western Europe saw global capitalism and freer markets as challenging hardwon social achievements. As in the United States and Great Britain in the 1980s, the public in other countries generally opposed the unemployment that accompanied corporate downsizing, the efforts to reduce the power of labor unions, and, above all, government plans to reduce social benefits. The reaction was particularly intense in France and Germany, where unions remained strong and socialists championed a minimum of change in social policies.

In the 1990s political developments across the European continent were also loosely unified by common patterns and problems. Most obviously, the demise of European communism brought the apparent triumph of liberal democracy everywhere. All countries embraced genuine electoral competition, with elected presidents and legislatures and the outward manifestations of representative liberal governments. With some notable exceptions, such as discrimination against Gypsies and illegal immigrants, countries also guaranteed basic civil liberties. For the first time since before the French Revolution almost all of Europe followed the same general political model, although the variations were endless.

The triumph of the liberal-democratic program in Europe (and large parts of Latin America and Asia) led the American scholar Francis Fukuyama to discern the "end of history" in an influential book by that title. According to Fukuyama, first fascism and Nazism and then communism had been bested by liberal-democratic politics and market economics. In fact, as James Cronin perceptively noted, the fall of communism and the end of ideological competition actually marked the return of nationalism and national history.[8] During the cold war the superpowers had generally kept their allies and clients in line throughout the world, either by force or by granting them conditional aid. As soon as the cold war was over, nationalism and ethnic conflict reemerged, and history, as the story of different peoples, began again.

The resurgence of nationalism in the 1990s led to terrible tragedy and bloodshed in parts of eastern Europe, Africa, and Asia. During the civil wars in Yugoslavia, many observers feared that national and ethnic hatreds would spread throughout eastern Europe and infect western Europe in the form of racial hostility toward minorities and immigrants. Although nationalist and racist incidents were a recurring theme after 1991, in Europe they remained limited in the extent of their damage. An important reason was that almost all states wished to become or remain full-fledged members of the European society of nations and to join an ever-expanding economic partnership, whereas

KAZAKHSTAN

R U S S I A

RUSSIA

Baku

AZERBAIJAN

AZER.

GEORGIA
T'bilisi
ARMENIA
Yerevan

Moscow

TURKEY

St. Petersburg
(Leningrad)

Kharkiv

Donets'k

Ankara

CYPRUS

Nicosia

Kiev

Dnipropetrovs'k

Odessa

UKRAINE

Dnipro

MOLDOVA
Chisinau

Bucharest

Minsk

BELARUS

Tallinn

ESTONIA

Helsinki

Riga LATVIA

LITHUANIA

Vilnius

RUSSIA

Stockholm

ROMANIA

BULGARIA
Sofia

Istanbul

GREECE

Athens

Crete
(Gr.)

FINLAND

SWEDEN

Gdansk

POLAND
Warsaw

Belgrade

YUGOSLAVIA

Skopje
MACEDONIA

Budapest

SLOVAKIA
Bratislava

HUNGARY

Zagreb
CROATIA

BOSNIA &
HERZEGOVINA
Sarajevo

ALBANIA
Tiranë

Copenhagen

DENMARK

Hamburg

Berlin

Prague
CZECH
REPUBLIC

Vienna
AUSTRIA

Ljubljana
SLOVENIA

Sicily
(It.)

NORWAY

Oslo

Leipzig

Frankfurt

Munich

VADUZ
LIECH.

SAN
MARINO

San
Marino

Naples

Rome

ITALY

Valletta MALTA

Mediterranean Sea

Faroe Islands
(Den.)

Shetland
Islands
(U.K.)

GERMANY

Bonn

Stuttgart

Amsterdam

NETH.

Brussels

BELGIUM

LUX.

Luxembourg

Zurich
SWITZ.
Bern
Geneva

Turin

Milan

MONACO

Monaco

Corsica
(Fr.)

Sardinia

Glasgow

NORTHERN
IRELAND

IRELAND
Dublin

UNITED
KINGDOM

London

Paris

FRANCE

Lyon

ANDORRA Monaco

Barcelona

Balearic
Islands
(Sp.)

ICELAND

Reykjavík

ATLANTIC
OCEAN

Andorra
la Vella

SPAIN
Madrid

Gibraltar

Porto

PORTUGAL
Lisbon

500 Mi.

500 Km.

250

250

Yugoslavia—the state that embraced ethnic warfare—was branded an outlaw and isolated by the international community. The process of checking resurgent nationalism in Europe and generally keeping it from getting out of hand was almost as significant as the resurgence itself.

Recasting Eastern Europe

With Soviet-style communism in ruins, the peoples of eastern Europe experienced continued rapid change. In Russia politics and economics were closely intertwined after the attempted Communist party coup in 1991 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. President Boris Yeltsin, his democratic supporters, and his economic ministers wanted to create conditions that would prevent a return to communism and right the faltering economy. Following the example of some postcommunist governments in eastern Europe and agreeing with Western advisers who argued that a private economy was best, reformers opted in January 1992 for breakneck liberalization. Their shock therapy freed prices on 90 percent of all Russian goods, with the exception of bread, vodka, oil, and public transportation. The government also launched a rapid privatization of industry and turned thousands of factories and mines over to new private companies. However, control of the privatized companies usually remained in the hands of the old bosses, the managers and government officials who had been running the factories and ministries in the communist era.

Yeltsin and his advisers believed that shock therapy would revive production and bring prosperity after a brief period of hardship. The results were quite different. Prices increased 250 percent on the very first day and kept soaring. At the same time, production fell a staggering 20 percent. The expected months of hardship stretched into years. By 1996 the Russian economy produced at least one-third and possibly one-half less than in 1991. In 1998, after stabilizing briefly, the Russian economy resumed its downward spiral.

Rapid economic liberalization worked poorly in Russia for several reasons. With privatization, the powerful state monopolies in industry simply became powerful private monopolies, which cut production and raised prices to limit losses and maximize profits. Yeltsin and his free-market ideologues had hoped that monopoly prices and profits would encourage new firms to begin production, which would increase competition and push prices down over time. But this process faced obstacles. Powerful managers and bureaucrats forced Yeltsin's government to hand out enormous subsidies and credits to reinforce the positions of big firms and to avoid bankruptcies. The managerial elite also combined with criminal elements, which had already been strong in the late Soviet period, to intimidate would-be rivals, preventing the formation of new firms. In addition, many Russians—told for decades that all capitalists were "speculators" and "exploiters"—were not interested in starting new businesses.

Runaway inflation and poorly executed privatization brought a profound social revolution to Russia. A new capitalist elite acquired great wealth and power, while large numbers of people fell into abject poverty, and the majority struggled to make ends meet.

Managers, former officials, and financiers who came out of the privatization process with large shares of the old state monopolies stood at the top of Russian society. This new elite was more highly concentrated in Moscow than ever before, and Westerners who visited only the capital had difficulty believing that there was a national economic decline.

At the other extreme the vast majority saw their savings become practically worthless. Pensions lost much of their value, and people sold personal goods to survive. Unemployment rose, and in 1996, 35 percent of the population was living in poverty. The quality of public services and health care declined precipitously—so far that the life expectancy of the average Russian male dropped from sixty-nine years in 1991 to only fifty-eight years in 1996. In 1997 a respected expert concluded, "Russia has suffered a minimum of five years of travail. . . . It is necessary to acknowledge that the economic reforms in Russia have not been the success so many insisted they were for so long."[9]

Yeltsin and his supporters proved more successful in politics than in economics. Rapid economic decline in 1992 and 1993 increased popular dissatisfaction. This encouraged the Russian parliament, dominated by communists elected in 1990, to oppose Yeltsin's plan for a proposed new constitution that gave him strong presidential powers. In April 1993, 58 percent of the voters approved Yeltsin's new constitution. Although his allies lost ground to the communists and nationalists

MAP 33.3 Contemporary Europe   No longer divided by ideological competition and the cold war, today's Europe features a large number of independent states. Several of these states were previously part of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, both of which broke into many different countries. Czechoslovakia also divided on ethnic lines, while a reunited Germany emerged, once again, as the dominant nation in central Europe.

in two subsequent elections, the president himself won re-election in 1996 in an impressive come-from-behind victory.

Political problems remained. Russian political parties were weak, and Russia still lacked a rule of law and a court system that could deal with crime and corruption. Yet all politicians looked to the ballot box for legitimacy, a sign that a growing tradition of Russian democracy might eventually rise to meet these challenges.

Russia's moderation in relations with foreign countries also provided a reason for guarded optimism. Military spending continued to decline under Yeltsin, and Russia reluctantly accepted the enlargement of NATO in 1997 to include Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. Moreover, Russia generally respected the independence of the Soviet successor states. The notable exception to this pattern was in Chechnya, a tiny republic of 1 million Muslims in southern Russia, where Yeltsin sent troops to crush a separatist movement. The war was highly unpopular in Russia, and Yeltsin was forced to accept a face-saving truce in 1996—a wily move that helped him win re-election. Thus the Russian people spurned military adventure and reinforced popular sovereignty as the ultimate authority in public life.

Developments in the rest of eastern Europe shared important similarities with those in Russia, as many of the problems were the same. First, the postcommunist states worked to replace state planning and socialism with market mechanisms and private property. Second, Western-style electoral politics took hold, and as in Russia these politics were marked by intense battles between presidents and parliaments and by weak political parties. Third, the social consequences of these revolutionary changes were similar, as inequality increased greatly. Ordinary citizens and the elderly were the big losers, while the young and the former Communist party members, whose privileges had included superior education and well-connected positions, were the big winners. Regional inequalities persisted. Capital cities such as Warsaw, Prague, and Budapest concentrated wealth, power, and opportunity while provincial centers stagnated and industrial areas declined.

The 1990s saw more than a difficult transition to market economies and freely elected governments in eastern Europe, however. The peoples of eastern Europe had never fully accepted communism, which the rebels of 1989 linked to Russian imperialism and the loss of national independence. The joyous crowds that toppled communist regimes believed that they were liberating the nation as well as the individual. Thus as communism died, nationalism was reborn, as had oc-

curred when authoritarian multinational empires had come crashing down in defeat in World War I.

In the 1990s the response to this opportunity was varied. Most observers agreed that Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary were the most successful in making the transition. Reasons for their success included considerable experience with limited market reforms before 1989, flexibility and lack of dogmatism in government policy, and an enthusiastic embrace of capitalism by a rapidly rising entrepreneurial class. These three countries also fared better than Russia in creating new civic institutions, legal systems, and independent broadcasting networks that reinforced political freedom and national revival. They managed to control national and ethnic tensions that might have destroyed their postcommunist reconstruction. Thus, in 1993, when Slovakian nationalists grew dissatisfied with Czech majority rule after Czechoslovakia's 1989 "Velvet Revolution" and clamored for their own state, Václav Havel agreed. He led his country to accept a "velvet divorce" that peacefully split Czechoslovakia into the Czech Republic and Slovakia. The popular goal of "rejoining the West" also was a powerful force toward moderation in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. These countries hoped to find security in NATO membership and prosperity by joining western Europe's ever-tighter economic union. NATO membership came in 1997; gaining admission to the European Union (EU; see the next section) promised to be more difficult.

The great postcommunist tragedy was Yugoslavia, which under Josip Tito had been a federation of republics and regions. After Tito's death in 1980 power passed increasingly to the sister republics, which encouraged a revival of regional and ethnic conflicts that were exacerbated by charges of ethnically inspired massacres during World War II and by a dramatic economic decline in the mid-1980s.

The revolutions of 1989 accelerated the breakup of Yugoslavia. Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic intended to grab land from other republics and unite all Serbs, regardless of where they lived, in a "greater Serbia." In 1989 Milosevic arbitrarily abolished self-rule in the Serbian province of Kosovo, where Albanian-speaking people constituted the overwhelming majority and the Serbs were only a small minority. Milosevic's moves strengthened the cause of separatism, and in June 1991 Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence. Slovenia repulsed a Serbian attack, but Milosevic's forces were able to take about 30 percent of Croatia. In 1992 the civil war spread to Bosnia-Herzegovina, which had declared its independence. Serbs—about 30

MAP 33.4 The Ethnic Composition of Yugoslavia, 1991   Yugoslavia had the most ethnically diverse population in eastern Europe. The republic of Croatia had substantial Serbian and Muslim minorities. Bosnia-Herzegovina had large Muslim, Serbian, and Croatian populations, none of which had a majority. In June 1991 Serbia's brutal effort to seize territory and unite all Serbs in a single state brought a tragic civil war. In early 1999 another civil war decimated the people of Kosovo.

percent of that region's population—refused to live under the more numerous Bosnian Muslims (Map 33.4). Yugoslavia had once been a tolerant and largely successful multiethnic state with people living side by side and often intermarrying. The civil war unleashed ruthless brutality, with murder, rape, the destruction of villages, and the herding of refugees into concentration camps.

While scenes of cruelty and horror shocked the world, the Western nations had difficulty formulating an effective response. Finally, in July 1995, Bosnian Serbs overran a Muslim city that the United Nations had declared a "safe area" and killed several thousand civilians. World outrage prompted NATO to bomb Bosnian Serb military targets, and the Croatian army drove all the Serbs from Croatia. In November 1995

President Bill Clinton brought the warring sides to Dayton, Ohio, where they hammered out a complicated accord that gave Bosnian Serbs about 49 percent of Bosnia and the Muslim-Croatian peoples the rest. Troops from many NATO countries patrolled Bosnia to try to keep the peace.

The Albanian Muslims of Kosovo—the Kosovars—had been hoping for a restoration of self-rule, but they gained nothing from the Dayton agreement. Kosovar militants now challenged the moderate leadership of Ibrahim Rugova, who urged continued peaceful resistance. In early 1998 the militants formed the Kosovo Liberation Army, or KLA, and began to fight for independence. Serbian repression increased greatly. In 1998 the savage Serbian summer offensive against KLA

guerrillas and unarmed villagers displaced 250,000 people within Kosovo.

Serbian aggression appalled Western nations, but they feared in turn that full independence for Kosovo would encourage dangerous ethnic separatism and civil conflict worldwide. By January 1999 the Western powers, led by the United States, were threatening Milosevic with heavy air attacks if he did not withdraw Serbian armies from Kosovo, accept self-government (but not independence) for Kosovo, and permit NATO troops to enter the province to guarantee the agreement. Milosevic refused, and on March 25, 1999, NATO began bombing Yugoslavia. To the world's surprise and horror, Serbian troops and irregular paramilitary forces dramatically stepped up their attacks on civilians, driving about 780,000 Kosovars from their homeland by late spring 1999. The NATO alliance redoubled its resolve to stop Milosevic, and the air campaign against Serbia continued.

Unity and Identity in Western Europe

The movement toward western European unity, which since the late 1940s had inspired practical politicians hoping to promote economic recovery and idealistic visionaries wanting to construct a genuine European identity, received a powerful second wind in the mid-1980s. The Single Europe Act of 1986 laid down a legal framework for establishing a single market that would add the free flow of labor, capital, and services to the free flow of goods. In 1993 the European Community proudly rechristened itself the European Union (EU). Meanwhile, French president François Mitterrand and German chancellor Helmut Kohl took the lead in pushing for monetary union of EU members. After long negotiations and compromises designed especially to overcome Britain's reluctance to cede aspects of sovereignty, the members of the EU reached an agreement in December 1991 in the Dutch town of Maastricht. The Maastricht treaty set strict financial criteria for joining the proposed monetary union, with its single currency, and set January 1, 1999, as the target date for its establishment.

Western European elites and opinion makers generally supported this step toward economic union. They saw monetary union as a means of coping with Europe's ongoing economic problems, imposing financial discipline, cutting costs, and reducing high unemployment. Although these elites seldom stressed the point in public debates, they also saw monetary union as a historic, irreversible step toward basic political unity. The Maastricht plan encountered widespread skepticism and considerable opposition from ordinary people, leftist political parties, and nationalists. Ratification votes were close, especially when the public rather than the politicians could vote yes or no on the question.

There were several interrelated reasons for this opposition. First, many people resented the unending flow of rules handed down by the EU's growing bureaucracy, which sought to standardize everything from cheeses to daycare, undermining national practices and local tradition. Second, increasing unity, many people feared, meant yielding more power to distant bureaucrats, undermining popular sovereignty. Above all, ordinary citizens feared that the new Europe was being made at their expense. Joining the monetary union required governments to meet stringent fiscal standards, which required budget cuts and financial austerity. The resulting reductions in health care and social benefits hit ordinary people, who at the same time saw no end to high unemployment rates. Battles over budgets and high unemployment were intense throughout Europe.

The movement toward union also raised profound questions about the meaning of European unity and identity. Would the EU remain an exclusive Western club, or would it expand to include the postcommunist nations of eastern Europe? If some of them were included, how could Muslim Turkey's long-standing application for membership be ignored? Conversely, how could a union of twenty-five to thirty countries have any real unity?

The merging of East Germany into the German Federal Republic suggested the enormous difficulties of full East-West integration under the best conditions. After 1991 Helmut Kohl pumped massive investments into Germany's new eastern provinces, but people in the east still saw factories closed and social dislocation. Unemployment in Germany reached a postwar high of 12.8 percent in 1997, but in the eastern regions it soared to 20 percent. Germany's generous social benefits cushioned the blow, but many ordinary citizens felt hurt and humiliated. Eastern German women in particular suffered. Before unification the overwhelming majority had worked outside the home, helped by cheap child care, flexible hours, and the prevailing socialist ideology. Now they faced expensive child care and a variety of pressures to stay at home and let men take hard-to-find jobs. Many, who had found autonomy and self-esteem in paid work, felt a keen sense of loss. They helped vote Kohl out of office in 1998.

Instructed by the difficulties of German unification, western Europeans proceeded very cautiously in con

Guggenheim Museum, Bilbao, Spain   Praised by admirers as the "first great building of the twenty-first century," Bilbao's exotic undulating museum of contemporary art is intended to revitalize the Basque region of northwestern Spain through international prestige, cultural renaissance, and tourism. Selected in a global competition, Frank Gehry's design relies heavily on three-dimensional computer modeling to hold dramatic opposites in delicate balance, as well as to translate complex forms into construction blueprints. *(Jeff Goldberg/Esto. All rights reserved)*

sidering new requests for EU membership. Sweden, Finland, and Austria were admitted because they had strong capitalist economies and no longer had to maintain the legal neutrality that the Soviet Union had required during the cold war. But of the former communist states, only Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary had any foreseeable chance of gaining admission—and even they would need to wait until some unnamed time early in the twenty-first century. Almost a decade after the revolutions of 1989 and the end of the cold war, a reunifying Europe was moving toward common institutions and groping for a common identity, but the process was far from complete.

SUMMARY

The postwar recovery of western Europe and the Americas was a memorable achievement in the long, uneven

course of Western civilization. The transition from imperialism to decolonization proceeded rapidly, and political democracy gained unprecedented strength in the West. Economic progress and social reforms improved the lives of ordinary citizens.

Postwar developments in eastern Europe displayed both similarities to and differences from developments in western Europe and the Americas. Perhaps the biggest difference was that Stalin imposed harsh one-party rule in the lands occupied by his armies, which led to the long and bitter cold war. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union became more liberal and less dictatorial under Khrushchev, and in the 1950s and 1960s the standard of living in the Soviet Union improved markedly.

In the late 1960s and early 1970s Europe and the Americas entered a new and turbulent time of crisis. Many nations, from France to Czechoslovakia and from Argentina to the United States, experienced major political difficulties, as social conflicts and ideological battles divided peoples and shook governments. Beginning with the oil shocks of the 1970s, severe economic problems added to the turmoil. Yet in western Europe and North America the postwar welfare system held firm, and both democracy and the movement toward European unity successfully passed through the storm.

Elsewhere the response to political and economic crisis sent many countries veering off toward repression. The communist system in eastern Europe was tightened up in the Brezhnev years, and a new kind of conservative authoritarianism arose in most of Latin America. Then, in the 1980s, both regions turned toward free elections and civil liberties, most spectacularly so in the eastern European revolutions of 1989. Like eastern Europe, Latin America also moved toward freer markets and embraced international trade and foreign investment, thereby abandoning its long-standing commitment to economic nationalism.

The remarkable result of all these parallel developments was that differences in political organization, human rights, and economic philosophy became less pronounced in the reuniting Western civilization of the 1990s than at any time since 1914. Eastern Europe especially struggled to rejoin the West and replace the bankrupt communist order with efficient capitalist democracies. Results varied greatly, and ordinary citizens often experienced real hardships in the process. But few saw attractive alternatives to global liberalism, and no effort was made to restore economic planning or one-party rule. This suggests that the anticommunist revolutions of 1989 marked a major turning point in Western history, and perhaps in world history as well, as we will see in the following chapters.

NOTES

1. Quoted in N. Graebner, *Cold War Diplomacy, 1945–1960* (Princeton, N.J.: Van Nostrand, 1962), p. 17.
2. Quoted ibid.
3. *Wall Street Journal,* June 25, 1985, p. 1.
4. Quoted in D. Treadgold, *Twentieth Century Russia,* 5th ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1981), p. 442.
5. M. Walker, *The Waking Giant: Gorbachev's Russia* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1987), p. 175.
6. Quoted in S. E. Morison et al., *A Concise History of the American Republic* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 697.
7. Quoted ibid., p. 735.
8. F. Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Free Press, 1992); and J. Cronin, *The World the Cold War Made: Order, Chaos and the Return of History* (New York: Routledge, 1996), pp. 267–281.
9. M. Goldman, "Russia's Reform Effort: Is There Growth at the End of the Tunnel?" *Current History* 96 (October 1997): 313.

SUGGESTED READING

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Reagan (1989), ably discuss developments in the United States. The culture and politics of protest are provocatively analyzed in H. Hughes, *Sophisticated Rebels: The Political Culture of European Dissent, 1968–1987* (1988), and W. Hampton, *Guerrilla Minstrels: John Lennon, Joe Hill, Woody Guthrie, Bob Dylan* (1986).

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Smith has written two outstanding journalistic reports, *The Russians* (1976) and *The New Russians* (1990). Gorbachev's reforms are perceptively examined by M. Lewin, *The Gorbachev Phenomenon: A Historical Interpretation* (1988). Z. Brzezinski, *The Grand Failure: The Birth and Death of Communism in the Twentieth Century* (1989), is a readable overview by a leading American scholar.

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A Solidarity Leader Speaks from Prison

Solidarity built a broad-based alliance of intellectu-als, workers, and the Catholic church, which was one reason it became such a powerful movement in Poland. Another reason was Solidarity's commitment to social and political change through nonviolent ac-tion. This enabled Solidarity to avoid a bloodbath in 1981 and thus maintain its structure after martial law was declared, although at the time foreign observers often criticized Lech Walesa's leadership for being too cautious and unrealistic.

One of Walesa's closest coworkers was Adam Mich-nik. Walesa was a skilled electrician and a devout Catholic, whereas Michnik was an intellectual and disillusioned communist. But their faith in non-violence and gradual change bound them together. Trained as a historian but banned from teaching be-cause of his leadership in student strikes in 1968, Michnik earned his living as a factory worker. In 1977 he joined with others to found the Committee for the Defense of Workers (KOR), which supported workers fired for striking. In December 1981, Michnik was ar-rested with the rest of Solidarity's leadership. While in prison until July 1994, he wrote his influential Letters from Prison, *from which the following is taken.*

Why did Solidarity renounce violence? This ques-tion returned time and again in my conversations with foreign observers. I would like to answer it now. People who claim that the use of force in the struggle for freedom is necessary must first prove that in a given situation it will be effective and that force, when it is used, will not transform the idea of liberty into its opposite.

No one in Poland is able to prove today that vi-olence will help us to dislodge Soviet troops from Poland and to remove the communists from power. The U.S.S.R. has such enormous military power that confrontation is simply unthinkable. In other words, we have no guns. Napoleon, upon hearing a similar reply, gave up asking further questions. However, Napoleon was above all interested in military victories and not building democratic, plu-ralistic societies. We, by contrast, cannot leave it at that.

In our reasoning, pragmatism is inseparably in-tertwined with idealism. Taught by history, we sus-pect that by using force to storm the existing Bastilles we shall unwittingly build new ones. It is true that social change is almost always accompa-nied by force. But it is not true that social change is merely a result of the violent collision of various forces. Above all, social changes follow from a con-frontation of different moralities and visions of so-cial order. Before the violence of rulers clashes with the violence of their subjects, values and systems of ethics clash inside human minds. Only when the old ideas of the rulers lose this moral duel will the subjects reach for force—sometimes. This is what happened in the French Revolution and the Rus-sian Revolution—two examples cited in every debate as proof that revolutionary violence is pre-ceded by a moral breakdown of the old regime. But both examples lose their meaning when they are reduced to such compact notions, in which the Encyclopedists are paired with the destruction of the Bastille, and the success of radical ideologies in Russia is paired with the storming of the Winter Palace. An authentic event is reduced to a sterile scheme.

In order to understand the significance of these revolutions, one must remember Jacobin and Bol-shevik terror, the guillotines of the sans-culottes, and the guns of the commissars. Without reflection on the mechanisms in victorious revolutions that gave birth to terror, it is impossible to even pose the fundamental dilemma facing contemporary freedom movements. Historical awareness of the possible consequences of revolutionary violence must be etched into any program of struggle for freedom. The experience of being corrupted by terror must be imprinted upon the consciousness of everyone who belongs to a freedom movement. [Or], as Simone Weil wrote, freedom will again be-come a refugee from the camp of the victors. . . .

Solidarity's program and ethos are inextricably tied to this strategy. Revolutionary terror has al-ways been justified by a vision of an ideal society. In the name of this vision, Jacobin guillotines and

Bolshevik execution squads carried out their unceasing, gruesome work. The road to God's Kingdom on Earth led through rivers of blood.

Solidarity has never had a vision of an ideal society. It wants to live and let live. Its ideals are closer to the American Revolution than to the French. . . . The ethics of Solidarity, with its consistent rejection of the use of force, has a lot in common with the idea of nonviolence as espoused by Gandhi and Martin Luther King, Jr. But it is not an ethic representative of pacifist movements.

Pacifism as a mass movement aims to avoid suffering; pacifists often say that no cause is worth suffering or dying for. The ethics of Solidarity are based on an opposite premise: that there are causes worth suffering and dying for. Gandhi and King died for the same cause as the miners in Wujek who rejected the belief that it is better to remain a willing slave than to become a victim of murder [and who were shot down by police for striking against the imposition of martial law in 1981]. . . .

But ethics cannot substitute for a political program. We must therefore think about the future of Polish-Russian relations. Our thinking about this key question must be open; it should consider many different possibilities. . . .

The Soviet state has a new leader; he is a symbol of transition from one generation to the next within the Soviet elite. This change may offer an opportunity, since Mikhail Gorbachev has not yet become a prisoner of his own decisions. No one can rule out the possibility that an impulse for reform will spring from the top of the hierarchy of power. This is exactly what happened in the time of Alexander II and, a hundred years later, under Khrushchev. Reform is always possible, even in the face of resistance by the old apparatus. . . .

So what can now happen [in Poland]?

The "fundamentalists" say, no compromises. Talking about compromise, dialogue, or understanding demobilizes public opinion, pulls the wool over the eyes of the public, spreads illusions. Walesa's declarations about readiness for dialogue were often severely criticized from this point of view. I do not share the fundamentalist point of view. . . . The logic of fundamentalism precludes any attempt to find compromise, even in the future. It harbors not only the belief that communists are ineducable but also a certainty that they are unable to behave rationally, even in critical situations—that, in other words, they are condemned to suicidal obstinacy.

This is not so obvious to me. Historical experience shows that communists were sometimes forced by circumstances to behave rationally and to agree to compromises. Thus the strategy of under-

Solidarity activist Adam Michnik in 1984, appearing under police guard in the military court that will sentence him to prison. *(Wide World Photos)*

standing must not be cast aside. We should not assume that a bloody confrontation is inevitable and, consequently, rule out the possibility of evolutionary, bloodless change. This should be avoided all the more inasmuch as democracy is rarely born from bloody upheavals. We should be clear in our minds about this: The continuing conflict may transform itself into either a dialogue or an explosion. The TKK [the underground Temporary Coordinating Committee of outlawed Solidarity] and [Lech] Walesa are doing everything in their power to make dialogue possible. Their chances of success will be greater if the level of self-organization of independent Polish society increases. For street lynchings, angry crowds are enough; compromise demands an organized society.

Questions for Analysis

1. What arguments does Michnik present for opposing the government with nonviolent actions? Are his arguments convincing?

2. How did Michnik's study of history influence his thinking? What lessons did he learn?

3. Analyze Michnik's attitudes toward the Soviet Union and Poland's Communist party leadership. What policies did he advocate? Why?

34 Asia and Africa in the Contemporary World

Shinto priests perform a ceremony of purification in front of a reactor pressure chamber, Japan. *(Yoshitaka Nakatani/PLUS ONE, Inc., Tokyo)*

When future historians look back at our era, they are likely to be particularly struck by the epoch-making resurgence of Asia and Africa after the Second World War. They will try to explain the rapid rise of new or radically reorganized Asian and African countries and their increasingly prominent role in world affairs. And they will try to understand the continued development of these countries as they sought to realize the promise of independence and to build strong nations.

- How did Asian and African countries reassert or establish their political independence in the postwar era?
- How, in the postindependence world, did leading states face up to the enormous challenges of nation building?
- To what extent did Asian and African countries choose democratic or authoritarian governments, and why?

These are the questions that this chapter seeks to answer. Chapter 35 will focus on common problems of economic and social development in Asia and Africa.

THE RESURGENCE OF EAST ASIA

In 1945 Japan and China, the two great powers of East Asia, lay exhausted and devastated. Japanese aggression had sown extreme misery in China and reaped an atomic whirlwind at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The future looked bleak. Yet both nations recovered even more spectacularly than western Europe. In the course of recovery the two countries, closely linked since the 1890s, went their separate ways. China under Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) transformed itself into a strong, one-party communist state. Japan under American occupation turned from military expansion to democracy and extraordinarily successful economic development until the 1990s. Not until the late 1970s did the reborn giants begin moving somewhat closer together, as China retreated from Maoist communism and moved cautiously toward the Japanese model of managed capitalism.

The Communist Victory in China

There were many reasons for the triumph of communism in China. As a noted historian has forcefully argued, however, "Japanese aggression was . . . the most important single factor in Mao's rise to power."[1] When Japanese armies advanced rapidly in 1938, the Nationalist government of Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) moved its capital to Chongqing (Chungking), deep in the Chinese interior (see page 977). As the Communists, aided by their uneasy "united front" alliance with the Nationalists, built up their strength in guerrilla bases in the countryside behind Japanese lines, Mao, at the peak of his creative powers, avoided pitched battles during World War II and concentrated on winning peasant support and forming a broad anti-Japanese coalition. By reducing rents, promising land redistribution, enticing intellectuals, and spreading propaganda, Mao and the Communists emerged in peasant eyes as the true patriots, the genuine nationalists.

Meanwhile, the long war with Japan was exhausting the established government and its supporters. Half of Japan's overseas armies were pinned down in China in 1945. Jiang Jieshi's Nationalists had mobilized 14 million men, and a staggering 3 million Chinese soldiers had been killed or wounded. The war created massive Chinese deficits and runaway inflation, hurting morale and ruining lives.

When Japan suddenly collapsed in August 1945, Communists and Nationalists both rushed to seize evacuated territory. Heavy fighting broke out in Manchuria. The United States, which had steadfastly supported the Nationalists during the Second World War, tried unsuccessfully to work out a political compromise, but civil war resumed in earnest in April 1946. At first Jiang Jieshi's more numerous Nationalists had the upper hand. Soon the better-led, more determined Communists rallied, and by 1948 the demoralized Nationalist forces were disintegrating. The following year Jiang Jieshi and a million mainland Chinese fled to the island of Taiwan, and in October 1949 Mao Zedong proclaimed the People's Republic of China.

Within three years the Communists had succeeded in consolidating their rule. The Communist government seized the holdings of landlords and rich peasants—10 percent of the farm population had owned between 70 and 80 percent of the land—and distributed it to 300 million poor peasants and landless laborers. This revolutionary land reform was extremely popular. Although the Chinese Communists soon began pushing the development of socialist collectives, they did so less brutally than had the Soviets in the

1930s, and they retained genuine support in the countryside.

Meanwhile, the Communists were dealing harshly with their foes. Mao admitted in 1957 that 800,000 "class enemies" had been summarily liquidated between 1949 and 1954; the true figure is probably much higher. By means of mass arrests, forced-labor camps, and re-education through relentless propaganda and self-criticism sessions, all visible opposition from the old ruling groups was destroyed.

Finally, Mao and the Communists reunited China's 550 million inhabitants in a strong centralized state. They laid claim to a new Mandate of Heaven and demonstrated that China was once again a great power. This was the real significance of China's participation in the Korean War. In 1950, when the American-led United Nations forces in Korea crossed the thirty-eighth parallel and appeared to threaten China's industrial base in Manchuria, the Chinese attacked, advanced swiftly, and fought the Americans to a bloody standstill on the Korean peninsula. This struggle against "American imperialism" mobilized the masses, and military success increased Chinese self-confidence.

Mao's China

Asserting Chinese power and prestige in world affairs, Mao and the party looked to the Soviet Union for inspiration in the early 1950s. Along with the gradual collectivization of agriculture, China adopted a typical Soviet five-year plan to develop large factories and heavy industry rapidly. Russian specialists built many Chinese plants. Soviet economic aid was also considerable. The first five-year plan was successful, as were associated efforts to redirect higher education away from the liberal arts and toward science and engineering. People were very poor, but undeniable economic growth followed the Communists' social revolution.

In the cultural and intellectual realms, too, the Chinese followed the Soviet example. Basic civil and political rights, which had been seriously curtailed by the Nationalists, were simply abolished. Temples and churches were closed; all religion was persecuted. Freedom of the press died, and the government went to incredible lengths to control information. A Soviet-style puritanism took hold. To the astonishment of "old

A People's Court   The man on his knees is accused in a people's court of selling a young girl living in his household, an old practice that became a serious crime in revolutionary China. Local villagers follow the proceedings intently. *(Popperfoto/Archive Photos)*

China hands," the Communists quickly eradicated the long-standing scourges of prostitution and drug abuse, which they had long regarded as humiliating marks of exploitation and national decline. The Communists enthusiastically promoted Soviet-Marxian ideas concerning women and the family. Full equality, work outside the home, and state-supported child care became primary goals.

By the mid-1950s the People's Republic of China seemed to be firmly set on the Marxist-Leninist course of development previously perfected in the Soviet Union. In 1958, however, China began to go its own way. Mao had always stressed revolutionary free will and peasant equality. Now he proclaimed a spectacular acceleration of development, a "Great Leap Forward" in which soaring industrial growth was to be based on small-scale backyard workshops run by peasants living in gigantic self-contained communes. Creating an authentic new socialist personality that rejected individualism and traditional family values was a second goal. In extreme cases commune members ate in common dining halls, nurseries cared for children, and fiery crusaders preached the evils of family ties.

The intended great leap past the Soviets to socialist utopia—true communism—produced an economic disaster in the countryside, for frantic efforts with primitive technology often resulted only in chaos. By 1960 only China's efficient rationing system was preventing starvation. But when Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev criticized Chinese policy, Mao condemned Khrushchev and his Russian colleagues as detestable "modern revisionists"—capitalists and cowards unwilling to risk a world war that would bring communist revolution in the United States. The Russians abruptly cut off economic and military aid. A mood of fear and hostility developed in both China and the Soviet Union in the 1960s as the communist world split apart.

Mao lost influence in the party after the fiasco of the Great Leap Forward and the Sino-Soviet split, but in 1965 the old revolutionary staged a dramatic comeback. Fearing that China was becoming bureaucratic, capitalistic, and "revisionist" like the Soviet Union, Mao launched what he called the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution." Its objective was to purge the party of time-serving bureaucrats and to recapture the revolutionary fervor of his guerrilla struggle (see page 977). The army and the nation's young people, especially students, responded enthusiastically. Encouraged by Mao to organize themselves into radical cadres called Red Guards, young people denounced their teachers and practiced rebellion in the name of

revolution. One Red Guard manifesto, "Long Live the Revolutionary Rebel Spirit of the Proletariat," exulted:

Revolution is rebellion, and rebellion is the soul of Mao Tse-tung's thought. Daring to think, to speak, to act, to break through, and to make revolution—in a word, daring to rebel—is the most fundamental and most precious quality of proletarian revolutionaries; it is fundamental to the Party spirit of the Party of the proletariat! . . .

You say we are too arrogant? "Arrogant" is just what we want to be. Chairman Mao says, "And those in high positions we counted as no more than the dust." We are bent on striking down not only the reactionaries in our school, but the reactionaries all over the world. Revolutionaries take it as their task to transform the world. How can we not be "arrogant"?[2]

The Red Guards sought to purge China of all traces of "feudal" and "bourgeois" culture and thought. Some ancient monuments and works of art were destroyed. Party officials, professors, and intellectuals were exiled to remote villages to purify themselves with heavy labor. The Red Guards attracted enormous worldwide attention and served as an extreme model for the student rebellions in the West in the late 1960s (see page 1063).

The Limits of Reform

Mao and the Red Guards succeeded in mobilizing the masses, shaking up the party, and creating greater social equality. But the Cultural Revolution also created growing chaos and a general crisis of confidence, especially in the cities. Persecuted intellectuals, technicians, and purged party officials launched a counterattack on the radicals and regained much of their influence by 1969. Thus China shifted to the right at the same time that Europe and the United States did. This shift in China, coupled with actual fighting between China and the Soviet Union on the northern border in 1969, opened the door to a limited but lasting reconciliation between China and the United States in 1972.

The moderates were led by Deng Xiaoping (1904–1997), a long-time member of the Communist elite who had been branded a dangerous agent of capitalism during the Cultural Revolution. After Mao's death in 1976, Deng and his supporters initiated a series of new policies, embodied in the ongoing campaign of the "Four Modernizations"—agriculture, industry, science and technology, and national defense. The campaign to modernize had a profound effect on China's people,

Chinese Students in 1989   These exuberant demonstrators in Tiananmen Square personify the idealism and optimism of China's prodemocracy movement. After some hesitation the Communist government crushed the student leaders and their supporters with tanks and executions, reaffirming its harsh, authoritarian character. *(Erika Lansner/Black Star)*

and Deng proudly called it China's "second revolution."

China's 800 million peasants experienced the greatest and most beneficial change from this "second revolution"—a fact that at first glance may seem surprising. The support of the peasantry had played a major role in the Communist victory. After 1949 land reform and rationing undoubtedly improved the diet of poor peasants. Subsequently, literacy campaigns taught rural people how to read, and "barefoot doctors"—local peasants trained to do simple diagnosis and treatment—brought modern medicine to the countryside. Handicraft industries grew to provide rural employment. But

rigid collectivized agriculture failed to provide either the peasants or the country with adequate food, as Chinese documents published in the 1980s made clear. Levels of agricultural production and per capita food consumption were no higher in the mid-1970s than in the mid-1950s, and only slightly higher than in 1937, before the war with Japan.

Determined to prevent a return to Maoist extremism as well as to modernize the economy, Deng and the reformers looked to the peasants as natural allies. Their answer to the stalemate in agricultural production was to let China's peasants farm the land in small family units rather than in large collectives. Peasants were en

couraged to produce what they could produce best and "dare to be rich." Peasants responded enthusiastically, increasing food production by more than 50 percent in just six years after 1978. Thus most Chinese finally gained enough calories and protein for normal life and growth.

The successful use of free markets and family responsibility in agriculture encouraged further economic experimentation. Foreign capitalists were allowed to open factories in southern China, and they successfully exported Chinese products around the world. The private enterprise of Chinese citizens was also permitted in cities. Snack shops, beauty parlors, and a host of small businesses sprang up. As signs of liberalization abounded, the Chinese economy bucked the world trend and grew rapidly between 1978 and 1987. The level of per capita income doubled in these years.

Change, however, was also circumscribed. As in the Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev (see page 1056), most large-scale industry remained state owned and state subsidized. Cultural change proceeded slowly, and the party maintained its strict control of the media. Above all, under Deng's leadership the Communist party zealously preserved its monopoly of political power.

When the worldwide movement for greater democracy and political freedom in the late 1980s also took root in China, the government responded by banning all demonstrations and slowing the trend toward a freer economy. Inflation then soared to more than 30 percent a year. The economic reversal, the continued lack of political freedom, and the conviction that Chinese society was becoming more corrupt led China's idealistic university students to spearhead demonstrations in April 1989.

The students evoked tremendous popular support, and more than a million people streamed into Beijing's central Tiananmen Square on May 17 in support of their demands. The government then declared martial law and ordered the army to clear the students. Masses of courageous Chinese citizens blocked the soldiers' entry into the city for two weeks, but in the early hours of June 4, 1989, tanks rolled into Tiananmen Square. At least seven hundred students died as a wave of repression, arrests, and executions descended on China. China's Communist leaders claimed that they had saved the country from plots to destroy socialism and national unity.

In the months after Tiananmen Square communism fell in eastern Europe, the Soviet Union broke apart, and China's rulers felt vindicated. They believed that their strong action had preserved Communist power, prevented chaos, and showed the limits of permissible reform. After some hesitation Deng reaffirmed economic liberalization, and private enterprise and foreign investment boomed in the 1990s. Consumerism was encouraged, and the standard of living continued to rise. But the rulers tortured and jailed critics of Communist rule, and they made every effort to ensure that the People's Army would again crush the people if called to do so. Thus China in the 1990s coupled growing economic freedom with continued political repression, embracing only one half of the trend toward global liberalization and rejecting the other.

Japan's American Revolution

After Japan's surrender in August 1945, American occupation forces began landing in the Tokyo-Yokohama area. Riding through what had been the heart of industrial Japan, where mighty mills and factories had once hummed with activity, they found only smokestacks and giant steel safes standing amid miles of rubble and debris. The bleak landscape manifested Japan's state of mind as the nation lay helpless before its conqueror.

Japan, like Nazi Germany, was formally occupied by all the Allies, but real power resided in American hands. The commander was General Douglas MacArthur (1880–1964), the five-star hero of the Pacific, who with his advisers exercised almost absolute authority.

MacArthur and the Americans had a revolutionary plan for defeated Japan. Convinced that militaristic, antidemocratic forces were responsible for Japanese aggression and had to be destroyed, they introduced fundamental reforms designed to make Japan a free, democratic society along American lines. The exhausted, demoralized Japanese, who had feared a worse fate, accepted passively. Long-suppressed liberal leaders emerged to offer crucial support and help carry the reforms forward.

Japan's sweeping American revolution began with demilitarization and a systematic purge. A special international tribunal tried and convicted as war criminals twenty-five top government leaders and army officers. Other courts sentenced hundreds to death and sent thousands to prison. Over 220,000 politicians, businessmen, and army officers were declared ineligible for office.

Although the American-dictated constitution of 1946 allowed the emperor to remain "the symbol of the State," the new constitution made the government fully responsible to the Japanese Diet, whose members

were popularly elected by all adults. A bill of rights granted basic civil liberties and freed all political prisoners, including communists. The constitution also abolished all Japanese armed forces. Japan's resurrected liberals enthusiastically supported this American move to destroy militarism.

The American occupation left Japan's powerful bureaucracy largely intact and used it to implement the fundamental social and economic reforms that were rammed through the Japanese Diet. Many had a New Deal flavor. The occupation promoted the Japanese labor movement and introduced American-style antitrust laws. The gigantic zaibatsu firms were broken up into many separate companies in order to encourage competition and economic democracy. The American reformers proudly "emancipated" Japanese women, granting them equality before the law.

The occupation also imposed revolutionary land reform. MacArthur pressured the Japanese Diet into buying up the land owned by absentee landlords and selling it to peasants on very generous terms. This reform strengthened the small, independent peasant, who became a staunch defender of postwar democracy.

The United States' efforts to remake Japan in its own image were powerful but short-lived. By 1948, when the United States began to look at the world through a cold war lens, occupation policy shifted gears. The Japanese later referred to this about-face as "the reverse course." As China went decisively communist, American leaders began to see Japan as a potential ally, not as an object of social reform. The American command began purging leftists and rehabilitating prewar nationalists, many of whom joined the Liberal Democratic party, which became increasingly conservative and emerged as the dominant political organization in postwar Japan. The United States ended the occupation in 1952. Under the treaty terms Japan regained independence, and the United States retained its vast military complex in Japan. With American encouragement Japan also developed an effective "Defense Force," a sophisticated modern army in everything but name.

"Japan, Inc."

Restricted to satellite status in world politics, the Japanese people applied their exceptional creative powers to rebuilding their country. Japan's economic recovery, like Germany's, proceeded painfully slowly immediately after the war. At the time of the Korean War, however, the economy took off and grew with spectacular speed for a whole generation. Between 1950 and 1970 the real growth rate of Japan's economy—adjusted for inflation—averaged a breathtaking 10 percent a year—almost three times that of the United States. Even after the shock of much higher energy prices in 1973, the petroleum-poor Japanese did considerably better than most other peoples. In 1986 average per capita income in Japan exceeded that in the United States for the first time. As recently as 1965, the average Japanese had earned only one-fourth of the average American's income.

Japan's emergence as an economic superpower fascinated some outsiders, troubled others, and generally became a subject of controversy. Many Asians and Africans looked to Japan for the secrets of successful modernization, but some of Japan's Asian neighbors again feared Japanese exploitation. And in the 1970s and 1980s some Americans and Europeans bitterly accused "Japan, Inc.," of an unholy alliance between government and business and urged their own governments to retaliate.

In trying to explain Japanese success, most scholars stress that many of the ingredients in western Europe's recovery also operated in Japan. American aid, cheap labor, and freer international trade all helped spark the process. They also agree that Japan's astonishing economic surge seems to have had deep roots in Japanese history, culture, and national character. By the time American and European pressure forced open Japan's gates in the mid-nineteenth century, Japanese agriculture, education, and material well-being were advanced even by European standards. Moreover, a culturally homogeneous Japanese society put the needs of the group before those of the individual. When the Meiji reformers redefined Japan's primary task as catching up with the West, they had the support of a sophisticated and disciplined people (see pages 869–871). Japan's modernization, even including a full share of aggressive imperialism, was extremely rapid.

By the end of the American occupation, this tight-knit, group-centered society had reassessed its future and worked out a new national consensus. Japan's new task was to build its economy and compete efficiently in world markets. Improved living standards emerged as a related goal after the initial successes of the 1950s. The ambitious "double-your-income" target for the 1960s was ultimately surpassed by 50 percent.

In a system of managed capitalism, government and big business shared leading roles in the drama of economic growth, or so most observers believed at the time. As during the Meiji Restoration, capable, respected bureaucrats directed and aided the efforts of

Building Team Spirit Shouting company slogans in unison, these young managers and salespeople are hiking near snowcapped Mount Fuji as part of a two-week training course teaching business skills and company loyalty. Many customs encourage group solidarity in Japan, where the success of the group is placed above the success of the individual. *(M. MacIntyre/The Hutchison Library)*

cooperative business leaders. The government decided which industries were important, then made loans and encouraged mergers to create powerful firms in those industries. The antitrust policy introduced by the American occupation was quickly scrapped, and the home market was protected from foreign competition by various measures.

Big business was valued and respected in postwar Japan because it served the national goal and mirrored Japanese society. Big companies traditionally hired workers for life immediately after they finished school, and the business firm in Japan was a big, well-disciplined family. Employees' social lives revolved around the company, and wages were based on age. (Discrimination against women remained severe: their wages and job security were strikingly inferior to men's.) Most unions became moderate, agreeable company unions. The social and economic distance between salaried

managers and workers was slight and often breached. *Efficiency, quality,* and *quantity* were the watchwords.

The 1990s brought a sharp reversal in Japan's economic performance and a decade of frustration. Financial problems were critical. Driven to great heights by excessive optimism, the Japanese stock market dropped by 65 percent from 1990 to 1992, and it hardly recovered thereafter. The bursting of the speculative bubble crippled Japanese banks, stymied economic growth, and led to record postwar unemployment of 4.5 percent in late 1998. Japan also faced increasingly tough competition from its industrializing neighbors in Asia (see Chapter 35), especially in the important American market.

Japan's stagnation in the 1990s was perplexing. Ironically, many observers, especially Americans, did an about-face and blamed government regulation and unimaginative business leaders for the newly discovered

"Japanese disease." They prescribed a radical restructuring of the Japanese economy, in which government officials would step aside and aggressive capitalists would "downsize" big firms with layoffs and consolidations.

Yet postwar Japanese society, with its stress on discipline and cooperation as opposed to individualism and competition, has generally proved well adapted to meet the challenges of modern industrial urban society. For example, Japan, almost alone among industrial nations, has experienced a marked decrease in crime over the past generation. Similarly, since the 1970s the Japanese have addressed themselves effectively to such previously neglected problems as serious industrial pollution and their limited energy resources. Specific reforms are necessary, but on balance Japanese leaders seem justified in proceeding cautiously.

New Nations in South Asia and the Muslim World

South Asia and the Muslim world have transformed themselves no less spectacularly than China and Japan. The national independence movements, which had been powerful mass campaigns since the 1930s, triumphed decisively over weakened and demoralized European imperialism after the Second World War. Between 1947 and 1962, as decolonization gathered irresistible strength, virtually every colonial territory won its political freedom. The complete reversal of the long process of European expansion was a turning point in world history.

The newly independent nations of South Asia and the revitalized states of the Muslim world exhibited many variations on the dominant themes of national renaissance and modernization, especially as the struggle for political independence receded into the past. Ethnic rivalries greatly complicated the process of renewal and development.

The Indian Subcontinent

After the First World War, Mahatma Gandhi and the Indian Congress party developed the philosophy of militant nonviolence to oppose British rule of India and to lessen oppression of the Indian poor by the Indian rich (see pages 968–970). By 1929 Gandhi had succeeded in transforming the Congress party from a narrow, middle-class party into a mass independence movement.

Gradually and grudgingly, Britain's rulers introduced reforms culminating in limited self-government in 1937.

The Second World War accelerated the drive toward independence but also pointed it in a new direction. Congress party leaders, humiliated that Great Britain had declared war against Germany on India's behalf without consulting them, resigned their posts in the Indian government and demanded self-rule as the immediate price of political cooperation. In 1942 Gandhi called on the British to "Quit India" and threatened another civil disobedience campaign. He and the other Congress leaders were quickly arrested and jailed for most of the war. As a result, India's wartime support for hard-pressed Britain was substantial but not always enthusiastic. Meanwhile, the Congress party's prime political rival skillfully seized the opportunity to increase its influence.

That rival was the Muslim League, led by the brilliant, elegant, English-educated lawyer Muhammad Ali Jinnah (1876–1948). Jinnah and the other leaders of the Muslim League feared Hindu domination of an independent Indian state led by the Congress party. Asserting in nationalist terms the right of Muslim areas to separate from the Hindu majority, Jinnah described the Muslims of India as "a nation with our distinct culture and civilization, . . . our own distinctive outlook on life and of life."[3] In March 1940 Jinnah told a hundred thousand listeners at the Muslim League's Lahore Conference that the British government should grant the Muslim and Hindu peoples separate homelands by dividing India into autonomous national states.

The Muslim League's insistence on the division of India appalled Gandhi. He regarded Jinnah's two-nation theory as simply untrue and as promising the victory of hate over love. The passionate debate continued unabated during the war as millions argued whether India was one nation or two. By 1945 the subcontinent was intellectually and emotionally divided, though still momentarily held together by British rule.

When Britain's Labour government agreed to speedy independence for India after 1945, conflicting Hindu and Muslim nationalisms and religious hatred became obstacles leading to murderous clashes between the two communities in 1946. In a last attempt to preserve the subcontinent's political unity, the British proposed a federal constitution providing for extensive provincial—and thus religious and cultural—autonomy. When after some hesitation Jinnah and the Muslim League would accept nothing less than an independent

Pakistan, India's last viceroy—war hero Lord Louis Mountbatten (1900–1979), Queen Victoria's great-grandson—proposed partition. Both sides accepted. At the stroke of midnight on August 14, 1947, one-fifth of humanity gained political independence.

Yet independence through partition also brought tragedy. In the weeks after independence communal strife exploded into an orgy of massacres and mass expulsions. Perhaps a hundred thousand Hindus and Muslims were slaughtered, and an estimated 5 million refugees from both communities fled in opposite directions to escape being hacked to death by frenzied mobs.

This wave of violence was a bitter potion for Congress party leaders, who were completely powerless to stop it. "What is there to celebrate?" exclaimed Gandhi. "I see nothing but rivers of blood."[4]

In January 1948, announcing yet another fast to protest Hindu persecution of Muslims in the Indian capital of New Delhi and to restore "heart friendship" between the two communities, Gandhi was gunned down by a Hindu fanatic. As the Mahatma's death tragically testifies, the constructive and liberating forces of modern nationalism have frequently deteriorated into blind hatred.

After the ordeal of independence, relations between India and Pakistan—both members of the British Commonwealth—remained tense. Fighting over the disputed area of Kashmir continued until 1949 and broke out again in 1965–1966 and 1971 (Map 34.1). Tensions over Kashmir remained intense. In May 1998 first India and then Pakistan set off nuclear weapons, thereby announcing to the world that they were armed with atomic power.

Pakistan   Like many newly independent states, Pakistan eventually adopted an authoritarian government in 1958. Unlike most, Pakistan failed to preserve its exceptionally fragile unity, which proved to be the unworkable dream of the intellectuals leading the Muslim League.

Pakistan's western and eastern provinces were separated by more than a thousand miles of Indian territory, as well as by language, ethnic background, and social custom. They shared only the Muslim faith that had temporarily brought them together against the Hindus. The Bengalis of East Pakistan constituted a majority of the population of Pakistan as a whole but were neglected by the central government, which remained in the hands of West Pakistan's elite after Jinnah's death. In essence, East Pakistan remained a colony of West Pakistan.

Tensions gradually came to a head in the late 1960s. Bengali leaders calling for virtual independence were charged with treason, and martial law was proclaimed in East Pakistan. In 1971 the Bengalis revolted. Despite savage repression—10 million Muslim Bengalis fled temporarily to India, which provided some military aid—the Bengalis won their independence as the new nation of Bangladesh in 1973. The world's eighth most populous country, Bangladesh was also one of its poorest.

Emerging as completely separate states, Pakistan and Bangladesh after 1973 exhibited many similarities. Both countries moved erratically from semi-authoritarian one-party rule toward competitive parliamentary systems with open elections. In the process each also experienced a series of military takeovers, restorations of civilian authority, political assassinations, and charges of official corruption. Each achieved some economic improvement but little social progress, especially for women.

India   India was ruled for a generation after 1947 by Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964) and the Congress party, which introduced major social reforms. Hindu women and even young girls were granted legal equality, which included the right to vote, to seek a divorce, and to marry outside their caste. The constitution abolished the untouchable caste and, in an effort to compensate for centuries of the most profound discrimination, established "ex-untouchable" quotas for university scholarships and government jobs. In practice attitudes toward women and untouchables evolved slowly—especially in the villages, where 85 percent of the people lived.

The Congress party leadership tried with modest success to develop the country economically by means of democratic socialism. But population growth of about 2.4 percent per year ate up much of the increase in output, and halfhearted government efforts to promote birth control met with indifference or hostility. Intense poverty remained the lot of most people and encouraged widespread corruption within the bureaucracy.

The Congress party maintained a moralizing neutrality in the cold war and sought to group India and other newly independent states in Asia and Africa into a "third force" of "nonaligned" nations. This effort culminated in the Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung, Indonesia, in 1955.

Nehru's daughter, Indira Gandhi (1917–1984), became prime minister in 1966. Mrs. Gandhi (whose deceased husband was no relation to Mahatma Gandhi

MAP 34.1 The Partition of British India, 1947   Violence and fighting were most intense where there were large Hindu and Muslim minorities—in Kashmir, the Punjab, and Bengal. The tragic result of partition, which has occurred repeatedly throughout the world in the twentieth century, was a forced exchange of populations and greater homogeneity on both sides of the border.

dominated Indian political life for a generation with a combination of charm, tact, and toughness. As it became clear that population growth was frustrating efforts to improve living standards, Mrs. Gandhi's government stepped up measures to promote family planning and birth control measures, including vasectomy

for both psychological and religious reasons. In the face of widespread resistance to such measures—and in an effort to clamp down on widespread corruption at all levels of government—Mrs. Gandhi in 1975 subverted parliamentary democracy and proclaimed a state of emergency. Attacking dishonest officials, black-

Hindu Nationalists at a Regional Convention, 1991   Religious intolerance is a driving force behind the Hindu-centered Bharatiya Janata party, which took power in 1998. Hindu hardliners have razed Muslim mosques and persecuted Indian Christians, who constitute 2 percent of the population. Their actions undermine the constitutional guarantees of equality and religious freedom that have been the bedrock of Indian democracy since 1947. *(Bob Nickelsberg/Time Magazine)*

marketeers, and tax evaders, she also threw the weight of the government behind a heavy-handed campaign of mass sterilization to reduce population growth. In some areas poor men with large families were made to accept a few cents' payment to submit to a simple, almost painless irreversible vasectomy. More than 7 million men were sterilized in 1976.

Many Indian and foreign observers believed that Mrs. Gandhi's emergency measures marked the end of the parliamentary democracy and Western liberties introduced in the last phase of British rule. But Mrs. Gandhi—true to the British tradition—called for free elections. She suffered a spectacular electoral defeat, largely because of the vastly unpopular sterilization campaign and her subversion of democracy. Her succes-

sors, however, fell to fighting among themselves, and in 1980 Mrs. Gandhi won an equally stunning electoral victory. Her defeat and re-election undoubtedly strengthened India's democratic tradition.

Mrs. Gandhi's last years in office were plagued by another old political problem—separatist ethnic nationalism. Democratic India remained a patchwork of religions, languages, and peoples. This enduring diversity threatened to further divide the country along ethnic or religious lines, as several peoples began to make political demands—most notably the 15 million Sikhs of the Punjab in northern India (see Map 34.1

The Sikhs have their own religion—a blend of Islam and Hinduism—and a distinctive culture, including a warrior tradition and the wearing of elegantly coiled

turbans. Industrious and cohesive, most Sikhs wanted greater autonomy for the Punjab. By 1984 some radicals were fighting for an independent homeland—a Sikh national state. In retaliation government troops stormed the Sikhs' sacred Golden Temple at Amritsar. Six hundred died in the assault. Five months later two of Mrs. Gandhi's Sikh bodyguards—she prided herself on their loyalty—cut her down with machine-gun fire in her own garden. Violence followed as Hindu mobs slaughtered over a thousand Sikhs throughout India.

Elected prime minister in 1984 by a landslide sympathy vote, one of Mrs. Gandhi's sons, Rajiv Gandhi (1944–1991), showed considerable skill at effecting a limited reconciliation with a majority of the Sikh population. Under his leadership the Congress party also moved away from the socialism of his mother and grandfather. In 1991 the Congress party wholeheartedly embraced market reforms, capitalist development, and Western technology and investment. These reforms were successful, and in the 1990s India's economy grew rapidly.

Holding power almost continuously from 1947, the Congress party was challenged increasingly by Hindu nationalists in the 1990s. These nationalists argued forcefully that India was based, above all, on Hindu culture and religious tradition and that these values had been badly compromised by the Western secularism of Congress party leaders and by the historical influence of India's Muslims. Campaigning also for a strong Indian military, the Hindu nationalist party finally gained power in 1998. The new government immediately exploded nuclear devices, asserting its vision of a militant Hindu nationalism.

Southeast Asia

The rest of Southeast Asia gained independence quickly after 1945, but the attainment of stable political democracy proved a more difficult goal (Map 34.2). Ethnic conflicts and cold war battles could easily divide countries. Thus leaders frequently turned to authoritarian rule and military power in an effort to impose order and unity.

Malaysia and Singapore   Malaya encountered serious problems not unlike those of British India. The native Malays, an Islamic agricultural people, feared and disliked the Chinese, who had come to the Malay Peninsula as poor migrant workers in the nineteenth century and stayed on to dominate the urban economy. The Malays pressured the British into giving them the dominant voice in a multiethnic federation of

Malayan territories. In 1948 local Chinese Communists launched an all-out guerrilla war. They were eventually defeated by the British and the Malays, and Malaya became self-governing in 1957 and independent in 1961. Yet two peoples soon meant two nations. In 1965 the largely Chinese city of Singapore was pushed out of the Malayan-dominated Federation of Malaysia. The independent city-state of Singapore prospered on the hard work and inventiveness of its largely Chinese population.

The Philippine Islands   The Philippine Islands suffered greatly under Japanese occupation during the Second World War. After the war the United States retained its large military bases but followed through on its earlier promises by granting the Philippines independence in 1946. As in Malaya, communist guerrillas tried unsuccessfully to seize power. The Philippines pursued American-style two-party competition until 1965, when President Ferdinand Marcos (1917–1989) subverted the constitution and ruled as a dictator. Abolishing martial law in 1981 but retaining most of his power, Marcos faced growing opposition as the economy crumbled and land-hungry communist guerrillas made striking gains in the countryside. Led by a courageous Corazón Aquino (b. 1933), whose politician husband had been murdered, probably by Marcos supporters, the opposition won a spectacular electoral victory in 1986 and forced Marcos to take refuge in Hawaii, where he subsequently died.

As president Mrs. Aquino negotiated a cease-fire with the communist rebels, beat off several attempted takeovers by dissident army officers, and pursued a policy of national reconciliation. She eventually sided with nationalists who argued that U.S. military bases in the Philippines should be closed in order for the nation to achieve complete independence. When the lease on the bases was not renewed in 1991, the American military left. Mrs. Aquino's democratically elected successor continued her policy of reconciliation. In 1996 a final peace agreement granted Muslim separatists an autonomous region in southern Mindinao, thereby ending a long and bloody rebellion and further strengthening the forces of peaceful change.

Indonesia   The Netherlands East Indies emerged in 1949 as independent Indonesia under the nationalist leader Achmed Sukarno (1901–1970), after successfully resisting stubborn Dutch efforts at reconquest. Like the Philippines, the populous new nation encompassed a variety of peoples, islands, and religions (Islam was predominant; see Map 34.3). Beginning in 1957

Sukarno tried to forge unity by means of his so-called guided democracy. He rejected parliamentary democracy as politically divisive and claimed to replicate at the national level the traditional deliberation and consensus of the Indonesian village. For a time the authoritarian, anti-Western Sukarno seemed to be under the sway of well-organized Indonesian communists, who murdered and mutilated seven leading army generals as part of an unsuccessful uprising in 1965. The army immediately retaliated, systematically slaughtering a half million or more Indonesian communists, radicals, and noncommunist Chinese. Sukarno was forced to resign.

The Muslim military leaders, led by General Suharto, established their own form of authoritarian rule. The government promoted an official five-point ideology stressing belief in one God, nationalism, humanitarianism, democracy, and social justice. But Suharto's New Order concentrated mainly on economic development. Blessed with large oil revenues, it welcomed foreign capital, expanded the Indonesian middle classes, and achieved solid economic growth for a generation. Increasingly tied to the world economy, Indonesia in 1997 was suddenly devastated by financial crisis. In 1998 Suharto was forced to resign as calls for democratic reform swept the country.

Vietnam   The most bitter struggle for independence in Southeast Asia occurred in French Indochina. The French tried to reimpose imperial rule there after the communist and nationalist guerrilla leader Ho Chi Minh (1890–1969) declared an independent republic in 1945, but they were decisively defeated in 1954 in the Battle of Dien Bien Phu. At the subsequent international peace conference, French Indochina gained independence. Laos and Cambodia (later known as Kampuchea) became separate states; Vietnam was "temporarily" divided into two hostile sections at the seventeenth parallel pending elections to select a single unified government within two years.

The elections were never held, and the civil war that soon broke out between the two Vietnamese governments, one communist and one anticommunist, became the hottest cold war conflict in the 1960s. The United States invested tremendous military effort but fought its Vietnam War as a deeply divided country (see pages 1064–1065). The tough, dedicated communists

Burning General Suharto in Effigy, May 1998   Student demonstrations played a decisive role in driving Indonesia's aging president from office. Students are a potent but unpredictable force in domestic politics around the world, as they have been since the early nineteenth century. *(Kees/Sygma)*

Date is year independence was achieved.
Shading indicates former ruler.

Great Britain
France
Netherlands
Italy

Belgium
Portugal
United States

MAP 34.3 Modern Islam, ca 1990 Although the Islamic heartland remains the Middle East and North Africa, Islam is growing steadily in Africa south of the Sahara and is the faith of heavily populated Indonesia.

eventually proved victorious in 1975. Thus events in Vietnam roughly recapitulated those in China, but in a long, drawn-out fashion: after a bitter civil war worsened by cold war hatreds, the communists succeeded in creating a unified Marxist nation. And after another generation the Vietnamese communists also began to turn from central planning toward freer markets and private initiative, even as they zealously guarded their political power.

MAP 34.2 The New States in Africa and Asia Divided primarily along religious lines into two states, British India led the way to political independence in 1947. Most African territories achieved statehood by the mid-1960s, as European empires passed away, unlamented.

The Muslim World

Throughout the vast arc of predominantly Islamic lands that stretches from Indonesia in Southeast Asia to Senegal in West Africa (Map 34.3), nationalism remained the primary political force after 1945. Anti-Western and anticommunist in most instances, nationalism in the Muslim world generally combined a strong secular state with a basic loyalty to Islam. Cold war conflicts and enormous oil resources enhanced the region's global standing.

In the Arab countries of North Africa and the Middle East, with their shared but highly differentiated language and culture, nationalism wore two faces. The idealistic side focused on the Pan-Arab dream of uniting all Arabs in a single nation that would be strong enough to resist the West and achieve genuine independence

This Pan-Arab vision contributed to political and economic alliances like the Arab League; but no Arab Bismarck appeared, and the vision foundered on intense regional, ideological, and personal rivalries. Thus the practical, down-to-earth side of Arab nationalism focused largely on nation building within the particular states that supplanted former League of Nations mandates and European colonies.

This effort eventually seemed to some to result in one-party dictatorship, corruption, and continued daily hardship. Beginning in the 1970s some Islamic preachers and devoted laypeople charged that the model of modernizing, Western-inspired nationalism had failed. These critics, known in the West as fundamentalists, urged a return to Islamic principles and traditional morality. They evoked a sympathetic response among many educated Muslims as well as among villagers and city dwellers.

Israel and the Palestinians   Before the Second World War, Arab nationalists were loosely united in their opposition to the colonial powers and to Jewish migration to Palestine. The French gave up their League of Nations mandates in Syria and Lebanon in 1945, having been forced by popular uprisings to follow the British example. Attention then focused even more sharply on British-mandated Palestine. The situation was volatile. The Jews' demand that the British permit all survivors of Hitler's death camps to settle in Palestine was strenuously opposed by the Palestinian Arabs and the seven independent states of the newly founded Arab League (Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen). Murder and terrorism flourished, nurtured by bitterly conflicting Arab and Jewish nationalisms.

The British—their occupation policies in Palestine condemned by Arabs and Jews, by Russians and Americans—announced in 1947 their intention to withdraw from Palestine in 1948. The insoluble problem was dumped in the lap of the United Nations. In November 1947 the United Nations General Assembly passed a nonbinding resolution supporting a plan to partition Palestine into two separate states—one Arab and one Jewish (Map 34.4). The Jews accepted, but the Arabs rejected, partition of Palestine.

By early 1948 an undeclared civil war was raging in Palestine. When the British mandate officially ended on May 14, 1948, the Jews proclaimed the state of Israel. Arab countries immediately launched an attack on the new Jewish state, but the Israelis drove off the invaders and conquered more territory. Roughly 900,000 Arab refugees—the exact number is disputed—fled or were expelled from old Palestine. This war left an enormous legacy of Arab bitterness toward Israel and its political allies, Great Britain and the United States, and it led to the creation of the Palestine Liberation Organization, a loose union of Palestinian refugee groups opposed to Israel.

Egypt   In Egypt the humiliation of Arab defeat triggered a nationalist revolution. A young army colonel named Gamal Abdel Nasser (1918–1970) drove out the corrupt and pro-Western King Farouk in 1952. A gifted politician and the unchallenged leader of the largest Arab state, Nasser enjoyed powerful influence in the Middle East and throughout Asia and Africa. Perhaps his most successful and widely imitated move was radical land reform: large estates along the Nile were nationalized and divided up among peasants without violence or drastic declines in production.

Nasser preached the gospel of neutralism in the cold war, jailed Egyptian communists, and turned for aid to the Soviet Union to demonstrate Egypt's independence of the West. Relations with Israel and the West worsened, and in 1956 Nasser nationalized the European-owned Suez Canal Company, the last vestige of European power in the Middle East. Outraged, the British and French joined forces with the Israelis and successfully invaded Egypt. But the Americans unexpectedly sided with the Soviets and forced the British, French, and Israelis to withdraw from Egypt.

This great victory for Nasser encouraged anti-Western radicalism, hopes of Pan-Arab political unity, and a vague "Arab socialism." Yet the Arab world remained deeply divided. The only shared goals were bitter opposition to Israel—war recurred in 1967 and in 1973—and support for the right of Palestinian refugees to return to their homeland. In late 1977 President Anwar Sadat of Egypt tried another tack: pathbreaking official visit to Israel.

Sadat's visit led to direct negotiations between Israel and Egypt, which were effectively mediated by U.S. president Jimmy Carter, and a historic though limited peace settlement. Each country gained: Egypt got back the Sinai Peninsula, which Israel had taken in the 1967 Six-Day War (see Map 34.4), and Israel obtained peace and normal relations with Egypt. Other Arab leaders denounced Sadat's initiative as treason.

After Sadat's assassination by Islamic radicals in 1981, Egypt's relations with Israel deteriorated badly over the question of ever-increasing Israeli settlement on the West Bank—the area west of the Jordan River inhabited by Palestinian Arabs but taken by Israel from Jordan during the 1967 war. Yet Egypt and Israel maintained their fragile peace.

Freedom for Palestinians   Jubilant friends and relatives embrace the first political prisoners released by Israel from the grim central prison in Gaza city. Israel freed a thousand Palestinian political prisoners to show its willingness to implement the interim peace agreement with the Palestine Liberation Movement. *(Larry Towell/Magnum Photos)*

In 1988 young Palestinians in the occupied territories began a prolonged campaign of rock throwing and civil disobedience against Israeli soldiers. Inspired increasingly by Islamic fundamentalists, the Palestinian uprising eventually posed a serious challenge not only to Israel but also to the secular Palestinian liberation movement, long led from abroad by Yasir Arafat. The result was an unexpected agreement in 1993 between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization, which, after further negotiations, granted Palestinian self-rule in Gaza and Jericho and called for self-rule throughout the West Bank in five years.

The 1993 agreement was hotly debated in an increasingly divided Israel. In 1995, in this tense atmosphere, a right-wing Jewish extremist assassinated Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin (r. 1992–1995), thereby following the lead of those Israelis who had denounced the war hero and leader as a traitor to his own people. In 1996 a coalition of opposition parties won a slender

majority in the Israeli government. Charging the Palestinian leadership with condoning anti-Jewish terrorism, the new Israeli government was determined to revise the 1993 peace accord and maintain Jewish settlements on the West Bank. By 1998 negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians were still continuing, but peace was nowhere in sight.

Nationalism, Fundamentalism, and Competition
The recent history of the non-Arab states of Turkey and Iran and of the Arab states of Iraq and Algeria (see Map 34.3) testifies to the diversity of national development in the Muslim world. That history also dramatically illustrates the intense competition between rival states and the growing strength of Islamic revival.

Turkey remained basically true to Atatürk's vision of a thoroughly modernized, secularized, Europeanized state (see page 961). Islam continued to exert less influence in daily life and thought there than it did in

MAP 34.4 Palestine, Israel, and the Middle East, 1947–1999   Since the British mandate expired on May 14, 1948, there have been five major wars and innumerable armed clashes in what was formerly Palestine. After winning the War of Independence in 1948, Israel achieved spectacular victories in 1967 in the Six-Day War, occupying the Sinai Peninsula, the Golan Heights, and the West Bank. The Yom Kippur War of 1973 eventually led to the Israeli evacuation of the Sinai and peace with Egypt. In 1993 Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization agreed in principle to self-rule for Palestinian Arabs in the West Bank in five years, and in 1994 the Gaza Strip and Jericho were placed under the administration of the Palestinian Authority. Negotiations are still continuing for a final agreement.

other Middle Eastern countries. Turkey still looked toward the West, joining NATO in 1952 and becoming an associate member of the European Community.

Iran tried again to follow Turkey's example, as it had before 1939 (see page 962). Once again its success was limited. The new shah—Muhammad Reza Pahlavi (r. 1941–1979), the son of Reza Shah Pahlavi—angered Iranian nationalists by courting Western powers and Western oil companies in the course of freeing his country from Soviet influence after the Second World War. In 1953, after leading the effort to nationalize the British-owned Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, the Iranian Majlis and the fiery prime minister Muhammad Mossaddeq forced the shah to flee to Europe. But Mossaddeq's victory was short-lived. Loyal army officers, with the help of the American CIA, quickly restored the shah to his throne.

The shah set out to build a powerful modern nation to ensure his rule. Iran's gigantic oil revenues provided the necessary cash. The shah undermined the power bases of the traditional politicians—large landowners and religious leaders—by means of land reform, secular education, and increased power for the central government. Modernization surged forward, but at the price of ancient values, widespread corruption, and harsh dictatorship. The result was a violent reaction against modernization and secular values: an Islamic revolution in 1978 that aimed at infusing strict Islamic principles into all aspects of personal and public life. Led by religious leaders grouped around the spellbinding Ayatollah Ruholla Khomeini, the radicals deposed the shah and tried to build their vision of a true Islamic state.

Iran's Islamic republic frightened its neighbors. Iraq, especially, feared that Iran—a nation of Shi'ite Muslims—would succeed in getting Iraq's Shi'ite majority to revolt against its Sunni leaders. Thus in September 1980 Iraq's president, Saddam Hussein (b. 1937), launched a surprise attack, expecting his well-equipped armies to defeat an increasingly chaotic Iran. Instead, Iraqi aggression galvanized the Iranian revolutionaries in a fanatical determination to defend their homeland and punish Iraq's leader. Iranians and Iraqis—Persians and Arabs—clashed in one of the bloodiest wars in modern times, a savage stalemate that killed hundreds of thousands of soldiers before finally grinding to a halt in 1988.

Emerging from the eight-year war with a big, tough army equipped by Western countries and the Soviet bloc, Iraq's strongman set out to make himself the leader of the entire Arab world. Eyeing the great oil wealth of his tiny southern neighbor, Saddam Hussein suddenly ordered his forces to overrun Kuwait in August 1990, and he proclaimed its annexation to Iraq. To Saddam's surprise, his aggression brought a vigorous international response (see page 1066).

In early 1991 his troops were chased out of Kuwait by an American-led, United Nations–sanctioned military coalition. American troops, accompanied by small British, French, and Italian forces, were joined in ground operations against Iraq by some Arab forces from Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia. Thus the Arab peoples, long wracked by bitter rivalries between nation-building states, came to fight a kind of bloody civil war. Disillusionment with existing Arab governments increased in the early 1990s.

The important North African country of Algeria highlighted the development of first nationalism and then fundamentalism. Nationalism in the French colony of Algeria was emboldened by Nasser's great triumph—and by the defeat of the French in Indochina. But Algeria's large European population of more than a million considered Algeria home and were determined to keep it an integral part of France. It was this determination that made the ensuing Algerian war so bitter and bloody.

In 1958 a military coup in Algeria, resulting from the fears of the European settlers that a disillusioned, anticolonial majority of French voters would sell them out, brought General Charles de Gaulle back to power in France. Contrary to expectations, de Gaulle accepted the principle of self-determination for Algeria in 1959, and French voters agreed in a national referendum. In 1962, after more than a century of French conquest, Algeria became an independent Arab state. The European population quickly fled.

The victorious anticolonial movement, known as the National Liberation Front, or FLN, used the revenues of Algeria's nationalized oil fields to promote state-owned industries, urban growth, and technical education. But the FLN also imposed a one-party state, which crushed dissent and favored a self-serving party elite. In the 1980s increasing numbers of dissatisfied Algerians looked toward Islam for moral and social revival, and in the early 1990s the Islamic opposition swept municipal and national elections. The FLN called on the army to preserve its power, claiming that the fundamentalists would "hijack" democracy and create an Islamic dictatorship. Military rule then led to growing violence and armed struggle between the government and the radical minority in the fundamentalist opposition. The ruthless civil war in Algeria placed in

bold relief the cultural and ideological divisions simmering just below the surface in the Muslim world.

IMPERIALISM AND NATIONALISM IN BLACK AFRICA

Most of sub-Saharan Africa won political independence fairly rapidly after the Second World War. Only Portugal's old but relatively underdeveloped African territories and white-dominated southern Africa remained beyond the reach of African nationalists by 1964. The rise of independent states in black Africa—a major development in world history—resulted directly from both a reaction against Western imperialism and the growth of African nationalism.

The Growth of African Nationalism

Western intrusion was the critical factor in the development of African nationalism, as it had been in Asia and the Middle East. But two things were different about Africa. First, because the imperial system and Western education did not solidify in Africa until after 1900 (see pages 861–864), national movements began to come of age only in the 1920s and reached maturity after 1945. Second, Africa's multiplicity of ethnic groups, coupled with imperial boundaries that often bore no resemblance to existing ethnic boundaries, greatly complicated the development of political—as distinct from a cultural—nationalism. Was a modern national state to be based on ethnic tribal loyalties (as it had been in France and Germany, in China and Japan)? Was it to be founded on an all-African union of all black peoples? Or would such a state have to be built on the multitribal territories arbitrarily carved out by competing European empires? Only after 1945 did a tentative answer emerge.

A few educated West Africans in British colonies had articulated a kind of black nationalism before 1914. But the first real impetus came from the United States and the British West Indies. American blacks struggling for racial justice and black self-confidence took a keen interest in their African origins and in the common problems of all black people. Their influence on educated Africans was great.

Of the many persons who participated in this "black nationalism" and in the "Renaissance" of American black literature in the 1920s, the most renowned was W. E. B. Du Bois (1868–1963). The first black to re

ceive a Ph.D. from Harvard, this brilliant writer and historian organized Pan-African congresses in Paris during the Versailles Peace Conference and in Brussels in 1921. The goals of Pan-Africanists were solidarity among blacks everywhere and, eventually, a vast self-governing union of all African peoples.

The European powers were hostile, of course, but so was the tiny minority of educated blacks in French Africa. As the influential Blaise Daigne, a black politician elected to the French parliament by the privileged African "citizens" of Senegal, told Du Bois:

We Frenchmen of Africa wish to remain French, for France has given us every liberty and accepted us without reservation along with her European children. None of us aspire to see French Africa delivered exclusively to the Africans as is demanded, though without any authority, by the American Negroes.[5]

Many educated French and British Africans, however, experienced a strong surge of pride and cultural nationalism in the 1920s and 1930s, inspired in part by American and West Indian blacks. African students and white intellectuals in Europe marveled at the accomplishments of American blacks in art, literature, African history, and anthropology. They listened to black musicians—jazz swept Europe by storm—and concluded that "in music American Negroes have acquired since the War a place which one can call pre-eminent; for they have impressed the entire world with their vibrating or melancholy rhythms."[6]

African intellectuals in Europe formulated and articulated the rich idea of *négritude,* or blackness: racial pride, self-confidence, and joy in black creativity and the black spirit. The powerful cultural nationalism that grew out of the cross-fertilization of African intellectuals and blacks from the United States and the West Indies was an unexpected byproduct of European imperialism.

Black consciousness also emerged in the British colonies between the world wars—especially in West Africa. The westernized elite pressed for more equal access to government jobs, modest steps toward self-government, and an end to humiliating discrimination. This elite began to claim the right to speak for ordinary Africans and to denounce the government-supported chiefs as "Uncle Toms." Yet the great majority of well-educated British and French Africans remained moderate in their demands.

The Great Depression was the decisive turning point in the development of African nationalism. For the first time unemployment was widespread among educated

NATIONALISM IN BLACK AFRICA

1919	Du Bois organizes first Pan-African congress
1920s	Cultural nationalism grows among Africa's educated elites
1929	Great Depression brings economic hardship and discontent
1930–1931	Farmers in the Gold Coast organize first "cocoa holdups"
1939–1945	World War II accelerates political and economic change
1951	Nkrumah and Convention People's party win national elections in Ghana
1957	Nkrumah leads Ghana—former Gold Coast—to independence
1958	De Gaulle offers commonwealth status to France's African territories Guinea alone chooses independence
1960	Mali and Nigeria become independent states
1966	Ghana's Nkrumah deposed in military coup
1967	Ibos secede from Nigeria to form state of Biafra
1979	Nigeria's military rulers permit elected civilian government
1980	Blacks rule Zimbabwe—formerly Southern Rhodesia—after long civil war with white settlers
1984	South Africa's whites maintain racial segregation and discrimination
1989–1990	South African government begins process of reform Black leader Nelson Mandela freed from prison
1994	Mandela elected president of South Africa

Africans. Hostility toward well-paid white officials rose sharply. The Western-educated elite became more vocal, and some real radicals appeared.

Educated Africans ventured into new activities, often out of necessity. Especially in the towns, they supplied the leadership for many new organizations, including not only political parties and trade unions but also social clubs, native churches, and agricultural cooperatives. Radical journalists published uncompromising attacks on colonial governments in easy-to-read mass-circulation newspapers. The most spectacular of these journalists was the Nigerian Nnamdi Azikiwe, who had attended black colleges in the United States and learned his trade on an African-American weekly in Baltimore.

The popular, flamboyant "Zik" was demanding independence for Nigeria as early as the late 1930s.

The Great Depression also produced extreme hardship and profound discontent among the African masses. African peasants and small business people who had been drawn into world trade, and who sometimes profited from booms, felt the agony of the decade-long bust, as did urban workers. In some areas the result was unprecedented mass protest. The Gold Coast "cocoa holdups" of 1930–1931 and 1937–1938 are the most famous examples.

Cocoa completely dominated the Gold Coast's economy. As prices plummeted after 1929, cocoa farmers refused to sell their beans to the large British firms that

fixed prices and monopolized the export trade. Instead, the farmers organized cooperatives to cut back production and sell their crops directly to European and American chocolate manufacturers. Small African traders and traditional tribal leaders largely supported the movement, which succeeded in mobilizing much of the population against the foreign companies. Many Africans saw the economic conflict in racial terms.

The holdups were only partially successful, but they did force the government to establish an independent cocoa marketing board. They also demonstrated that mass organization and mass protest had come to advanced West Africa. Powerful mass movements for national independence would not be far behind.

Achieving Independence with New Leaders

The repercussions of the Second World War in black Africa greatly accelerated the changes begun in the 1930s. Mines and plantations strained to meet wartime demands. Towns mushroomed into cities whose tin-can housing, inflation, and shortages of consumer goods created discontent and hardship. Africans had such eye-opening experiences as the curious spectacle of the British denouncing the racism of the Germans. Many African soldiers who served in India were powerfully impressed by Indian nationalism.

The attitudes of Western imperialists changed also. Both the British and the French acknowledged the need for rapid social and economic improvement in their colonies; both began sending money and aid on a large scale for the first time. The French funneled more money into their West African colonies between 1947 and 1957 than during the entire previous half century. The principle of self-government was written into the United Nations charter and was supported by Great Britain's postwar Labour government. As one top British official stated in 1948:

The central purpose of British colonial policy is simple. It is to guide the colonial territories to responsible government within the commonwealth in conditions that ensure to the people concerned both a fair standard of living and freedom from oppression from any quarter.[7]

Thus the key question for Great Britain's various African colonies was their rate of progress toward self-government. The British and the French were in no rush. But a new breed of African leader was emerging. Impatient and insistent, these spokesmen for modern African nationalism were remarkably successful: by 1964 almost all of western, eastern, and central Africa

had achieved statehood, usually without much bloodshed.

The new postwar African leaders shared common characteristics. They formed an elite by virtue of advanced European or American education, and they were profoundly influenced by Western thought. But compared with the interwar generation of educated Africans, they were more radical and humbler in social origin. Among them were former schoolteachers, union leaders, government clerks, and unemployed students, as well as lawyers and prizewinning poets.

Furthermore, the postwar African leaders expressed their nationalism in terms of the existing territorial governments. They accepted prevailing boundaries to avoid border disputes and to achieve freedom as soon as possible. Sometimes tribal chiefs became their worst political enemies. Skillfully, the new leaders channeled postwar hope and discontent into support for mass political organizations. These organizations staged gigantic protests and became political parties. Eventually they came to power by winning the general elections that the colonial government belatedly called to choose its successor.

Ghana Shows the Way

Perhaps the most charismatic of this generation of African leaders was Kwame Nkrumah (1909–1972). Under his leadership the Gold Coast—which he rechristened "Ghana"—became the first independent African state to emerge from colonialism. Having begun his career as a schoolteacher in the Gold Coast, Nkrumah spent ten years studying in the United States, where he was deeply influenced by European socialists and by the Jamaican-born black leader Marcus Garvey (1887–1940). Convinced that blacks could never win justice in countries with white majorities, Garvey had organized a massive "Back to Africa" movement in the 1920s. He also preached "Africa for the Africans," calling for independence. Nkrumah returned to the Gold Coast immediately after the Second World War and entered politics.

The time was ripe. Economic discontent erupted in rioting in February 1948; angry crowds looted European and Lebanese stores. The British, embarking on their new course, invited African proposals for constitutional reform. These proposals became the basis of the new constitution, which gave more power to Africans within the framework of (eventual) parliamentary democracy. Meanwhile, Nkrumah was building a radi-

cal mass party appealing particularly to modern elements—former servicemen, market women, union members, urban toughs, and cocoa farmers. He and his party injected the joy and enthusiasm of religious revivals into their rallies and propaganda: "Self-Government Now" was their credo, secular salvation the promise.

Rejecting halfway measures—"We prefer self-government with danger to servitude in tranquillity"—Nkrumah and his Convention People's party staged strikes and riots. Arrested, the "Deliverer of Ghana" campaigned from jail and saw his party win a smashing victory in the national elections of 1951. Called from prison to head the transitional government, Nkrumah and his nationalist party defeated both westernized moderates and more traditional "tribal" rivals in free elections. By 1957 Nkrumah had achieved worldwide fame and influence as Ghana became the first African state to emerge from colonial control.

After Ghana's breakthrough, independence for other African colonies followed rapidly. As in Algeria, the main problem was the permanent white settlers, as distinguished from the colonial officials. Wherever white settlers were at all numerous, as in Kenya, they sought to preserve their privileged position. But only in Southern Rhodesia were whites numerous enough to prevail long. Southern Rhodesian whites declared independence illegally in 1965 and held out until 1980, when black nationalists won a long guerrilla war and renamed the country Zimbabwe. In Zambia (formerly Northern Rhodesia) and East Africa, white settlers simply lacked the numbers to challenge black nationalists or the British colonial office for long.

The Opening of Parliament in Ghana   As part of an ancient ritual, two medicine men pour out sacred oil and call on the gods to bless the work of the Second Parliament and President Kwame Nkrumah, standing on the right. The combination of time-honored customs and modern political institutions was characteristic of African states after they secured independence. *(Wide World Photos)*

French-Speaking Regions

Decolonization took a somewhat different course in French-speaking Africa. France tried hard to hold on to Indochina and Algeria after 1945. Thus although France upped its aid to its African colonies, independence remained a dirty word until de Gaulle came to power in 1958. Seeking to head off radical nationalists, and receiving the crucial support of moderate black leaders, de Gaulle chose a divide-and-rule strategy. He divided the federations of French West Africa and French Equatorial Africa into thirteen separate governments, thus creating a "French commonwealth." Plebiscites were called in each territory to ratify the new arrangement. An affirmative vote meant continued ties with France; a negative vote signified immediate independence and a complete break with France.

De Gaulle's gamble was shrewd. The educated black elite—as personified by the influential poet-politician Léopold Sédar Senghor, who now led the government of Senegal (see the feature "Individuals in Society: Léopold Sédar Senghor, Poet and Statesman")—loved France and dreaded a sudden divorce. They also wanted French aid to continue. France, in keeping with its ideology of assimilation, had given the vote to the educated elite in its colonies after the Second World War, and about forty Africans held seats in the French parliament after 1946. Some of these impressive African politicians exercised real power and influence in metropolitan France. The Ivory Coast's Félix Houphouét-Boigny, for instance, served for a time as France's minister of health. For both cultural and practical reasons, therefore, French Africa's leaders tended to be moderate and in no rush for independence.

Yet political nationalism was not totally submerged. In Guinea an inspiring young radical named Sekou Touré (1922–1984) led his people in overwhelming rejection of the new constitution in 1958. Inspired by Ghana's Nkrumah, Touré laid it out to de Gaulle, face to face: "We have to tell you bluntly, Mr. President, what the demands of the people are. . . . We have one prime and essential need: our dignity. But there is no dignity without freedom. . . . We prefer freedom in poverty to opulence in slavery."[8]

De Gaulle punished Guinea as best he could. French officials and equipment were withdrawn, literally overnight, down to the last man and pencil. Guinea's total collapse was widely predicted—and devoutly hoped for in France. But Guinea's new government survived. Following Guinea's lead, Mali asked for independence in 1960. The other French territories quickly followed suit, though the new states retained close ties with France.

Belgium tried belatedly to imitate de Gaulle in its enormous Congo colony, but without success. Long-time practitioners of paternalism coupled with harsh, selfish rule, the Belgians had discouraged the development of an educated elite. In 1959, therefore, when after wild riots they suddenly decided to grant independence, the fabric of government simply broke down. Independence was soon followed by violent tribal conflict, civil war, and foreign intervention. The Belgian Congo was the great exception to black Africa's generally peaceful and successful transition to independence between 1957 and 1964.

🜨 Sub-Saharan Africa Since 1960

The facility with which most of black Africa achieved independence stimulated buoyant optimism in the early 1960s. As Europeans congratulated themselves on having fulfilled their "civilizing mission," Africans anticipated even more rapid progress. But in the course of a generation the outlook changed. In most former colonies democratic government and civil liberties gave way to one-party rule or military dictatorship. In many countries it became common for the winners in a political power struggle to imprison, exile, or murder the losers. Corruption was widespread.

The rise of authoritarian government in Africa after independence must be viewed in historical perspective. Representative institutions on the eve of independence were an imperial afterthought, and the new African countries faced tremendous challenges. Above all, ethnic divisions threatened civil conflicts that could tear the fragile states apart. Yet this did not happen. Strong leaders used nationalism, first harnessed to throw off foreign rule, to build one-party regimes and promote unity. Unfortunately, nation building by idealistic authoritarians often deteriorated into brutal dictatorships, frequent military coups, and civil strife. Then, in the early 1990s, a powerful reaction to this decline resulted in a surge of democratic protest, which achieved major political gains and rekindled in part the optimism of the independence era.

Striving for National Unity

The course of African history after independence was complex and often confusing, but the common legacy of imperialism resulted in certain basic patterns and

Léopold Sédar Senghor, Poet and Statesman

Of all the modern leaders in French-speaking Africa, Léopold Sédar Senghor (b. 1906) was the most famous and the most intriguing. His early years in a dusty village in southern Senegal were happy and varied. Later, in cold and lonely Paris, he would feast on memories of this "kingdom of childhood." Senghor's father, a successful peanut merchant, lived in the port city of Joal and had two dozen children and several wives. His last wife, Senghor's mother, remained in her village, where her extended family taught the boy the legends and mysteries of his people. In a famous poem, Senghor later wrote that his mother's brother, Uncle Waly the shepherd, could hear "what is beyond hearing," and that he lovingly explained to the wondering child "the signs that the Ancestors give in the calm seas of the constellations."[1]

Islam is Senegal's majority religion and the Wolof its dominant ethnic group. But Senghor's family was staunchly Christian and of the Serer people, and when Sédar was seven, his practical father sent him to a French mission school near Joal. Learning French and Wolof, Senghor made rapid progress. When he was seventeen, his teachers sent him on to the colonial capital of Dakar, where he became the top student in the predominately white lycée. In 1928 he received a rare scholarship for advanced study in Paris. Working hard in elite schools and settling on a university career, Senghor became the first African to win the equivalent of a Ph.D. He then took a position as a classics teacher in a lycée near Paris. It was an extraordinary achievement.

Senghor's chance to pursue advanced education reflected French colonial policy in Africa. The French believed that most Africans deserved only a little practical schooling, but they also wanted to create a tiny elite of "black Frenchmen." This elite would link the French rulers and the African masses, who would need permanent French guidance. In the 1930s the brilliant Senghor seemed a model of elitist assimilation.

In fact, however, Senghor was experiencing a severe identity crisis. Who was he? How could he reconcile his complex African heritage with his French education and culture? Making close friends with other black intellectuals in Paris and strongly influenced by African-American music and literature, Senghor concluded that he would never be a "black Frenchman," for in European eyes the most accomplished African always remained exotic and inferior. He then found a new identity in racial pride and the idea of *négritude,* or blackness (see page 1102). Yet Senghor did not repudiate Europe. Instead, he reconciled his identity crisis—his being torn "between the call of the Ancestors and the call of Europe"—by striving to hold his "two sides" in equilibrium and "peaceful accord." He advocated "cross-fertilization" for Africa and Europe, which, he believed, would benefit both continents.[2]

President Léopold Sédar Senghor in 1965. *(Keystone/Hulton Getty/Liaison)*

Serving in the French army in World War II and turning to politics after 1945, Senghor was elected Senegal's deputy to the French National Assembly. Idolized in Senegal, he joined with other African deputies to press for greater autonomy, as well as for harmony between France and Africa. He led Senegal into Charles de Gaulle's "French commonwealth" in 1958 and then on to independence in 1960. All the major political parties in Senegal were merged to form a one-party government, with Senghor as president. Wisely avoiding dictatorship, ethnic conflict, and military rule, he led Senegal until 1980, when he retired voluntarily. Lionized in France as a great poet and statesman, Senghor was increasingly criticized by some young Senegalese, who grumbled that the aging leader had become too cooperative with France—a real "black Frenchman."

Questions for Analysis

1. What cultural and intellectual forces influenced Senghor's development? Why did he have difficulty reconciling these influences?

2. How did Senghor fit into the whole process of decolonization and African independence?

1. Quoted in J. Vaillant, *Black, French, and African: A Life of Léopold Sédar Senghor* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), p. 18.

2. Ibid., p. 146.

problems. The legacy of imperialism in Africa was not all bad. One positive outcome was the creation of about forty well-defined states (see Map 34.2). These new states inherited functioning bureaucracies, some elected political leaders, and some modern infrastructure—that is, transportation, schools, hospitals, and the like.

The new African states inherited relatively modern, diversified social structures. Traditional tribal and religious rulers had generally lost out to a dynamic westernized elite whose moderate and radical wings faithfully reproduced the twentieth-century political spectrum. Each new state had the beginnings of an industrial working class and a volatile urban poor. Each country inherited the cornerstone of imperial power—a tough, well-equipped army to maintain order.

Other features of the imperialist legacy, however, served to torment independent Africa. The disruption of traditional life had caused real suffering and resulted in postindependence expectations that could not be met. The prevailing export economies were weak, lopsided, and concentrated in foreign hands. Technical, managerial, and medical skills were in acutely short supply. Above all, the legacy of political boundaries imposed by foreigners without regard to ethnic and cultural groupings weighed heavily on postindependence Africa. Almost all of the new states encompassed a variety of peoples, with different languages, religions, and cultures. As in the Austro-Hungarian Empire in the nineteenth century or in British India before independence, different peoples might easily develop conflicting national aspirations.

Great Britain and France had granted their African colonies democratic government as they prepared to depart. Yet belated, Western-style democracy served the new multiethnic states poorly. After freedom from imperialism no longer provided a unifying common objective, political parties often coalesced along regional and ethnic lines. Open political competition often encouraged regional and ethnic conflict, complicated nation building, and promoted political crisis. Many African leaders concluded that democracy threatened to destroy the existing states, which they deemed essential for social and economic progress in spite of their less-than-perfect boundaries. Thus these leaders maintained the authoritarian tradition they inherited from the imperialists. They imposed tough measures to hold their countries together, and free elections often gave way to dictators and one-party rule.

After Ghana won its independence, for instance, Nkrumah jailed without trial his main opponents—chiefs, lawyers, and intellectuals—and outlawed opposition parties. Embracing the authoritarian model,

Nkrumah worked to build a "revolutionary" one-party state and a socialist economy. His personality, his calls for African unity, and his bitter attacks on "Western imperialists" aroused both strong support and growing opposition. By the mid-1960s Nkrumah's grandiose economic projects had almost bankrupted Ghana, and in 1966 the army suddenly seized power while Nkrumah was visiting China. Across the continent in East Africa, Kenya and Tanzania likewise became one-party socialist states with strong leaders.

The French-speaking countries also shifted toward one-party government to promote state unity and develop distinctive characteristics that could serve as the basis for statewide nationalism. Mali followed Guinea into Marxist radicalism. Senegal and the Ivory Coast stressed moderation and close economic and cultural ties with France.

Like Nkrumah, many of the politicians at the helm of one-party states were eventually overthrown by military leaders. The rise of would-be Napoleons was lamented by many Western liberals and African intellectuals, who often failed to note that military rule was also widespread in Latin America, Asia, and the Near East in the 1970s and 1980s.

As elsewhere, military rule in Africa was authoritarian and undemocratic. Sometimes it placed a terrible burden on Africans. In Uganda, for instance, Idi Amin (b. 1925?), a brutal former sergeant, seized power in 1971, packed the army with his tribal supporters, and terrorized the population for a decade. Yet military government often had redeeming qualities. African military leaders generally did manage to hold their countries together, and they worked to build viable states. Equally important, many military regimes, like their counterparts in Latin America (see pages 1068–1070), were committed to social and economic modernization. Drawing on an educated, well-organized, and highly motivated elite, they sometimes accomplished a good deal.

African military leaders often claimed that their ultimate goal was free, representative civilian government, which they would restore after surmounting a grave national crisis. They also claimed that they would purge widespread civilian corruption, a promise often warmly welcomed by dissatisfied citizens. Yet the purification of public life and the restoration of elected government became increasingly rare. As economic and social conditions stagnated and often declined in African countries from the mid-1970s to the early 1990s (see Chapter 35), army leaders became more and more greedy and dishonest. By the late 1980s military rule and one-party authoritarian regimes had reached a dead end in Africa.

Nigeria, Africa's Giant

The history of Nigeria illustrates just how difficult genuine nation building could be after independence was achieved. "Nigeria" was a name coined by the British to designate their nineteenth-century conquests in the Niger River basin, for the peoples of Nigeria encompassed many ancient kingdoms and hundreds of smaller ethnic and kinship groups. Yet despite the fact that in 1914 modern Nigeria was only an arbitrary consolidation of the northern Muslim territories and the southern Christian or animist areas for administrative convenience, by 1945 Nigeria had spawned a powerful independence movement. The British responded receptively in the early postwar era, and Nigeria entered into a period of intense but peaceful negotiation. In 1954 the third constitution in seven years set up the framework within which independence was achieved in 1960.

The key constitutional question was the relationship between the central government and the various regions. Ultimately Nigeria adopted a federal system, whereby the national government at Lagos shared power with three regional or state governments in the north, west, and east. Each region had a dominant tribe and a corresponding political party. The parties were expected to cooperate in the national parliament, and the rights of minorities were protected by law.

With a population of 55 million in 1963, "Africa's Giant" towered over the other new African nations. But after independence Nigerians' bright hopes gradually dimmed because of ethnic rivalries. In 1964 minorities in the Western Region began forming their own region in an attempt to escape Yoruba domination, and tribal battles erupted. At this point a group of young army officers seized power in the capital city of Lagos, executing leading politicians and all officers above the rank of major. In an attempt to end the national crisis and preserve the nation, the new military council imposed martial law and abolished the regional governments.

At first the young officers were popular, for the murdered politicians had been widely considered weak, corrupt, and too pro-Western. However, many of the new military leaders were Ibos. The Muslim northerners had long distrusted the hard-working, clannish, non

Mobilizing in Biafra   A Biafran officer, himself only nine years old, drills a column of fresh recruits in 1969 during the Nigerian civil war. The boy soldiers were used for spying and sabotage, as Biafra struggled desperately against encirclement and starvation to win its independence. *(Pictorial Parade/Archive Photos)*

Muslim Ibos, who under the British had come to dominate business and the professions throughout Nigeria. When the Ibo-led military council proclaimed a highly centralized dictatorship, wild mobs in northern cities massacred thousands of Ibos. The panic-stricken survivors fled to their Ibo homeland in southeastern Nigeria. When a group of northern officers then seized the national government in a countercoup, the traumatized Ibos revolted in 1967 and proclaimed the independent state of Biafra.

The war in Biafra lasted three years. The Ibos fought with heroic determination, believing that political independence was their only refuge from genocide. Heavily outnumbered, the Ibos were gradually surrounded. Perhaps millions starved to death as Biafra became a symbol of monumental human tragedy.

The bloody civil war in Nigeria showed the world that Africa's "artificial" boundaries and states were remarkably durable. Having preserved the state in the 1960s, Nigeria's military rulers focused on building a nation in the 1970s. Although the federal government held the real power, the country was divided into nineteen small, manageable units to handle local and cultural matters. The defeated Ibos were pardoned, and Iboland was rebuilt with federal money. Modernizing investments of this kind were made possible by soaring oil revenues, as Nigeria became the world's seventh largest oil producer.

In 1979, after thirteen years of military rule, Nigeria's army leaders were confident enough to return power to an elected civilian government. But four years later the army again seized control and imposed a harsh dictatorship, which was dominated by Hausa-Fulani Muslims. These northerners practiced a tribal favoritism that threatened to re-ignite regional and ethnic tensions that were never far beneath the surface. This encouraged another coup in 1985, which promised more liberty and less favoritism. But in 1993 the outgoing rulers cynically canceled the results of the long-awaited elections. General Sani Abacha seized power, jailed the newly elected president, and based his dictatorship on the Hausa-Fulani officer corps until his sudden death in 1998. Abacha's military regime was a tragic betrayal of the army's earlier nation-building mission, which Abacha's successor promised to honor by means of a gradual restoration of civilian rule.

The Struggle in Southern Africa

After the great rush toward political independence in the early 1960s, decolonization stalled. Southern Africa remained under white minority rule, largely because of the numerical strength and determination of its white settlers. In Portuguese Angola and Mozambique, the white population actually increased from 70,000 to 380,000 between 1940 and the mid-1960s, as white settlers using forced native labor established large coffee farms.

As economic exploitation grew, so did resentment. Nationalist liberation movements arose to wage unrelenting guerrilla warfare. After a coup overturned the long-established dictatorship in Portugal, African guerrillas managed to take control in Angola and Mozambique in 1975. Shortly thereafter a coalition of nationalist groups also won in Zimbabwe after a long struggle.

The battle in South Africa threatened to be still worse. The racial conflict in the white-ruled Republic of South Africa could be traced back in part to the outcome of the Boer War (see page 860). Although the British finally conquered the inland Afrikaner republics, they had to compromise to avoid a long guerrilla war. Specifically, the British agreed to grant all of South Africa self-government as soon as possible and to let its government decide which nonwhites, if any, should vote. It was to be a tragic compromise.

Defeated on the battlefield, the embittered Afrikaners elaborated a potently racist nationalism. Between 1910—when South Africa became basically a self-governing dominion, like Canada and Australia—and 1948 the Afrikaners gradually won political power from their English-speaking settler rivals. After their decisive electoral victory in 1948, Afrikaner nationalists spoke increasingly for a large majority of South African whites, who supported the political leadership with varying degrees of enthusiasm.

The goals of Afrikaner nationalism in the twentieth century were remarkably consistent: white supremacy and racial segregation. In 1913 the new South African legislature passed the Native Land Act, which limited black ownership of land to native reserves encompassing a mere one-seventh of the country. Poor, overpopulated, and too small to feed themselves, the native reserves in the countryside served as a pool of cheap, temporary black labor for white farms, gold mines, and urban factories. A black worker—typically a young single person—could leave the reserve only with special permission. In the eyes of the law he or she was only a temporary migrant who could be returned at will by the employer or the government. The native reserves system, combining racial segregation and indirect forced labor, formed the foundation of white supremacy in South Africa.

After 1948 successive Afrikaner governments wove the somewhat haphazard early racist measures into an authoritarian fabric of racial discrimination and inequality. This system was officially known as *apartheid,* meaning "separation" or "segregation." The population was divided into four legally unequal racial groups: whites, blacks, Asians, and racially mixed "coloureds." Although Afrikaner propagandists claimed to serve the interests of all racial groups by preserving separate cultures and racial purity, most observers saw apartheid as a way of maintaining the lavish privileges of the white minority, which accounted for only one-sixth of the total population.

After 1940 South Africa's cities grew rapidly in conjunction with its emergence as the most highly industrialized country in Africa. Urbanization changed the face of the country, but good jobs in the cities were reserved for whites. Whites lived in luxurious modern central cities. Blacks, legally classified as temporary migrants, were restricted to outlying black townships plagued by poverty, crime, and white policemen. In spite of segregation, the growing cities produced a vibrant urban black culture, largely distinct from that of the tribal reserves. As a black journalist in Johannesburg explained in 1966:

I am supposed to be a Pondo, but I don't even know the language of that tribe. . . . I am just not a tribesman, whether I like it or not. I am, inescapably, a part of the city slums, the factory machines and our beloved shebeens [illegal bars].[9]

South Africa's harsh white supremacy elicited many black nationalist protests from the 1920s onward. By the 1950s blacks—and their coloured, white, and Asian allies—were staging large-scale peaceful protests. A high point came in 1960, when police at Sharpeville fired into a crowd of demonstrators and killed sixty-nine blacks. The main black nationalist organization—the African National Congress (ANC)—was outlawed but sent some of its leaders abroad to establish new headquarters. Other members, led by a young black lawyer named Nelson Mandela (b. 1918), stayed in South Africa to set up an underground army to oppose the government. Captured after seventeen months, Mandela was tried for treason and sentenced to life imprisonment. (See the feature "Listening to the Past: The Struggle for Freedom in South Africa" on pages 1116–1117.)

By the late 1970s the white government had apparently destroyed the moderate black opposition within South Africa. Operating out of the sympathetic black states of Zimbabwe and Mozambique to the north, the militant ANC turned increasingly to armed struggle. South Africa struck back hard and forced its neighbors

to curtail the ANC's guerrilla activities. Fortified by these successes, South Africa's white leaders launched in 1984 a program of cosmetic "reforms." For the first time, the 3 million coloureds and the 1 million South Africans of Asian descent were granted limited parliamentary representation. But no provision was made for any representation of the country's 22 million blacks, and laws controlling black movement and settlement were maintained.

The government's self-serving reforms provoked black indignation and triggered a massive reaction. In the segregated townships young black militants took to the streets, attacking in particular black civil servants and policemen as agents of white oppression. Heavily armed white security forces clashed repeatedly with black protesters, who turned funerals for fallen comrades into mass demonstrations. In 1985 the white government delared a state of emergency and took a gigantic step toward dictatorship for all, regardless of race. Between 1985 and 1989 five thousand died and fifty thousand were jailed without charges because of the political unrest.

By 1989 the white government and the black opposition had reached an impasse. Black protesters had been bloodied but not beaten, and their movement for democracy had gathered worldwide support. The U.S. Congress had applied strong sanctions against South Africa in October 1986, and the Common Market had followed. The white government still held power, but harsh repression of black resistance had failed.

A major step toward breaking the political stalemate came in September 1989 with the election of a new state president, Frederik W. de Klerk, an Afrikaner lawyer and politician. A late-blooming reformer, de Klerk moved cautiously toward reducing tensions and opening a dialogue with ANC leaders. Negotiating with Nelson Mandela, whose reputation had soared among urban blacks during his long years in prison, de Klerk lifted the state of emergency in most of the country, legalized the ANC, and freed Mandela in February 1990. Emerging from prison as a proud and impressive leader, Mandela courageously suspended the ANC's armed struggle and thereby met de Klerk's condition for serious talks on South Africa's political future. Negotiations were long and difficult, greatly complicated by bitter opposition from right-wing whites and by violent clashes between some Zulus and some supporters of the ANC. But Mandela and de Klerk persevered. They reached an agreement calling for universal suffrage, which meant black majority rule. They also guaranteed the civil and economic rights of minorities, including job security for white government workers

Men of Destiny   Nelson Mandela shakes hands with Frederik de Klerk following a televised presidential debate in the 1994 electoral campaign. Mandela won and replaced de Klerk as president of South Africa after 350 years of white supremacy. De Klerk became vice president. Both leaders vowed to build a multiracial democratic society. *(Mark Peters/Sipa Press)*

Elected president of South Africa by an overwhelming majority in May 1994, Mandela told his jubilant supporters of his "deep pride and joy—pride in the ordinary, humble people of this country. . . . And joy that we can loudly proclaim from the roof tops—free at last!"[10] Heading the new "government of national unity," which included de Klerk as vice president, Mandela and the peoples of South Africa set about building a democratic, multiracial nation. The new constitution guaranteed that all political parties would have some legislative seats until 1998.

Black majority rule under Mandela worked remarkably well. In an imaginative attempt to heal the wounds of apartheid, the government established the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. This commission let black victims speak out and share their suffering, and it also offered white perpetrators amnesty from prosecution in return for fully confessing their crimes. Mandela's ministers repudiated their earlier socialist beliefs and accepted realistically the liberal order of global capitalism as the only way to develop the economy and reduce widespread black poverty. And South African businesses, freed from the hostility generated by apartheid, began expanding throughout southern and even central Africa. Social and economic problems persisted in South Africa, but the country's peaceful transition to majority rule was an inspiring achievement.

Political Reform Since 1990

The triumph of democratic rule in South Africa was part of a broad trend toward elected civilian government that swept through sub-Saharan Africa between 1990 and 1995. Beginning in late 1989 in the small French-speaking state of Benin, political protesters rose up and forced one-party authoritarian regimes to grant liberalizing reforms and call national conferences, which often led to competitive elections and new constitutions. These changes occurred in almost all African countries, and, in the words of two leading scholars, "they amounted to the most far-reaching shifts in

The Presidential Election in Nigeria   In February 1999 tens of millions of Nigerians enthusiastically went to the polls in a free election, as civilian rule replaced military dictatorship in Africa's largest country. This tiny woman, a domestic servant in the capital city of Lagos, is making her voice heard. *(Ozier Muhammad/NYT Pictures)*

African political life since the political independence of thirty years earlier."[11]

Many factors contributed to this historic watershed. The anticommunist revolutions of 1989 in eastern Europe were extremely important. They showed Africans that even the most well-entrenched one-party regimes—regimes that had often inspired Africa's own authoritarians—could be opposed, punished for prolonged misrule, and replaced with electoral competition and even democracy. The decline of military rule in Latin America and the emerging global trend toward political and economic liberalism worked in the same direction.

The end of the cold war also transformed Africa's relations with the Soviet Union and the United States. Both superpowers had viewed Africa as an important cold war battleground, and both had given large-scale military and financial aid to their allies, as well as to "uncommitted" African leaders who could play one side against the other. Moreover, the failure of reform communism in Europe brought a decline in, and then an abrupt end to, Soviet aid to its African clients, which left them weakened and much more willing to compromise with opposition movements.

American involvement in Africa also declined. During the cold war U.S. leaders had opposed communism in Africa at any cost, and they generally had supported "pro-Western" African dictators, no matter how corrupt or repressive. This interventionist policy gave way to a less intense (and much cheaper) interest in free elections and civil rights, which in the 1990s the United States promoted mainly through international organizations such as the World Bank. A striking example of this evolution was steadfast U.S. support for the "anticommunist" General Mobutu Sese Seko after he seized power in 1965 in Zaire (the former Belgian Congo, renamed the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 1997). Mobutu looted and impoverished his country for decades before the United States cut off its aid in the early 1990s, which helped an opposition group topple the dying tyrant in 1997.

If events outside Africa established conditions favoring political reform, Africans themselves were the principal actors in the shift toward democracy. The

demanded reform because long years of mismanagement and repression had delegitimized one-party rule. In many countries the nation-building claims of ruling parties and dictators rang increasingly hollow because a single ethnic group dominated the government, thereby promoting the resentment and the ethnic conflict the ruling group had promised to master. Protests also exploded because governments had failed to improve living conditions in the 1980s (see Chapter 35).

Above all, the strength of the democratic opposition rested on a growing class of educated urban Africans, for postindependence governments had enthusiastically expanded opportunities in education, especially higher education. In the typical West African state of Cameroon, the number of students graduating from the French-speaking national university jumped from a minuscule 213 in 1961 to 10,000 in 1982 and 41,000 in 1992.[12] The growing middle class of educated professionals chafed at the ostentatious privilege of tiny closed elites, and it pressed for political reforms that would democratize social and economic opportunities. Reacting primarily to the excesses of African governments after independence rather than to the legacy of European imperialism, the new leaders of the democratic movement were generally pragmatic, moderate, and open to new ideas.

As the century came to an end, democratic reform in Africa was still in its early stages. As after independence, multiparty competition could easily fan ethnic rivalries and lead to political restrictions designed to maintain order. Yet African governments were much less authoritarian than a decade earlier. Moreover, civil rights, public debate, and freedom of the press had all been strengthened. Real progress had been made, and a general return to one-party dictatorship appeared unlikely. Thus in the 1990s sub-Saharan Africa participated fully in the global trend toward greater democracy and human rights.

SUMMARY

Asian and African peoples experienced a remarkable resurgence after the Second World War, a resurgence that will almost certainly stand as a decisive turning point in world history. The long-developing nationalist movement in China culminated in a social revolution led by the Communists, who went on to pursue innovative and fiercely independent policies that redeemed China as a great power in world affairs. Japan—defeated, demilitarized, and democratized—took a completely different path to the rank of economic superpower in a no less spectacular renaissance. Else

where—in India, Indonesia, and the Philippines—Asian peoples won their freedom and self-confidently charted independent courses. The Muslim world was also rejuvenated, most notably under Nasser in Egypt. In black Africa a generation of nationalist leaders successfully guided colonial territories to self-rule by the middle of the 1960s.

The resurgence and political self-assertion of Asian and African peoples in revitalized or developing nation-states did not proceed without conflict. Serious regional and ethnic confrontations erupted, notably between Hindus and Muslims in India and between Arabs and Israelis in the Middle East, and similar conflicts continued after independence was won. The vestiges of Western colonialism and cold war struggles resulted in atypical but highly destructive conflicts in Algeria, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe. The revitalized peoples of Asia and Africa continued to face tremendous economic and social challenges, as the next chapter will show.

Gaining independence under strong nationalist leaders after 1945, Asian and African peoples joined in the late twentieth century in the worldwide movement toward liberal democracy. In Asia well-entrenched authoritarians, such as Marcos in the Philippines and Suharto in Indonesia, were driven from office, although the Chinese Communist party retained its monopoly of political power. In sub-Saharan Africa the movement toward multiparty electoral competition and greater civil rights achieved striking breakthroughs. Thus the whole world moved, fitfully but unmistakably, in the same political direction—eloquent testimony to the globalization of history on the eve of the third millennium.

NOTES

1. S. Schram, *Mao Tse-tung* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1966), p. 151.
2. Quoted in P. B. Ebrey, ed., *Chinese Civilization and Society: A Source Book* (New York: Free Press, 1981), p. 393.
3. Quoted in W. Bingham, H. Conroy, and F. Iklé, *A History of Asia,* vol. 2, 2d ed. (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1974), p. 459.
4. Quoted in K. Bhata, *The Ordeal of Nationhood: A Social Study of India Since Independence, 1947–1970* (New York: Atheneum, 1971), p. 9.
5. Quoted in R. W. July, *A History of the African People,* 3d ed. (New York: Scribner's, 1980), pp. 519–520.
6. J. L. Hymans, *Léopold Sédar Senghor: An Intellectual Biography* (Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh Press, 1971), p. 58.
7. Quoted in L. H. Gann and P. Duignan, *Colonialism in Africa,* vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), p. 512.

8. Quoted in R. Hallett, *Africa Since 1875: A Modern History* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1974), pp. 378–379.

9. Quoted ibid., p. 657.

10. *Chicago Tribune,* May 3, 1994, section 1, p. 5.

11. M. Bratton and N. van de Walle, *Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspectives* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 3.

12. D. Birmingham and P. Martin, eds., *History of Central Africa: The Contemporary Years Since 1960* (London: Routledge, 1998), p. 59.

SUGGESTED READING

Many of the works mentioned in the Suggested Reading for Chapter 30 are also valuable for considering postwar developments in Asia and the Middle East. Two other important studies on developments in China are E. Friedman, *Chinese Village, Socialist State* (1991), and C. Johnson, *Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power: The Emergence of Revolutionary China, 1937–1945* (1962). M. Meisner, *Mao's China: A History of the People's Republic* (1977), is an excellent comprehensive study. Recent developments are ably analyzed by J. Spence, *The Search for Modern China* (1990), and Lin Binyan, *China's Crisis, China's Hope* (1990). T. Yueh and C. Wakeman, *To the Storm: The Odyssey of a Revolutionary Chinese Woman* (1985), and M. Bo, *Blood Red Sunset: A Memoir of the Chinese Cultural Revolution* (1995), are poignant accounts by participants. Important works on Deng's reforms include R. Evans, *Deng Xiaoping and the Making of Modern China* (1994), and M. Meisner, *The Deng Xiaoping Era* (1996). A. and J. Tyson, *Chinese Awakenings: Life Stories from Unofficial China* (1995), is recommended.

K. Kawai, *Japan's American Interlude* (1960), and R. P. Dore, *Land Reform in Japan* (1959), consider key problems of occupation policy. A. Gordon, ed., *Postwar Japan as History* (1993), contains essays by leading scholars and has an extensive bibliography. Two excellent and thought-provoking studies of contemporary Japanese society are E. Reischauer, *The Japanese Today, Change and Continuity* (1989), and F. Gibney, *Japan, the Fragile Superpower* (1977). G. Bernstein, *Haruko's World: A Japanese Farm Woman and Her Community* (1983), probes changing patterns of rural life. A. Iriye, *The Cold War in Asia: A Historical Introduction* (1974), and M. Schaller, *The United States and China in the Twentieth Century* (1979), analyze international conflicts in the postwar Pacific basin.

S. Wolpert, *India* (1991), a wise and beautifully written introduction, and G. Adhikari, *India: The First Fifty Years* (1997), a lively survey by a noted Indian journalist, are both recommended. G. Hutchins, *India's Revolution: Gandhi and the Quit India Movement* (1973), is an excellent account of wartime developments in India, which may be compared with J. Nehru, *An Autobiography* (1962). F. Frankel, *India's Political Economy, 1947–1977* (1978), intelligently discusses the economic policies of independent India. There is a good biography of Indira Gandhi by D. Moraes (1980). J. Novak, *Bangladesh: Reflections of the Water* (1993), is a moving introduction. H. Tinker, *South Asia: A Short History,* 2d ed. (1990), is a good guide to the states of the Indian subcontinent. C. Dubois, *Social Forces in Southeast Asia* (1967), and R. N. Kearney, *Politics and Modernization in South and Southeast Asia* (1974), are solid general accounts. Two valuable works on specific countries are B. Dahm, *Sukarno and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence* (1969), and T. Friend, *Between Two Empires: The Ordeal of the Philippines, 1929–1946* (1965). F. FitzGerald, *Fire in the Lake* (1973), probes the tragic war in Vietnam.

Recommended studies of the Middle East and Israel include a balanced account by C. Smith, *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict* (1988); and B. Kimmerling and J. Migdal, *The Palestinians: The Making of a People* (1992). A. Goldschmidt, Jr., *Modern Egypt: The Formation of a Nation-State* (1988), treats the post-Nasser years extensively. Religious fundamentalism is sympathetically analyzed in J. Esposito, *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?* (1992). A. Sidahmed and A. Ehteshami, eds., *Islamic Fundamentalism* (1996), is also useful.

In addition to the studies by July and Hallett cited in the Notes, J. Fage, *A History of Africa,* 3d ed. (1995), is a balanced introduction to modern Africa's rich and complex history. Important works on the colonial era include A. Boahen, *African Perspectives on Colonialism* (1989), and R. O. Collins, *Problems in the History of Modern Africa,* (1997). B. Davidson, *The Black Man's Burden: Africa and the Curse of the Nation State* (1993), is a thought-provoking reconsideration by a noted historian. W. E. B. Du Bois, *The World and Africa* (1947), and J. Kenyatta, *Facing Mount Kenya* (1953), are powerful comments on African nationalism by, respectively, the distinguished American black thinker and Kenya's foremost revolutionary and political leader. R. July, *The African Voice: The Role of the Humanities in African Independence* (1987), focuses on intellectuals and artists struggling against cultural imperialism. A. Hopkins, *An Economic History of West Africa* (1973), is a pioneering synthesis. R. Olaniyan, ed., *African History and Culture* (1982), is a valuable collection. M. Crowder, ed., *The Cambridge History of Africa,* vol. 8, examines the struggle for independence. Major works on specific countries include M. Crowder, *The Story of Nigeria,* 4th ed. (1978); L. Thompson, *A History of South Africa,* rev. ed. (1995); and the work by Birmingham and Martin cited in the Notes. F. Willett, *African Art* (1971), is a good introduction. Important studies on recent political changes include J. Clark and D. Gardinier, eds., *Political Reform in Francophone Africa* (1997), and J. Harbeson and D. Rothchild, eds., *Africa in World Politics: Post–Cold War Challenges,* 2d ed. (1995).

The Struggle for Freedom in South Africa

Many African territories won political freedom in the mid-1960s, but in South Africa the struggle was long and extremely difficult. Only in 1990 did the white government release Nelson Mandela from prison and begin negotiations with the famous black leader and the African National Congress (ANC). Only in 1994 did Mandela and the ANC finally come to power and establish a new system based on majority rule and racial equality.

Born in 1918 into the royal family of the Transkei, Nelson Mandela received an education befitting the son of a tribal chief. But he ran away to escape an arranged tribal marriage, experienced the harsh realities of black life in Johannesburg, studied law, and became an attorney. A born leader with a natural air of authority, Mandela was drawn to politics and the ANC. In the 1950s the white government responded to the growing popularity of Mandela and the ANC with tear gas and repression.

In 1960 the ANC called a general strike to protest the shooting of peaceful protesters at Sharpeville. Acts of sabotage then shook South Africa, and Mandela led the underground opposition. Betrayed by an informer, he was convicted of treason in 1964 and sentenced to life imprisonment. Mandela defended all of the accused in the 1964 treason trial. The following selection is taken from Mandela's opening statement.

At the outset, I want to say that the suggestion made by the State in its opening that the struggle in South Africa is under the influence of foreigners or communists is wholly incorrect. I have done whatever I did, both as an individual and as a leader of my people, because of my experience in South Africa and my own proudly felt African background, and not because of what any outsider might have said.

In my youth in the Transkei I listened to the elders of my tribe telling stories of the old days. Amongst the tales they related to me were those of wars fought by our ancestors in defence of the fatherland. . . . I hoped then that life might offer me the opportunity to serve my people and make my own humble contribution to their freedom struggle. . . .

It is true that there has often been close cooperation between the ANC [African National Congress] and the Communist Party. But cooperation is merely proof of a common goal—in this case the removal of White supremacy—and is not proof of a complete community of interests. . . . What is more, for many decades communists were the only political group in South Africa who were prepared to treat Africans as human beings and their equals; who were prepared to eat with us, talk with us, live with us, and work with us. . . . Because of this, there are many Africans who today tend to equate freedom with communism. . . .

I turn now to my own position. I have denied that I am a communist. . . . [But] I am attracted by the idea of a classless society, an attraction which springs in part from Marxist reading and, in part, from my admiration of the structure and organization of early African societies in this country. The land, then the main means of production, belonged to the tribe. There were no rich or poor and there was no exploitation. . . .

[Unlike communists] I am an admirer of the parliamentary system of the West. . . . [Thus] I have been influenced in my thinking by both West and East. . . . [I believe] I should be absolutely impartial and objective. I should tie myself to no particular system of society other than of socialism. I must leave myself free to borrow the best from the West and from the East. . . .

Our fight is against real, and not imaginary, hardships or, to use the language of the State Prosecutor, "so-called hardships." . . . Basically, we fight against two features which are the hallmarks of African life in South Africa and which are entrenched by legislation which we seek to have repealed. These features are poverty and lack of human dignity, and we do not need communists or

so-called "agitators" to teach us about these things.

South Africa is the richest country in Africa, and could be one of the richest countries in the world. But it is a land of extremes and remarkable contrasts. The Whites enjoy what may well be the highest standard of living in the world, while Africans live in poverty and misery. . . . Poverty goes hand in hand with malnutrition and disease. . . .

The lack of human dignity experienced by Africans is the direct result of the policy of White supremacy. White supremacy implies Black inferiority. Legislation designed to preserve White supremacy entrenches this notion. . . . Because of this sort of attitude, Whites tend to regard Africans as a separate breed. They do not look upon them as people with families of their own; they do not realize that they have emotions. . . .

Africans want to be paid a living wage. Africans want to perform work which they are capable of doing, and not work which the Government declares them to be capable of. . . . Africans want a just share in the whole of South Africa; they want security and a stake in society.

Above all, we want equal political rights, because without them our disabilities will be permanent. I know this sounds revolutionary to the Whites in this country, because the majority of voters will be Africans. This makes the White man fear democracy.

But this fear cannot be allowed to stand in the way of the only solution which will guarantee racial harmony and freedom for all. It is not true that the enfranchisement of all will result in racial domination. Political division, based on color, is entirely artificial and, when it disappears, so will the domination of one color group by another. The ANC has spent half a century fighting against racialism. When it triumphs it will not change that policy.

This then is what the ANC is fighting. Their struggle is a truly national one. It is a struggle of the African people, inspired by their own suffering and their own experience. It is a struggle for the right to live.

During my lifetime I have dedicated myself to this struggle of the African people. I have fought against White domination, and I have fought against Black domination. I have cherished the

Nelson Mandela at the time of his imprisonment in 1964. *(Mohamed Lounes/Liaison)*

ideal of a democratic and free society in which all persons live together in harmony and with equal opportunities. It is an ideal which I hope to live for and to achieve. But if needs be, it is an ideal for which I am prepared to die.

Questions for Analysis

1. How does Nelson Mandela respond to the charge that he and the ANC are controlled by communists?

2. What factors influenced Mandela's thinking? In what ways has he been influenced by "both East and West" and by his African background?

3. According to Mandela, what is wrong with South Africa? What needs to be done?

4. What are Mandela's goals for South Africa? Are his goals realistic or idealistic? Or both?

35 Changing Lives in the Developing Countries

A private computer college in Somalia. *(Hamish Wilson/Panos Pictures)*

After the Second World War everyday life in the emerging nations of Asia and Africa changed dramatically as many peoples struggled to overcome the legacy of imperialism and build effective nation-states. Some of the changes paralleled the experiences of Europe and North America, but most observers stressed the enormous differences in development between the emerging nations and the industrialized nations. The new nations—along with the older states of Latin America—suffered widespread poverty, shared a heritage of foreign domination, and discerned a widening economic gap between themselves and the industrialized nations of Europe and North America. Thus many leaders and intellectuals in Asia, Africa, and Latin America felt that they were all joined together in an underlying unity, which was generally known as the Third World.

From the mid-1970s onward this sense of shared experience and Third World solidarity gradually broke down. Different countries and whole regions went their separate ways. Above all, some countries in East Asia experienced remarkable economic progress and emerged as middle- and lower-middle-income nations. Countries elsewhere were less fortunate. Much of sub-Saharan Africa in particular experienced economic retreat and great hardship. Thus the Third World fragmented increasingly into a wide range of so-called developing countries, and the global class structure became more complicated and diverse.

- How have the emerging nations of the Third World sought to escape from poverty, and what have been the results of their efforts?
- What has caused the prodigious growth of cities in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, and what does this growth mean for their inhabitants?
- How have thinkers and artists in the developing countries interpreted the modern world and the experiences of their peoples before, during, and after foreign domination?

These are the questions we will explore in this chapter.

THE EMERGENCE OF THE THIRD WORLD

Beginning in the late 1950s many thinkers, journalists, and politicians viewed Africa, Asia, and Latin America as a single entity—the "Third World." Or, as some scholars would say today, they imagined and "con structed" Africa, Asia, and Latin America as a unity for effective analysis and action. For a long generation, in spite of all these countries' differences in history and culture, they did share some common characteristics. These characteristics linked them together and encouraged a Third World consciousness and ideology. There are several reasons for this important development.

First, many writers and politicians argued that virtually all the countries of Africa, Asia, and even Latin America had experienced political or economic domination, nationalist reaction, and a struggle for genuine independence. This shared past gave rise to a common consciousness and a widespread feeling of having been oppressed and victimized in dealings with the West. A variety of nationalists, Marxists, and anti-imperialist intellectuals nurtured this outlook, arguing forcibly that the Third World's problems were the result of past and present exploitation by the wealthy capitalist nations. Precisely because of their shared sense of past injustice, many influential Latin Americans identified with the Third World, despite their countries' greater affluence. The term also came into global use in the cold war era as a handy way of distinguishing Africa, Asia, and Latin America from the "First World" and the "Second World"—the capitalist and communist industrialized nations, respectively.

Second, in the 1950s and 1960s a large majority of men and women in most Third World countries lived in the countryside and depended on agriculture for a living. Agricultural goods and raw materials were the primary exports of many Third World countries. By contrast, in Europe, Canada, the United States, and Japan, most people lived in cities and depended mainly on industry and urban services for employment.

Finally, the agricultural countries of Asia, Africa, and most of Latin America were united by a growing awareness of their common poverty. By no means was everyone in the Third World poor; some people were quite wealthy. The average standard of living, however, was low, especially compared with that of people in the wealthy industrialized nations, and massive poverty was ever present.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CHALLENGES

As postindependence leaders confronted the tough task of preserving political unity and building cohesive nation-states (see Chapter 34), the enormous chal

lenges of poverty, malnutrition, and disease weighed especially heavily on rural people. In the 1950s and 1960s most Third World leaders and their advisers believed that rapid industrialization and "modernization" were the answers to rural poverty and disease. Industrialization and modernization would also kindle popular enthusiasm and thus serve nation building, which in turn promised economic self-sufficiency and cultural renewal. Moreover, having raised people's hopes in the struggle for freedom, these leaders had to start delivering on their promises if they were to maintain trust and stay in power. For all these reasons the leaders and peoples of the Third World set themselves the massive task of building modern factories, roads, and public health services like those in Europe and North America. Their considerable success fueled rapid economic progress.

Yet social problems, complicated by surging population growth, almost dwarfed the accomplishment. Disappointments multiplied. By and large, the poorest rural people in the poorest countries gained the least from industrialization, and industrial expansion provided jobs for only a small segment even of the urban population. By the late 1960s widespread dissatisfaction with policies of all-out industrialization prompted a greater emphasis on rural development.

Poverty

After World War II the gap in real income—income adjusted for differences in prices—between the industrialized world and the former colonies and dependencies of Africa, Asia, and Latin America was enormous. According to a leading historian, in 1950, when war-scarred Europe was in the early phase of postwar reconstruction,

the real income per capita of the Third World was five or six times lower than that of the developed countries. . . . In the developed countries, a century and a half of Industrial Revolution had resulted in a multiplication by more than five of the average standard of living in 1950. . . . For the average Third World countries the 1950s level was practically that of 1800 or, at best, only 10–20 percent above.[1]

Coal Miner Families in India   With their tools and many of their possessions loaded on their rickety carts, these workers struggle with steep grades and grinding poverty. The hardships of life in the Third World weigh heavily on them. *(Sebastiao Salgado/Magnum Photos)*

The people of these poor Third World countries were overwhelmingly concentrated in the countryside as small farmers and landless laborers.

Poverty meant, above all, not having enough to eat. For millions hunger and malnutrition were harsh facts of life. In India, Ethiopia, Bolivia, and other extremely poor countries, the average adult ate fewer than two thousand calories a day—only 85 percent of the minimal requirement. Although many poor countries fared better, in the 1960s none but Argentina could match the three thousand or more calories consumed in the more fortunate industrialized world. Even Third World people who consumed enough calories often suffered from the effects of unbalanced high-starch diets and inadequate protein. Severe protein deficiency stunts the brain as well as the body, and many of the poorest children grew up mentally retarded.

Poor housing—crowded, often damp, and exposed to the elements—also contributed significantly to the less-developed world's high incidence of chronic ill health. So too did scanty education and lack of the fundamentals of modern public health: adequate and safe water, sewage disposal, immunizations, prenatal care, and control of communicable diseases. Village women around the world spent much of each day carrying water and searching for firewood or dung to use as fuel, as they must still do in many countries. Infant mortality was savage, and chronic illness weakened and demoralized many adults, making them unfit for the hard labor their lives required. Generally speaking, people's health was better in Asia and Latin America than in the new states of sub-Saharan Africa.

The Medical Revolution and the Population Explosion

The most thoroughgoing success achieved by the Third World after the Second World War was a spectacular medical revolution. Immediately after winning independence, the governments of emerging nations began adopting modern methods of immunology and public health. These methods were often simple and inexpensive but extremely effective. One famous measure was spraying DDT in Southeast Asia to control mosquitoes bearing malaria, one of the deadliest and most debilitating tropical diseases. In Sri Lanka (formerly Ceylon), DDT spraying halved the yearly death toll in the first postwar decade—at a modest cost of $2 per person. According to the United Nations' World Health Organization, which helped provide medical expertise to the

new states, deaths from smallpox, cholera, and plague declined by more than 95 percent worldwide between 1951 and 1966.

Asian and African countries increased the small numbers of hospitals, doctors, and nurses that they had inherited from the colonial past. Sophisticated medical facilities became symbols of the commitment to a better life. Some critics, however, maintained that expensive medical technology was an indulgence that Third World countries could not afford, for it was ill suited to the pressing health problems of most of the population. Such criticism eventually prompted greater emphasis on delivering medical services to the countryside. Local people were successfully trained as paramedics to staff rural outpatient clinics that offered medical treatment, health education, and prenatal and postnatal care. Many paramedics were women, as many health problems involved childbirth and infancy, and villagers the world over considered it improper for a male to examine a woman's body.

The medical revolution significantly lowered death rates and lengthened life expectancies. In particular, children became increasingly likely to survive their early years, although infant and juvenile mortality remained far higher in the Third World than in rich countries. By 1980 the average inhabitant of the Third World could expect to live about fifty-four years; life expectancy at birth varied from forty to sixty-four years depending on the country. In developed countries life expectancy at birth averaged seventy-one years.

A less favorable consequence of the medical revolution was the acceleration of population growth. As in Europe during the nineteenth century, a rapid decline in death rates was not immediately accompanied by a similar decline in birthrates. Third World women continued to bear five to seven children each, as their mothers and grandmothers had done. The combined populations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, which had grown relatively modestly from 1925 to 1950, increased between 1950 and 1975 from 1,750 million to 3,000 million. It was an unprecedented explosion, which promised to continue for many years.

The population explosion aroused fears of approaching famine and starvation. Thomas Malthus's gloomy late-eighteenth-century conclusion that population always tends to grow faster than the food supply (see page 785) was revived and updated by "neo-Malthusian" social scientists. Such fears were exaggerated, but they did produce uneasiness in the Third World, where leaders saw that their countries had to run fast just to maintain already low standards of living

The Medical Revolution   A woman doctor in Yemen on the Arabian peninsula makes house calls by motorcycle, thereby carrying modern medicine to women in isolated desert communities. The doctor wears the veil traditionally required of women in public throughout much of the Arab world. *(Hans Bollinger for STERN magazine)*

Some governments began pushing family planning and birth control to slow population growth. These measures were not very successful in the 1950s and 1960s. In many countries Islamic and Catholic religious teachings were hostile to birth control. Moreover, widespread cultural attitudes dictated that a "real" man keep his wife pregnant. There were also economic reasons for preferring large families. Farmers needed the help of plenty of children at planting and harvest times, and sons and daughters were a sort of social security system for their elders. Thus a prudent couple wanted several children because some would surely die young.

The Race to Industrialize (1950–1970)

Throughout the 1950s and most of the 1960s many key Third World leaders, pressed on by their European,

American, and Soviet advisers, were convinced that all-out industrialization was the only answer to poverty and population growth. The masses, they concluded, were poor because they were imprisoned in a primitive, inefficient agricultural economy. Only modern factory industry appeared capable of creating wealth quickly enough to outrace the increasing number of people.

The two-century experience of the West, Japan, and the Soviet Union seemed to validate this faith in industrialization. To Third World elites economic history taught the encouraging lesson that the wealthy countries had also been agricultural and "underdeveloped" until the Industrial Revolution had lifted them out of poverty, one by one. According to this view, the uneven progress of industrialization was primarily responsible for the great income gap that existed between the rich

countries and the poor countries of the postindependence Third World.

Theories of modernization, which were particularly popular in the 1960s, also assumed that all countries were following the path already taken by the industrialized nations and that the task of the elites was to speed the trip. Marxism, with its industrial and urban bias, preached a similar gospel. These ideas reinforced the Third World's desire to industrialize.

Nationalist leaders believed that successful industrialization required state action and enterprise. Many were impressed by socialism in general and by Stalin's forced industrialization in particular, which they saw as having won the Soviet Union international power and prominence, whatever its social costs. In Asia and Africa capitalists and private enterprise were often equated with the old rulers and colonial servitude. The reasoning was practical as well as ideological: socialism meant an expansion of steady government jobs for political and ethnic allies, and modern industry meant ports, roads, schools, and hospitals, as well as factories. Only the state could afford such expensive investments.

The degree of state involvement varied considerably. A few governments, such as communist China, tried to control all aspects of economic life. A few one-party states in Africa, notably Zambia, Ghana, and Ethiopia, mixed Marxist-Leninist ideology and peasant communes in an attempt to construct a special "African socialism." At the other extreme only the British colony of Hong Kong downgraded government control of the economy and emphasized private enterprise and the export of manufactured goods. A large majority of governments assigned the state an important, even leading, role, but they also recognized private property and tolerated native (and foreign) business people. The "mixed economy"—part socialist, part capitalist—became the general rule in the Third World.

Political leaders concentrated state investment in big, highly visible projects that proclaimed the country's independence and stimulated national pride. Enormous dams for irrigation and hydroelectric power were favored undertakings. Nasser's stupendous Aswan Dam harnessed the Nile, demonstrating that modern Egyptians could surpass even the pyramids of their ancient ancestors. The gigantic state-owned steel mill was another favorite project. These big projects testified to the prevailing faith in expensive advanced technology and modernization along European lines.

Nationalist leaders and their economic experts measured overall success by how fast national income grew, and they tended to assume that social problems and income distribution would take care of themselves. India, the world's most populous noncommunist country, exemplified the general trends. After India achieved independence in 1947, Mahatma Gandhi's special brand of nationalism was redirected toward economic and social rebirth through state enterprise and planning. Jawaharlal Nehru and many Congress party leaders believed that unregulated capitalism and free trade under British rule had deepened Indian poverty. Considering themselves democratic socialists, they introduced five-year plans, built state-owned factories and steel mills, and raised tariffs to protect Indian manufacturers. Quite typically, they neglected agriculture, land reform, and village life.

The Third World's first great industrialization drive was in many ways a success. Industry grew faster than ever before, though from an admittedly low base in Africa and most of Asia. According to the United Nations, industry in the noncommunist developing nations grew at more than 7 percent per year between 1950 and 1970, which meant a per capita rate of about 4.5 percent per year. This was very solid industrial growth by historical standards. It matched the fastest rates of industrialization in the United States before 1914 and was double the rates of Britain and France in the same years.

Industrial expansion stimulated the other sectors of Third World economies. National income per capita grew about 2.5 percent per year in the booming world economy of the 1950s and 1960s. This pace was far superior to the very modest increases that had occurred under colonial domination between 1900 and 1950. Future historians may well see the era after political emancipation as the era of industrial revolution in Asia and Africa.

Nevertheless, by the late 1960s disillusionment with the Third World's relatively rapid industrialization was spreading. The countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America did not as a whole match the "miraculous" concurrent advances of western Europe and Japan, and the great economic gap between the rich and the poor nations continued to widen.

Also, most Third World leaders had genuinely believed that rapid industrial development would help the rural masses. Yet careful studies showed increasingly that the main beneficiaries of industrialization were business people, bureaucrats, skilled workers, and urban professionals. Peasants and agricultural laborers gained little or nothing. It was estimated that about 40 percent of the population in fast-growing, dynamic Mexico, for instance, was completely excluded from the benefits of

Building the Aswan Dam   Financed and engineered by the Soviet Union, the massive high dam at Aswan was Nasser's dream for Egypt's economic future. Here an army of workers lays the stones that will harness the Nile for irrigation and hydroelectric power. *(Popperfoto/Archive Photos)*

industrialization. Moreover, the poorest countries—such as India and Indonesia in Asia, and Ethiopia and the Sudan in Africa—were growing most slowly in per capita terms. The industrialization prescription appeared least effective where poverty was most intense. Economic dislocations in the global economy after the 1973 oil crisis accentuated this trend, visiting particularly devastating effects on the poorest countries.

Perhaps most serious, industrialization failed to provide the sheer number of jobs needed for the sons and daughters of the population explosion. Statisticians estimated that the growth of Third World manufacturing between 1950 and 1970 provided jobs for only about one-fifth of the 200 million young men and women who entered the exploding labor force in the same pe-

riod. For the foreseeable future, most Third World people would have to remain on the farm or work in traditional handicrafts and service occupations. All-out modern industrialization had failed as a panacea.

Agriculture and the Green Revolution (1960–1980)

From the late 1960s onward the limitations of industrial development forced Third World governments to take a renewed interest in rural people and village life. At best this attention meant giving agriculture its due and coordinating rural development with industrialization and urbanization. At worst, especially in the very poorest countries, it deflated the optimistic vision of liv

ing standards approaching those of the wealthy industrialized nations and led to the pessimistic conclusion that it was possible to ease only modestly the great hardships.

Nationalist elites had neglected agriculture in the 1950s and 1960s for various reasons. They regarded an agricultural economy as a mark of colonial servitude, which they were symbolically repudiating by embracing industrialization. They wanted to squeeze agriculture and peasant producers in order to provide capital for industry. Thus governments often established artificially low food prices, which also subsidized their volatile urban supporters at the expense of the farmers.

In addition, the obstacles to more productive farming seemed overwhelming to unsympathetic urban elites and condescending foreign experts: farms were too small and fragmented for mechanization, peasants were too stubborn and ignorant to change their ways, and so on. Little wonder that only big farmers and some plantations received much government support. Wherever large estates and absentee landlords predominated—in large parts of Asia and in most of Latin America, excluding Mexico, though not in sub-Saharan Africa—landless laborers and poor peasants who had no choice other than to rent land simply lacked the incentive to work harder. Any increased profits from larger crops went mainly to the absentee landowners.

Most honest observers were convinced that improved farm performance required land reform. Yet ever since the French Revolution, genuine land reform has been a profoundly radical measure, frequently bringing violence and civil war. Powerful landowners and their allies generally succeeded in blocking or subverting redistribution of land to benefit the poor. Land

Peasants Farming in Ecuador Cultivating the land with simple hand tools, these peasant women in Latin America appear doomed to poverty despite backbreaking labor. In many cases a high rent to an absentee landlord reduces the peasants' income still further. *(Bernard Pierre Wolff/Photo Researchers)*

reform, unlike industrialization, was generally too hot for most politicians to handle.

Third World governments also neglected agriculture because feeding the masses was deceptively easy in the 1950s and early 1960s. Before 1939 the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America had collectively produced more grain than they consumed. But after 1945, as their populations soared, they began importing ever-increasing quantities. Very poor countries received food from the United States at giveaway prices as part of a U.S. effort to dispose of enormous grain surpluses and help American farmers.

Crops might fail in poor countries, but starvation seemed a thing of the past. In 1965, when India was urged to build up its food reserves, one top Indian official expressed a widespread attitude: "Why should we bother? Our reserves are the wheat fields of Kansas."[2] In the short run, the Indian official was right. In 1966 and again in 1967, when the monsoon failed to deliver its life-giving rains to the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent and famine gripped the land, the United States gave India one-fifth of the U.S. wheat crop. More than 60 mil-

lion Indians lived exclusively on American grain. The effort required a food armada of six hundred ships, the largest fleet assembled since the Normandy invasion of 1944. The famine was ultimately contained, and instead of millions of deaths, there were only a few thousand.

That close brush with mass starvation sent a shiver down the world's spine. Complacency dissolved in the Third World, and prophecies of disaster multiplied in wealthy nations. Paul Ehrlich, an American scientist, envisioned a grisly future in his polemical 1968 best-seller *The Population Bomb:*

The battle to feed all of humanity is over. In the 1970s the world will undergo famines—hundreds of millions of people are going to starve to death in spite of any crash programs embarked upon now. At this stage nothing can prevent a substantial increase in the world death rate.[3]

Countering such nightmarish visions was the hope of technological improvements. Plant scientists and agricultural research stations had already set out to develop new hybrid seeds genetically engineered to suit the growing conditions of tropical agriculture. Their model

Old and New   A fetish statue designed to frighten off evil spirits stands by as the proud owner of a two-acre plot in southern India shows a visiting expert his crop of "miracle rice." As this picture suggests, the acceptance of modern technology does not necessarily require the repudiation of cultural traditions. *(Marc and Evelyne Bernheim/Woodfin Camp & Associates)*

was the extraordinarily productive hybrid corn developed for the American Midwest in the 1940s. The first breakthrough came in Mexico in the 1950s, when an American-led team developed new high-yielding dwarf wheats. These varieties enabled farmers to double their yields, though they demanded greater amounts of fertilizer and water for irrigation. Mexican wheat production soared. Thus began the transformation of Third World agriculture—the so-called Green Revolution.

In the 1960s an American-backed team of scientists in the Philippines turned their attention to rice, the Asian staff of life; they quickly developed a "miracle rice." The new hybrid required more fertilizer and water but yielded more and grew much faster. It permitted the revolutionary advent of year-round farming on irrigated land, making possible two, three, or even four crops a year. The brutal tropical sun of the hot dry season became an agricultural blessing for the first time. Asian scientists, financed by their governments, developed similar hybrids to meet local conditions.

Increases in grain production were rapid and dramatic in some Asian countries. In gigantic India, for example, farmers upped production more than 60 percent in fifteen years. By 1980 thousands of new grain bins dotted the countryside, symbols of the agricultural revolution in India and the country's newfound ability to feed all its people. China followed with its own highly successful version of the Green Revolution under Deng Xiaoping.

The Green Revolution offered new hope to the Third World but was no cure-all. At first most of its benefits seemed to flow to large landowners and substantial peasant farmers who could afford the necessary investments in irrigation and fertilizer. Subsequent experience in China and other Asian countries showed, however, that even peasant families with tiny farms could gain substantially. Indeed, the Green Revolution's greatest successes occurred in Asian countries with broad-based peasant ownership of land.

The technological revolution shared relatively few of its benefits with the poorest villagers, who gained only slightly more regular employment from the Green Revolution's demand for more labor. Pakistan, the Philippines, and other countries with large numbers of landless peasants and insecure tenant farmers experienced less improvement than did countries such as South Korea and Taiwan, where land was generally owned by peasants. This helps explain why the Green Revolution failed to spread from Mexico throughout Latin America: as long as 3 to 4 percent of the rural population owned 60 to 80 percent of the land, as was still the case in many Latin American countries, the Green Revolution usually remained stillborn.

In the early years of the transformation sub-Saharan Africa benefited little from the new agricultural techniques, even though land reform was a serious challenge only in white-ruled South Africa. Poor transportation, inadequate storage facilities, and low government-imposed agricultural prices must bear much of the blame. More generally, the climatic conditions of black Africa encouraged continued adherence to dry farming and root crops, whereas the Green Revolution was almost synonymous with intensive irrigation and grain production.

The Green Revolution, like the medical revolution and first industrialization drive, represented a large but uneven step forward for the Third World. East Asian countries in particular were increasingly able to feed themselves and could support growing urban populations and more diversified economies. Yet even in the best of circumstances, relatively few of its benefits flowed to the poorest groups. These poor, who lacked political influence and had no clear idea about what needed to be done, increasingly longed to escape from ill-paid, irregular work in somebody else's fields. For many of the strongest and most enterprising, life in a nearby town or city seemed a way out.

THE GROWTH OF CITIES, 1945 TO THE PRESENT

The changing lives of Third World people were marked by violent contrasts, which were most striking in urban areas. Shiny airports, international hotels, and massive government buildings were constructed next to tar-paper slums. Like their counterparts in the industrialized world, these rapidly growing cities were monuments to political independence and ongoing industrial development. They were also testimonials to increasing population, limited opportunities in the countryside, and neocolonial influence. Runaway urban growth became a distinctive feature of the developing countries.

Rapid Urbanization

The cities of the Third World expanded at an astonishing pace after the Second World War. Many doubled and some even tripled in size in a single decade. The Algerian city of Algiers jumped from 300,000 to 900,000 between 1950 and 1960; Accra in Ghana, Lima in Peru, and Nairobi in Kenya grew just as fast. Moreover,

TABLE 35.1   Urban Population as a Percentage of Total Population in the World and in Eight Major Areas, 1925–2025

Area	1925	1950	1975	2000 (est.)	2025 (est.)
World total	21	28	39	50	63
North America	54	64	77	86	93
Europe	48	55	67	79	88
Soviet Union	18	39	61	76	87
East Asia	10	15	30	46	63
Latin America	25	41	60	74	85
Africa	8	13	24	37	54
South Asia	9	15	23	35	51
Oceania	54	65	71	77	87

Little more than one-fifth of the world's population was urban in 1925. In 1990 the urban proportion in the world total was about 45 percent and, according to U.N. experts, it should reach one-half by the century's end and two-thirds by about 2025. The most rapid urban growth will come in Africa and Asia, where the move to cities is still in its early stages.

rapid urban growth continued. The less-developed countries became far more urbanized in recent times than most people realized. In Latin America three out of five people lived in towns and cities by 1975; in Asia and Africa, as Table 35.1 shows, one in four people lived in an urban area by the same year.

The urban explosion continued in the 1980s, so that by 1990 fully 60 percent of the planet's city dwellers lived in the cities of Africa, Asia, and Latin America, according to United Nations estimates. Rapid urbanization in the developing countries represented a tremendous historical change. As recently as 1920, three out of every four of the world's urban inhabitants were concentrated in Europe and North America.

In most of the developing world the largest cities grew fastest. Gigantic "supercities" of 2 million to 10 million persons arose. It was expected that in the year 2000 about one-half of the urban population of Africa and Latin America would live in thirty-four very large agglomerations containing more than 5 million people. The capital city often emerged as the all-powerful urban center, encompassing all the important elite groups and dwarfing smaller cities as well as villages. Mexico City, for example, grew from 3 million to 12 million people between 1950 and 1975, and it was expected to have about 22 million people in 2000. The pattern of a dom-

inant megalopolis has continued to spread from Latin America to Africa and Asia (though not to Asia's giants, China and India).

In the poorest countries of Africa and Asia the process of urbanization is still in the early stages, and the countryside still holds the majority of the people. Thus if United Nations projections hold true, the urban population will triple from 1.4 billion persons in 1990 to 4.4 billion in 2025. Such rapid urbanization has posed enormous ongoing challenges for peoples and governments.

What caused this urban explosion? First, the general growth of population in the Third World was critical. Urban residents gained substantially from the medical revolution but only gradually began to reduce the size of their families. At the same time, the pressure of numbers in the countryside encouraged millions to set out for the nearest city. More than half of all urban growth has been due to rural migration.

Another factor was the desire to find jobs. Manufacturing jobs in Third World nations were concentrated in cities. In 1980 half of all the industrial jobs in Mexico were located in Mexico City, and the same kind of extreme concentration of industry occurred in many Third World countries. Yet careful study shows that this accounts for only part of the urban explosion. In the

words of a leading authority, "After about 1930 a new phenomenon which might be termed "urbanization without industrialization" began to appear in the Third World. This phenomenon very rapidly acquired an inflationary character and in the early 1960s began to present most serious problems of urban employment and underemployment."[4] In short, urban population grew much faster than industrial employment.

Thus many newcomers streamed to the cities for nonindustrial employment. Many were pushed: they simply lacked enough land to survive. Large landowners found it more profitable to produce export crops, such as sugar or coffee, for wealthy industrialized countries, and their increasingly mechanized operations provided few jobs for agricultural laborers. The push factor was particularly strong in Latin America, with its neocolonial pattern of large landowners and foreign companies exporting food and raw materials. More generally, much migration was seasonal or temporary. Many young people left home for the city to work in construction or serve as maids, expecting higher wages and steadier work and planning to return shortly with a modest nest egg.

Finally, the magnetic attraction of Third World cities was more than economic. Their attraction rested on the services and opportunities they offered, as well as on changing attitudes and the urge to escape from the traditional restraints of village life. Most of the modern hospitals, secondary schools, and transportation systems in less-developed countries were in the cities. So were most banks, libraries, movie houses, and basic conveniences. Safe piped water and processed food, for instance, were rare in rural areas, and village women by necessity spent much of their time carrying water and grinding grain.

The city held a special appeal for rural people who had been exposed to the seductive influence of modern education. One survey from the 1960s in the Ivory Coast found two out of three rural high school graduates planning to move to the city; only one in ten illiterate persons expressed the same intention. Africa was not unique in this. For the young and the ambitious, the allure of the city was the excitement and opportunity of modern life. The village took on the curse of boredom and failure.

Overcrowding and Shantytowns

Rapid population growth placed great pressure on existing urban social services, and in many Third World cities the local authorities could not keep up with the demand. New neighborhoods often lacked running water, paved streets, electricity, and police and fire protection. As in the early days of Europe's industrialization, sanitation was minimal in poor sections of town. Outdoor toilets were shared by many. Raw sewage often ran in streets and streams.

Faced with a rising human tide, government officials and their well-to-do urban allies sometimes tried to restrict internal migration to preserve the cities. Particularly in Africa, politicians talked of sending newcomers "back to the land" to reduce urban unemployment, crime rates, congestion, and environmental decline. In Africa as elsewhere, these antimigration efforts proved unsuccessful, and frustrated officials often threw up their hands in despair.

Surging population growth had particularly severe consequences for housing. As in western Europe in the early nineteenth century, overcrowding reached staggering proportions in a great many Third World cities. Old buildings were often divided and redivided until population density reached the absolute saturation point.

Makeshift squatter settlements were another striking manifestation of the urban housing problem. These shantytowns sprang up continuously, almost overnight, on the worst possible urban land—dismal mud flats, garbage dumps, railroad sidings, steep hills on the outskirts, even polluted waterfronts. Typically, a group of urban poor "invaded" unoccupied land and quickly threw up tents or huts. Often beaten off by the police, they invaded again and again until the authorities gave up and a new squatter beachhead had been secured.

Squatter shantytowns, also known more positively as self-help housing, grew much faster than more conventional urban areas in most Third World cities. In the giant Brazilian city of Rio de Janeiro, for example, the population of the shantytowns grew four times faster than the population of the rest of the city in the 1950s and 1960s. As a result, the Third World's self-help settlements came to house up to two-fifths of the urban population. The proportion was particularly high in Asia. Such settlements had occasionally grown up in American mining towns and in Europe, but never to the extent they did in Latin America, Asia, and Africa. The Third World created a new urban form.

The meaning of spontaneous self-help housing has been hotly debated. For a long time most observers stressed the miseries of squatter settlements—the lack of the most basic services, the pitiful one-room shacks, the hopelessness of disoriented migrants in a strange environment, the revolutionary discontent. However, by the 1970s some excellent studies stressed the vitality of what were seen as real neighborhoods, whose

Juan O'Gorman: Credit Transforms Mexico (1965)   Emerging as an important architect in the 1930s, O'Gorman championed practical buildings and then led the movement to integrate architecture with art in postrevolutionary Mexico. These panels from a fresco for a bank interior combine an optimistic view of economic development with many Mexican motifs. O'Gorman believed that Mexico had to preserve its cultural values in order to preserve its independence. *(Photos: Enrique Franco-Torrijos. Courtesy, Banco Bital, S.A., Mexico City)*

resourceful residents often shared common ethnic origins and kinship ties.

Moreover, the shantytowns themselves evolved. Poor but enterprising inhabitants relied on their own efforts to improve their living conditions. With much sweat labor and a little hard-earned cash, a family replaced its mud walls with concrete blocks and gradually built a real home. Or the community pressured the city to install a central water pump or build a school. Low-paid officeworkers in search of cheap housing sometimes moved in and continued the upgrading process. Nor were people who lived in squatter communities particularly attracted to revolutionary doctrines. In short, when self-help settlers were not threatened by eviction, they showed themselves capable of improving their housing.

Better understanding of spontaneous settlements led most governments to re-evaluate their hostility toward them. Efforts to bulldoze them out of existence in the 1960s and 1970s were generally abandoned. Under pressure from these still primitive neighborhoods and their activists, some governments, particularly in Asia, turned to supporting improvements—gradually installing piped water, public toilets, lighting, and some paved streets. New self-help settlements continued to spring up on the urban fringes, but in the largest cities they became less desirable because poor transportation made getting to and from work a nightmare. As a re

sult, more centrally located slums and old shantytowns became more congested and densely populated. They also became more attractive to government planners and capitalists, who sometimes combined to banish the poor and build new housing for the middle and upper classes.

Rich and Poor

After the developing countries achieved political independence, massive inequality continued, with few exceptions, to be the reality of life. A monumental gap separated rich and poor. In about 1975 in most developing countries, the top 20 percent of the people took more than 50 percent of all national income. At the other end of the scale, the poorest 60 percent received on average less than 30 percent of all income, and the poorest 20 percent got about 5 percent of the income. Thus the average household in the top fifth of the population received about ten times as much monetary in-

come as the average household in the bottom fifth in the 1970s. This situation did not change significantly thereafter.

Such differences have been the rule in human history. The distribution of income in the Third World strongly resembled that of Europe prior to the First World War, before the movement toward greater equality accelerated sharply (see page 814). It is noteworthy that types of economy—rightist or leftist, capitalist or socialist—have had a limited effect on shares of income. For example, in the 1970s income inequality was almost as pronounced in Mexico, with its progressive, even revolutionary, tradition, as in Brazil, with its rightist military rule.

Differences in wealth and well-being were most pronounced in the exploding towns and cities of the Third World. Few rich or even middle-class people lived in the countryside. Urban squatters may have been better off than landless rural laborers, but they were light-years away from the luxury of the urban elite. In Asia and

A Sleek Automobile   The most ambitious of these four boys in an African village may already dream of acquiring power and wealth in the city. *(Marc and Evelyne Bernheim/Woodfin Camp & Associates)*

Africa the rich often moved into the luxurious sections previously reserved for colonial administrators and white business people. Particularly in Latin America, upper-class and upper-middle-class people built fine mansions in exclusive suburbs, where they lived behind high walls, with many servants and protected from intruders by armed guards and fierce dogs.

A lifestyle in the "modern" mold was almost the byword of the Third World's urban elite. From French perfume and Scotch whisky to electronic gadgets and the latest rock music, imported luxuries, especially automobiles, became the unmistakable signs of wealth and privilege. In Swahili-speaking East Africa, the common folk called the elite *wa Benzi*, "those who ride in a Mercedes-Benz." Even in Mao Zedong's relatively egalitarian China, the urban masses saved to buy bicycles, while government officials rode in chauffeur-driven, state-owned limousines.

Education also distinguished the wealthy from the masses. The children of the elite often attended expensive private schools, where classes were taught in English or French and had little in common with the overcrowded public school classes taught in the national language. Subsequently, they often studied abroad at leading European and North American universities, or they monopolized openings at local universities. While absorbing the latest knowledge in a prestigious field such as civil engineering or economics, they also absorbed foreign customs and values. They mastered the fluent English or French that is indispensable for many top-paying jobs, especially with international agencies and giant multinational corporations. Thus elites in the developing countries often had more in common with the power brokers of the industrialized nations than with their own people, and they seemed willing tools of neocolonial penetration and globalization.

The middle classes of the Third World generally remained small relative to the total population in most countries, although some notable exceptions emerged in Asia in the 1980s and 1990s. White-collar workers and government bureaucrats joined the traditional ranks of merchants and professionals in the urban middle class. Their salaries, though modest, were secure and usually carried valuable fringe benefits. Unlike recent migrants and the rural poor, white-collar workers often received ration cards entitling them to cheap subsidized food.

An unexpected component of the urban middle classes until quite recently was the modern factory proletariat, a privileged segment of the population in many poor countries. Few in number because sophisticated machines require few workers relative to agriculture or traditional crafts, they were often well organized and received high wages for their skilled work. On the Caribbean island of Jamaica in the late 1960s, for example, aluminum workers in big, modern American-owned plants earned $60 to $65 a week. Meanwhile, cane cutters on sugar plantations earned $3 a week, and many laborers on small farms earned only $1 a week. Thus modern factory workers in the Third World tended to be self-satisfied.

In the 1980s and 1990s the growth of economic liberalism and global competition tended to undermine the factory worker's relatively privileged position. Many of the plants of the first industrialization drive, like those in Latin America in the 1930s, had grown up with strong unions behind tariff walls that protected them from more sophisticated producers in the wealthy industrialized countries. As barriers to trade came down, these factories had to cut costs in an attempt to survive. Factory workers often encountered lower wages, permanent layoffs, and plant closings.

More generally, the majority of the exploding population of urban poor earned precarious livings in a modern yet traditional "bazaar economy" of petty trades and unskilled labor. Here regular salaried jobs were rare and highly prized, and a complex world of tiny, unregulated businesses and service occupations predominated.

As in industrializing countries a century ago, irregular armies of peddlers and pushcart operators hawked their wares and squeezed a living from commerce. West African market women, with their colorful dresses and overflowing baskets, provided a classic example of this pattern. Sweatshops and home-based workers manufactured cheap goods for popular consumption. Maids, prostitutes, small-time crooks, and unemployed former students sold all kinds of services. This old-yet-new bazaar economy continued to grow prodigiously as migrants streamed to the cities, as modern industry provided too few jobs, and as the wide gap between rich and poor persisted.

Migration and the Family

Large-scale urban migration had a massive impact on traditional family patterns in the Third World. Particularly in Africa and Asia, the great majority of migrants to the city were young men, married and unmarried; women tended to stay in the villages. The result was a sexual imbalance in both places. There were several rea-

sons for this pattern. Much of the movement to cities (and mines) remained temporary or seasonal. At least at first, young men left home to earn hard cash to bring back to their villages. Moreover, the cities were expensive, and prospects there were uncertain. Only after a man secured a genuine foothold did he marry or send for his wife and children.

Kinship and village ties helped ease the rigors of temporary migration. Often a young man could go to the city rather easily because his family had close ties with friends and relatives there. Many city neighborhoods were urban versions of their residents' original villages. Networks of friendship and mutual aid helped young men (and some women, especially brides) move back and forth without being overwhelmed.

For rural women the consequences of male out-migration were mixed. Asian and African women had long been treated as subordinates, if not inferiors, by their fathers and husbands. Rather suddenly, such women found themselves heads of households, faced with managing the farm, feeding the children, and running their own lives. In the East African country of Kenya, for instance, one-third of all rural households were headed by women in the late 1970s. African and Asian village women had to become unprecedentedly self-reliant and independent. As a result, the real beginnings of more equal rights and opportunities, of "women's liberation," became readily visible in Africa and Asia. (See the feature "Listening to the Past: Voices from the Village" on pages 1142–1143.)

In Latin America the pattern of migration was different. Whole families migrated, very often to squatter settlements, much more commonly than in Asia and Africa. These families frequently belonged to the class of landless laborers, which was generally larger in Latin America than in Africa and Asia. Migration was also more likely to be once and for all. Another difference was that single women were as likely as single men to move to the cities, in part because there was a high demand for women as domestic servants. The situation in Mexico in the late 1970s was typical:

They [women] leave the village seeking employment, often as domestic servants. When they do not find work in the cities, they have few alternatives. If they are young, they frequently turn to prostitution; if not, they often resort to begging in the streets. Homeless peasant women, often carrying small children, roam every quarter of Mexico City.[5]

Some women also left to escape the narrow, male-dominated villages. Even so, in Latin America urban migration seemed to have less impact on traditional family patterns and on women's attitudes than it did in Asia and Africa. This helps explain why the women's movement lagged in Latin America.

GROWING DIVERSITY SINCE 1980

The ongoing urban explosion was one of several factors promoting growing diversity in the developing world. First, the transformation of modest cities into gigantic agglomerations sharpened the contrast between life in urban areas and life in rural areas. This difference in experiences made individual countries and their citizens less homogeneous. Second, continuing urban expansion diversified further the class structure, expanding especially the middle classes and thereby strengthening the forces of democratic reform. Third, the growth of middle-income people was very uneven. It depended primarily on economic performance, which varied substantially by country and region beginning with the world recession of the early 1980s.

Momentous economic changes occurred in East Asia. The rapid industrial progress that characterized first Japan and then the "Four Dragons"—Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and South Korea—was replicated in China in the 1980s and most of the 1990s. After Deng Xiaoping took over in 1978 and launched economic reforms (see page 1085), the Chinese economy grew through 1993 at an average annual rate of about 9 percent. Average per capita income in China was doubling every ten years, three to five times faster than in successfully industrializing countries such as the United States and Britain before 1914. According to the World Bank, the number of very poor people in China declined by 60 percent after 1978. The spectacular economic surge of almost one-fourth of the human race helped to vitalize all of East Asia. Starting from low levels, first Indonesia and then India did fairly well among big countries; Malaysia and Thailand led the smaller newly industrializing countries. A vibrant, independent East Asia emerged as the world's economic pacesetter, an event of enormous significance in long-term historical perspective.

One key to China's success was the example of South Korea and Taiwan, which with Hong Kong and Singapore showed the way in East Asia. Both South Korea and Taiwan were typical underdeveloped countries in the early postwar years—poor, small, agricultural, densely populated, and lacking in natural resources. They also had suffered from Japanese imperialism and

from destructive civil wars with communist foes. Yet they managed to make good. How was this possible?

Radical land reform expropriated large landowners, who were mainly Japanese or pro-Japanese, and drew the mass of small farmers into a competitive market economy, which proved an excellent school of self-reliance and initiative. As in Japan, economic development became a national mission in South Korea and Taiwan. Probusiness governments cooperated with capitalists, opposed strikes, and did nothing to improve the long hours and low wages of self-sacrificing workers. These governments protected their own farmers and industrialists from foreign competition, while also securing almost free access to the large American market. And like Japan, both countries succeeded in preserving many fundamentals of their interrelated Korean and Chinese cultures even as they accepted and mastered Western technology. Tough nationalist leaders maintained political stability at the expense of genuine political democracy.

When China turned toward the market in 1979, it could build on the national unity and radical land distribution inherited from Mao. Introducing economic reforms gradually and maintaining many tools of economic regulation, China's Communist party leaders encouraged native entrepreneurs and also drew on the business talent of wealthy "overseas" Chinese in Hong Kong and Taiwan. They knew the world market, needed new sources of cheap labor, and played a key role in the emerging "Greater China." Harsh authoritarian political rule encouraged China's people to focus on "daring to be rich," as Deng advised them.

No other region of the Third World (or Europe or North America) came close to matching East Asia after 1980. Latin America had some bright spots, most notably Brazil and Argentina. But West Asia and North Africa, wracked by war, political instability, and low oil prices, experienced spiraling urbanization without much new industrialization or economic development. The situation in sub-Saharan Africa was particularly grave. Severe famines, bitter ethnic conflicts, and low prices for African exports of raw materials weighed heavily on the vast region, vivid testimony to the growing diversity in the developing world.

In the late 1990s lingering visions of underlying Third World unity appeared less fanciful once again. In

The World's Largest McDonald's   The remarkable success of the Beijing McDonald's, shown here, illustrates how rapidly China has been urbanizing and industrializing since 1980. China is moving swiftly in the direction of a consumer society. (*Mu Zhou/Sipa Press*)

1997 the great boom in East Asia came to an end. Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand experienced financial crashes and industrial decline that undermined China and worsened conditions in stagnating Japan. In August 1998 the financial crisis spread to Russia, threatened Latin America, and caused uneasiness in markets in western Europe and North America. Frantic efforts to limit the global impact of the Asian economic crisis highlighted again the world's interdependency, as we will see in Chapter 36.

MASS CULTURE AND CONTEMPORARY THOUGHT

Ideas and beliefs continued to change dramatically in the Third World after independence. Education fostered new attitudes, and mass communications relentlessly spread the sounds and viewpoints of modern life Intellectuals and writers, in their search for the meanings of their countries' experiences, articulated a wide spectrum of independent opinions in keeping with growing regional and national diversity.

Education and Mass Communications

In their efforts to modernize and better their societies after securing independence, political leaders became increasingly convinced of the critical importance of education. They realized that "human capital"—skilled and educated workers, managers, and citizens—played a critical role in the development process. Faith in education and "book learning" then spread surprisingly rapidly to the Third World's masses, for whom education principally meant jobs. Thus young people in the developing countries headed for schools and universi

Education in an African Village   An instructor at an open-air school in Kenya teaches blue-shirted children from the Masai tribe to tell time. Basic literacy has risen substantially in developing countries after independence. *(Peter Carmichael/Aspect Picture Library)*

ties in unprecedented numbers. There still remained, however, a wide education gap between them and the rich countries, where more than 90 percent of both sexes attended school through age seventeen.

Moreover, the quality of education in the developing countries was often mediocre. African and Asian universities tended to retain the old colonial values, stressing law and liberal arts at the expense of technical and vocational training. As a result, many poor countries found themselves with large numbers of unemployed or underemployed liberal arts graduates. These "generalists" competed for scarce jobs in the already bloated government bureaucracies, while less prestigious technical jobs went begging.

A related problem was the "brain drain" in the developing nations: many gifted students in vital fields such as engineering and medicine ended up pursuing their careers in the rich countries of the developed world. For example, in the early 1980s as many Indian-trained doctors practiced abroad, mainly in advanced countries, as served India's entire rural population of 480 million. The threat represented by the brain drain helped explain why the Third World's professional elite received high salaries even in very poor countries.

In recent years many observers have concluded that the education drive, like its forerunner the industrialization drive, served the rural masses poorly. It sometimes seemed that its greatest beneficiaries were schoolteachers, who profited from the elite status provided by a permanent government job. Instruction was often impractical and mind numbing. The children of farmers generally learned little about agriculture, raising animals, or practical mechanics. Instead, students often memorized passages from ancient literary works and religious texts and spewed back cut-and-dried answers. No wonder children stayed away from schools in droves. Village schools succeeded best at identifying the exceptional pupils, who were then shipped off to the city for further study and were lost forever to the village.

Whatever its shortcomings, formal education spread with another influential agent of popular instruction: mass communications. The transistor radio penetrated the most isolated hamlets of the developing world. Governments universally embraced radio broadcasting as a means of power, propaganda, and education. Relentlessly, the transistor radio propagated the outlooks and attitudes of urban elites and in the process challenged old values.

The second communications revolution—the visual one—is now in the process of reaching rural people everywhere. Television is bringing the whole planet into the bars and meetinghouses of the world's villages. Experience elsewhere—in remote French villages, in Eskimo communities above the Arctic Circle—shows that television is having a profound, even revolutionary, impact. At the very least the lure of the city continues to grow.

Interpreting the Experiences of the Emerging World

Popular education and mass communications compounded the influence of the developing world's writers and thinkers—its purveyors of explanations. Some intellectuals meekly obeyed their employers, whether the ministry of information or a large newspaper. Others simply embellished or reiterated some received ideology, such as Marxism or free-market capitalism. But some intellectuals led in the search for meaning and direction that has accompanied rapid social change and economic struggle.

Having come of age during and after the struggle for political emancipation, numerous intellectuals embraced Third World solidarity, and some argued that genuine independence and freedom from outside control required a total break with the former colonial powers and a total rejection of Western values. This was the message of Frantz Fanon (1925–1961) in his powerful study of colonial peoples, *The Wretched of the Earth* (1961).

Fanon, a French-trained black psychiatrist from the Caribbean island of Martinique, was assigned to a hospital in Algeria during the bloody war for Algerian independence. He quickly came to sympathize with the guerrillas and probed deeply into the psychology of colonial revolt. According to Fanon, decolonization is always a violent and totally consuming process whereby one "species" of men, the colonizers, is completely replaced by an absolutely different species—the colonized, the wretched of the earth. During decolonization the colonized masses mock colonial values, "insult them, and vomit them up," in a psychic purge.

Fanon believed that the battle for formal independence was only the first step. Throughout the Third World the former imperialists and their local collaborators—the "white men with black faces"—remained the enemy:

During the colonial period the people are called upon to fight against oppression; after national liberation, they are called upon to fight against poverty, illiteracy, and underdevelopment. The struggle, they say, goes on.

. . . We are not blinded by the moral reparation of national independence; nor are we fed by it. The wealth of the imperial countries is our wealth too. . . . Europe is literally the creation of the Third World. The wealth which smothers her is that which was stolen from the underdeveloped peoples.[6]

For Fanon national independence and Third World solidarity went hand in hand with outrage at the misdeeds and moral posturings of the former colonial powers. Fanon's passionate, angry work became a sacred text for radicals attacking imperialism and struggling for liberation.

As countries gained independence and self-rule, some writers looked beyond wholesale rejection of the industrialized powers. They too were "anti-imperialist," but they saw colonial domination as only one chapter in the life of their peoples. They were often activists and cultural nationalists who applied their talents to celebrating the rich histories and cultures of their peoples. And many did not hesitate to criticize their leaders or fight against oppression and corruption. (See the feature "Individuals in Society: Rigoberta Menchú, Speaking for Her People.")

The Nigerian writer Chinua Achebe (b. 1930) rendered these themes with acute insight and vivid specificity in his short, moving novels. Achebe wrote in English rather than his native Ibo tongue, but he wrote primarily for Africans, seeking to restore his people's self-confidence by reinterpreting the past. For Achebe the "writer in a new nation" had first to embrace the "fundamental theme":

This theme—quite simply—is that the African people did not hear of culture for the first time from Europeans; that their societies were not mindless but frequently had a philosophy of great depth and volume and beauty; that they had poetry and above all, they had dignity. It is this dignity that many African peoples all but lost in the colonial period, and it is this that they must now regain. The worst thing that can happen to any people is the loss of their dignity and self-respect. The writer's duty is to help them regain it by showing what happened to them, what they lost.[7]

In *Things Fall Apart* (1958) Achebe achieved his goal by vividly bringing to life the men and women of an Ibo village at the beginning of the twentieth century, with all their virtues and frailties. The hero, Okonkwo, is a mighty wrestler and a hard-working, prosperous farmer, but he is stern and easily angered. Enraged at the failure of his people to reject newcomers, and especially at the white missionaries who convert his son to Christianity and provoke the slaying of the sacred python, Okonkwo kills a colonial messenger. When his act fails to spark a tribal revolt, he commits suicide. Okonkwo is destroyed by the general breakdown of tribal authority and his own intransigent recklessness.

Salif Keita A rising star of contemporary African music, Keita sings in French and in Bambara and Mandinka, the languages of his native Mali. Shown here with his accompanist on a concert tour in the United States, Keita combines African styles with American pop and jazz. Musical styles and cultures constantly interact in today's world. *(Paul Rider/Retna)*

Rigoberta Menchú: Speaking for Her People

Rigoberta Menchú, activist in the struggle for native rights. *(José Luis Yuste/Sygma)*

In 1992 Rigoberta Menchú became the first person of indigenous origin ever to receive the prestigious Nobel Prize for Peace. In honoring Menchú and placing her alongside such historic figures as Martin Luther King, Jr., and Lech Walesa, the Nobel committee praised her work for social justice and ethnocultural reconciliation. In the midst of the "large-scale oppression of Indian peoples" in Guatemala, she was lauded for playing a "prominent part as an advocate of native rights." And although her actions were not always peaceful, she stood as a "uniquely potent symbol of a just struggle."

Although certain aspects of Menchú's life remain controversial and disputed, Menchú's achievement clearly grew out of a long history of oppression. After almost five hundred years a minority of Ladinos, mostly the descendants of Spanish settlers, still rules over the twenty-three indigenous peoples that make up 60 to 80 percent of Guatemala's population. Long-standing government practices of conferring legal ownership of land mainly on Ladinos, condoning Ladino seizure of Indian communal lands, and refusing to acknowledge community ownership have been particularly devastating. Many Indians cannot earn a living on their meager landholdings, and they must seek seasonal work on coastal plantations, where they receive low pay and brutal treatment. Efforts to hold on to land or gain higher wages are met by repression and assassination.

Born in mountainous northern Guatemala, where the large Menchú family survived mainly on the beans and corn they grew, Rigoberta absorbed a profound love of her culture. Her moving autobiography speaks reverently of ancestors, treasured traditions, and the fierce determination of the Quiché people to maintain their collective identity in the face of scorn and hostility. Thus at their marriage ceremony, a young Quiché couple asks "for help with bringing up their children in Indian ways" and "always remaining true to their race no matter how much trouble, sadness and hunger they endure. And their parents answer: 'Generations and generations will pass but we will always remain Indians.'"[1]

Menchú's early education included laboring on a coffee plantation from dawn to dusk at the age of eight, but her formative struggle occurred at home. According to Menchú, a brutal landowner and his gun-toting thugs, acting in collusion with the govern ment, sought to terrorize the Menchús' village into either abandoning its land or accepting the status of landless peons.

Rigoberta's father, Vicente, led the resistance, organizing traps for invaders in 1977 and forming a national union of peasants and plantation workers. The whole family followed his lead, and, with tens of thousands of other highland Indians, they paid a frightful price. Rigoberta joined her father on his organizing missions in the mountains and learned the major Indian languages as well as Spanish in order to forge unity and communicate with poor Ladinos and sympathetic Europeans. Her sixteen-year-old brother became an organizer and was kidnapped, mutilated, and publicly burned to death. Branded a communist and repeatedly imprisoned and tortured, Vicente died in 1980 when troops stormed the building that he and others had occupied in the capital. Rigoberta's activist mother was then seized by soldiers and beaten to death. Hunted by security forces, Rigoberta escaped to Mexico in 1981.

Since 1981 Rigoberta Menchú has emerged through her writing and international organizing as a powerful advocate for indigenous peoples and their rights. As in the case of the African writer Chinua Achebe in his recent work, Menchú is an outstanding example of individuals in developing countries who are looking beyond Western imperialism and focusing instead on their own societies and how to improve them.

Questions for Analysis

1. How has society been divided in Guatemala? How does Rigoberta Menchú's identity relate to these divisions?

2. Is the struggle of the Menchú family an isolated event? Or is it an aspect of larger historical developments? Which developments?

1. Rigoberta Menchú, *I . . . Rigoberta Menchú: An Indian Woman in Guatemala,* ed. E. Burgos-Debray (New York: Verso, 1985), p. 67.

Woven into the story are the proverbs and wisdom of a sophisticated people and the beauty of a vanishing world.

In later novels Achebe portrays the postindependence disillusionment of many writers and intellectuals. In *A Man of the People* (1966) the villain is Chief The Honorable Nanga, a politician with the popular touch. This "man of the people" lives in luxury, takes bribes to build expensive apartment buildings for foreigners, and flimflams the voters with celebrations and empty words. The hero, an idealistic young schoolteacher, tries to unseat Chief Nanga, with disastrous results. Beaten up and hospitalized, the hero broods that the people "had become even more cynical than their leaders and were apathetic into the bargain."[8] Achebe's harsh but considered judgment reflected trends in many developing nations in the 1960s and 1970s: the rulers seemed increasingly corrupted by Western luxury and estranged from the rural masses.

From the 1970s onward Achebe was active in the struggle for democratic government in Nigeria. In his latest novel, *Anthills in the Savannah* (1988), he calls upon Africa to stand on its own two feet, take responsibility, and realize that widespread corruption is frustrating hopes of progress and genuine independence. Yet in his recent essays and speeches he also returns to his earlier theme of the West's enduring low opinion of Africa—ever the "dark continent," the savage, non-Western "other world." Achebe urges his readers to throw away these old prejudices, which he sees rooted in racism, and fashion instead new, socially beneficial visions that will help both Africans and non-Africans to redefine Africa and its prospects.

The celebrated novelist V. S. Naipaul, born in Trinidad in 1932 of Indian parents, also castigated Third World governments for corruption, ineptitude, and self-deception. Another of Naipaul's recurring themes is the poignant loneliness and homelessness of people uprooted by colonialism and Western expansion. In *The Mimic Men* (1967) the blacks and whites and the Hindus and Chinese who populate the tiny Caribbean islands are all aliens, thrown together by "shipwreck." As one of the characters says:

It was my hope in writing to give expression to the restlessness, the deep disorder, which the great exploration, the overthrow in three continents of established social organizations, the unnatural bringing together of peoples who could achieve fulfillment only within the security of their own societies and the landscapes hymned by their ancestors . . . has brought about. The empires of our time were

Mariama Bá Bá's first novel, translated from French into English as *So Long a Letter* in 1981, was a literary milestone and an enormous success. For the first time in an African novel, a woman tells her own story. But Bá's fictional "I" also speaks for all Senegalese women, telling her society that she exists, suffers from injustice, and will now make her own decisions. (© *George Hallett*)

short-lived, but they altered the world forever; their passing away is their least significant feature.[9]

Most of Naipaul's stories take place in postindependent developing countries, which are struggling to find themselves and to build national identities out of the bewildering legacy of native cultures, colonial experiences, and modern ideologies.

Naipaul and Achebe, like many other talented writers and intellectuals in developing nations, probed memories and experiences in pursuit of understanding and identity. A similar soul-searching went on in other creative fields, from art and dance to architecture and

social science, and seemed to reflect a growing intellectual maturity and cultural vitality.

SUMMARY

As Third World leaders and peoples threw off foreign domination after 1945 and reasserted themselves in new or revitalized states, they turned increasingly inward to attack poverty and limited economic development. The collective response was an unparalleled medical revolution and the Third World's first great industrialization drive. Long-neglected agriculture also made progress, and some countries experienced a veritable Green Revolution. Moreover, rapid urbanization, expanding educational opportunities, and greater rights for women were striking evidence of modernization and fundamental human progress. The achievement was great.

But so was the challenge, and results fell far short of aspirations. Deep and enduring rural poverty, overcrowded cities, enormous class differences, and the sharp criticisms of leading Third World writers mocked early hopes of quick solutions. From the late 1960s onward there was growing dissatisfaction and frustration in developing nations, lessened only slightly by the emergence of China and East Asia as economic powerhouses. Thus, as Chapter 36 will show, in recent times many observers came to believe that the developing nations can meet their challenges only by reordering the global system and dissolving the unequal ties that bind them to the rich nations.

NOTES

1.   P. Bairoch, *Economics and World History: Myths and Paradoxes* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), p. 95.

2   Quoted in L. R. Brown, *Seeds of Change: The Green Revolution and Development in the 1970s* (New York: Praeger, 1970), p. 16.

3.   P. Ehrlich, *The Population Bomb* (New York: Ballantine, 1968), p. 11.

4.   P. Bairoch, *The Economic Development of the Third World Since 1900* (London: Methuen, 1975), p. 144.

5.   P. Huston, *Third World Women Speak Out: Interviews in Six Countries on Change, Development, and Basic Needs* (New York: Praeger, 1979), p. 11.

6.   F. Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (New York: Grove Press, 1968), pp. 43, 93–94, 97, 102.

7.   C. Achebe, *Morning Yet on Creation Day* (London: Heinemann, 1975), p. 81.

8.   C. Achebe, *A Man of the People* (London: Heinemann, 1966), p. 161.

9.   V. S. Naipaul, *The Mimic Men* (New York: Macmillan, 1967), p. 38.

SUGGESTED READING

Many of the works in the Suggested Reading for Chapter 34 discuss themes considered in this chapter. P. Bairoch, *Economics and World History: Myths and Paradoxes* (1993), is a concise summation of a leading specialist's many valuable studies. T. von Laue, *The World Revolution of Westernization: The 20th Century in Global Perspective* (1988), and L. Harrison, *Who Prospers? How Cultural Values Shape Economic and Political Success* (1992), are stimulating interpretations of problems in the developing world. R. Auty, *Patterns of Development: Resources, Policy and Economic Growth* (1995), and J. Mittelman and M. K. Pasha, *Out from Underdevelopment Revisited: Changing Structures and the Remaking of the Third World* (1997), are stimulating introductions to recent trends and issues. R. Gamer, *The Developing Nations: A Comparative Perspective,* 2d ed. (1986), is a useful synthesis. Two excellent works from a Third World perspective are especially recommended: E. Hermassi, *The Third World Reassessed* (1980), and M. ul Haq, *The Poverty Curtain: Choices for the Third World* (1976). B. Ward, *The Lopsided World* (1968), and G. Myrdal, *Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations,* 3 vols. (1968), movingly convey the hopes and frustrations of sympathetic Western economists in the 1960s. Valuable introductions to world agriculture and population are found in various works by L. R. Brown, notably the work cited in the Notes and *In the Human Interest: A Strategy to Stabilize World Population* (1974). A. Maddison, *Monitoring the World Economy, 1820–1992* (1995), is a brief but authoritative overview.

Three valuable studies on African questions are R. Austen, *African Economic History: Internal Development and External Dependency* (1987); B. Turner et al., eds., *Population Growth and Agricultural Change in Africa* (1993); and P. Lloyd, ed., *The New Elites of Tropical Africa* (1966). C. Turnbull, *The Lonely African* (1962), provides intimate portraits of Africans caught up in decolonization and rapid social change. J. Iliffe, *The African Poor: A History* (1987), is an original and important work that is highly recommended. Critical aspects of Indian economic development are carefully considered in M. Franda, *India's Rural Development: An Assessment of Alternatives* (1980). E. Vogel, *The Four Little Dragons: The Spread of Industrialization in East Asia* (1991), is an outstanding short study. China's economic and social challenges in the early 1980s are skillfully placed in a broad and somewhat somber perspective by two Chinese-speaking journalists, F. Butterfield, *China: Alive in the Bitter Sea* (1982), and R.

Bernstein, *From the Center of the Earth: The Search for the Truth About China* (1982). W. Overholt, *The Rise of China: How Economic Reform Is Creating a Modern Superpower* (1993), is an account of more recent success.

For the prodigious growth of Third World cities, J. Kasarda and A. Parnell, eds., *Third World Cities: Problems, Policies and Prospects* (1993); A. Gilbert and J. Gugler, *Cities, Poverty and Development: Urbanization in the Third World,* 2d ed. (1992); and J. Abu-Lughod and R. Hay, Jr., eds., *Third World Urbanization* (1977), are highly recommended. Similarly recommended is a fascinating investigation of enduring poverty by M. Lipton and J. van der Gaag, eds., *Including the Poor* (1993).

A good introduction to changes within families is Huston, cited in the Notes, a truly remarkable study. C. Johnson-Odim and M. Stroebel, eds., *Expanding the Boundaries of Women's History: Essays on Women in the Third World* (1992), is an important study. Other useful works on Third World women and the changes they are experiencing include J. Momsen, *Women and Development in the Third World* (1991); N. Keddie and B. Baron, eds., *Women in Middle Eastern History: Shifting Boundaries in Sex and Gender* (1992); A. de Souza, *Women in Contemporary India and South Asia* (1980); N. J. Hafkin and E. Bay, eds., *Women in Africa* (1977); and M. Wolf, *Revolution Postponed: Women in Contemporary China* (1985).

The reader is especially encouraged to enter into the contemporary Third World with the aid of the gifted writers discussed in this chapter. F. Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (1968), is a particularly strong indictment of colonialism from the 1960s. Chinua Achebe illuminates the proud search for a viable past in his classic novel of precolonial Africa, *Things Fall Apart* (1958), and the disillusionment with unprincipled postindependence leaders in *A Man of the People* (1966). G. Moore and U. Beier, eds., *Modern Poetry from Africa* (1963), is a recommended anthology. In addition to his rich and introspective novels such as *The Mimic Men* (1967), V. S. Naipaul has reported extensively on life in Third World countries. His *India: A Wounded Civilization* (1978), impressions gleaned from a trip to his family's land of origin, and *A Bend in the River* (1980), an investigation of the high price that postcolonial Africa is paying for modernization, are especially original and thought provoking. E. Burke III, ed., *Struggle and Survival in the Modern Middle East, 1700 to the Present* (1993), contains colorful brief biographies of a wide variety of ordinary people and is outstanding. L. Heng and J. Shapiro, *Son of the Revolution* (1983), brilliantly captures the drama of Mao's China through the turbulent real-life story of a young Red Guard.

Voices from the Village

How has social and economic development been changing women's lives and family relations in the villages of the Third World? How have women and families been coping with enormous changes, and how can governments and international agencies better respond to the real needs of rural people? These questions have fascinated the American writer Perdita Huston ever since she worked as a medical-social worker in rural North Africa in the early 1960s. The only literate woman in the area, she served as "nurse, letter-writer, marriage counselor, and midwife." And she learned to respect the wisdom and courage of poor peasant women "who searched ceaselessly for food, firewood, dung, water, and hope."

In the mid-1970s, as the critical importance of women in both development and population control was increasingly recognized, Huston received a grant from the United Nations to study the needs of village women in Tunisia, Egypt, Sudan, Kenya, Sri Lanka, and Mexico. Assisted by interpreters and using unstructured interviews, Huston talked first with women in groups and then with volunteers in private, "heart-to-heart" exchanges. In each village she began with a simple but profound question: "How does your life differ from that of your mother or grandmother?" This question brought many answers and opened up further discussion of key issues, such as housing, education, jobs, male-female relationships, and children. The following women were representative.

A young, high-school educated woman in Sri Lanka, the eldest of nine children:

"My mother's generation did not have all the opportunities we have. They did not have education, health services, or the transportation systems that exist now. But economically, they were better off. The income they got was sufficient to meet all their needs. At the moment, the high cost of living makes life difficult. They find it difficult to have a happy life.

"Today young people have the opportunity to show their capabilities in sports and cultural activi-ties—even in social and public affairs. Earlier generations did not allow girls to leave the home and attend public meetings. Now we have that opportunity. Even without the consent of our parents, we take part in social and public affairs or in political matters.

"That is why I wanted to come and join this [agricultural] cooperative. When I live at home, I have no freedom. Wherever I go, I have to be accompanied by a brother and I have to return home early. I am questioned all the time. . . . But here I can earn my living and have some freedom to move about and make choices about participation in after-work activities.

"Of course, my parents didn't want me to come here. They refused at first. They were concerned about letting a daughter come to a place like this, but the second time I asked—or rather, insisted—they gave their consent.

"You see, my father is a farmer. My parents lived from the land, but when my grandfather died, the land was distributed among his sons. Now my parents' portion is very small. It is not sufficient for them to exist on. They continue to work the land and to search for other jobs.

"I want my children to have a firmer footing—not to have this type of life. They must learn a profession and have a better job than mine. Women in Sri Lanka need employment. They should all have jobs. They must be taught skills so that they can earn a bit for their families.

"I will have only two children: When you have more than two, you have all sorts of problems and expenses to worry about."

A nomadic Bedouin woman in Tunisia:

"I was given in marriage at age thirteen. I hadn't even reached puberty. My father was dead, so my uncle arranged the marriage with a neighbor. Now it is better; there is a law that says girls mustn't marry before the age of seventeen. That is good. You know, I hadn't had my period when I married. A month later it came—and a month after that I

was pregnant. I had five children—three girls and two boys—but one daughter was stillborn.

"My children go to school, and I want them, both sons and daughters, to go as far as their ability lets them. I want them to have a good future, a profession, a happy life. I don't want them working in the fields, picking up straws and leftovers as I do. I would like so much to have gone to school. I would like to have opened my mind. I would have taught other people about things. I want to know everything—everything you can learn if you have an education. I won't let my daughters marry earlier than seventeen.

"Men are much better these days than they were before. They respect women more. . . . Before, a woman could be divorced, beaten, and poorly treated. That kind of thing doesn't exist anymore, thanks to President Bourguiba. Thanks to him and the laws, women are much better off today.

"We have family planning now, and you can take better care of your children. That, too, is different. You can't imagine how many things I tried to swallow to prevent myself from having more children. I even used to eat mothballs, thinking that would help. I am only thirty-six years old, and I have planned my family now for five years. I have a loop. I don't want any more children. Life is too difficult." [She paused.] "Before the new laws, all women lived the lives of beasts."

A young Muslim woman in Sudan:

"Mother's life was, and is, very different from my own. She couldn't go out or talk to any men other than her husband. She never even went out into the street with him. She just stays home all the time; that is her life. But I go to market; I go out with my husband; we may even go to a movie. My husband does not mind. Sometimes I don't even put on my tow [veil]. Mother would never go outside without a full veil covering her face and hair.

"These changes are all due to education. Before, women did not go to school. They did not know their husbands. They never saw them until the wedding night, once they were already married. But here in Sudan, women don't have as much access to education as men. It is better for boys, much better. I want my children to have more education than I did; then they will be different from me, just as I am different from my mother. The

Village women and their daughters in a hut in southern Mexico. *(Cindy Karp/Black Star)*

main thing is education. Schools are very important for girls.

"A girl and a boy must be equal. A woman must work in all areas—doctor, teacher, anything. Any work a man can do, a woman can do also."

Questions for Analysis

1. In what ways do these women think their lives are different from their mothers'?

2. What common themes emerge in these responses?

3. What do these women think about education and jobs? About marriage and children?

4. Huston found many women who spoke openly in private but who did not want their names used or their neighbors or husbands informed of their views. How do you explain this?

Source: Perdita Huston, *Third World Women Speak Out: Interviews in Six Countries on Change, Development, and Basic Needs* (New York: Praeger, 1979), pp. 25, 27–28.

36
One Small Planet

World Youth Day, Paris,
late 1990s
(Lange/in Sygma)

The idea of visitors from elsewhere in the universe has kindled the modern imagination. Motorists swear that they have seen unidentified flying objects; the alchemy of imagination even lands the crew of the starship *Enterprise* on earth in our era. A best-selling author spins preposterous theories about "ancient astronauts" who landed on earth and built everything from the pyramids at Giza to the temples of the Aztecs. It is as if we earthlings, believers in the power of technology but weighed down by apparently insolvable human conflicts, yearn for some superior intelligence to decipher our little world and set it straight.

Perhaps our yearning for enlightened interstellar guidance can be put to good use. We can imagine how superior intelligences, easily able to grasp our world and its complex history, would view the planet and its talented but quarrelsome human race. Surely interstellar observers would take a genuinely global perspective, free from our customary biases of creed and nation. If we try to do the same, perhaps we too can gain insight into our world's ongoing development and its prospects.

- How has the planet organized itself politically, and will competing nation-states continue to dominate world politics?
- How has the human race been using its resources to meet its material needs?
- What key ideas are guiding human behavior as our planet moves toward an uncertain future?

From a global perspective these questions might seem particularly important.

🜨 WORLD POLITICS

Although many earthlings are deeply impressed by our recent scientific and technological achievements, highly advanced space travelers might be less so. They might instead be astonished that accelerated technological achievement has not been matched by any corresponding change in the way the human race governs—or fails to govern—itself. Sovereign nation-states reign supreme and are reinforced by enormously destructive weapons. The embryonic growth of an effective global political organization, of a government that could protect the world's nations from themselves, appears permanently arrested. The tension generated by powerful,

warlike states in a fragile and interdependent world remains one of the most striking—and dangerous—characteristics of this small planet.

Nation-States and the United Nations

The rise of the nation-state and the global triumph of nationalism have been a grand theme of modern world history. The independent territorial nation-state—sometimes containing separatist ethnic groups striving for nationhood in their own right—is clearly the fundamental principle of political organization in our times. Yet from a global perspective we must surely question what we take for granted.

Has the nation-state system, with its apparently inevitable conflicts, become a threat to life on the planet? Some have thought so. It is one of history's ironies that nationalism has been widely condemned in the twentieth century, especially in Europe, just as it has triumphed decisively in world politics. In *Mankind and Mother Earth* (1976), his last work, the renowned British historian Arnold Toynbee (1889–1975) poignantly expressed the post-1914 disillusionment of many European and American intellectuals. At the time of his birth, Toynbee wrote, his middle-class countrymen "supposed Earthly Paradise was just around the corner." They also assumed that the national state was "the natural, normal, rightful political unit." Toynbee's generation of Europeans, however, lived through an era of "self-inflicted tribulation," war and genocide, largely due to their "explosive, subversive" faith in national self-determination.

Toynbee borrowed a term from the ancient Greeks to explain that the spread of the western European political idea of the national state, first to eastern Europe and then to Asia and Africa, had created a fatal discrepancy:

the discrepancy between the political partition of the Oikoumené [the habitat of the human race] into local sovereign states and the global unification of the Oikoumené on technological and economic planes. This misfit is the crux of mankind's present plight. Some form of global government is now needed for keeping the peace . . . and for reestablishing the balance between Man and the rest of the biosphere.[1]

A small but articulate group of intellectuals and political scientists has continued to advocate similar views. Thus we should probably take the "unrealistic" question

of world government seriously. Let us look more closely than usual at the United Nations for signs of the emergence of a global authority transcending sovereign states.

When the United Nations was founded in San Francisco in 1945, the United States was the driving force behind its creation. President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Democrats in the Wilsonian tradition believed that the failure of the United States to join the League of Nations had contributed to the tragic breakdown of "collective security" in the 1930s. A resurrected League, they believed, would facilitate Allied cooperation in the postwar era.

The main purpose of the new organization was "to maintain international peace and security." Primary responsibility for this awesome task was assigned to the twelve-nation Security Council. According to the United Nations charter, the Security Council had the authority to examine any international conflict, impose economic and political penalties on an aggressor, and even "take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to restore international peace and security." In short, the Security Council had the power to police the world.

In practice, however, this theoretical power was severely restricted. China, Great Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and the United States were all made permanent members of the Security Council, and all five had to agree on any peacekeeping action. The veto power of the Big Five has been criticized for preventing the United Nations from ever regulating its most powerful members. But that was precisely the point: none of the Big Five, and certainly not the United States, was willing to surrender sovereign power to a potential world government.

Indeed, a second principle of the United Nations affirmed and reinforced the primacy of the national state

The United Nations in Action   These soldiers are part of a French battalion serving in a United Nations peacekeeping operation in Cambodia (Kampuchea), a country wracked by war and civil conflict since 1970. United Nations forces usually provide humanitarian aid as they try to preserve fragile cease-fires after warring armies agree to stop fighting. *(J. F. Roussier/Sipa Press)*

in world politics. The charter directed the United Nations to pursue "friendly relations between nations based on the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples." Every "peace-loving" state was eligible to join and to participate in the General Assembly, the United Nations' second main body. Founded with 50 members, the General Assembly reached 122 members in 1965 and 159 in 1990. Each member state, whatever its size, always had one voice and one vote on all resolutions, but the resolutions of the General Assembly became legally binding on states only if all five of the Security Council's permanent members agreed. The General Assembly was a world debating society for nation-states, not a lawmaking body for the peoples of the planet.

The third express purpose of the United Nations testified to the expanded scope of government tasks since the late nineteenth century, as well as to an emerging vision of global interdependence. According to its charter, the United Nations was "to achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedom for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion." This open-ended assignment was the province of a Social and Economic Council, whose eighteen members were to be elected periodically by the General Assembly. The council was also to work with specialized affiliated agencies such as the World Health Organization in Geneva and the Food and Agriculture Organization in Rome.

The scope of its original purposes helps explain the evolution of the United Nations. Hopes of effective Allied cooperation in the Security Council faded in the early cold war, as the outnumbered Soviet Union often used its veto power to paralyze that body. The Security Council proved somewhat more successful at quieting bloody conflicts between smaller states where the interests of the superpowers were not directly involved, such as the dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir and that between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus. In 1960 it even sent military forces to the former Belgian Congo in an attempt to re-establish order there.

With the Security Council often deadlocked, the rapidly changing General Assembly claimed ever greater authority. As decolonization picked up speed and the number of member states more than doubled by the early 1960s, a nonaligned, anticolonial Afro-Asian bloc emerged. Reinforced by sympathetic Latin American countries, the bloc succeeded in organizing a Third

World majority in the General Assembly by the mid-1960s. This majority concentrated on economic and social issues, while also passing many resolutions often directed against the former colonial powers, the United States, Israel, imperial Portugal, and the white government of South Africa.

The long-term significance of these developments at the United Nations was by no means clear. The Third World majority, predominantly composed of small and poor countries, clearly mistook the illusion of power at the United Nations for the substance of power in world affairs. By the late 1970s many of the General Assembly's resolutions were simply ignored. Meanwhile, many critical international issues, such as the Arab-Israeli conflict, were increasingly resolved by resorting to traditional diplomacy or war. From the mid-1980s onward the United Nations experienced a serious financial crisis as the United States and a few other Western countries cut their contributions in order to retaliate against U.N. policies that they opposed.

Nor did the United Nations generate much popular support around the world. Most people continued to identify with their national states, which may even provide adults with a psychological substitute for the family bonds that nurtured them in childhood. Thus nation-states have continued to weave the powerful social bonds necessary for group action. As two American political scientists put it, "The nation-state may all too seldom speak the voice of reason. But it remains the only serious alternative to chaos."[2]

Despite these limitations the United Nations also proved to be a remarkably hardy institution. Particularly significant was the Third World majority's successful expansion of the scope of the organization's economic, social, and cultural mission. By the 1970s an alphabet soup of United Nations committees, specialized agencies, and affiliated international organizations was studying and promoting health, labor, agriculture, industrial development, and world trade, not to mention disarmament, control of narcotics, and preservation of the great whales. These agencies and affiliated organizations derived their initial authority from treaties and agreements between sovereign states, but once in operation they took on a life of their own and expanded their activities.

Staffed by a talented international bureaucracy, United Nations agencies worked tenaciously to consolidate their power and to serve their main constituency—the overwhelming Third World majority in both the General Assembly and the world's total population. Without directly challenging national sovereignty,

they exerted a steady pressure for more "international cooperation" in dealing with specific global issues, and the world's big powers sometimes went along. The United Nations also emerged as the central forum for the debate on the world economic order and the relations between rich and poor countries, issues of fundamental importance in the late twentieth century. Thus sharp-eyed observers detected a gradual, many-sided enlargement of United Nations involvement in the planet's social and economic affairs.

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s the United Nations also continued to play a role in establishing peace in conflicts that did not directly involve the superpowers. Typically, United Nations negotiators helped weary foes to work out a cease-fire agreement, which was then monitored by a United Nations command drawing its troops from many countries. Then, as the 1990s opened and the cold war ended, the United Nations again acted on a grand scale to stop aggression and police the world. In response to Iraq's invasion and annexation of the small state of Kuwait, the five permanent members of the Security Council agreed in August 1990 to impose a strict naval blockade on Iraq. They subsequently authorized a U.S.-led military coalition to drive Iraqi forces out of Kuwait (see page 1066).

In the flush of victory over Iraqi armies, some leaders and observers believed that a "new world order" might be at hand. Perhaps Great Power cooperation on the Security Council would enable the United Nations to

Escape from Srebrenica   A Bosnian Muslim refugee arrives at the United Nations base in Tuzla and with her anguished screams tells the world of the Serbian atrocities. Several thousand civilians were murdered at Srebrenica, and Western public opinion finally demanded decisive action. Efforts continue to arrest those Serbs believed responsible and to try them for crimes against humanity. *(J. Jones/Sygma)*

fulfill its original purpose and impose peace and security throughout the world.

One such attempt came in December 1992, when armed forces from the United States landed on the East African beaches of Somalia in order to stop a savage civil war and allow United Nations soldiers to maintain peace thereafter. But the operation failed, as some Somali fighters attacked, killed, and drove out their would-be benefactors. United Nations negotiators and military observers were also unable to stop the equally savage civil war in Bosnia, which was eventually turned over to the NATO alliance and brought to a conclusion in the Dayton Accords (see pages 1074). In response to these setbacks, the United Nations scaled back its peacekeeping ambitions and concentrated on helping warring factions that wanted peace and did not try to impose peace. Even this was an awesome task: in 1995 more than sixty-seven thousand United Nations soldiers were stationed in hot spots all around the world. United Nations peacekeeping efforts were imperfect, but they were also indispensable. These efforts, combined with the United Nations' growing range of social and economic activities, suggest that the first historic steps toward some kind of world government had already been taken.

Complexity and Violence

Alongside territorial nation-states and international organizations that focus on specific problems stretched a wide range of alliances, blocs, partnerships, regional rivalries, and local conflicts. It was often difficult to make sense of this tangle of associations, for at least four reasons.

First, the end of the cold war removed one of the planet's most enduring realities. To be sure, by the 1980s neither the Soviet nor the Western bloc was as solid as it had been a generation earlier. Yet the hostile superpowers continued to dominate and curb their allies and clients, and both superpowers were in turn restrained by them. The sudden end of the cold war shattered these interlocking restraints, removing a basic principle of global organization and order.

The cold war contributed to the ideology of Third World solidarity, which was until recently a second significant factor in planetary affairs. A critical step was taken in 1955, when Asian and African nations came together in Bandung, Indonesia, to form a "third force" of nonaligned nations. The neutralist leaders of Asia and Africa believed that genuine independence and social justice were the real challenges before them, and they considered the cold war a wasteful and irrelevant diversion. African, Asian, and Latin American countries learned to work together at the United Nations, called for a restructuring of the world economic system, and achieved some successes (see below). However, in the 1980s and 1990s big differences in economic performances in countries and regions and the apparent triumph of neoliberalism undermined the whole idea of Third World solidarity and action. Developing countries increasingly went their own ways.

Indeed, a striking third development was the increasingly "multipolar" nature of world politics. Regional conflicts and jockeying for regional influence became the keynotes. During the cold war a number of increasingly assertive "middle powers" emerged around the world. Calling on nationalism as a mobilizing force, these middle powers strove to be capable of leading or dominating their neighbors. The rise of middle powers reflected the fact that most of the world's countries were small and weak, with fewer than 20 million people. Only a few countries had the large populations, natural resources, and industrial bases necessary for real power on a regional or global scale.

Latin America presented two striking examples of rising middle powers. Brazil, with more than 140 million people, vast territory and resources, and one of the world's more rapidly industrializing economies, emerged rather suddenly as South America's dominant nation-state. Equally impressive was the emergence of Mexico, with its large population, substantial industrial base and oil wealth, and tradition of revolution and proud nationalism. By the early 1980s Mexico clearly saw itself as the natural leader of the Spanish-speaking Americas.

Strong regional powers such as France and West Germany had re-emerged in western Europe by the early 1960s. The unification of Germany in 1990 created a dominant economic power in Europe, with far-reaching implications for the Common Market and Europe's role in world affairs. Nigeria was unquestionably the leading power in sub-Saharan Africa. Heavily populated Egypt and much smaller Israel were also regional powerhouses. Iran sought under the shah to dominate the Persian Gulf but came out of the long, bitter war with Iraq in the 1980s a bloodied loser. This defeat encouraged Saddam Hussein to attack tiny Kuwait as part of Iraq's unsuccessful bid to become the dominant power in the region. China, India, and Japan were all leading regional powers, and several other Asian countries—notably Indonesia, Vietnam, Pakistan, and the Philippines—were determined to join them.

Finally, a high degree of conflict and violence characterized the emerging multipolar political system. Competition for regional leadership led to several major wars. Less spectacularly but perhaps more destructively, there were many smaller wars. Some countries were literally torn apart. Lebanon, which had long been considered the most advanced state in the Arab world, was practically destroyed by ethnic struggles and foreign occupation. Cambodia (now known as Kampuchea)—invaded by American armies in 1970, then ravaged by the savage Pol Pot regime, and finally occupied by Vietnamese armies—became another terrible tragedy.

The ongoing plague of local wars and battles caused great suffering and millions of refugees. Vietnam's "boat people" fled for their lives after unification under the communists. The war for independence in Bangladesh temporarily created more than 10 million refugees, who fled into India toward Calcutta. Hungry, homeless people overwhelmed the Indian relief centers and were forced to sleep in trees, huddle in the rain, and in many cases starve to death. After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, fully one-tenth of that country's population of 17 million people fled. In 1981 the United Nations' commission for emergency relief counted 10 million refugees in Asia and Africa. In the 1990s civil war in Bosnia and Kosovo created tens of thousands of new refugees in Europe, while fighting in Rwanda resulted in the slaughter of thousands of Tutsis and Hutus and sent thousands more running for their lives.

Famine Relief   These desperate Ethiopians, fleeing from drought and starvation in 1985, hope to find enough food to escape death in makeshift refugee camps. The recent arrivals in the foreground are completely exhausted by hunger, fatigue, and a cold night in the desert. The United Nations has coordinated most famine relief in recent years. *(Sebastiao Salgado/ Magnum Photos)*

As these and many other examples suggest, rivalries between ethnic groups were often at the heart of civil wars and local battles. Different groups and their politicians competed for power, or they fought to overturn entrenched discrimination and oppression. Ethnic competition could easily turn violent, inflamed by demogogic politicians and accumulated grievances, and lead to radical demands for ethnic autonomy or political independence. Yet only about twenty states, representing about 10 percent of the world's population, are truly homogeneous. Even if common language were the only basis for ethnic identity, which it is not, the number of countries in the world could explode to six thousand.[3] Thus the goal of a separate region or state for each self-defined people could lead to endless battles, fragmentation, and tragedy on a global scale. The peaceful reconciliation of existing states with widespread separatist aspirations stands as a mighty challenge in the twenty-first century.

In summary, regional competition, local hot wars, and ethnic conflicts kept military matters on the world's mind after the cold war ended. And almost every country in the world continued in a global arms race.

Weapons of Mass Destruction

One ominous aspect of the global arms race was the enduring threat of nuclear war and nuclear proliferation. How, a superior intelligence would surely ask, had this frightening situation arisen? And what was being done to find a solution?

Having let the atomic genie out of the bottle at Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, a troubled United States immediately proposed that it be recaptured through effective international control of all atomic weapons. The Soviets, suspicious that the United States was really trying to preserve its atomic monopoly through its proposal for international control and inspection, rejected the American idea. Instead, the Soviet Union continued its crash program and exploded its first atomic bomb in 1949. The United States exploded its first hydrogen bomb in 1952, and within ten months the Soviet Union did the same. Further American, Soviet, and then British tests aroused worldwide fear that radioactive fallout would enter the food chain and cause leukemia, bone cancer, and genetic damage. Concerned scientists called for an international agreement to stop all testing of atomic bombs.

Partly in response to worldwide public pressure, the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain agreed in 1958 to stop testing for three years. In 1963 these three powers signed an agreement, eventually signed by more than 150 countries, banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere. A second step toward control was the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, designed to halt their spread to non-nuclear states and to reduce stockpiles of existing bombs held by the nuclear powers. It seemed that the nuclear arms race might yet be reversed.

This outcome did not come to pass. De Gaulle's France and Mao's China, seeing themselves as great world powers, simply disregarded the test ban and continued their development of nuclear weapons, although they later signed the nonproliferation treaty. By 1968 they too had hydrogen bombs. Reversing its previous commitment to nuclear arms limitations, India also developed weapons. In 1974 India exploded an atomic device. The nuclear arms race between the Soviet Union and the United States also surged ahead after 1968. According to American officials, in 1974 the United States was capable of dropping 36 bombs on each of the 218 Soviet cities with populations of 100,000 or more. The Soviet Union had 11 nuclear weapons for each American city of comparable size. The much-discussed SALT talks confined themselves to limiting the rate at which the Soviet Union and the United States produced more nuclear warheads.

India developed its atomic capability partly out of fear of China, which had manhandled India in a savage border war in 1962. India's nuclear blast in 1974 in turn frightened Pakistan, which after 1947 regarded India as a bitter enemy and lost Bangladesh because of Indian armies. Pakistan's president Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (1928–1979) was reported to have said that Pakistan must have the bomb even if its people had to eat grass. In the 1980s Pakistan was clearly on the verge of producing nuclear weapons.

It was also generally believed that both Israel and South Africa had arsenals of nuclear bombs. Israel's apparent nuclear superiority was profoundly distasteful to the Arabs. Hence Iraq pushed hard, with help from France, to develop nuclear capability. In June 1981 Israel responded suddenly, attacking and destroying the Iraqi nuclear reactor. At the same time, many near-nuclear powers appeared poised to go nuclear by 1980. Was the human race, as one expert on nuclear arms warned, "an endangered species"?[4]

Such warnings helped to mobilize the international community and contributed to positive developments. Armed to the teeth with atomic bombs, the United States and the Soviet Union did cooperate successfully in limiting the spread of nuclear weapons to their

Killer Gas in Tokyo   A gas attack on the Tokyo subway system by members of a Japanese cult on March 20, 1995, took the lives of a dozen people and left more than 5,500 others sickened and traumatized. Wearing gas masks and protective clothing, these firefighters are emerging after cleaning contaminated cars. The gas attack in Tokyo has reinforced fears of terrorists using chemical weapons. *(Atsushi Tsukada/Wide World Photos)*

friends and foes. The international commission monitoring the nonproliferation treaty helped Argentina and Brazil abandon their nuclear weapons program by providing a framework of effective verification. Related agencies monitored exports of nuclear material, technology, and missiles that could carry atomic bombs. These measures encouraged confidence in global cooperation and the nonproliferation treaty, which was extended indefinitely in 1995.

Yet at least three serious challenges remained as the century ended. First, top-secret efforts by Iraq to build a bomb before the Persian Gulf War had almost succeeded, highlighting the need for better ways to detect cheating. Second, Russia and the United States had promised vaguely to cut their nuclear weapons to between 2,000 and 2,500 each by the year 2007 (down from 45,000 and 30,000, respectively, at the high point), but in 1998 they were stalled at about 6,000 each, with no hope of quick progress. Finally, in 1998 first India and then Pakistan exploded nuclear weapons, which, in the words of the influential *Economist*, dealt

the "decades-long effort to halt the spread of the bomb . . . a severe blow."[5] The continuing threat of nuclear weapons and eventual atomic war in a multipolar world of intense regional rivalries was clear to all.

Chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction posed similar anxieties. For many years the use of chemical weapons had been outlawed by international agreement, but the manufacture of these terrible weapons was nonetheless permitted. Shocked by Iraq's use of chemical weapons against both Iran and its own Kurdish population in the 1980s, most of the world's nations in 1997 signed a convention banning the production of chemical weapons and requiring the destruction of those in existence. Inspectors received the right to make surprise searches "anytime, anywhere." But complex practical questions relating to effective verification remain. Moreover, most Arab countries refused to sign the new treaty, pointing to Israel's long-standing refusal to join the nuclear proliferation agreement.

Building credible verification is an even greater problem for the experts monitoring the 1972 Biological and

Toxins Weapons Convention, which outlawed the production of the tiny quantities sufficient to poison large populations. Iraq's attempts to develop biological weapons, discovered after the Persian Gulf War, gave new urgency to formulating rules for surprise inspections and trade controls. In short, the terrible doomsday scenario of man-made plagues, lethal nerve gases, and mushroom clouds still haunted humanity, which sought in turn to escape the threat of self-inflected cataclysm.

GLOBAL INTERDEPENDENCE

Alongside political competition, war, and civil conflict, a contradictory phenomenon unfolded: as Toynbee suggested, the nations of our small world became increasingly interdependent both economically and technologically. Even the great continental states with the largest landmasses and populations and the richest natural resources found that they could not depend only on themselves. The United States required foreign oil, China needed foreign markets, and Russia needed foreign grain. All countries and peoples had need of each other.

Mutual dependence in economic affairs was often interpreted as a promising sign for the human race. Dependence promoted peaceful cooperation and limited the scope of violence. Yet the existing framework of global interdependence also came under intense attack. The poor countries of the developing world—sometimes called simply the South—charged that the North (the industrialized countries) continued to receive far more than its rightful share from existing economic relationships, which had been forged unjustly to the South's disadvantage in the era of European political domination. The South demanded a new international economic order. (See the feature "Listening to the Past: One World and a Plan for Survival" on pages 1170–1171.) Critics also saw strong evidence of neocolonialism in the growing importance of the North's huge global business corporations—the so-called multinationals—in world economic development. Thus global interdependence was widely acknowledged in principle and hotly debated in practice.

Pressure on Vital Resources

During the postwar economic boom of the 1950s and 1960s the nations of the world became more dependent on each other for vital resources. Yet resources also seemed abundant, and rapid industrialization was a worldwide article of faith. Only those alarmed by the population explosion predicted grave shortages, and they spoke almost exclusively about food shortages in the Third World.

The situation changed suddenly in the 1970s. Fear that the world was running out of resources was widely voiced. In a famous study aptly titled *The Limits to Growth* (1972), a group of American and European scholars argued that unlimited economic development is impossible on a finite planet. In the early twenty-first century, they predicted, the ever-increasing demands of too many people and factories would exhaust the world's mineral resources and destroy the fragile biosphere with pollution.

Meanwhile, Japan was importing 99 percent of its petroleum, western Europe 96 percent. When the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) increased the price of crude oil fourfold in 1973 (see page 1051), there was panic in many industrial countries. Skyrocketing prices for oil and other raw materials seemed to confirm grim predictions that the world was exhausting its vital resources.

In many developing countries the pressure to grow more food for more people led to piecemeal destruction of forests and increased soil erosion. These countries suffered from what has been called "the other energy crisis"—a severe lack of firewood for cooking and heat. A striking case was the southern edge of the Sahara. Population growth caused the hard-pressed peoples of this region to overgraze the land and denude the forests. As a result, the sterile sand of the Sahara advanced southward as much as thirty miles a year along a three-thousand-mile front. Thus land available for cultivation decreased, leaving Africa all the more exposed to terrible droughts. In the 1980s and 1990s crops shriveled up and famine stalked the land, but an interdependent world mobilized, and international relief prevented mass starvation.

Recognition of interdependence was reinforced by a common dependence on the air and sea. Just as radioactive fallout has no respect for national boundaries, so pollution may sully the entire globe. Deadly chemicals, including mercury, lead, and arsenic, accumulated in the biosphere. Some feared that pollution of the oceans would lead to the contamination of fish, one of the world's main sources of protein. Others, worried that the oceans had been overfished, feared that a decline in the worldwide fish catch indicated abuse of the sea, the common heritage of humankind.

The One-Child Family China's continued moderate rate of population increase resulted in the early 1980s in drastic laws that generally prohibit Chinese families from having more than one child. The happy grandmother and the government posters in the background preach the joys of the one-child family, which is at odds with Chinese tradition. *(Jin Xuqi/Picture Group)*

Of all the pressures on global resources, many observers believed that population growth was the most serious. Here recent experience offered room for optimism: population growth in the industrialized countries fell dramatically. In the 1950s women there had 2.8 children on average; in the late 1990s they had only 1.5. This level is not enough to maintain a stable population, and if present trends continue, total numbers in the developed countries will decline in the next generation.

Of much greater importance from a global perspective, the world's poor women began to bear fewer children. Small countries such as Barbados, Chile, Costa Rica, South Korea, Taiwan, Tunisia, and the British colony of Hong Kong led the way. Between 1970 and 1975 China followed, registering the fastest five-year decline in the birthrate in recorded history. Then other big countries, especially in Latin America and East Asia, experienced large declines in fertility. In 1970 the aver

age Brazilian woman had close to 6 children; by 1994 she had slightly more than 2. In 1970 the average woman in Bangladesh had more than 7 children; in 1994 she had 4.5. Overall, the average woman in the developing world had 6.2 children in 1950 and just under 3 in 1998.

There were several reasons for this decline in fertility among women in the developing world. Fewer babies were dying of disease or malnutrition, thus couples needed fewer births to guarantee the survival of the number of children they wanted. As had happened earlier in the industrialized nations, better living conditions, urbanization, and more education encouraged women to have fewer children. No wonder that the most rapidly industrializing countries, such as Taiwan and South Korea, led the way in declining birthrates.

Outside East Asia contraception and especially abortion remained controversial. This helps explain why

birthrates and population growth remained much higher in Africa and in the Muslim world than in East Asia. In 1985 Africa led the world with a population growth of 3.2 percent per year—enough to double the continent's numbers in only twenty-two years. Yet even in fast-growing Africa the rate of growth began to fall, with the average woman having about six children in 1994 as opposed to eight a few years earlier.

Recent experience suggests that, barring catastrophe, worldwide population growth will continue to decline primarily as a result of billions of private decisions, which are influenced by government policies supporting contraception. More than half of the world's couples now practice birth control, up from one in eight just forty years ago, and that proportion continues to rise.

As a result, projections of world population have declined sharply. In the 1980s experts calculated that the population would probably not stabilize until the mid-twenty-first century at the earliest, when it was estimated it would reach between 10 billion and 11 billion people. In 1998, when total world population was just under 6 billion, some experts concluded that stabilization could occur by 2040 with "only" 7.7 billion people.

Whatever the case may be, efforts to bring living standards in developing countries to levels approaching those in rich industrialized countries will put tremendous pressure on global resources. Gloom, however, is not the proper perspective. Even with 11 billion people, the earth would be less densely populated than Europe is today, and only one-fourth as densely populated as small, prosperous countries such as Belgium and the Netherlands, which largely feed themselves. Such countries, often overlooked in world politics, are promising models for life on a crowded planet. Moreover, the human race has exhibited considerable skill throughout its history in finding new resources and inventing new technologies. An optimist could conclude that, at least from a quantitative and technical point of view, the adequacy of resources is a serious but by no means insolvable problem.

Relations Between Rich and Poor Countries

The real key to adequate resources is probably global cooperation. Will the world's peoples work together, or will they eventually fight over resources like wild dogs over meat?

After the 1960s there was dissatisfaction in Asia, Africa, and Latin America not only with the fruits of the industrialization drive but also with the world's economic system. Scholars imbued with a Third World perspective and spokesmen for the United Nations majority declared that the international system was unjust and in need of radical change. Mahbub ul Haq, a brilliant Pakistani, World Bank official, and member of the international bureaucratic elite, sympathetically articulated this position in 1976:

The vastly unequal relationship between the rich and the poor nations is fast becoming the central issue of our time. The poor nations are beginning to question the basic premises of an international order which leads to ever-widening disparities between the rich and the poor countries and to a persistent denial of equality of opportunity to many poor nations. They are, in fact, arguing that in international order—just as much as within national orders— all distribution of benefits, credit, services, and decision-making becomes warped in favor of a privileged minority and that this situation cannot be changed except through fundamental institutional reforms.[6]

The subsequent Third World demand for a "new international economic order" had many causes, both distant and immediate. Critics of imperialism such as J. A. Hobson (see page 853) and Third World writers on decolonization such as Frantz Fanon (see page 1136) had long charged that the colonial powers grew rich exploiting Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Beginning in the 1950s a number of writers, many of them Latin American Marxists, breathed new life into these ideas with their "theory of dependency."

The poverty and so-called underdevelopment of the South, they argued, were not the starting points, but the deliberate and permanent results of exploitation by the capitalist industrialized nations in the modern era. Third World countries produced cheap raw materials for wealthy, industrialized countries and were conditioned to buy their expensive manufactured goods. As in the case of Latin America since the nineteenth century, the industrialized nations perpetuated this neocolonial pattern after Third World countries gained political independence. Thus the prevailing economic interdependence was the unequal, unjust interdependence of dominant and subordinate, of master and peon. The international order needed a radical restructuring.

The highly successful OPEC oil coup of 1973–1974 ignited Third World hopes of actually achieving a new system of economic interdependence. The sudden price rise brought a massive global transfer of wealth unprecedented since the looting of Mexico and Peru by

MAP 36.1 OPEC and the World Oil Trade   Though much of the world depends on imported oil, western Europe and Japan are OPEC's biggest customers. What major oil exporters remain outside of OPEC?

the Spanish conquistadors in the sixteenth century. Perhaps 2 percent of all the income of the rich nations was suddenly forwarded to the OPEC countries (Map 36.1). Third World critics of dependence and neocolonialism were euphoric, even if higher oil prices weighed heavily on poor countries that lacked oil. For years the developed countries had gradually been reducing their modest levels of economic aid, but OPEC's success suggested that radical change was possible.

In 1974 a special session of the U.N. General Assembly rammed through two landmark resolutions calling for a "new international economic order" and a "program of action" to attain it. Among the specific demands were each country's firm control of its own natural resources, higher and more stable prices for raw materials, and equal tariff treatment for manufactured goods from the Third World. As one sympathetic scholar observed in 1980, these demands were subject to "collective bargaining," but the Third World was now "unionized" and vigorously insisted on new terms.[7]

Subsequently, the developing countries did negotiate some victories, notably a Common Fund under United Nations auspices to support the prices of raw materials and a scaling down of their enormous debts to the industrial nations (see below). Moderate socialists and some liberal economists in the North also supported some of the demands of the developing countries. But generally the industrialized North, deeply troubled by inflation and by its own economic problems, proved a very tough bargainer when it came to basic changes.

For example, in the late 1970s the developing nations laid great hopes on a long, complicated conference to formulate a new Law of the Sea. The proposed new law was based on the principle that the world's oceans are "a common heritage of mankind" and should be exploited only for the benefit of all nations. In practice this was to mean that a United Nations–sponsored authority would regulate and tax use of the sea and that a global organization would even mine the ocean floor. Some wealthy countries and their business

firms were reluctant to accept such an infringement of their economic sovereignty and scope of action. The United States withdrew from the negotiations in 1981, and it refused to sign the final draft of the new Law of the Sea in 1982.

Increasingly frustrated in their desire to fashion a new international economic order quickly, some leaders in the developing countries predicted more confrontation and perhaps military conflict between a wealthy North and an impoverished South. Some alarmists in the North voiced similar concerns.

In considering these frightening predictions, an impartial observer was initially struck by the great gap between the richest and poorest nations. That gap was built on the coercive power of Western imperialism as well as on the wealth-creating achievements of continuous technological improvement since the Industrial Revolution. In the face of bitter poverty, unbalanced economies, and local elites that often catered to Western interests, peoples of the developing countries had reason for anger.

But close examination of our small planet hardly suggested two sharply defined economic camps, a "North" and a "South." Rather, by the early 1990s there were several distinct classes of nations in terms of wealth and income, as may be seen in Map 36.2. The former communist countries of eastern Europe formed something of a middle-income group, as did the major oil-exporting states, which still lagged behind the wealthier countries of western Europe and North America. Latin America was much better off than sub-Saharan Africa, but it contained a wide range of national per capita incomes. South and East Asia were equally diverse.

When one added global differences in culture, religion, politics, and historical development, the supposed clear-cut split between the rich North and the poor South broke down further. Moreover, the solidarity of the South had always been fragile, resting largely on the ideas of some Third World intellectuals and their supporters. The oil cartel's achievement was due in large part to regional Arab solidarity, for example, and duplicating its success with less vital raw materials and more complicated issues proved impossible.

Thus a continuation of the global collective bargaining that first emerged in the 1970s seems more likely than an international class (and race) war. The poorer nations will press to reduce international economic differences through trade preferences, redistribution measures, and special aid to the most unfortunate countries. And because global interdependence has become a reality, they will probably win more concessions, as the working classes have won gains within the wealthy nations since the late nineteenth century.

The recurring international debt crisis illustrated the process of global bargaining. The economic dislocations of the 1970s and early 1980s worsened the problems of many Third World countries, especially those that had to import the oil they needed. Growing unemployment, unbalanced budgets, and large trade deficits forced many Third World countries to borrow rapidly from the wealthy industrialized nations. By the early 1980s much of this debt was short-term and could not be repaid as it came due.

In 1982 Mexico appeared ready to default and financial chaos seemed at hand. Yet the Reagan administration, consistently opposed to Third World calls for a new international system, quickly organized a gigantic rescue operation to pump new money into Mexico. The reason was simple: Mexico's failure to service its foreign debt would cripple large American banks that had lent Mexico money and possibly cause a financial panic that would plunge the whole world into depression and turmoil. Thus a series of international negotiations in the 1980s reduced the debts of developing countries, granted new loans, and encouraged economic liberalization. Lenders and borrowers, rich and poor, North and South, realized that they were bound together in mutual dependence by the international debt challenge.

After the United States again saved Mexico (and American banks) from default in 1995, the world saw a new round of grave global financial crisis. In 1997 the rapidly growing economies of Thailand, Malaysia, South Korea, and Indonesia experienced a "run on the bank," as previously enthusiastic foreign investors panicked and withdrew their funds. As a result, the currencies of these Asian countries plunged, many Asian banks and companies could not repay their debts, and prices and unemployment soared. As in the 1980s, the industrialized countries and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) tried to stem the crisis with emergency loans and prescriptions for recovery. Yet the "Asian contagion" spread, bringing financial collapse in Russia and threatening to blow away Latin America's hardwon financial stability. Worried increasingly about the fate of their own economies, in late 1998 Japan, the United States, and the European Union, working with the IMF, redoubled their rescue operations. The outcome remained uncertain in the spring of 1999, but global interdependence was clearly a fact of life.

The terrible AIDS epidemic highlighted this situation no less dramatically. In 1998 the Population Division of the United Nations calculated that 30 million

More than $10,000

Australia
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Cyprus
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Iceland
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Japan
Kuwait
Luxembourg
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Qatar
Singapore
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
United Arab Emirates
United Kingdom
United States

$3,001–$10,000

Argentina
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Brunei
Chile
Croatia
Czech Republic
Estonia
Gabon
Greece
Hungary
Korea, South
Libya
Malaysia
Malta
Mexico
Oman
Portugal
Saudi Arabia
Slovakia
Slovenia
Taiwan
Uruguay
Yugoslavia

$1,501–$3,000

Algeria
Belarus
Belize
Botswana
Brazil
Costa Rica
Cuba

$501–$1,500

Angola
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Bolivia
Bulgaria
Cameroon
Colombia
Congo
Côte D'Ivoire
Djibouti
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
Egypt
El Salvador
Georgia
Guatemala
Honduras
Indonesia
Iran
Iraq
Jamaica
Jordan
Kazakhstan
Korea, North
Kyrgyzstan
Latvia
Lebanon
Lesotho
Lithuania
Macedonia, F.Y.R.
Moldova
Morocco
Myanmar (Burma)
Namibia
Panama
Papua New Guinea
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Romania
Russia
Senegal
South Africa
Sri Lanka
Sudan
Suriname
Swaziland
Syria
Thailand
Tunisia
Turkey
Turkmenistan
Ukraine
Uzbekistan
Venezuela
Yemen
Zimbabwe

$0–$500

Afghanistan
Albania
Bangladesh
Benin
Bhutan
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cambodia
Central African Republic
Chad
China
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Gambia
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Guyana
Haiti
India
Kenya
Laos
Liberia
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mauritania
Mongolia
Mozambique
Nepal
Nicaragua
Niger
Nigeria
Pakistan
Rwanda
Sao Tome and Principe
Sierra Leone
Somalia
Tajikistan
Tanzania
Togo
Uganda
Vietnam
Zaire
Zambia

Fighting the AIDS Epidemic in Asia A dramatic billboard warns people in Malaysia about the deadly dangers of AIDS. The billboard offers sound advice, focusing on the three primary ways by which the AIDS virus is spread. Can you "read" the three-part message? *(Robert Francis/The Hutchison Library)*

persons all around the world were infected with HIV, the virus that causes AIDS. Each day an estimated 7,000 individuals were newly infected, about half of whom were young people between the ages of ten and twenty-four.

Yet the distribution of AIDS also testifies to a lopsided, unequal world. About 90 percent of all persons who have died from AIDS and 86 percent of those currently infected with HIV live in sub-Saharan African countries, partly because AIDS apparently originated in Africa and has had more time to spread there, and partly because the virus is frequently passed between men and women through normal sexual relations. Moreover, although researchers have found complicated treatments to contain the epidemic in the wealthy industrialized countries, these treatments are much too expensive for the developing world. No cheap, effective vaccine appears on the horizon for the world's poor. Global interdependence increases, but profound inequalities remain.

The Multinational Corporations

One of the most striking features of global interdependence beginning in the early 1950s was the rapid emergence of *multinational corporations*, business firms that operate in a number of different countries and tend to adopt a global rather than a national perspective

MAP 36.2 Estimated Gross National Product (GNP) per Capita in the Early 1990s

FIGURE 36.1 Total Investment by American Corporations in Foreign Subsidiaries   *(Source: Data from U.S. Department of Commerce. Survey of Current Business.)*

Multinational corporations themselves were not new, but their great importance was. By 1971 multinational corporations accounted for fully one-fifth of the non-communist world's annual income, and they grew to be even more important in the 1980s and 1990s.

The rise of multinationals aroused a great deal of discussion around the world. Defenders saw the multinational corporations as building an efficient world economic system and transcending narrow national ties. Critics worried precisely that the nation-state was getting the worst of the new arrangement. Provocative book titles portrayed *Frightening Angels* holding *Sovereignty at Bay* while building *Invisible Empires* and extending their nefarious *Global Reach*. As usual whenever a major development attracts widespread attention, exaggerations and unreasonable predictions abounded on both sides.

The rise of the multinationals was partly due to the general revival of capitalism after the Second World War, relatively free international economic relations, and the worldwide drive for rapid industrialization. The multinationals also had three specific assets, which they used to their advantage.

First, "pure" scientific knowledge unrelated to the military was freely available, but its highly profitable industrial applications remained in the hands of the world's largest business firms. These firms held advanced, fast-changing technology as a kind of property and hurried to make profitable use of it wherever they could. Second, the multinationals knew how to sell, as well as how to innovate and produce. They used modern advertising and marketing skills to push their products, especially the ever-expanding range of consumer products, around the world. Third, the multinationals developed new techniques to escape from political controls and national policies. Managers found ways to treat the world as one big market, coordinating complex activities across many political boundaries so as to reap the greatest profits.

In the late nineteenth century U.S. businesses took the lead in building multinational industrial corporations. The United States had a vast, unified market and the world's highest standard of living by 1890, so U.S. firms were positioned to pioneer in the mass production of standardized consumer goods in foreign lands. Many of the most famous examples, such as kerosene (John D. Rockefeller and Standard Oil), date from the 1880s. Others, such as the cheap automobile (Henry Ford) and standardized food (Coca-Cola, Wrigley's chewing gum), were thriving by 1914.

After 1945 the giant American manufacturing firms surged again. There was continued multinational investment in raw-material production in Latin America (particularly copper, sugar, and bananas) as well as in the Middle East and Africa (primarily oil and gold). By 1967 American corporations—mainly the largest, most familiar household names—had sunk $60 billion into their foreign operations (Figure 36.1).

A few European companies, notably German chemical and electrical firms, also became multinationals before 1900. Others emerged in the twentieth century. By the 1970s these European multinationals were in hot pursuit. Big Japanese firms such as Sony also rushed to catch up and go multinational in the 1960s and 1970s. Whereas American investment had been heavily concentrated in Europe, Canada, and the Middle East, Japanese firms turned at first to Asia for raw materials and cheap, high-quality factory labor. By the 1970s Japanese subsidiaries in Taiwan, Thailand, Hong Kong, and Malaysia were pouring out a torrent of transistor radios, televisions, cameras, and pocket calculators.

Fearful of a growing protectionist reaction in their largest foreign market, the United States (where unem-

Advertising's Global Reach   "Dallas: The American Dream" –so reads this ad for a brand
of cigarettes in a poor family's front yard in Kisangani, a city in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo. Full of ironies, this photo shows how images of foreign places and practices are
often manipulated and misrepresented for someone's benefit. *(Marc Schlossman/Panos Pictures)*

ployed autoworkers symbolically demolished a Japanese
automobile with sledgehammers in 1979), a host of
Japanese firms followed Sony's example and began
manufacturing in the United States in the 1980s. The
Japanese inflow was so great that by 1989 Japanese
multinationals had invested $70 billion in their sub-
sidiaries in the United States, far surpassing the $19 bil-
lion that American multinationals had invested in
Japan. The emergence of European and Japanese multi-
national corporations alongside their American fore-
runners marked the coming of age of global business in
an interdependent world.

The impact of multinational corporations, especially
on Third World countries, has been heatedly debated.
From an economic point of view, the effects were
mixed. The giant firms provided advanced technology,
but the technology was expensive and often inappro

priate for poor countries with widespread unemploy-
ment.

The social consequences were quite striking. The
multinationals helped spread the products and values of
consumer society to the elites of the developing world.
They fostered the creation of growing islands of West-
ern wealth, management, and consumer culture around
the world. After buying up local companies with offers
that local business people did not dare to refuse, multi-
national corporations often hired Third World business
leaders to manage their operations abroad. Critics con-
sidered this practice an integral part of the process of
neocolonialism, whereby local elites abandoned the na-
tional interest and made themselves willing tools of
continued foreign domination.

Some global corporations used aggressive techniques
of modern marketing to sell products that are not well

suited to Third World conditions. For example, mothers in developing countries were urged to abandon "old-fashioned, primitive" breast-feeding (which was, ironically, making a strong comeback in rich countries) and to buy powdered milk formula for their babies. But the use of unsanitary bottles and contaminated water and the dilution of the expensive formula to make it last longer resulted in additional infant deaths. On this and many other issues the multinationals came into sharp conflict with host countries.

Far from acting helpless in such conflicts, some poor countries found ways to assert their sovereign rights over the foreign multinationals. Many foreign mining companies, such as the fabulously profitable U.S. oil companies in the Middle East, were simply nationalized by the host countries. More important, governments in the developing countries learned how to play Americans, Europeans, and Japanese off against each other and to make foreign manufacturing companies conform to some of their plans and desires. Increasingly, multinationals had to share ownership with local investors, hire more local managers, provide technology on better terms, and accept a variety of controls.

PATTERNS OF THOUGHT

The renowned economist John Maynard Keynes often said that we live by our ideas and by very little else. True or not, a global perspective surely requires keen attention to patterns of collective thinking. As Keynes saw, we need to be aware of the ideas that are shaping the uncertain destiny of this small, politically fragmented, economically interdependent planet.

To be sure, human thought can be baffling in its rich profusion. Nevertheless, in the late twentieth century, three distinct patterns on a global scale could be identified: the enduring strength of the modern world's secular ideologies, a vigorous revival of the world's great religions, and a search for mystical experience.

Secular Ideologies

Almost all of the modern world's great secular ideologies—liberalism, nationalism, Marxian socialism, as well as faith in scientific and technical progress, industrialism, and democratic republicanism—took form in Europe between the eighteenth-century Enlightenment and the revolutions of 1848. These ideologies continued to evolve with the coming of mass society in the late nineteenth century and were carried by imperialism

to the highly diverse societies of Asia and Africa. There they won converts among the local elites, who eventually conquered their imperialist masters in the twentieth century. European ideologies became worldwide ideologies, outgrowing their early, specifically European, character.

All this can be seen as a fundamental aspect of global interdependence. The world came to live, in part, by shared ideas. These ideas continued to develop in a complex global dialogue, and champions of competing views arose from all regions. This was certainly true of nationalist ideology and also of Marxism. Europe, the birthplace of Marxism, made few original intellectual contributions to Marxism after Stalin transformed it into a totalitarian ideology of forced industrialization. After 1945 it was Marxists from the Third World who injected new meanings into the old ideology, notably with Mao's brand of peasant-based revolution and the Marxist theory of Third World dependency. Leftist intellectuals in Europe cheered and said "me too."

It was primarily as critics that Europeans contributed to world Marxism. Yugoslavs were particularly influential. After breaking with Stalin in 1948, they revived and expanded the ideas of Stalin's vanquished rival, Leon Trotsky. Trotsky claimed that Stalin perverted socialism by introducing "state capitalism" and reactionary bureaucratic dictatorship. According to the influential Yugoslav Milovan Djilas (1911–1995), Lenin's dedicated elite of full-time revolutionaries became Stalin's ruthless bureaucrats, "a new class" that was unprecedented in history. Djilas's powerful impact stemmed from his mastery of the Marxian theory of history and the Marxian dialectic:

The social origin of the new class lies in the proletariat just as the aristocracy arose in peasant society, and the bourgeoisie in a commercial and artisans' society. . . .

Former sons of the working class are the most steadfast members of the new class. It has always been the fate of slaves to provide for their masters the most clever and gifted representatives. In this case a new exploiting and governing class is born from the exploited class. . . .

The communists are . . . a new class.[8]

Non-Marxian criticism of communism also continued to develop, as in Jean François Revel's provocative *The Totalitarian Temptation* (1977). According to Revel, the application of the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist model brought about phony revolution. Under the guise of supposedly progressive socialism, it built reactionary to

talitarian states of the Stalinist variety. Critics of Marxism-Leninism like Revel and Djilas undermined the intellectual appeal of communism and thereby contributed to its being overthrown in eastern Europe in 1989.

As Marxism lost luster, old-fashioned, long-battered liberalism and democracy survived and flourished as a global ideology. In communist countries small human rights movements bravely demanded the basic liberties, preparing the way for the renewed triumph of liberal revolution in eastern Europe in 1989. And there were always some African and Asian intellectuals, often in exile, calling for similar rights even in the most authoritarian states. The call for human rights and representative government interacted with a renewed faith in economic liberalism as an effective strategy of economic and social development. That countries as highly diverse as Brazil, Russia, China, and Ghana all moved in this direction was little short of astonishing.

Efforts to combine the best elements of socialism and liberalism in a superior hybrid have also been important. The physicist Andrei Sakharov (1921–1990), the father of the Russian atomic bomb who in the 1960s became a fearless advocate of human rights, argued that humanity's best hope lay in an accelerated convergence of liberal capitalism and dictatorial communism on some middle ground of welfare capitalism and democratic socialism. This outlook waned somewhat in the 1990s, but it had deep historical roots and remained a potent force in world thought.

Finally, there was an ongoing global critique of the long-dominant faith in industrialization, consumerism, and unrestrained "modernization." The disillusionment of the Third World was matched by considerable disillusionment in the developed countries and a search for alternative secular visions of the future. There were many advocates of alternative lifestyles and technologies friendly to the environment. E. F. Schumacher, an English disciple of Mahatma Gandhi, in *Small Is Beautiful* (1973) urged the building of solar-heated houses to conserve nonrenewable oil. Many Africans and Asians stressed "appropriate technologies" tailored to village life rather than borrowed from large-scale urban industrialized society—such as small, rugged, three-wheeled motorized carts suited to existing country lanes, rather than large trucks requiring expensive modern highways and imported fuel. Writers from the industrialized countries also reassessed traditional cultures and found nobility and value similar to that championed by the Nigerian novelist Chinua Achebe (see page 1137). Opponents of modern industrial society and defenders of

The Revolution in Communications   Although this young man must carry his motorbike up a rocky path to reach his home, he has gained access to speed and excitement, to roads and cities. The messages of the modern world easily reach remote villages by transistor radio. *(S. Pern/The Hutchison Library)*

the environment remained only a vocal minority, but their worldwide presence was a vivid example of the globalization of intellectual life.

Religious Belief: Christianity and Islam

The questioning of industrialism and consumerism was part of a broader religious response to the dominance of secular ideologies in general. The revival of Christianity among intellectuals after the First World War (see pages 1045–1046) was matched in the 1970s and 1980s by a surge of popular, often fundamentalist,

Christianity in many countries. Judaism, Islam, and Buddhism also experienced a resurgence, and militant Hinduism became a political force in India. The continuing importance of religion in contemporary human thought—an importance that has often escaped those fascinated by secular ideology and secular history—must impress the unbiased observer.

Pope John Paul II (r. 1978–) exemplified several aspects of the worldwide Christian revival. A jet-age global evangelist, John Paul journeyed to Africa, Asia, and North and South America, inspiring enthusiastic multitudes with his warm sincerity and unfailing popular touch. John Paul's melding of a liberal social gospel with conservatism in doctrinal matters often seemed to reflect the religious spirit of the age. Thus the pope boldly urged a more equitable distribution of wealth in plutocratic Brazil and more civil liberties in Marcos's authoritarian Philippines while reaffirming the church's long-standing opposition to contraception and women in the priesthood. Many of Christianity's most rapidly

growing Protestant churches also espoused theological fundamentalism, based on a literal reading of the Bible.

It was emblematic that the "Polish Pope" came from an officially atheist communist country. Yet after long years of communist rule, Poland was more intensely Catholic than ever before. Lech Walesa, the leader of Poland's trade union Solidarity, said that he never could be a communist because he was a devout Roman Catholic. Poland illustrated the enduring strength of spiritual life in the face of materialistic culture and secular ideologies. Similarly, the work of Mother Teresa and her followers poignantly captured the enduring appeal of Christian service and self-sacrifice. (See the feature "Individuals in Society: Mother Teresa: A Life for the Poor.")

Islam, the religion of one-seventh of the earth's people, also experienced a powerful resurgence from the 1970s onward. Like Orthodox Judaism and fundamentalist Christianity, Islam had been challenged by the self-confident secular ideologies of the West since the

Women in Afghanistan   The Taleban government in Afghanistan, which took power in 1998 after a long civil war, embodies the harshest and most extreme aspects of Islamic fundamentalism. Women must cover themselves completely when they go out, seeing the world only through a heavy net. They are forbidden to work outside the home, and it is against the law for their daughters to attend school. *(I. Uimonen/Sygma)*

Mother Teresa: A Life for the Poor

Mother Teresa, joyfully sharing her faith. *(M. Polak/Sygma)*

Few individuals show better the enduring power of the world's religions than Mother Teresa (1910–1997). Born into a happy, prosperous Albanian family living in Skopje, then part of the Ottoman Empire and now the capital of Macedonia, the young Agnes Bojaxhiu felt called to minister to the poor as a nun and missionary. At eighteen, she joined the Sisters of Loretto, and after studying briefly at the order's head-quarters in Ireland, she was sent to Calcutta, India. There she served as a Sister-teacher in the Lorettos' girls' school, soon teaching geography and religion in fluent Bengali and becoming principal of the school.

In 1946 Sister Teresa received a second vocation. As she explained, "I again experienced a calling to re-nounce everything and to follow Christ into the slums, to serve the poorest of the poor."[1] It was a clear order to leave the security of the convent and care for Calcutta's despised and forsaken.

Receiving authorization from the Vatican for her new order, the Missionaries of Charity, Mother Teresa entered the streets. A few former students learned of her whereabouts and became her disciples. The little band soon concentrated on caring for the homeless and the dying, but success did not come easily. In the 1950s local critics saw the little woman in the simple Indian sari as a Christian interloper and a relic of British imperialism in a largely Hindu nation, even though most of her Sisters were idealistic Bengali women, often from well-to-do families.

The work itself was extremely demanding. Gather-ing up desperately ill people, who often belonged to the lowly "untouchable" castes, Mother Teresa and the Sisters "took them home" to their hospice, cared for their wounds, and prepared them for a gentle death, in cleanliness and with love and respect. The patients not only were hungry or dirty, but they also suffered from contagious diseases, oozing sores, and gangrenous limbs. As Mother Teresa recounts, one night one woman was "in very bad shape, . . . actually eaten alive with worms and maggots." When the Sis-ters picked up another man, the "whole of his back re-mained on the street."

How could Mother Teresa and the Sisters face such mind-numbing tragedy with good cheer and determination day after day? Above all, there was Mother Teresa's pro-found and quite literal religious faith. That faith ac-cepted Catholic teaching and savored Christ's assurance that care for the poorest is care for him. "The Missionaries of Charity do firmly believe that they are touching the body of Christ in his distressing disguise whenever they are helping and touching the poor. . . . [They are] feeding the hungry Christ, clothing the naked Christ." Mother Teresa and the thousands who followed her gave love to the poor as a service to God. When she died in 1997, Sisters in 120 countries staffed more than 500 missions—hos-pices, orphanages, homes for lepers, shelters for the mentally ill.

Mother Teresa was a great organizer and a tough combatant. She never pulled any punches. Serving the poor, she also denounced the West's materialism, its neglect of the elderly, and its legalized abortion. In the 1990s critics castigated her for accepting dona-tions from despots and for "putting a more kindly face on social exploitation," for example, in a British tele-vision program called *Hell's Angel*. Through it all she followed her faith. Asked about the TV documentary, she said simply, "Forgive them for they know not what they do."

Questions for Analysis

1. What did Mother Teresa do? Why did she do it? Why do you think she attracted followers?

2. Mother Teresa aroused considerable criticism. Why do you think this was so?

1. Quoted in J. Gonzalez-Balado and J. Playfoot, eds., *My Life for the Poor: Mother Teresa of Calcutta* (New York: Harper & Row, 1985), p. 6. Other quotes pp. 15, 90–91.

early nineteenth century. And although the acids of modern thought did not eat as deeply as in Europe and North America, they etched a seductive alternative to Islam. Moderate Muslim intellectuals advocated religious reforms; radicals wanted drastic surgery. The most famous and successful of the radicals was the twentieth-century Turkish nationalist Mustafa Kemal, or Atatürk (see pages 959–961), who reflected and accelerated the impact of secularism on the Muslim world.

The generation of Muslim intellectual and political leaders born in the interwar years, who reached maturity after the Second World War, agreed that Islam required at least some modernizing. They accepted the attractively simple Muslim creed, "There is no god but Allah, and Muhammad is his Prophet," but they did not think that the laws of the Qur'an should be taken literally. The prohibition on lending money at interest, the social inferiority of women, even cutting off the hands of thieves and public beheading of murderers, had made sense for the Arabian peninsula in the Middle Ages. But, they argued, such practices did not suit the modern age. It was necessary for Islam to adapt.

These views were still common among educated elites in the 1970s, and they remained dominant in Turkey and probably in Egypt. But throughout much of the Middle East they had to bow before a revival of Islamic fundamentalism, the critical development of recent years. Like some of their Christian and Jewish counterparts, orthodox Muslim believers wanted to return to unalterable fundamentals. In taking the Qur'an literally, they demanded that the modern world adapt to the Prophet's teachings, not vice versa. And because the masses remained deeply religious and profoundly disturbed by rapid change, Islamic fundamentalism aroused a heartfelt popular response.

Iran provided the first spectacular manifestation of resurgent Islamic fundamentalism. In the 1970s Iran's religious leaders, notably the charismatic Ayatollah Khomeini, catalyzed intense popular dissatisfaction with the shah's all-out industrialization and heavy-handed religious reform into a successful revolution. An "Islamic Republic" was established to govern according to the sacred laws of the Qur'an. State and church were tightly bound together. The holy men and their followers sanctioned the stoning to death of prostitutes and adulterers and revised the legal code along strictly Qur'anic lines.

Iran's fundamentalism was exceptionally rigid and antimodern, partly because the country adhered to the minority Shi'ite version of Islam. But similar move-

ments developed in every Muslim country. In Algeria in the early 1990s only harsh military rule prevented the fundamentalists from forming a popularly elected government (see page 1101). Even where the fundamentalists were less likely to take power, as in Indonesia or Pakistan, and where they were co-opted and neutralized, as in Saudi Arabia, they found enthusiastic support among the masses and revitalized the Muslim faith. Islamic missionary activity also remained extremely vigorous and continued to win converts, especially in sub-Saharan Africa.

Searching for Mystical Experience

Alongside continuing secular ideologies and a revival of the world's great religions, the third powerful current of intellectual attraction was an enormous variety of religious sects, cults, and spiritual yearnings. Some of these new outpourings welled up within one or another of the great religions; many more did not. Though widely divergent, these movements seemed to share a common urge toward nonrational experiences such as meditation, spiritual mysteries, and direct communication with supernatural forces.

Not that this was new. So-called primitive peoples have always embraced myths, visions, and continuous revelation. So too have the world's main religions, especially those of the ancient East—Taoism, Hinduism, and the Zen form of Buddhism. What was new was the receptiveness of many people in the rationalistic, scientific, industrialized countries (and the well-educated elite in the developing world) to ancient modes of mystical experience. Some of this interest stemmed from the doubt about the power of the rational human mind that blossomed after the First World War. By the 1960s it had struck deep chords in the mass culture of Europe and North America, and it remained strong thereafter.

In this sense the late twentieth century is reminiscent of the initial encounter of West and East in the Hellenistic Age. Then, the rationalistic, humanistic Greeks encountered the Eastern mystery religions and were profoundly influenced by them. Now, various strains of mystical thought were again appearing from the East and from "primitive" peoples. It can be said that the non-Western world was providing intellectual repayment for the secular ideologies that it borrowed in the nineteenth century.

Reflecting on this ongoing encounter, the American social scientist Robert Heilbroner was not alone in suggesting startling implications for the future:

A Buddhist Temple in France   Buddhism, with its stress on right living and contemplation, strikes a responsive chord for some in the West. This replica of a Buddhist temple has been erected in Autun, a small French town known for its exquisite medieval cathedral. Perhaps the harmonious coexistence of Catholic cathedral and Buddhist temple at Autun testifies to the promise of planetary encounters. *(Manaud/Figaro/Liaison)*

It is therefore possible that a post-industrial society would also turn in the direction of many preindustrial societies— toward the exploration of inner states of experience rather than the outer world of fact and material accomplishment. Tradition and ritual, the pillars of life in virtually all societies other than those of an industrial character, would probably once again assert their ancient claims as the guide to and solace for life.[9]

Some observers saw the onrush of science and technology as actually reinforcing the search for spiritual experience. Electronic communications and the Internet were demolishing time and distance; information itself was becoming the new global environment. According to the philosopher William Thompson:

Culture is full of many surprises, because culture is full of the play of opposites. And so there will be scientists and mystics in the New Age. . . . To look at the American counterculture today, one would guess . . . that the East was about to engulf the West. But in fact . . . America is swallowing up and absorbing the traditional Eastern techniques of transformation, because only these are strong enough to humanize its technology. In the days before planetization, when civilization was split between East and West, there were basically two cultural directions. The Westerner went outward to level forests, conquer nations, and walk on the moon; the Easterner went inward and away from the physical into the astral and causal planes. Now . . . we can glimpse the beginnings of a new level of religious experience, neither Eastern nor Western, but planetary.[10]

Many people may have doubts about the significance of such views. But it seems quite possible that the upsurge of mysticism and religious searching will exert a

growing influence in the coming era, especially if political conflict and economic difficulties continue to undermine the old secular faith in endless progress.

SUMMARY

Whatever does or does not happen, the study of world history puts the future in perspective. Future developments on this small planet will surely build on the many-layered foundations hammered out in the past. Moreover, the study of world history, of mighty struggles and fearsome challenges, of shining achievements and tragic failures, imparts a strong sense of life's essence: the process of change over time. Again and again we have seen how peoples and societies evolve, influenced by ideas, human passions, and material conditions. Armed with the ability to think historically, students of history are prepared to comprehend this inexorable process of change in their own lifetimes, as the world races forward toward an uncertain destiny.

NOTES

1. A. Toynbee, *Mankind and Mother Earth* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), pp. 576–577.
2. D. Calleo and B. Rowland, *America and the World Political Economy* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973), p. 191.
3. B. Barber, *Jihad vs. McWorld* (New York: Times Books, 1995), p. 9.
4. W. Epstein, *The Last Chance: Nuclear Proliferation and Arms Control* (New York: Free Press, 1976), p. 274.
5. *Economist*, January 6, 1998, p. 17.
6. M. ul Haq, *The Poverty Curtain: Choices for the Third World* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), p. 152.
7. E. Hermassi, *The Third World Reassessed* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), p. 76.
8. M. Djilas, *The New Class* (New York: Praeger, 1957), pp. 41–42, 44.
9. R. L. Heilbroner, *An Inquiry into the Human Prospect* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1974), p. 140.
10. W. I. Thompson, *Evil and World Order* (New York: Harper & Row, 1980), p. 53.

SUGGESTED READING

Many of the books cited in the Suggested Reading for Chapters 34 and 35 pertain to the themes of this chapter.

Three helpful and stimulating studies on global politics from different perspectives are M. Juergensmeyer, *The New Cold War? Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State* (1993); R. Barnet, *The Lean Years: The Politics of the Age of Scarcity* (1980); and Barber's work, cited in the Notes. Two wide-ranging appraisals of current trends are found in Z. Brzezinski, *Out of Control: Global Turmoil on the Eve of the 21st Century* (1993), and D. Snow, *The Shape of the Future: The Post–Cold War World* (1991).

An excellent introduction to early negotiations for the international control of nuclear arms is W. Epstein, *The Last Chance: Nuclear Proliferation and Arms Control* (1976). L. Freedman, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy* (1982), is a history of American thinking about nuclear weapons and nuclear war. M. Reiss and R. Litwak, eds., *Nuclear Proliferation After the Cold War* (1994), is a stimulating work.

M. ul Haq's book, cited in the Notes, is an excellent presentation of Third World demands for a new economic order. This position is expanded in J. Tinbergen and A. J. Dolman, eds., *North-South: A Program for Survival* (1980), a report calling for increased help for the South. Such views do not go unchallenged, and P. T. Bauer, *Equality, the Third World, and Economic Delusion* (1981), is a vigorous defense of the industrialized nations and their wealth. J. K. Galbraith, the witty economist and former U.S. ambassador to India, argues simply and effectively in *The Voice of the Poor* (1983) that poor countries have important lessons to teach rich countries.

Common problems and aspirations are the focus of E. Laszlo et al., *Goals for Mankind* (1977). *World Development Report,* which the World Bank publishes annually, is an outstanding source of information about current trends. Valuable studies on multinational corporations and global indebtedness include L. Solomon, *Multinational Corporations and the Emerging World Order* (1978), and A. Sampson, *The Money Lenders: The People and Politics of the World Banking Crisis* (1983). Famines, AIDS, and global migration are examined perceptively in A. de Waal, *Famine Crises: Politics and the Disaster Relief Industry in Africa* (1997); W. Rushing, *The AIDS Epidemic: Social Implications of an Infectious Disease* (1995); and S. Castles and M. Miller, *International Population Movements in the Modern World* (1993).

Contemporary thought is so rich and diverse that any selection must be highly arbitrary. G. Blainey, *The Great Seesaw: A New View of the Western World, 1750–2000* (1988), uncovers a cyclical pattern of optimism and pessimism and is recommended as an introduction to the history of ideas. D. H. Meadows and D. L. Meadows, *The Limits of Growth* (1974), argues that the world will soon exhaust its natural resources. E. F. Schumacher, *Small Is Beautiful: Economics as If People Mattered* (1973), advocates conservation and a scaling down of technology to avoid disaster. R. M. Pirsig, *Zen and the Art of Motorcycle*

Maintenance: An Inquiry into Values (1976), is a stimulating exploration of the tie between modern technology and personal development.

E. Rice, *Wars of the Third Kind: Conflict in Underdeveloped Countries* (1988), is a thoughtful inquiry into the dynamics of guerrilla movements. T. R. Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (1970), skillfully reworks the idea that revolutions occur when rising expectations are frustrated. M. Djilas, in the work cited in the Notes, criticizes the ruling communist bureaucracies from a Marxist point of view. J. Revel, *The Totalitarian Temptation* (1977), claims that many Western intellectuals have been seduced into seeing communist dictatorships as progressive socialist societies. E. Egan, *Such a Vision of the Street: Mother Teresa—The Spirit and the Work* (1985), is highly recommended.

The Islamic revival may be approached through the sympathetic work of E. Gellner, *Muslim Society* (1981); the reservations of V. S. Naipaul, *Among the Believers: An Islamic Journey* (1981); and J. Stempel, *Inside the Iranian Revolution* (1981). Muslim writers address issues in the Islamic world in J. Donohue and J. Esposito, eds., *Islam in Transition: Muslim Perspectives* (1982).

Studies of the future are so numerous that M. Marien, *Societal Directions and Alternatives: A Critical Guide to the Literature* (1977), is a useful aid with its annotated bibliography. P. Kennedy, *Preparing for the Twenty-First Century* (1993), is the work of a well-known historian. Also recommended is J. Lukacs, *The End of the Twentieth Century and the End of the Modern Age* (1993).

LISTENING TO THE
PAST

One World and a Plan for Survival

In the 1970s Third World countries of the South called on the industrialized countries of the North to join with them in establishing a "new international order." Using the United Nations General Assembly as a platform, Third World countries argued that the world economy worked to their disadvantage and that the ominous gap between the wealthy North and the poor South was widening.

Third World countries found only limited support from politicians and voters in the North, which was wracked by a deep recession caused in part by an explosion in oil prices. Yet the South did find some sympathy in the North, especially among journalists, professors, and moderate western European socialists.

An outstanding example of such support came from the Brandt Commission, an independent, self-appointed international study group chaired by Willy Brandt, the former chancellor of West Germany, a moderate socialist and a renowned world leader. Brandt's blue-ribbon commission presented its findings and proposals in 1980 as North-South Relations: A Program for Survival. *The following selection is taken from this influential and widely publicized call to action.*

The crisis through which international relations and the world economy are now passing presents great dangers, and they appear to be growing more serious. We believe that the gap which separates rich and poor countries—a gap so wide that at the extremes people seem to live in different worlds— has not been sufficiently recognized as a major factor in this crisis. It is a great contradiction of our age that these disparities exist—and are in some respects widening—just when human society is beginning to have a clearer perception of how it is interrelated and of how North and South depend on each other in a single world economy. . . .

The nations of the South see themselves as sharing a common predicament. Their solidarity in global negotiations stems from the awareness of being dependent on the North, and unequal to it; and a great many of them are bound together by their common colonial experience. The North including Eastern Europe has a quarter of the world's population and four-fifths of its income; the South including China has three billion people—three-quarters of the world's population but living on one-fifth of the world's income. . . .

Behind these differences lies the fundamental inequality of economic strength. . . . Because of this economic power northern countries dominate the international economic system—its rules and regulations, and international institutions of trade, money and finance. Some developing nations have swum against this tide . . . but most of them find the currents too strong for them. In the world as in nations, economic forces left entirely to themselves tend to produce growing inequality. Within nations public policy has to protect the weaker partners. The time has come to apply this precept to relations between nations within the world community. . . .

The North-South debate is often described as if the rich were being asked to make sacrifices in response to the demands of the poor. We reject this view. The world is now a fragile and interlocking system, whether for its people, its ecology or its resources. Many individual societies have settled their inner conflicts by accommodation, to protect the weak and to promote principles of justice, becoming stronger as a result. The world too can become stronger by becoming a just and humane society. If it fails in this, it will move towards its own destruction. . . .

[In conclusion] mankind already faces basic problems which cannot be solved purely at the national or even regional levels, such as security, protection of the environment, energy, and the control of space and ocean resources. The international community has begun to tackle these problems, though inadequately.

At the beginning of the 1980s the world com-

munity faces much greater dangers than at any time since the Second World War. It is clear that the world economy is now functioning so badly that it damages both the immediate and the longer-run interests of all nations. . . . A new international order will take time to achieve. . . . But the present world crisis is so acute that we also feel compelled to draw up an emergency program . . . [and lay out the] tasks for the 80s and 90s. . . .

Priority must be given to the needs of the poorest countries and regions. We call for a major initiative in favor of the poverty belts of Africa and Asia. We recognize that the removal of poverty requires both substantial resource transfers from the developed countries and an increased determination of the developing countries to improve economic management and deal with social and economic inequalities.

The world must aim to abolish hunger and malnutrition by the end of the century through the elimination of absolute poverty. Greater food production, intensified agricultural development, and measures for international food security are essential. These too require both major additional external assistance and revised priorities in many developing countries. . . .

The North should reverse the present trend towards protecting its industries against competition from the Third World. . . .

The objectives we have defined . . . will call for a transfer of funds [from North to South] on a very considerable scale . . . [and] will require sums equal to more than a doubling of the current $20 billion of annual official development assistance, together with substantial additional lending on market terms. . . . The large-scale transfer of resources we call for should be organized in partnership between developed and developing countries. . . .

The global agreement we envisage, with the understanding that must lie behind it, will call for a joint effort of political will and a high degree of trust between the partners, with a common conviction in their mutual interest. . . . [And indeed] whatever their differences and however profound, there is a mutuality of interest between North and South. The fate of both is intimately connected. The search for solutions is not an act of benevolence but a condition of mutual survival. We be-

Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, 1992.
(Claus Meyer/Black Star)

lieve it is dramatically urgent today to start taking concrete steps, without which the world situation can only deteriorate still further, even leading to conflict and catastrophe.

Questions for Analysis

1. Why do the nations of the South "see themselves as sharing a common predicament"?

2. Why, according to the Brandt Commission, should the North aid the South?

3. What does the Brandt Commission propose? What are the most urgent priorities?

4. "Resolved: the North must help the South to avoid conflict and global catastrophe." What are the arguments for and against this proposition? Take sides, and debate this proposition.

5. Do you think the members of this commission would support steps toward world government? Why or why not?

Source: Independent Commission on International Development Issues [Brandt Commission], *North-South Relations: A Program for Survival* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1980), pp. 30–33, 267, 270–273, 280–282

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A History of World Societies: A Brief Overview

Period (CA 10,000–CA 400 B.C.)	Africa and the Middle East	The Americas
10,000 B.C.	New Stone Age culture, ca 10,000–3500	Migration into Americas begins, ca 20,000
5000 B.C.	Farming begins in Tigris-Euphrates and Nile River Valleys, ca 6000 First writing in Sumeria; city-states emerge, ca 3500 Unification of Egypt, 3100–2660	Maize domesticated in Mexico, ca 5000
2500 B.C.	Egypt's Old Kingdom, 2660–2180 Akkadian empire, ca 2331–2200 Egypt's Middle Kingdom, 2080–1640 Hyksos "invade" Egypt, 1640–1570 Hammurabi, 1792–1750 Hebrew monotheism, ca 1700	First pottery in Americas, Ecuador, ca 3000 First metalworking in Peru, ca 2000
1500 B.C.	Egypt's New Kingdom; Egyptian empire, ca 1570–1075 Hittite Empire, ca 1475–1200 Akhenaten institutes worship of Aton, ca 1360 Moses leads Hebrews out of Egypt, ca 1300–1200 Political fragmentation of Egypt; rise of small kingdoms, ca 1100–700 United Hebrew kingdom, 1020–922	Olmec civilization, Mexico, ca 1500 B.C.–A.D. 300
1000 B.C.	Ironworking spreads throughout Africa, ca 1000 B.C.–A.D. 300 Assyrian Empire, 900–612 Zoroaster, ca 600 Babylonian captivity of Hebrews, 586–539 Cyrus the Great founds Persian Empire, 550 Persians conquer Egypt, 525 Darius and Xerxes complete Persian conquest of Middle East, 521–464	Chavin civilization in Andes, ca 1000–200 B.C. Olmec center at San Lorenzo destroyed, ca 900; power passes to La Venta
500 B.C.		
400 B.C.	Alexander the Great extends empire, 334–331 Death of Alexander (323): Ptolemy conquers Egypt, Seleucus rules Asia	

East Asia	India and Southeast Asia	Europe
Farming begins in Yellow River Valley, ca 4000	Indus River Valley civilization, ca 2800–1800; capitals at Mohenjo-daro and Harappa	
Horse domesticated in China, ca 2500		Greek Bronze Age, 2000–1100 Arrival of Greeks in peninsular Greece Height of Minoan culture, 1700–1450
Shang Dynasty, first writing in China, ca 1500–ca 1050	Aryans arrive in India; Early Vedic Age, ca 1500–1000 Vedas, oldest Hindu sacred texts	Mycenaeans conquer Minoan Crete, ca 1450 Mycenaean Age, 1450–1200 Trojan War, ca 1180 Greek Dark Age, ca 1100–800
Zhou Dynasty, promulgation of the Mandate of Heaven, ca 1027–256 Confucius, 551–479 First written reference to iron, ca 521	Later Vedic Age, solidification of caste system, ca 1000–500 Upanishads; foundation of Hinduism, 700–500 Persians conquer parts of India, 513 Maharira, founder of Jainism, 540–486 Siddhartha Gautama (Buddha), 528–461	Greek Lyric Age; rise of Sparta and Athens, 800–500 Origin of Greek polis, ca 700 Roman Republic founded, 509
		Persian Wars, 499–479 Athenian Empire; flowering of art and philosophy, 5th century Peloponnesian War, 431–404
Warring States Period in China, 403–221 Zhuangzi and development of Daoism, 369–268	Alexander invades India, 327–326 Chandragupta founds Mauryan Dynasty, 322–ca 185	Plato, 426–347 Roman expansion, 390–146 Conquests of Alexander the Great, 334–323

Period (CA 300 B.C.–A.D. 700)	Africa and the Middle East	The Americas
300 B.C.	Arsaces of Parthia begins conquest of Persia, ca 250–137 Scipio Africanus defeats Hannibal at Zama, 202	Fall of La Venta, 300; Tres Zapotes becomes leading Olmec site
200 B.C.		Andean peoples intensify agriculture, ca 200
100 B.C.	Meroë becomes iron-smelting center, 1st century B.C. Dead Sea Scrolls Pompey conquers Syria and Palestine, 63	
A.D. 100	Jesus Christ, ca 4 B.C.–A.D. 30 Bantu migrations begin Jews revolt; Romans destroy temple in Jerusalem: end of Hebrew state, 70	Moche civilization flourishes in Peru, ca 100–800
A.D. 200	Camel first used for trans-Saharan transport, ca 200 Expansion of Bantu peoples, ca 200–900 Axum (Ethiopia) controls Red Sea trade, ca 250	
A.D. 300	Axum accepts Christianity, ca 4th century	Maya civilization in Central America, ca 300–1500 Classic period of Teotihuacán civilization in Mexico, ca 300–900
A.D. 500	Political and commercial ascendancy of Axum, ca 6th–7th centuries Muhammad, 570–632; the *hijra,* 622 African Mediterranean slave trade, ca 600–1500 Umayyad Dynasty, 661–750; continued expansion of Islam	Mayan civilization reaches peak, ca 600–900 Tiahuanaco civilization in South America, ca 600–1000
A.D. 700	Berbers control trans-Saharan trade, ca 700–900 Abbasid Dynasty, 750–1258; Islamic capital moved to Baghdad Decline of Ethiopia, ca 9th century Golden age of Muslim learning, ca 900–1100 Kingdom of Ghana, ca 900–1100	Teotihuacán, Monte Alban destroyed, ca 700 "Time of Troubles" in Mesoamerica, 800–1000 Toltec hegemony, ca 980–1000

East Asia	India and Southeast Asia	Europe
Development of Legalism, ca 250–208	Ashoka, 269–232	Punic Wars, destruction of Carthage, 264–146
Qin Dynasty unifies China; Great Wall begun, Confucian literature destroyed, 221–210		
Han Dynasty, 206 B.C.–A.D. 220		
	Greeks invade India, ca 183–145	Late Roman Republic, 133–27
	Mithridates creates Parthian empire, ca 171–131	
China expands, ca 111	First Chinese ambassadors to India and Parthia, ca 140	Julius Caesar killed, 44
Silk Road opens to Parthia, Rome; Buddhism enters China, ca 104	Bhagavad Gita, ca 100 B.C.–A.D. 100	Octavian seizes power, rules imperial Rome as Augustus, 27 B.C.–A.D. 14
First written reference (Chinese) to Japan, A.D. 45	Shakas and Kushans invade eastern Parthia and India, 1st century A.D.	
Chinese invent paper, 105	Kushan rule in northwestern India, 2d–3d century	Roman Empire at greatest extent, 117
Emperor Wu, 140–186	Roman attacks on Parthian empire, 115–211	Breakdown of pax Romana, ca 180–284
Creation of Yamato state in Japan, ca 3d century	Fall of the Parthian empire, rise of the Sassanids, ca 225	Reforms by Diocletian, 284–305
Buddhism gains popularity in China and Japan, ca 220–590		
Fall of Han Dynasty, 220; Period of Division, 220–589		
Three Kingdoms Period in Korea, 313–668	Chandragupta I founds Gupta Dynasty in India, ca 320–480	Constantine, 306–337; Edict of Milan, 313; founding of Constantinople, 324; Council of Nicaea, 325
China divides into northern, southern regimes, 316	Gupta expansion, trade with Middle East and China, ca 400	Theodosius recognizes Christianity as official state religion, 380
	Huns invade India, ca 450	Germanic raids of western Europe, 400s
		Clovis rules Gauls, 481–511
Sui Dynasty restores order in China, 581–618	Sanskrit drama, ca 600–1000	Saint Benedict publishes his *Rule*, 529
Shotoku's "Constitution" in Japan, 604	Muslim invasions of India, ca 636–1206	Code of Justinian, 529
Tang Dynasty, 618–907; cultural flowering		Synod of Whitby, 664
Korea unified, 668		
Taika Reforms in Japan, 646	Islam reaches India, 713	Charles Martel defeats Muslims at Tours, 733
Nara era, creation of Japan's first capital, 710–794	Khmer Empire (Kampuchea) founded, 802	Charlemagne rules, 768–814
Heian era in Japan, 794–1185; literary flowering		Viking, Magyar invasions, 845–900
Era of the Five Dynasties in China, 907–960		Treaty of Verdun divides Carolingian Empire, 843
Song Dynasty, 960–1279		Cluny monastery founded, 910

Period (CA 1000–1600)	Africa and the Middle East	The Americas
1000	Seljuk Turks take Baghdad, 1055 Islam penetrates sub-Saharan Africa, ca 11th century Great Zimbabwe built, flourishes, ca 1100–1400 Kingdom of Benin, ca 1100–1897	Inca civilization in South America, ca 1000–1500 Toltec state collapses, 1174
1200	Kingdom of Mali, ca 1200–1450 Mongol invasion of Middle East, ca 1220 Mongols conquer Baghdad, 1258; fall of Abbasid Dynasty	Manco Capac, first Inca king, ca 1200
1300	Rise of Yoruba states, West Africa, ca 1300 Height of Swahili (East African) city-states, ca 1300–1500 Mansa Musa rules Mali, 1312–1337 Ottomans invade Europe, 1356	Aztecs arrive in Valley of Mexica, found Tenochtitlán (Mexico City), ca 1325
1400	Arrival of Portuguese in Benin, ca 1440 Songhay Empire, ca 1450–1591 Atlantic slave trade, ca 1450–1850 Ottoman Empire, 1453–1918 Da Gama reaches East Africa, 1498	Height of Inca Empire, 1438–1493 Reign of Montezuma I, 1440–1468; height of Aztec culture Columbus reaches Americas, 1492
1500	Portugal dominates East Africa, ca 1500–1650 Safavid Empire in Persia, 1501–1722; height of power under Shah Abbas, 1587–1629 Peak of Ottoman power under Suleiman, 1520–1566 Height of Kanem-Bornu, 1571–1603 Battle of Lepanto, 1571, signals Ottoman naval weakness in the eastern Mediterranean	Mesoamerican and South American holocaust, ca 1500–1600 First African slaves brought to Americas, ca 1510 Cortés arrives in Mexico, 1519; Aztec Empire falls, 1521 Pizarro reaches Peru, conquers Incas, 1531
1600	Dutch West India Co. supplants Portuguese in West Africa, ca 1630 Dutch settle Cape Town, 1651	British settle Jamestown, 1607 Champlain founds Quebec, 1608 Dutch found New Amsterdam, 1624 Black slave labor allows tenfold increase in production of Carolinian rice and Virginian tobacco, ca 1730–1760

East Asia	India and Southeast Asia	Europe
China divided into Song, Jin empires, 1127 Kamakura Shogunate, 1185–1333	Vietnam gains independence from China, ca 1000 Construction of Angkor Wat, ca 1100–1150 Muslim conquerors end Buddhism in India, 1192	Yaroslav the Wise, 1019–1054, peak of Kievan Russia Latin, Greek churches split, 1054 Norman Conquest of England, 1066 Investiture struggle, 1073–1122 Crusades, 1096–1270 Growth of trade and towns, ca 1100–1400 Barbarossa invades Italy, 1154–1158
Mongol conquest of China begins, 1215 Yuan (Mongol) Dynasty, 1271–1368 Unsuccessful Mongol invasions of Japan, 1274, 1281 Marco Polo arrives at Kublai Khan's court, ca 1275	Peak of Khmer Empire in Southeast Asia, ca 1200 Turkish sultanate at Delhi, 1206–1526; Indian culture divided into Hindu and Muslim	Magna Carta, 1215 Aquinas, *Summa Theologica,* 1253 Nevsky recognizes Mongol overlordship of Moscow, 1252
Ashikaga Shogunate, 1336–1408 Hung Wu defeats Mongols, 1368; founds Ming Dynasty, 1368–1644	Tamerlame conquers the Punjab, 1398	Babylonian Captivity of papacy, 1307–1377 Tver revolt in Russia, 1327–1328 Hundred Years' War, 1337–1453 Bubonic plague, 1347–1700 Beginnings of representative government, ca 1350–1500
Ming policy encourages foreign trade, ca 15th century Ming maritime expeditions to India, Middle East, Africa, 1405–1433	Sultan Mehmed II, 1451–1481 Da Gama reaches India, 1498	Italian Renaissance, ca 1400–1530 Voyagers of discovery, ca 1450–1600 Ottomans capture Constantinople, 1453; end of Byzantine Empire War of the Roses in England, 1453–1471 Unification of Spain completed, 1492
Portuguese trade monopoly in East Asia, ca 16th century Christian missionaries active in China and Japan, ca 1550–1650 Unification of Japan, 1568–1600	Barbur defeats Delhi sultanate, 1526–1527; founds Mughal Empire Akbar expands Mughal Empire, 1556–1605 Spanish conquer the Philippines, 1571	Luther's Ninety-five Theses, 1517 Charles V elected Holy Roman emperor, 1519 English Reformation begins, 1532 Council of Trent, 1545–1563 Dutch declare independence, 1581 Spanish Armada, 1588
Tokugawa Shogunate, 1600–1867 Japan expels all Europeans, 1637 Manchus establish Qing Dynasty, 1644–1911 Height of Qing Dynasty under K'ang-hsi, 1662–1722	Height of Mughal Empire under Shah Jahan, 1628–1658 British found Calcutta, 1690	Romanov Dynasty in Russia, 1613 Thirty Years' War, 1618–1648 English Civil War, 1642–1649 Louis XIV, king of France, 1643–1715 Growth of absolutism in central and eastern Europe, ca 1680–1790 The Enlightenment, ca 1680–1800 Ottomans besiege Vienna, 1683 Revocation of Edict of Nantes, 1685 Glorious Revolution in England, 1688

Period (CA 1700–1940)	Africa and the Middle East	The Americas
1700	Rise of Ashanti Empire, ca 1700	Silver production quadruples in Mexico and Peru, ca 1700–1800
	Decline of Safavid Empire under Nadir Shah, 1737–1747	Spain's defeat in War of the Spanish Succession results in colonial dependence on Spanish goods, 1700s
1750	Selim III introduces administrative and military reforms, 1761–1808	"French and Indian Wars," 1756–1763
	British seize Cape Town, 1795	Quebec Act, 1774
	Napoleon's campaign in Egypt, 1798	American Revolution, 1775–1783
		Comunero revolution, New Granada, 1781
1800	Muhammad Ali founds dynasty in Egypt, 1805–1848	Latin American wars of independence, 1806–1825
	Slavery abolished in British Empire, 1807	Brazil wins independence, 1822
	Peak year of African transatlantic slave trade, 1820	Monroe Doctrine, 1823
		Political instability in most Latin American countries, 1825–1870
		U.S.-Mexican War, 1846–1848
1850	Crimean War, 1853–1856	American Civil War, 1861–1865
	Suez Canal opens, 1869	British North America Act, 1867, for Canada
	European "scramble for Africa," 1880–1900	Diaz controls Mexico, 1876–1911
	Battle of Omdurman, 1898	United States practices "dollar diplomacy" in Latin America, 1890–1920s
	Boer War, 1899–1902	Spanish-American War, 1898
1900	Union of South Africa formed, 1910	Massive immigration from Europe and Asia to the Americas, 1880–1914
	French annex Morocco, 1912	Mexican Revolution, 1910
	Ottoman Empire dissolved, 1919; Kemal's nationalist struggle in Turkey	Panama Canal opens, 1914
		Mexico adopts constitution, 1917
1920	Cultural nationalism in Africa, 1920s	U.S. "consumer revolution," 1920s
	Turkish Republic recognized, 1923	Stock market crash in United States; Great Depression begins, 1929
	Reza Shah leads Iran, 1925–1941	
1930	African farmers organize first "cocoa holdups," 1930–1931	Revolutions in six South American countries, 1930
	Iraq gains independence, 1932	New Deal begins in United States, 1933
1940	Arabs and Jews at war in Palestine; Israel created, 1948	Surprise attack by Japan on Pearl Harbor, 1941
	Apartheid system in South Africa, 1948–1991	United Nations established, 1945
		Perón rules Argentina, 1946–1953

East Asia	India and Southeast Asia	Europe
Height of Edo urban culture in Japan, ca 1700 Height of Qing Dynasty under Emperor Ch'ien-lung, 1736–1799	Decline of Mughal Empire, ca 1700–1800 Persian invaders loot Delhi, 1739 French and British fight for control of India, 1740–1763	War of Spanish Succession, 1701–1713 Treaty of Utrecht, 1713 Cabinet system develops in England, 1714–1742
Maximum extent of Qing Empire, 1759	Treaty of Paris gives French colonies in India to Britain, 1763 Cook in Australia, 1768–1771; first British prisoners to Australia, 1788 East India Act, 1784	Watt produces first steam engine, 1769 Outbreak of French Revolution, 1789 National Convention declares France a republic, 1792
Anglo-Chinese Opium War, 1839–1842 Treaty of Nanjing, 1842: Manchus surrender Hong Kong to British	British found Singapore, 1819 Java War, 1825–1830 British defeat last independent native state in India, 1848	Napoleonic Empire, 1804–1814 Congress of Vienna, 1814–1815 European economic penetration of non-Western countries, ca 1816–1880 Greece wins independence, 1830 Revolution of 1848
Taiping Rebellion, 1850–1864 Perry's arrival opens Japan to United States and Europe, 1853 Meiji Restoration in Japan, 1867 Adoption of constitution in Japan, 1890 Sino-Japanese War, 1894–1895 "Hundred Days of Reform" in China, 1898	Great Rebellion in India, 1857–1858 French seize Saigon, 1859 Indian National Congress formed, 1885 French acquire Indochina, 1893 United States gains Philippines, 1898	Second Empire and Third Republic in France, 1852–1914 Unification of Italy, 1859–1870 Bismarck controls Germany, 1862–1890 Franco-Prussian War, 1870–1871; foundation of the German Empire Reform Bill, Great Britain, 1867 Second Socialist International, 1889–1914
Boxer Rebellion in China, 1900–1903 Russo-Japanese War, 1904–1905 Chinese revolution; fall of Qing Dynasty, 1911 Chinese Republic, 1912–1949	Commonwealth of Australia, 1900 Muslim League formed, 1906 First calls for Indian independence, 1907 Amritsar massacre in India, 1919 Intensification of Indian nationalism, 1919–1947	Revolution in Russia; Tsar Nicholas II issues October Manifesto, 1905 Triple Entente (Britain, Russia, France), 1914–1918 World War I, 1914–1918 Treaty of Versailles, 1919
Kita Ikki advocates ultranationalism in Japan, 1923 Jiang Jieshi unites China, 1928	Gandhi launches nonviolent resistance campaign, 1920	Mussolini seizes power in Italy, 1922 Stalin takes power in U.S.S.R., 1927 Depths of Great Depression, 1929–1933
Japan invades China, 1931 Mao Zedong's Long March, 1934 Sino-Japanese War, 1937–1945	Gandhi's Salt March, 1930 Japan conquers Southeast Asia, 1939–1942	Hitler gains power, 1933 Civil War in Spain, 1936–1939 World War II, 1939–1945
United States drops atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 1945 Chinese civil war, 1945–1949; Communists win	Philippines gain independence, 1946 India (Hindu) and Pakistan (Muslim) gain independence, 1947	Marshall Plan, 1947 NATO formed, 1949 Soviet Union and Red China sign 30-year alliance, 1949

Period (CA 1950–1990)	Africa and the Middle East	The Americas
1950	Egypt declared a republic; Nasser named premier, 1954 Morocco, Tunisia, Sudan, and Ghana gain independence, 1956–1957 French-British Suez invasion, 1956	Castro takes power in Cuba, 1959
1960	Mali, Nigeria, and the Congo gain independence, 1960 Biafra declares independence from Nigeria, 1967 Arab-Israeli Six-Day War, 1967	Cuban missile crisis, 1962 Military dictatorship in Brazil, 1964–1985 United States escalates war in Vietnam, 1964
1970	"Yom Kippur War," 1973 Islamic revolution in Iran, 1979 Camp David Accords, 1979	Military coup in Chile, 1973 U.S. Watergate scandal, 1974 Revolutions in Nicaragua and El Salvador, 1979
1980	Iran-Iraq War, 1980–1988 Reforms in South Africa, 1989 to present	U.S. military buildup, 1980–1988 Argentina restores civilian rule, 1983
1990	Growth of Islamic fundamentalism, 1990 to present Iraq driven from Kuwait by United States and allies, 1991 Israel and Palestinians sign peace agreement, 1993 Nelson Mandela elected president of South Africa, 1994	Canada, Mexico, and United States form free-trade area (NAFTA), 1994 Haiti establishes democratic government, 1994 Permanent extension of Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1995

East Asia	India and Southeast Asia	Europe
Korean War, 1950–1953 Japan begins long period of rapid economic growth, 1950 Mao Zedong announces Great Leap Forward, 1958	Vietnamese nationalists defeat French; Vietnam divided, 1954 Islamic Republic of Pakistan declared, 1956	Death of Stalin, 1953 Warsaw Pact, 1955 Revolution in Hungary, 1956 Common Market formed, 1957
Sino-Soviet split becomes apparent, 1960 Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in China, 1965–1969	Indira Gandhi prime minister of India, 1966–1977, 1980–1984	Student revolution in France, 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, 1968
China pursues modernization, 1976 to present	India-Pakistan war, 1971 Communist victory in Vietnam War, 1975 Chinese invade Vietnam, 1979	Brandt's Ostpolitik, 1969–1973 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, 1979
Japanese foreign investment surge, 1980–1992 China crushes democracy movement, 1989	Sikh nationalism in India, 1984 to present Corazón Aquino takes power in Philippines, 1986	Soviet reform under Gorbachev, 1985–1991 Communism falls in eastern Europe, 1989–1990
Birthrates keep falling Economic growth and political repression in China, 1990 to present	Vietnam embraces foreign investment, 1990 to present U.S. military bases closed in Philippines, 1991	Maastricht treaty proposes monetary union, 1990 Conservative economic policies, 1990s End of Soviet Union, 1991 Civil war in Bosnia, 1991 to present

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
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